| dc.contributor.author | Capuano, Carlo | |
| dc.contributor.author | De Feo, Giueseppe | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-08T13:47:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-11-08T13:47:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Capuano, C. and De Feo, G. (2008). “Privatization in oligopoly: the impact of the shadow cost of public funds”. DISES Working Paper 3.195, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche. | it_IT |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1971-3029 | it_IT |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://elea.unisa.it:8080/xmlui/handle/10556/3800 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.14273/unisa-2022 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of privatization
in oligopoly when the government takes into account
the distortionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost
of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in ownership
not only on the objective function of the firms, but also
on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination
of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg)
games. We show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never
increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are
realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred. | it_IT |
| dc.format.extent | 56 p. | it_IT |
| dc.language.iso | en | it_IT |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Working Papers ; 3.195 | it_IT |
| dc.source | UniSa. Sistema Bibliotecario di Ateneo | it_IT |
| dc.subject | Mixed oligopoly | it_IT |
| dc.subject | Privatization | it_IT |
| dc.subject | Endogenous Timing | it_IT |
| dc.subject | Distortionary taxes | it_IT |
| dc.title | Privatization in oligopoly: the impact of the shadow cost of public funds | it_IT |
| dc.type | Working Paper | it_IT |
