In the English-speaking world Viacheslav Ivanov is best known as the author of *Freedom and the Tragic Life: A Study in Dostoevsky*, first published in 1952 by Harvill Press in London and Noonday Press in New York, and republished and anthologized many times since. However the book has rarely if ever been acknowledged as a source for the development of Ivanov’s own thought. Not only did it appear three years after Ivanov’s death in 1949, at the age of 83, but it was also presented as a posthumous re-translation of the Alexander Kresling’s German translation of Ivanov’s original Russian text.

There exists ample evidence, however, that Ivanov not only took an active role in arranging and negotiating the English-language edition, but even reviewed Norman Cameron’s translation, making corrections and changing the wording, to the degree that the English translation should be considered authorized. Since Ivanov’s original Russian text has been lost, this means that *Freedom and the Tragic Life* must be treated alongside *Dostojewskij: Tragödie – Mythos – Mystik* (1932) as a primary source for future editions of Ivanov’s book on Dostoevsky in whatever language. The only other English-language text with similar authority in Ivanov’s canon is a brief 1912 essay published in *The Russian Review* from Ivanov’s unknown Russian text.1

The history of *Freedom and the Tragic Life* is amply documented in Ivanov’s correspondence with the directors of Harvill Press, Manya Harari and Marjorie Villiers (who combined their surnames to produce the company’s name), and with the academics who mediated between Ivanov and Harvill: Isaiah Berlin, C. M. Bowra, who contributed a brief foreword, and, especially, Sergei Konovalov, who is credited as the editor of Norman Cameron’s translation. Most importantly, the Viacheslav Ivanov Research Center (VIRC) in Rome also holds ten pages of Cameron’s English translation with Ivanov’s notations, including the text of Ivanov’s introduction, which failed to make it

into the Harvill edition and is published here for the first time. Future editions of Freedom and Tragic Life should be sure to include this prefatory text.

The idea of publishing Ivanov’s book on Dostoevsky in English originated after the war with Sergei Konovalov, who had just moved from the University of Birmingham to the University of Oxford. Arriving at his new post with ambitious publishing plans, Konovalov first wrote to Ivanov in 1945 proposing to help publish some of Ivanov’s major works. The Dostoevsky book proved the most popular choice, and by 1946 Konovalov had reached a preliminary agreement with Harvill, which had just commenced operations and had an interest in translations of contemporary European philosophy. Responding to the news, Ivanov wrote to Konovalov in July 1946 (I cite the first, rough draft of his letter, which conveys Ivanov’s pleasant surprise more directly than the typescript):

So, my essay about Dostoevsky will be translated and published? This is a great joy for me! After your news I can be confident about the translation’s style. But will the responsible and fine shades of my thought be conveyed with full accuracy? I can’t be absolutely sure about this. Therefore I must review the translation in its final proofs in order to remark on any noted incongruities in the margins, in case of any serious misunderstanding.²

Fearing that the book might prove a bit short for an English publisher, Ivanov also suggested to Konovalov adding his two recent essays on Pushkin, and using for prefatory material some of the essays from the issue of the journal Convegno dedicated in full to Ivanov’s work, particularly those by Gabriel Marcel, Olga Deschartes (the pseudonym of his long-time companion and secretary Ol’ga Shor), E. R. Curtius, Fedor Stepun or Faddei Zelinskii.³

By September 1946 Ivanov was in direct correspondence with Manya Harari (and later, to a lesser extent, also with Marjorie Villiers). On 18 October 1946 Ivanov agreed to Harvill’s terms: “selling the rights for the first edition for the lump sum of £125, half of which would be paid on the signing of the contract and the other half on the publication of the book; royalties on the basis of 12½% of the asking price would be provided for subsequent editions”.⁴ A contract was issued in 1946 and finalized in January 1947; however after a change in British tax law a new contract was issued in June 1948.

⁴ VIRC op. 5 k. 17 p. 26 pg. 06.
An American printing was originally mooted with Harvard University Press, but in the event it was taken on by Noonday Press.\(^5\)

Konovalov in turn put Ivanov in touch with C.M. Bowra in the hope that his new Oxford colleague might be able to help with the publication of Ivanov’s uncollected poems in England. The two classicists first exchanged epistles in Latin (Ivanov’s in verse), after which Ivanov switched to English (“to amuse you with innocent solemisms of my virgin english prose”) and sent Bowra the Russian and Italian editions of his poem *Chelovek* (Man), which had been published in 1939.\(^6\) On 19 September 1946 Bowra wrote to Ivanov ahead of his visit to Rome together with Isaiah Berlin, who in previous months had been in close contact with Anna Akhmatova in Leningrad and Boris Pasternak in Moscow.\(^7\) At their meeting, Ivanov gave the two men the manuscript of his poems, which in 1962 finally appeared as a book from Clarendon Press.

On 2 July 1947 Harari informed Ivanov that the translation was complete and that he would receive it as soon as Konovalov revised it. However on 16 December 1947 Villiers revised the timeline: “Dr. Konovalov will pass on the now completed draft of the translation of your Dostoevski to Dr. Bowra as soon as he has himself considered it and, when Dr. Bowra has read it, it will be forwarded to you for your comments”\(^8\). Evidently, this first translation by an unknown hand was found wanting, and it was sent on for revision to Norman Cameron (1905-1953), a British poet and translator who was just back in London after working for the British diplomatic mission in occupied Vienna. In a letter from 7 December 1948 Cameron wrote to his wife:

I’ve had a look at that Dostoevsky translation from German, which I was supposed to ‘revise’. It’s so abominably bad that I’ve written to say that all I could do would be to do a completely new translation, at two guineas a thousand words – since the original is very complicated, the complication being Russian extravagance plus German Geschwollenheit [“pomposity” – R.B.] – and that I can’t have it finished before the end of February, at the earliest. If they decide not to give me the job on those terms, I don’t much mind.\(^9\)

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\(^5\) VIRC op. 5 k. 17 p. 26 pg. 28; cf. P. Davidson, *Vyacheslav Ivanov and C. M. Bowra: A Correspondence from Two Corners on Humanism*, Birmingham, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, 2006, p. 108. In a letter from 24 April 1952, after apologizing for yet more delays, Harvill informed Dmitrii Ivanov that 1500 copies were published for Harvill and 1000 to 15000 “with the imprint of the American publisher which have been sent to him in sheets and bound in the USA”; op. 5 k. 17 p. 26 pg. 36.

\(^6\) P. Davidson, *Vyacheslav Ivanov and C. M. Bowra*, pp. 82-98.


\(^8\) VIRC op. 5 k. 17 p. 25 pg. 1.

Evidently Cameron’s demands were met, he kept his promised deadline, and the translation was dispatched to Ivanov in Rome for his review. In retrospect, Ivanov seems to have been quite lucky with his translator, who treated his text with sympathetic understanding and a poetic flourish. In this respect it is worth noting that later in 1952 Cameron published translations of poetry by Heinrich Heine and Arthur Rimbaud. Still, reviewing his decades-old text for a new, postwar audience, Ivanov found many passages that required abbreviation, amplification, or rewording.

On 13 June 1949 Harari expressed pleasure that Ivanov “approve[d] of the translation in the main” and assured him that, “Your corrections will of course be incorporated”. She wrote again in July, but the response she received was from Dmitrii Viacheslavovich Ivanov, who informed her of his father’s death on 16 July. “The revision of the English text of Dostoievsky was the very last work of my father”, Dmitrii wrote. “He was very anxious to finish it. There are many notes left and I am busy now putting them in the right place. Meanwhile, O. Deschartes’ introduction will be ready and I then will send you both the Dostoievsky and the Introduction. It is hard to say when I will be able to send both manuscripts, but it will be as soon as possible”.

Throughout the process Harvill was most concerned with supplying introductory matter that would help to present Ivanov to a British public who had never heard his name, a point on which (in Harari’s words) “everyone is agreed”. Bowra pledged a foreword, but Harvill insisted upon a longer introduction “by a well-known English authority”. On 16 December 1946 Harari informed Ivanov that she had written to Marcel, whose book The Philosophy of Existence Harvill published in 1948 in Harari’s translation, “offering to buy the translation rights”. On 2 July 1947 she wrote that “we have M. Marcel’s permission to use his article”. Ivanov sent the issue of Il Convegno with Marcel’s and Deschartes’s texts, but for unknown reasons it never reached the publisher. Dmitrii’s letter of 21 July 1949 suggests that, not unusually, Ol’ga Shor-Deschartes had decided to rewrite her introduction, but that she never completed it. Perhaps the confusion over the introductory material was the reason that Ivanov’s own foreword to the German edition was dropped from the English-language one.

Among other things Ivanov’s edits of Cameron’s translation provide a detailed sense of his sophisticated command of written English. In this Ivanov

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10 Ibid., pp. 193-194.
11 VIRC op. 5 k. 17 p. 25 pg. 1.
12 VIRC op. 5 k. 17 p. 26 pg. 19.
13 VIRC op. 5 k. 17 p. 26 pg. 8, 11.
may have been aided by his son Dmitrii, who, having been educated as a philologist and trained as a journalist, had a superlative command of the language and who, as we have seen, took responsibility for transmitting his father’s edits to Harvill Press. More importantly, Ivanov’s edits provide a very clear record of changes (however minute) in his thought over the last two decades of his life, of his attempts to adapt his thought for a new audience, and in general of his supple mind, even at his advanced age.

Ivanov’s foreword to *Freedom and the Tragic Life* and the beginning of part I are published here for the first time according to a typescript corrected by Viacheslav Ivanov with pencils of various colors. Ten pages remain in the Ivanov archive (VIRC op. 2 k. 35 p. 4), of which only the first five are consecutive. Ivanov’s deletions are marked by a strikethrough (i.e., *influence*); his additions are in italics. Almost all of Ivanov’s edits were retained in the published text.

[p. 1]

Vyatsheslav Ivanov

DOSTOIEVSKY

*An Essay*

Tragedic, Mythical and Mystical Aspects of His Work

Re-translated *under the Author’s control* by Norman Cameron from the authorised translation into German prepared by Alexander Kresling and published by J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, in 1932.

Harvill Press Ltd.

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I

Foreword

It will no doubt be useful to begin this book with an explanation of its logical plan. Its threefold inquiry into the elements of tragedy, myth and religion in Dostoievsky’s work as a tragic dramatist, creator of mythes and religious evangelist is represented in the tripartition of the text under headings: “Tragedic Aspect,” “Mythical Aspect” and “Theological Aspect”. But these headings indicate only three of the viewpoints from which the entirety of Dostoievsky’s work may be considered. My intention was by this tripartition to exhibit the work’s inner unity, since each of these three aspects at once implies and affects the two others.

I proceed from an examination of the work’s form, and arrive, within the framework indicated, at the conclusion that Dostoievsky’s writings are, in their inner structure, tragedies in epic dress, such as the Iliad was. If these writings reveal an extreme approximation of the novel form to the poetical artistic prototype of tragedy, this is so only because the author’s sense of life is essentially tragic, and therefore at the same time realistic; for tragedy is conceivable only as a relation between real and free entities.

Dostoievsky’s philosophy of life proves, in fact, to be a sort of ontological realism, based on mystical self-identification with transposition into the other-Ego, as into a reality rooted in the Ens realissimum. The artistic exploration, on three levels, of the motives of human action—on the pragmatic level of external stimuli, on the psychological level, and lastly on the metaphysical level—shows that man exercises and determines himself as an absolutely free personality only on the third of these levels. This is where true tragedy is enacted: in the sphere of the original self-determination of the free will—the sphere of metaphysics. The only means of illustrating events in this sphere, however, is myth—in so far as myth is understood to mean a
synthetic proposition in which the symbolic subject, which represents a transcendental entity, is given a verbal predicate that shows this entity under its dynamic aspect, either in action or in suffering. Dostoievsky’s tales writings must, therefore, have a background of mythical imagery, and this is confirmed by a demonstration of the mythological leitmotifs of his chief works.

The author’s views of the tragedy enacted in the metaphysical sphere between God and man imply a dialectical system which is expounded in the last part of this book. This dialectic is founded on the Augustinian opposition antinomy of love of God, on the one hand, and love of self, culminating in hatred of God, on the other. The philosophy of the Evil One, which here consists in an analysis of the conceptual symbols “Lucifer,” “Ahriman” and “Legion” (Evil in the social sphere), finally finds its corollary in the depiction of the religious ideal of Hagiocracy.

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II

So much for the logical plan of the essay book as a whole. I now wish to say a few words about the manner in which it came to be written. My earlier studies of the novel-tragedy and of Dostoievsky’s religion (which were first published in 1911 and 1917 respectively, in the St. Petersburg monthly review “Russkaya Mysl”, and were later reproduced in the second and third volumes of my collected Essays) form the groundwork of the first and third parts of this book: “Tragedic Aspect” and “Theological Aspect”; but they have been so radically worked over that they depart substantially not only from the form, but also from the content of the original version. The second part (“Mythical Aspect”) is—with the exception of a few pages on the nature of myth and the basic idea of “Daemons,” alias “The Possessed” (Essays, Vol. II)—now published for the first time.

As regards the text here presented, I feel obliged to express my sense of guilt towards the translator for having tampered with his already completed and excellent translation by means of occasional and sometimes rather long interpolations (including the poetical self-quotation on p. 23); and even, here and there, by willful stylistic incursions. If the reader stumbles upon any solecism, he should attribute this mishap to my intervention, and should hold me solely responsible.

Lastly, it is my pleasant duty to record with the deepest gratitude the part played by my friend J. Schor (at present in Freiburg) in the preparation of this book. For years he indefatigably labored with affectionate zeal to further the work’s progress. I even have to thank him for the
initial suggestion that I should collate my published and unpublished writings on Dostoievsky into a uniform study, so that without But for his understanding initiative and steadfast affectionate zeal loyalty this publication would never have seen the light of day.

V.I.

Pavia, December 1931

1 This refers, of course, to the German translation.
2 P. 23 in the German text; p. – in the present text.

[p. 5]
PART I
Τραγῳδοθέματα
(Tragic Aspect)

PART I
Tragic Aspect

Many events have happened Half a century has passed since Dostoievsky’s death, yet his work and influence are more alive than ever before.

The creatures of his world of fantasy are instinct with a daemonic vitality. They do not retreat from us with the passage of time; they do not age; they refuse to withdraw into the ethereal airy regions of the Muses, there to become objects of our alien and dispassionate contemplation. From the fog in the streets they arise before us; in dark and sleepless nights they knock at our doors, frequent our bedsides and in confidential whispers engage us in many a disquieting terrifying conversation.

On the furthest horizon Dostoievsky has lit beacons of such radiant brilliance that they seem to me not terrestrial fires, but stars in heaven; but he, all the while, is at our sides, guiding their rays into our breasts – their cruelly healing lancets of light, more soaring than molten steel. At every palpitation of our hearts, he says to us: “Yes, I know; and I know more, and much else besides.” Amidst the roar of the maelstrom calling us, amidst the yawn of the chasm enticing us, rises the sound of his pipes, the sanity-destroying pipes of the deep, and inexorably he stands before us, with his penetrating enigmatic gaze, he who has solved the riddle of our natures but never of his own – the sombre and keen-eyed guide through the labyrinth of our souls, simultaneously guiding us and reconnoitring spying upon us.
He dwells in our midst, and changes as we do with us; for by dint of his steady concentration upon that which is universally and basically human; of his enormous psychological and ontological intensification and sharpening of the conflicts of his century; and also of the peculiar effects of the ferment he induced, which had the power to stir up all the depths of
[p. 6]
onwards commences slow decline of the heroic epic in general.

The novel-form, on the other hand, has developed in a contrary direction. In modern times it has evolved with ever greater power and impact, becoming ever more many-sided and comprehensive, until finally, in its urge to acquire the characteristics of great art, it has become capable of conveying pure tragedy.

Plato described the epic as a hybrid or mixed bastard form, partly narrative or instructive, partly mimetic or dramatic – the latter in those passages where the narration is interrupted with by numerous and extensive monologues or dialogues by the characters, whose words reach us in oratio recta, directly from the mouths of the masks that the poet has conjured into existence upon the imaginary invisible tragic stage. Plato concludes that, on the one hand, lyrical or epic-lyrical enunciations works (expressing what the poet says in his own person), and, on the other hand, the drama (compromising everything that the poet relates word for word as authentic sayings deliberately put into the mouths of his heroes), are two natural and clearly distinct forms of poetry; whereas the epic combines in itself both lyrical and dramatic elements. This dual nature of the epic, correctly recognised by Plato, may be explained on the assumption that it arose from the conglomerate art of ancient times – the art described by Alexander Veselovsky Weselow-ski, and defined by him as “syncretic” – in which the epic was not yet distinguished from ritual musical performances and imitative masked plays orche-strally accompanied sacred rites, or from religious masques. 14

Be that as it may, the tragic element in the Iliad – its substance and internal form – is our historical reason for regarding the novel-tragedy, not as a decadent form of the purely epic romance, but as an enrichment of it; as the reinstatement of the epic in the full inheritance of its rights. And what then entitles us to apply the term “novel-tragedy” to the novels writings of Dostoievsky is, above all 14? The essentially tragic element in each of his great works is, above all, its their basic conception, which is thoroughly and essentially tragic.

14 This is a footnote! *A survival of the rhythmical alternation of two interlocutors is the Homeric formula: τον δ’ απομειβομενος.
“The joy of the story-teller”– the self-sufficing pleasure

in invention of adventures and surprising entanglements ideas and discoveries, in the many-coloured tapestry of over-lapping and interlocking situations—at one time this was the novelist’s professed main object. And it seemed that in this pleasure the epic narrator could find himself entirely anew: carefree, loquacious, inexhaustibly inventive, without any particular desire – or, indeed, real ability – to find the moral of his story. Always he remained loyal to his old predisposition to bring the tale to a happy ending: an ending that would fully satisfy the sympathies aroused in us by our continual participation in good and ill luck the adventures of the hero, and would bring us, after lengthy journeys on the flying carpet, back home to our customary surroundings – leaving us sated with the rich diversity of the life mirrored in the bright phantasmagoria on the threshold between reality and dream, and at the same time filled with a healthy hunger for new experiences in our own existence.

The enchantment of pathetic element in this “idle musing” (to use Pushkin’s phrase) of the story-teller is, of course, irrevocably lost to our over-clouded and restless brooding epoch. Besides some vigorous offshoots By Dostoievsky’s time, moreover, an important section of novel-literature had branched away from the main stem of the post-medieval novel-literature: the humorous and satiric stories, the didactic or utopian narratives, and last not least, in order to explore the field either of ideology (this occurred long before Rousseau—in the tales of the Utopists, for example) or of the character-study (which was not first explored by the romantic novel, but as long ago as in since Boccaccio’s “Fiametta,” the sentimental love-tale.

Nevertheless, the story-teller’s art survived, and continued to exploit its flexible, accommodating vigorous technique,—its own natural wealth of unexpected events, their puzzling complexities and the art of holding the reader in suspense as he awaits the unravelment of an apparently hopeless tangle: and all this Dostoievsky refused to renounce – as also in Balzac and Dickens, for example, who notably influenced him, – and he was right to do so. In his case, however, this motley material is subordinated to a special and higher architectural purpose: in all its component parts, however

autonomous law, to which all his environment somehow like a plastic stuff, eventually adapts itself. The ultimate principle of his reaction to upon the world and his reaction upon it to it – the insoluble unfathomable content of his Ego – is determined from within, and maintains itself essentially in
virtual independent independence. Moreover, since the word “tragic” can be used but improperly only in a pejorative and abusive sense, so long as there is no free self-determination – the true tragedy of a human life is perceptible can be enacted in external manifestations only in so far as these reflect the extra-temporal and original tragedy of the intelligible character (in Kant’s acceptation of this term) of his perceptible essence. Thus it comes about that Dostoievsky sets the real key-point of the tragic tangle in the realm of metaphysics; for only here we are can our understanding allowed to premise the pure activity of the free will and have an insight into it through the prism of art and, under the artist’s guidance, to gain an intellectual perception of it.

Dostoievsky is thus obliged to give hypothesise a threefold motive and explanation for crime. Firstly, he has to settle in the metaphysical deed antinomy of the individual will – which, in the conflict of confronted with the opposition between being-for-itself and being-in-God, must either choose between the two or, at least, subordinate one to the other, thus freely determining the fundamental law of its existence. Secondly, he has to explore the in psychological pragmatism – that is to say, in the connection between, and development of, the peripheral conditions of consciousness, in the linking together of experience, in the pathology of the passions, in the ebb and flow of emotional stimuli – all of which lead to the final step, and induce the final emotion necessary to the committal of the crime. Thirdly and lastly, he has to investigate in the pragmatism of external events,--in the whole net of apparently accidental occurrences, fine as a cobweb, yet ever thickening its mesh until it is unbreakable, the net that life casts about its victim,--in the chain of actions and combination of circumstances whose causality inescapably conduces to the crime. The joint effect of all these factors, moreover, is brought into relation with processes occurring in the social sphere; so that we can clearly understand how the collective will, too, secretly plays a part in the individual will’s act

[p. 9]

Part I, Chapter II

The Tragic principle in Dostoievsky’s philosophy of life view of life

The expression “naïve idealism” may well be applied to that primitive perception of life which seems to be connatural is peculiar to man as an individual and being which, being an essential part of individuality, is characterised by the fact that the object is directly perceived as a part of the substance
of the his own Ego just awakened to self-awareness: at this stage the real meaning of the Tu has not be revealed disclosed unknown.

The evolution of family and the community, and the discovery of the forces mysteriously working from without in the world of animism, form a transition (marked by the development of ritual, judicial and ethical laws rules and axioms of behavior) to the age of “naive realism.”

From This soil is fertile enough to produce the germination there next arises a system of higher morality, firmly rooted in religion, which strengthens the ties existing bonds connecting man with ensures that man shall have a sense of the transcendental reality of the beings and things above and underneath and around him; whilst the perception of this transcendental reality—having, after the gradual decay of ancient old images of belief, become a thing apart from practical reasoning—now once more inclines urges the human being (to the extent to which he has abandoned all preconceived ideas of the religious conception of life) him, though now on the way of reflection, towards the pole of his innate idealism.

Because Since, however, this idealism has long since lost its original naivete, the perceiving thinking Ego henceforth endeavours to sever the act of cognition abstract itself from the empirically known substance of the personality; and the subjective consciousness desires to universalise itself in abstrato by means of pure thought.

The first, and probably the only, attempt to create a moral religion, derived from purely idealistic conception cognition, was Buddhism, which nowadays still exercises a strong attraction upon many natures.

Clearly this mode of thought is not based upon theoretical cognition, with its constant antithesis of subject and object, but upon an act of will and faith approximately corresponding to the Augustinian “transcende te ipsum.” Dostoeievsky has coined for this a word of his own: proniknowenije, which properly means “intuitive seeing-through” or “spiritual penetration.” He has given this word almost the character of a terminus technicus, it may perhaps be rendered as “self transposition.”

Self transposition It is a transcension of the transcending of a subject. In this state of mind we individualise In so far as a situation is present in which the subject is capable of regarding the other-Ego not as our an object, but as another subject, it becomes in some degree penetrable because of its evident
not only analogy but almost identity with structure of human soul. It is therefore not a mere peripheral extension of the bounds of individual consciousness, but a complete inversion of its normal moral system of coordinates.

The authenticity of this transvaluation is demonstrated primarily in one’s inner life: in the experience of true love (which is the only real cognition, for the very reason that it is bound up with absolute faith in the reality of the beloved); and, more generally, in the self-surrender or self-renunciation with which the pathos of pathetic element in love is informed.

This spiritual penetration self-transportation finds its expression in the unconditional acceptance with our acceptance, unconditional and instinct with the full force of will and thought, of the other-existence—in “Thou art.” If this acceptance of the other existence is complete; if, with and in this acceptance, the whole substance of my own existence is as it were rendered null and void exinanition (exinanition, κένωσις), then the other-existence ceases to be an alien “Thou”; instead, the “Thou” becomes another description of my “Ego.” “Thou art” then no longer means “Thou art recognised by me as existing,” but “I experience thy existence as my own, and in thy existence I again find myself existing.” Es, ergo sum.

Certainly, Altruism as a moral principle does not contain the totality has nothing in common with