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Title: A general coalition structure: some equivalence results
Authors: Bimonte, Giovanna
Keywords: Differential information economy
Restriction on coalition for- mation
Private core
Issue Date: 2013
Citation: Bimonte, G. (2013). “A general coalition structure: some equivalence results”. DISES Working Paper 3.230, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche.
Abstract: The formation of coalition may imply some theoretical difficulties, such as costs arising from forming a coalition or sharing information among agents. In this paper we will assume that only a subset S of the set of all possible coalitions in an economy is the set of admissible coalitions. We define the S-core concept, as in Hervs-Moreno. We will extend to a model with both uncertainty and asymmetric informations the results showed in Okuda and Shitovitz.
ISSN: 1971-3029
Appears in Collections:DiSES Working Papers

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