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# *The Cultural Borders of Citizenship in a Multicultural Society*

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## **Abstract**

One of the basic problems confronting multicultural societies is the *inclusion* of cultural differences into a common citizenship. What does it mean inclusion? And inclusion to what? The 'inclusion' formula of modernity (lib/lab) leads to the inadequacy of the forms of cultural universalism as conceptualized and practiced in the processes of Western modernization. The more we globalize the social world, the more we come to reinforce 'local cultures'. The paper contends that the political inclusion of minorities into a 'universalistic culture' can be wholly misleading if the concept of political inclusion is not well managed in terms of the articulation of the borders between different cultures. In order to manage borders without either denying the boundaries (as in the assimilation solution), or consider the boundaries as barriers that separate cultures (as in the communitarian multiculturalism), we need a new relational semantics of borders.

**Keywords:** Citizenship, Cultural borders, Multicultural society, Relational sociology.

## *1. The issue: the challenge of the 'new' multiculturalism to modern citizenship*

1.1. There is no doubt that the modern concept of citizenship, as it relates to the modern idea of nation-state, is experiencing a period of great instability and change. The reasons do not so much lie in democracy itself, as a form of government (the political institutions of representation not being usually involved), as in the socio-political national institutions of citizenship, i.e. all institutions responsible for granting what are commonly referred to as 'rights of citizenship'.

In recent years, the studies on the mutations in citizenship have become crystallized in an ever-shifting landscape shaped by the flows of markets, technologies, stable populations and migrants. Apparently, there is a general consensus on the argument that the elements of citizenship (rights, en-

titlements, etc.) are becoming disarticulated from each other, and becoming re-articulated with universalizing criteria of neoliberalism and human rights pushed forward by a new (global?) civil society (Ong, 2006).

In many countries, due to growing migration processes, new 'global assemblages' define zones of social claims and political entitlements. The space of the 'assemblage', rather than the national terrain, becomes the site for social and political mobilizations by diverse groups in motion. In the Mediterranean zone, global markets and migrant flows challenge traditional state citizenship. In camps of the disenfranchised or displaced, sheer survival becomes the ground for political claims. Thus, particular constellations shape specific problems and resolutions to questions of contemporary living, further disarticulating and deterritorializing aspects of citizenship. In short, instead of all citizens enjoying a unified bundle of citizenship rights, we have a shifting political landscape in which heterogeneous populations claim diverse rights and benefits associated with citizenship, as well as universalizing criteria of neoliberal norms or human rights.

Citizenship is in flux, challenged by shifting cultural boundaries of the nation-states and innovative forms of political action. My purpose is to explain why and how this shifting boundaries are emerging and put forward the argument that a *transmodern* (societal) citizenship is currently springing from a nascent global civil society, rather than from the nation-state, stemming from a new multicultural society generated by increasing migrations.

All over the world contemporary societies are rediscovering the cultural roots of citizenship, i.e. the cultural bases of what it means to be a citizen in a particular social context. This process is wide spreading at all levels: local, regional, national, supranational. Tensions, conflicts, and clashes are emerging everywhere. In a sense, we are witnessing the simple fact that 'each culture has its own citizenship', and vice versa. At the same time, citizenship is a way (a political one) to design and implement the relationships among different cultures, be they co-operative or conflictual. Changes in a cultural system affect changes in the forms and contents of what it means to be a citizen in the societies where that particular culture is influential.

Today, large scale processes are putting into danger what Western countries are used to call modern citizenship. These trends produce new theories, practices and perspectives concerning the complex of citizenship rights and duties. They are called (or can be called) anti-modern, post-

modern, neo-modern. What are they? How can we conceive of the complex settings of relationships that these trends create between culture and citizenship?

In the West as well as in the East, in the North as well as in the South of the globe, different forms of citizenship, besides having different configurations, have nevertheless something in common. Can we draw the lines of division as well as the lines of convergence? Whatever they might be, they produce different balances and combinations of the global and local cultural dimensions of citizenship.

Cultural changes are inducing processes of differentiation within and between nation-state citizenship, as well as processes of globalization. Societies are confronted with new issues. In the end these are the main questions to be dealt with: what are the cultural dynamics changing the cultural premises of citizenship in the different parts of the world? And: how does the different complexes of citizenship react to them in the different contexts?

New forms of interdependences and links between 'local' identities and 'broader' solidarities are building up a *post-lib/lab* citizenship, which stems from adaptive forms of learning new relational practices in dealing with social issues where citizenship rights and obligations are involved. From a sociological point of view, may be that a new *societal semantics* is emerging, according to which citizenship becomes a complex of rights and duties not only of individuals but also of social groups, arranging civic life into a number of social autonomies capable of reconciling collective goals and self-management practices, solidarity and identity issues. This is the new challenge for citizenship in an *after*(or *trans*)-modern world.<sup>1</sup> I claim that the name of this new game is *societal citizenship* (Donati, 2006) or citizenship of social autonomies expressing their own culture.

1.2. Ever since human cultures have confronted themselves, swinging between a decent living together and clashing one against the other. Why do we perceive today that the relationships between different cultures have

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<sup>1</sup> In my language. *after*-modern is different from *post*-modern in so far as 'after' means a deep/sweeping *discontinuity* with modernity, while 'post' is usually understood as a radicalization of modernity or late modernity.

become a *new* challenge, different from the past?

There are, of course, many different reasons. In this paper I will take into consideration three main 'causes', which are playing a major role: i) first, the changes in the quantity and quality of migrations as related to cultural changes both in sending and receiving countries; ii) second, the crisis of citizenship as referred to the typical modern nation-state; iii) third, the process of globalization in so far as it diverges from a process of universalization.

These three orders of reasons are interrelated among them. The dynamics they imply altogether lead to the obsolescence and inadequacy of the forms of universalism as conceptualized and practiced in the processes of modernization so far. In order to understand where multicultural societies are going to, and whether a new universalism is possible or not, we need a new approach. I will call it 'relational' in so far as it is based on the relational management of memberships. Its main task is to provide a general framework which can be able to articulate, by differentiating and re-integrating, the different types of universalism emerging today in interaction with the new forms of localism and particularism.

1.3. Undoubtedly it would be useful to analyse how the issues of coexistence between cultures change over time, particularly in relation to the quality and quantity of migrations. But empirical data are very poor or not available, and moreover there is not enough room here. A tentative typology could suggest a distinction among the following types:

a) *relatively integrated multicultural societies* seem to be linked to traditional settlements created through slow historical processes in the presence of a scarce and limited migration; the sequence variation, selection, stabilization can be helpful in the interpretation of this process, provided that the social differentiation be slow enough and that integration forces prevail over conflicts; but, in any case, integrated multicultural societies stem from particular conditions favourable to the stability of contacts and associations amongst people of different cultures through an idea and practice of human or civil society (for instance in some areas of the Far East and also in some areas of the Mediterranean basin);

b) *conflicting multicultural societies* are linked to the segregation/segmentation of societal and migratory structures; usually they have

been created through historical processes unable to achieve a minimum of stabilization, either because of the lack of a unifying political power (for instance in many areas of the USA), or because civil society was not able to give itself an efficient political system (for instance in the former Yugoslavia, and in certain areas of Italy); in this cases a process of differentiation-with-integration was not produced, so that the conflict between cultures has dominated;

c) today we are witnessing the emergence of what I would call *fluctuating multicultural society* which is typical of highly mobile and stratified contexts based upon the principle of social differentiation; here migrations are characterized by features of massive instability and conflict among different cultures.

The three forms (a, b, c) have not a linear relationship among them. There is no continuity and no adaptation, let alone a kind of *up-grading* adaptation, among them. The mere flowing of time and the mere reiteration of communications are not enough to provide a good coexistence between different cultures.

1.4. Today the third type (fluctuating multiculturalism) endangers all the other kinds of multicultural orders. Why is it so?

A trivial answer says that it is so because migration processes are now taking place on a global, i.e. planetary, level. Large-scale demographic unbalances produce rising expectations for migrations; the invasion of Western modernization into other cultures takes on a violent character; and in many countries the capacity to provide political regulations for all these processes decreases day by day.

In this scenario, everybody must become a migrant from the cultural point of view. No one type of community can guarantee the survival of a particular culture or a particular social group if that culture or group wants to avoid the inter-cultural confrontation under the umbrella of the nation-state citizenship as it has been conceived and practiced in the modern age - see the societal community theorized by Parsons (2007). Within modernity, universalism and communitarianism tend to become antithetical (Rasmussen, 1990).

That is why we can say that the challenge of multiculturalism is new. It is like that in so far as the ideas and practices of democratic citizenship – as

modernity thinks of it, i.e. as a *lib/lab* configuration<sup>2</sup> – are no longer able to provide significant steps further in the resolution of the issues connected with the political coexistence among different cultures.

Today we have to acknowledge that the outcome of what we are used to call (Western) modern democracy is something which resembles a paradoxical community: a community made by people without any real community. Modern democracy in fact normatively prescribes a community where people are supposed not to be linked to any particular community. As a matter of fact, citizenship becomes a place where what is common to all people is only a kind of universal uprooting. Citizenship still means the necessity to abandon one's own memberships and may be also belongings.

1.5. Among the very many different paradoxes of our contemporary society, there is one point which deserves a particular inspection: why is it happening today that globalization increases at the same time that universalism decreases? Or: how is it that we witness the emergence of particular cultural attachments in the presence of widespreading processes of cultural globalization?

My feeling is that the 'causes' of this paradox (i.e. the more society globalizes the more we see cultural conflicts coming up) are different in different contexts:

- in Europe we could see the motive of an unprecedented demographic depression amongst native populations,
- in the USA there is the crisis of the national ideologies which have traditionally provided a cultural cement; the ideas of *melting pot* and *salad bowl* are in crisis, and a new ideology seems to propagate which is centered on the idea of walking around carefully (*streetwise*), and to proceed through *negative capabilities*.
- in other continents, what is emerging is above all a reaction against the cultural violence of the Western modernization as guided by precise interests and identities that are aliens to those peoples.

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<sup>2</sup> By *lib/lab* I mean the compromise between liberal and labour (socialist) ideologies, or between capitalist market and political democracy. The *lib/lab* configuration of citizenship is based upon the idea that human emancipation is an optimum combination (hybridization) of liberal freedom and socialist equality, leaving aside the issue of social solidarity (Donati, 2000).

We ask ourselves: can we bring the issue of cultural coexistence back to some design of cultural universalism? According to Klaus Eder, one of the basic problems confronting post-industrial societies is “the *inclusion* of cultural differences into a universalistic political and social order (in a democratically organized civil society)” (1993, p. 169). To me this statement - which is widely shared among Western scholars - is certainly attractive, but it should be discussed at length. What does it mean inclusion? And inclusion to what?

An easy criticism to Eder’s perspective is that it leaves completely apart the problem of the quality and quantity of the crisis of Western universalism as incorporated in the inclusion formula of modernity.

Eder’s suggestion is clearly made by the viewpoint of Western society, and for this reason it meets a great limit: it rejects the idea that different cultures could have different conceptions of citizenship (understood as the complex of rights and obligations which characterize a full participation of individuals and groups to a political community).

The historical process generated by the West produces the crisis of the universalism as created by the West itself. It is in the Western world where collective and widespread fears arise concerning the idea that we could come to live in a world without any universal value or norm. And it is there that a crucial question arises: can we still think in terms of some form of cultural universalism?

Within the postmodern Western climate the answer seems to be negative. Most people say: the process of modernization is over. And the proof is precisely seen in the fact that the more we globalize the social world, the more we come to reinforce local cultures which are particularistic (Gutmann, 1992). This is undoubtedly a clear symptom of a historical turn. The problem of multiculturalism is no longer an heritage of past traditions, but an issue brought about by the present social system. It is a need which is generated again and again precisely in globalized localities (‘glocalities’).

1.6. My feeling is that the perspective of coping with the issues linked to a multicultural society by means of political inclusion of minorities into a ‘general system’ (be it a nation-state or anything alike or equivalent) can be utopian and even dangerous if the concept of political inclusion is not well articulated. Briefly: the failures in achieving a peaceful multicultural society

may not be linked to mere deficiencies in what we are used to call 'political inclusion'. Lacks and lags may be due to the quality of such an inclusion: if it is thought in terms of inclusion into a *culturally neutral* public sphere (as it is widely thought in Europe) or into a *morally qualified* public sphere (as it is widely believed in the USA), and in the second case what kind of moral qualification the public sphere should have.

I wish to argue here that issues linked to the coexistence of different cultures derive from the fact that they cannot be dealt with in terms of the binary couple '*political inclusion vs exclusion*'.

## 2. *Ethnocentrism and racism in the postmodern society*

2.1. According to some scholars, the more society becomes postmodern the more ethnocentrism and racism lose their importance or at least can be restrained. This perspective can be exemplified by the picture of *Tooting*, the 'global village' within the Great London described by Martin Albrow (1996).

Except some particular areas, anyway, it seems that the contrary is true: the failure of the rule of modernity, and the crisis of many control mechanisms set up by the welfare state, seem to produce a revival of ethnocentrism and racism in many places, perhaps the majority of the countries. The urban dynamics seems to create ethnic villages again and again, as E. Anderson (1990) has brilliantly described for an American town.

Of course, one can observe that the U.K. is not equal to the U.S. But, to my mind, the persistence of ethnic and racial discriminations does not depend only on the different context, i.e. on the peculiarities of each country. One could notice that ethnic and racial discriminations tend to re-emerge within the same contexts in which they were supposed to have been overcome.

We should pay attention to the fact that ethnocentrism and racism (like other cultural forms, e.g. nationalism) are becoming more and more different from the past.

Despite the fact that these cultural forms cannot presume to get a cultural hegemony, they can reproduce themselves here and there more easily than yesterday. As a matter of fact, ethnocentrism and racism become more

and more social constructions which are useful to redefine social relationships locally. What is implied here is certainly the redefinition of power relationships (both internal and external to a social group). But, more generally, what is implied is the control over the resources affecting all the identities and interests of social life.

To the extent that society enters into a configuration of advanced modernity, so to assume postmodern features, as it happens today in Europe and - in a different way - in the U.S., the clashes between cultures *change their meanings and their functions*:

- generally speaking, cultures are no longer global ideologies that fight one against the other at the higher level of the cultural meanings, but they become local representations which are used for much more limited and contingent goals and strategies;
- generally speaking, the cultural dynamics no longer has the function of closing the boundaries of each culture towards its external world, but, on the contrary, it has the task of including more complexity from outside, so to stabilize itself through a 'chaotic order'.

Under these conditions, it seems impossible to resort to a universalistic system of symbolic and structural references in order to find out a solution to the issue of a multicultural coexistence.

2.2. It is trivial to observe that on the earth there was never a factual universalism among human populations. But it is nevertheless true that there were and still are many systems of thought which pretend to bring about some form of universalism (they correspond, in fact, to patterns of civilization).

Some scholars have observed that many 'universalisms' have represented, as a matter of fact, forms of disguised particularism. The criticism to Christianity has come to claim that, for instance, the empire of Alexander the Great was much more universalistic than all the forms of Christian universalism, both in old times and in the contemporary West.

What is sure is that the secularization of the Christian universalism has reached its peak in what we usually call the American civil religion. But one can observe that this religion too is meeting a very deep crisis. Suffice it to quote the arguments by N. Luhmann (1977), who argues for the death of this civil religion, and the well-known forecast on the clash of civilizations

made by S. Huntington, to cite only two perspectives.

Undoubtedly many scholars do not agree on the death of the American civil religion. Possibly, for instance, J.C. Alexander (2008) would make a lot of objections to these perspectives. But I suppose that even Alexander could not deny the symptoms of the new forms of ethnocentrism and racism which are appearing in the USA: he only would claim that American civil society is strong enough to react democratically to them. So the question become: until when can the American model of civil society be strong enough to regenerate a civil religion? And what about those societies in which there is no such a religion?

### *3. Globalization vs universalism*

3.1. Some people think that, under conditions of post-modernity, viable solutions to the difficulties of a multicultural coexistence might come from the so called processes of globalization (see Featherstone, 1990). But many others are doubtful about that (Archer, 1985). I believe that we must distinguish carefully between universalism and globalization. By universalism I mean a cultural order based upon values common to all human beings, or, better said, values which ask for the maximum respect of the human persons as such. By globalization I do not mean mere inter-dependence on a global scale, but a peculiar dynamics of cultural standardization.

a. As a matter of fact, globalization does not eliminate ethnocentrism and racism; globalization makes them only more latent, more wadded, and under many respects it privatizes them; in sum, globalization seems to be not a culture properly understood, but on the contrary a kind of sterilization of culture.

b. Globalization means much more a treatment of commercials than a linguistic, expressive or symbolic communication able to sustain real and meaningful social relationships. For this reason, globalization - as modernity understands it - comes to be a new cultural Babel which does not really help much in the multicultural dialogue. Dialogue is a matter of interpersonal socio-cultural relationships, not a mere juxtaposition of individuals sharing a common symbolic code through which they can exchange informations.

3.2. What I want to underline is that globalization and universalism are not synonymous.

Globalization means a process of standardization, particularly the standardization of the mind, that stratifies, separates and connects people through an implicit cultural determinism. It is a structural process (one could say: a structural effect) that leaves small room to both intentional action and symbolic evaluation.

On the contrary, universalism is an intentional and value process, one which must rely upon the presence and the contributions of human subjects. It aims at connecting human beings without confusing them (it makes them similar not identical). Universalism refers to human subjects who cope with existential issues by interpreting their situation as a problem of mutual reciprocity.<sup>3</sup>

In sum: globalization is a systemic process (a process of system integration) whereas universalism relies upon a relational process of social integration centered on the human person. Both of them are useful, but we must not get confused as to what is their different orientation to what, in social life, is 'human'. While in the case of globalization the human person is reduced to a sign, i.e. a reference for a merely performative communication, in the case of universalism the human person is and must be conceived of as the focus of a moral conscience.

#### 4. Is a 'new universalism' possible? Which universalism?

4.1. The idea of universalism can be understood in many different ways. In general, anyway, those who appeal to universalism do that by having in mind one target: to urge the observer to learn how to see the Other as a human being instead of something else, e.g. a specimen of a race.

It is precisely this distinction which is (and must be) used in evaluating and selecting the types of possible universalism. For a good selection one is

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<sup>3</sup> From this point of view, it is interesting to notice that what we call *streetwise* culture develops in the context of experienced interpersonal relationships through which individuals "may learn to see people rather than race and to rely less on prejudice and stereotyping" (Anderson, 1990, p. 253).

sent back to a relational thought which must be able to see the singularity of the human person as a 'concrete universal', not as an individuality of a species. It is from this angle that the functional equivalence among the different forms of cultural universalism fail.

4.2. Let us consider the different forms of cultural universalism. A tentative list could be the following:

- the *substantial or comprehensive universalism*, according to which there are objective human rights which are universal in the sense of being out there (Hudson, 1993);
- the *deliberative universalism*, according to which we can arrive at decisions who are taken by a discursive community of people making reasonable choices (Habermas, 2002);
- the *conventional universalism*, according to which "there is nothing deep down inside us except what we have put there ourselves, no criterion that we have not created in the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality that is not an appeal to a such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience to our own conventions" (Rorty, 1982, p. xiii);
- the *functional universalism*, according to which the two sides of the distinction particular/universal are interchangeable, so that the universal is only an operator of differences (see T. Parsons and N. Luhmann);
- the *symbolic universalism*, according to which mankind is able to elaborate cultural patterns that can be meaningful for everybody (see Walzer, 1983; Alexander, 2008).

Each of these types of universalism has different capabilities in order to produce a viable and meaningful distinction between a (human) person and a non(human)-person.

What must be underlined is the fact that today most forms of universalism articulate such a distinction through oppositions (binary distinctions) which impede a relational management of the two sides of the coin.

Substantial universalism is opposed to conventional universalism, deliberative universalism is opposed to functional universalism, and so on. Each form is interpreted and developed through the negation (both internal and external) of its opposite. By this way universalism becomes a paradox: not only it denies its own universality, but it comes to deny the wholeness of the human person which should precisely be the focus of its directive dis-

inction. We must remember that many nation-states still now are built up from a binary logic according to which a majority of people is supposed to be identified by a common history, common culture and language *against* the so called national minorities, which are supposed to be detrimental to a harmonious state development. In early modernity, the nation-state has been built up as an explicit and intentional negation of a multi-national state. National citizenship, therefore, is a form of restriction of what is civil in the sense of being able to recognize the human person as such against other features of the individual (such as his/her language, religion, the colour of the skin, and so on). It would be useful to remember the controversy between John Stuart Mill, who was a supporter of the nation-state, and John Dalberg-Acton who, on the contrary, argued that the combination of various nations within a state was a necessary condition of civilized life.

What is at stake is a kind of universalism which we could call *universalism of multiple loyalties*. We are still within a form of universalism in which one loyalty (for instance to a nation-state or a religion) is supposed to absorb all other memberships and symbolic references.

Under conditions of social complexity, as it happens today, the major trouble for a universalistic perspective is to put the human person as the focus of social action so to avoid any reduction of the person to something alien to the dignity of a human being.

Such an orientation is something necessary for a multicultural society which wants to deserve the title of 'human'. But the universalism of multiple loyalties is very difficult to be conceived and managed. One should be able to avoid a kind of hierarchy between different memberships which can be detrimental to the human conscience, as well as to avoid a fundamentalist perspective. One must be able to activate a relational management of the loyalties to different values and norms.

A culture which can be able to perform these operations is not available yet. For this reason, the universalism of multiple loyalties keeps being very weak, and sometimes seems to have no premises.

4.3. Perhaps today we can think of its premises as lying in a different vision of the human individual as an intrinsically relational being. It is on this general presupposition that we can found a *relational universalism*, as distinct from all the other kinds of universalism (which have no relationality

properly).

Relational universalism does presuppose a certain cultural vision of society, i.e. a certain idea of the process of civilization. It implies a concept of societal citizenship rather than state citizenship (Donati, 2006).

Relational universalism emphasizes the capability to relate what is different, i.e. to manage the difference by seeing a synergic relationship instead of an opposition (or binary distinction). From this point of view, we can see how far it is from violence as it is incorporated in the use of the binary oppositions proper to modern thought (think of Luhmann's logic), starting from the dialectic master/slave as theorized by F. Hegel.

Relational universalism presupposes the maximum feasible interior freedom of the individual at the same time that it requires the maximum adhesion to the Alter as a bearer of a (human) condition which needs a comprehension and a sharing in terms of basic values and norms. Is it a paradox? Under many important aspects, the answer can be positive. But this paradox can be highly instructive, since it can be coped with only by resorting to a peculiar notion of common good.

Such common good, which might be properly called *relational good* (Donati, 2015a), does not require equality in the identities of the people involved in it. It requires that the good be produced and enjoyed together by every participant in the game.

In order to manage this paradox, modern Western culture has resorted to many devices:

- the reference to the (enlightened) Reason, or to a systemic functional equivalent of it (as it has been stressed in Parsons and Luhmann),
- the reference to the Subject (as rediscovered, for instance, by A. Touraine),
- the reference to the 'Human Existence' (for instance F. Crespi following M. Heidegger).

More recently, particularly in sociology, it has appeared a new form of management of the paradoxes connected to a universalistic stance which is called *euryalistics*: it consists in asking the observer to change its position (the point of observation) continuously so to escape from the paradox in which one risks to be imprisoned (Luhmann, 1990). But evidently such an euryalistics does not solve the paradoxes, it only bring them to the paroxysm.

What is interesting to observe is the fact that, step by step, in all these perspectives, a progressive obliteration of the reference to the universalism of the human rights has taken place. The legitimation for such a result is nowadays that there is no anthropology available for supporting the universalism of human rights. It is no accident that the universalism of human rights has gone away together with the notion of a common good and an anthropology able to see it. Today universal human rights are simply understood as subjective requests that should be recognized in so far as they are shared by a collective entity sufficiently strong to impose them to the public opinion and consequently to the governments.

To me there is no real difference between the paroxysm of cultural differences (as emphasized by Luhmann's euryalistics) and the aestheticism of the postmodern culture. Both of them spring out from the fear they have in common in coping with the issue of interpreting (giving meaning) to cultural differences. Both of them are unable to elaborate symbols which can represent the cultural difference as familiar. Can we look for another way out to the ultimate outcome of modernity, i.e. the perspectives of paroxysm and aestheticism?

The more we consider the crisis of modernity, the more we realize that a multicultural coexistence requires an open-minded religious perspective. Kierkegaard argued that only what is absolute can give freedom to human beings. Modernity, as we know, argues just in the opposite way: for modernity freedom can be achieved only through the negation of what is absolute. S.N. Eisenstadt (1992) has shown what is the issue of charismatic legitimation involved in all that.

## *5. Conclusions*

We need a new vision of human existence to manage the cultural borders in such a way as to preserve the differences while taking care of what links them and can be shared by them. This amounts to find out a new 'relational culture', i.e. a culture of social relations that can be able to see and deal with the 'enigma' of the borders themselves (Donati 2015b), that consists in having to connect different people, different styles of life, different memberships, different citizenships, without neither reproducing their

separation nor make them clash with each other.

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