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dc.contributor.authorSpennati, Pietro
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-03T14:04:12Z
dc.date.available2014-10-03T14:04:12Z
dc.date.issued2014-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10556/1549
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.14273/unisa-384
dc.description2012-2013en_US
dc.description.abstractIn Common pool models fiscal outcomes are determined by the decision-making rule that is used to aggregate conflicting interests into a single budget. The rules according through which the budget is prepared, approved and carried out can affect spending bias. The idea is that the common pool problem may manifest itself during different phases of the budgetary process. This thesis analyzes a model in which the Ministry of Finance internalizes the Common pool externality of the budget. From an institutional point of view this assumption is realistic because it takes into account the budget institutional equilibrium. Formally, this is reflected in the assumption that the Ministry of finance maximizes his utility function à la Stackelberg. In Stackelberg equilibrium leader’s expenditures choice is grater than in Cournot-Nash result, while the deficit bias is lower due to agenda setting power over spending ministries. [edited by author]en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversita degli studi di Salernoen_US
dc.subjectBilancio statoen_US
dc.titleThree essays on state budget rules and proceduresen_US
dc.typeDoctoral Thesisen_US
dc.subject.miurSECS-S/06 METODI MATEMATICI DELL'ECONOMIA E DELLE SCIENZE ATTUARIALI E FINANZIARIEen_US
dc.contributor.coordinatoreDestefanis, Sergioen_US
dc.description.cicloX ciclo n.s.en_US
dc.contributor.tutorBimonte, Giovannaen_US
dc.identifier.DipartimentoScienze Economiche e Statisticheen_US
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