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dc.contributor.authorCapuano, Carlo
dc.contributor.authorDe Feo, Giueseppe
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-08T13:47:38Z
dc.date.available2019-11-08T13:47:38Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationCapuano, C. and De Feo, G. (2008). “Privatization in oligopoly: the impact of the shadow cost of public funds”. DISES Working Paper 3.195, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche.it_IT
dc.identifier.issn1971-3029it_IT
dc.identifier.urihttp://elea.unisa.it:8080/xmlui/handle/10556/3800
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.14273/unisa-2022
dc.description.abstractThe aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of privatization in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in ownership not only on the objective function of the firms, but also on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. We show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred.it_IT
dc.format.extent56 p.it_IT
dc.language.isoenit_IT
dc.relation.ispartofWorking Papers ; 3.195it_IT
dc.sourceUniSa. Sistema Bibliotecario di Ateneoit_IT
dc.subjectMixed oligopolyit_IT
dc.subjectPrivatizationit_IT
dc.subjectEndogenous Timingit_IT
dc.subjectDistortionary taxesit_IT
dc.titlePrivatization in oligopoly: the impact of the shadow cost of public fundsit_IT
dc.typeWorking Paperit_IT
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