Abstract

The Treaty of Lisbon reinforces the role of National Parliaments as never had happened before. They are now given the possibility to directly affect the European decision-process. In general, National Parliaments have the task of actively contribute “to the right operation of the EU”, according the formula used by the new article 12 of the Treaty on the European Union, entirely dedicated to National Parliaments.

A year after the new treaty entered into force, (1st December 2009), the National legislative councils started to consider the answer to be give to the European «call» from both an «individual» and «collective» point of view. Of particular importance, is the issue regarding the right interpretation of the new Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions on subsidiarity monitoring. Do they acknowledge to National Parliaments an «individual empowerment» or a kind of «collective responsibility»?

In such a context, the author has chosen to analyze the effect of the Treaty of Lisbon on the European mechanisms to involve National Parliaments in the European decision-making circuit, therefore privileging the analysis the so called «ascending phase» of the EU law. This in-depth analysis also allowed to carry out a critic exam of the innovations introduced by the Law 4 February 2005, n. 11, also known as «legge Buttiglione» - which replaced the Law 9 March 1989, n. 86, or «legge La Pergola»), dedicating some innovative dispositions to the role of the Italian Parliament in the European decision process ascending phase. Moreover, aim of this study, is to formulate some evaluations regarding the more recent application procedures followed by the Italian Chambers.