

Mediterranean, Knowledge, Culture and Heritage 2

Giuseppe D'ANGELO – Jorge MARTINS RIBEIRO
Editors

BORDERS AND CONFLICTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN



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Book Series edited by

Giuseppe D'Angelo and Emiliana Mangone

The Book Series, published in electronic open access, shall be a permanent platform of discussion and comparison, experimentation and dissemination, promoting the achievement of methodological action-research goals, in order to enforce the development of the territories and of the local and European identities, starting from the cultural heritage and from the Mediterranean Area. All the research work revolves around three key topics:

Mediterranean: The knowledge and cultural values of southern Europe and the Mediterranean Area may represent the strategic elements to overcome the current crisis in Europe, to the point of becoming a stimulus for the review of policies.

Knowledge: Language, history, tradition and art have always conveyed dialogic relations and interpersonal relationships within societies, founding on otherness the peculiarities understood as knowledge development, processes, sedimentation and transformation. What becomes peculiar is the "knowledge" as the achievement of an advantage derived from the possession of unique and inimitable knowledge.

Culture and Heritage: Culture, understood as its cultural heritage, is proposed as one of the privileged areas of the "new economy". In fact, the encounter between culture and territory represents one of the most valuable opportunities for development.

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Preface by the Series Editors

The second volume of the book series published by the ICSR Mediterranean Knowledge originates by the reflections that –from the constitution of the ICSR – have developed among disciplines and among members of the different research units. The book involves historians from different countries: Italy, Portugal, Malta, Turkey.

The chapters address topics related to the Mediterranean Basin, using the words “borders” and “conflicts” both in the traditional sense given to them by a part of the historiography and recognizing a positive meaning to the concept of border, of edge, of *limen*: place where identity and otherness can meet, contaminate, hybridize; where the other, the different, is not the enemy and is not prejudicially judged.

The chapters analyze the Mediterranean from the Middle Age to the Contemporary Era, deepening some topics that, for centuries, have been concerning the area: relations East/West; processes of dominion developed on its shores; conflicts, understood both in military and cultural sense.

The three sections of the book reconstruct three different subjects related to the Mediterranean (idea and praxis of the borders; historical and cultural aspects of the combination borders/conflicts; wars fought in the basin of the “Internal Sea”), which find an unity around a basic idea: the ability of the Mediterranean peoples to rebuild an autonomous thought (Barbieri, 2016), starting from the peculiarities that fifty centuries of history have entrenched in the area. The Mediterranean acquires a fundamental importance in promoting pluralism, diversity, and freedom. Becoming a place of dialogue and encounter, this sea «could turn into the peace table between the West and the Islamic world and play an important role for the initiation of a peace process on a global scale» (Horchani & Zolo, 2005, p. 7). It is necessary to rethink the “Mediterranean mind” with the political and cultural actors bordering on the Mediterranean, starting with the Arab peoples and the representations that they have of the Mediterranean (Lewis, 1993; Norman, 1960). A new conception of the Mediterranean can be built with the help of an approach that goes beyond the classical oppositions Europe/ Mediterranean, North/South, East/West, etc.

It is a global interpretation of the Mediterranean as a natural “liquid border”, that splits coasts, men, way of thinking, religions, but that for centuries has been constituting the common ground where the same men have shared experiences, trade, culture. It is desirable for the Mediterranean to become a “thoughtful knowledge”, promoting relationship among peoples and within their living environment, facilitating an encounter between the North and South and West and East, with the awareness that only dialogue can make society open to the re-composition of cultural differences and the specific features of every culture.

Therefore the editors aims at offering a different interpretation and, at the same time, a different perspective, bringing the point of observation in the middle of the sea and, from there, looking at the coast, in order to reconstruct the past with different prospective angles and different horizons.

This is, in the substance, the aim of book series “Mediterranean, Knowledge, Culture and Heritage” contributing to make the Mediterranean, as common and shared asset belonging to all the people living in the area, the centre of new and different social, cultural and economic dynamics.

Fisciano, Italy
November 2016

Emiliana Mangone

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Giuseppe D'ANGELO – Jorge MARTINS RIBEIRO

Editors

**BORDERS AND CONFLICTS
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN**



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Introduction

The “Mare Nostrum” Belongs to Everybody

GIUSEPPE D’ANGELO and JORGE MARTINS RIBEIRO

The movie *Alexander* starts with the image of a huge mosaic, representing the Mediterranean basin centred on its central-oriental part, off the coasts of the Gulf of Sirte, between Greece, Middle East and Egypt. On the mosaic it is readable the writing “Mediterranean Sea”, in English. It is a fabrication of history that – like in other cases, such as the final scenes of *The House of the Spirits* and the demonstrations against the Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile – reproduces in English what is written in other languages: Greek in the first case, Spanish of South America in the second. But it is also, legitimately, a process of appropriation of a space, the Mediterranean, that for centuries has been representing a fertile crossroad of knowledge and trade, exchanges, as well as a tragic core of economic interests and bloody conflicts. Nowadays it is the theatre of the routes of desperation of people who escape from hunger and tries to overcome the “liquid border” between an atrocious death and the hope of a better future.

This part of the world, between North and South, between Europe, Asia and Africa, that shall be again able to elaborate its own autonomous thought, like when it was the centre of prominent civilizations, can turn into a resource.

A part of the world that includes the southern Atlantic coast of the continent. It is interesting to note what Orlando Ribeiro, one of the major Portuguese geographers and intellectuals of the 20th century wrote about the Mediterranean. After saying that this sea has always appeared as one of the most ancient and constant features of the globe’s physiognomy, its shores woke at an early stage to civilization that during centuries developed around this interior sea. It was by the intercourse with this area, that the rest of Europe improved its ideas and believes, so that afterwards she was able to spread them all over the world. This author claims that this very small piece of the earth’s surface played one of the most important roles on the globe’s and humanity’s History (Ribeiro, 2011, p. 19).

As far as Portugal is concerned, Orlando Ribeiro quotes another 20th century Portuguese author (Pequito Rebelo), who wrote that Portugal is by nature, at the same time, Mediterranean and Atlantic, because of its location. In fact, Orlando Ribeiro completely agrees with this view and in his opinion the Portuguese territory has the same characteristic aspects of the riverine countries of the Mediterranean, with which Portugal is connected by flagrant and deep affinities. However, due to the country's geographical position the climate is already influenced by the influx of the Atlantic, making it more moderate and humid (Ribeiro, 2011, p. 63).

Finally, in a book entitled *O Problema do Mediterrâneo*, published in 1943, the author, Jorge Alarcão, speaking about the geographical, economic, political and intellectual complex, that is the Mediterranean, wants to show that the mutual incomprehension between the peoples does not derive from any geographical fatalism unsurmountable by human will and that the great stages of mankind's are coincident with the fall of great geographical barriers. The Mediterranean is seen as the cradle of western civilization, as well as the most fecund communication link between the western civilization and all the others (Alarcão, 1943, pp. 7-8).

Franco Cassano, in order to define the geographical, mental and cultural field of his "meridian thought", writes that it is «quel pensiero che si inizia a sentir dentro laddove inizia il mare, quando la riva interrompe gli integrismi della terra (*in primis* quello dell'economia e dello sviluppo), quando si scopre che il confine non è un luogo dove il mondo finisce, ma quello dove i diversi si toccano e la partita del rapporto con l'altro diventa difficile e vera» (Cassano 2003, pp. 5-6). And he puts an essential issue when states that the separation between "meridian thought" and the whirlwind increase of the accumulation, that is more and more a victim of its own acceleration – an essential feature of contemporary history, as highlighted by Massimo Mazzetti (1969), – aims not only to «custodire forme d'esistenza diverse da quella dominante su scala planetaria», but also to «tutelare la stessa modernità dal suo avvolgimento in una spirale senza ritorno (...), darle generosamente la 'chance' di avere un freno a bordo, di poter ricavare al proprio interno delle catene selettive diverse da quelle vincenti e capaci di bloccare il feticismo dello sviluppo» (Cassano, 2003, p. 7).

We do not want put the issue of a "happy degrowth", in the meaning proposed by Serge Latouche (2007), even if this problem fits into the question of the Mediterranean, of the development models of the coastal countries, of the hetero-direction of economies and productions of goods that redistribute wealth to the privileged few and increase poorness, hunger and, indirectly, the flows of desperate people towards richer regions. We believe, on the contrary, that it is necessary to give a different meaning to the space and the time that we are living, where the border has been, in most cases, a place of encounter, exchange, contamination. This would represent a different order of values, a different hierarchy of rules, but also a rediscovery of a common history – sometimes even tragic – of this part of world between the Mesopotamia and the Pillars of Hercules, from the Southern shores of the opulent Europe to the Northern shores of Africa. The Mediterranean

bathes three continents, which is an unique case in the world; it has seen the birth of three monotheistic religions, has been birthplace of great civilizations and of the modern thought, from the Greeks onwards.

The aim of this book, indeed, is re-reading the history of the Mediterranean basin starting from a double interpretative key: sea and border. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings it is good to clarify the sense of these two words, as the sea – and the Mediterranean in particular – is itself a border.

The starting point is to re-read the past of the Mediterranean and to move the observation point from the land to the sea aims. This perspective wants to carry out a de-construction and to start the cancelation, step by step, of the consolidate ethnocentrism of our analyses, in the sense given to the word by William Graham Sumner (1906). It aims, in other words, at avoiding to look at members, structure, culture and history of local groups, other than one’s own, with reference to their own values, habits and rules, as this interpretation of the other unavoidably spurs to overestimate one’s own culture, devaluating that of the others.

Secondly, after this first approach, it is possible to build an interpretative model able to recognize what is different from one’s own culture – the alien, the stranger – not as an enemy, but simply as “different”. This process has a dedicated place: the border, namely the place where diversities come into contact, where contamination is accepted, a territory where what is different does not scare, as the otherness is lived as an opportunity, the contamination is an occasion of growth, the hybrid is the rule. The border, indeed, is not the furthest limit to reach, but a new point of departure. This “place” is necessarily a “liquid” border, permeable, sometimes violent: the sea. We would just like to remind the Canto XXVI of the *Inferno* of the Divine Comedy: the Canto of Ulysses, who continues his journey beyond «quella foce stretta / dov’Ercule segnò li suoi riguardi, / acciò che l’uom più oltre non si metta» (vv. 107-109). After the Pillars of Hercules - behind the Sun, Dante Says – there is the unknown, «mondo senza gente» (v. 117).

Borders and conflicts in times of globalisation

For this reason the present volume and the Centre that has promoted it want to focus on the Mediterranean, starting from the words borders and conflicts. These two words can be historiographically understood as the paradigm of the rejection of the other.

The sacralisation of the borders, or even their “deification”, has been practised since the classical antiquity, in particular by Romans, in order to make them inviolable. In this way they had tried to deprive, at least ideally, the borders of the idea of removal, revocability or negation to which all human creations are subjected (De Sanctis, 2015). In particular, the relation of Romans with the Mediterranean is full of sense of geopolitical security, because they reached a complete control of the “Mediterranean lake”, so as to they could consider it the *Mare Nostrum*, as it was included

into the empire and the borders were moved to its edges (Canfora, 2009). In the passage from the XX and the XXI century, after that scientific literature has long discussed the “eclipse of the sacred”, we see an «imprevisto ritorno (...) nelle varie forme, suggerite dall'accidentalità del percorso storico» (Ferrarotti, 2002, p. 230).

What is outside borders is the other and, quite often, the enemy, who is dangerous for the “sacred motherland”. Therefore the borders become the ideal place to build and enclose identity and to make contraposition; violence is the tool to defend one's own land or to extend borders, in the name of a superior form of civilization; who dies for defending his motherland or for affirming its supremacy becomes the hero, who shall be reminded and venerated by the future generations. And this is the same for all people living on the borders and participating in the conflicts.

Our history and that of the others is marked by this logic of contraposition. It is the history of the building of empires; the history of the assault to the goods of the others. Just think to the violent pillaging of Africa, accelerated after the Berlin Conference on Congo of 1884-1885, that imposed a complete European dominion over the continent. Economical interests, will power, political, social and strategic elements are at the root of the European intervention in Africa (Hobson, 1902), so as to the current research no longer believes in the unity of the phenomenon but in a number of imperialisms, more or less different one from another, arisen in the context of different links, competitions and interactions (Speitkamp, 2007).

It is advisable to reverse the perspective from which we observe sea and land, but also present and future, and the concept of “civilization” itself. It is not usual to observe the coast from the sea, as Carl Schmidt (1954) reminds, because our categories of space and time come from the land and consider the sea as the horizon, the extreme infinite, the unknown. The popular tradition and the “common sense” are full of expressions that locate on the land the certainty of existence, the solidity of what is built on the rock, unlike not only the sea – instable element – but also the changing and fragile border between sea and land constituted by the beach. Cassano argues that «l'incontro di terra e mare non è l'idillio che ricompono: esso non è quiete, ma la difficoltà di stare in un solo luogo, non è il ritorno di identità semplici, ma la scoperta che *dopo lo sviluppo*, ritornano utili risorse che si erano gettate via con sprezzo dai finestrini».

The Mediterranean, as highlighted by Braudel (1949), is not even a sea, but a complex of seas, enclosed among jagged coasts, full of peninsulas and islands; its water is mixed with the land, its coasts are marked by olives and grapes; a sea of farmers that share, according to the French historian, its history with that of the land.

A place, physical and ideal at the same time, in which different communities and societies coexist, sometimes in opposition among them, and where the invention of tradition (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) more and more dangerously becomes an “unnatural nature” of clash of civilizations.

In this regard, Anthony Mohlo (2002, pp. 29-30) effectively summarises the “sense” of the Mediterranean Basin: «Il mondo mediterraneo si offre come un punto di osservazione ideale per studiare il problema di come comunità che apparten-

gono a religioni, lingue, culture, etnie e tradizioni diverse possano e riescano ad interagire reciprocamente nel tempo. Poche aree del mondo possono eguagliare la densità storica, l’eterogeneità etnica e religiosa e la complessità dell’interazione sociale che, in conseguenza dell’alto grado di vicinanza e della mobilità geografica, sono emerse nel mondo mediterraneo».

By overturning the view land/sea, indeed, it is possible to determine different perspectives and a different relation with the other, which is an indispensable operation, mainly under the cultural point of view. Alphonse Dupront – developing the thought of André Aymard and presenting it at the XII Congress of historical sciences in Vienna in 1965, in place of the great historian died the previous year – centres his reflection on the concept of “acculturation”, understood as the movement of an individual, a group, a society and also a culture toward another culture. This movement produces a dialogue, an encounter, a mixture, but more often a clash and a showdown (Dupront, 1965). Think to the insertion of western culture in indigenous societies or to the interrelations among groups considered “civilized” and groups perceived as “primitive”. Acculturation is still now an ambiguous words, but in many cases it has represented a process of forced assimilation of a culture by another, through violent conquest and political dominion.

From this point of view it is possible to build a different historiographical sensibility and to re-read, through a different interpretation of the concept of border, the history of the Mediterranean – and of the processes of the acculturation that involved it – not only as a conflict, but also as incorporation of stranger cultural elements by a people through the relations with a close people. It is a different interpretation of the word “acculturation” and, as is evident, is opposed to the violent concept of subjugation.

The need of researching one’s own borders and to re-writing one’s own history, starting from the elements of contamination and hybridization, appears more and more necessary because of two phenomena that involve our contemporaneity. First, the pervasiveness of the mass media and, mainly, of the internet and social networks, that entails homologation at global level and, at the same time, reduces distances and time, redefines the meaning of words such as “public” and “private”. Secondly, the extraordinary and dramatic movement of population started in the wake of the fall of the Berlin wall (Corti 2003, pp. 105-135) and – more interesting for our considerations – now coming from the areas of crisis that encircles the Mediterranean: from the Middle East to the Eastern Africa, to the Equatorial Africa, to the Sahel.

A response to these phenomena and to the problems induced by them can be the construction of walls and barriers, re-proposing the borders as impassable limits and searching new forms of sacralisation. Think to the xenophobic and ultra-nationalist reactions of the Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán and, more in general, to the anti-immigration movements arisen in Europe. Alternatively, there is the way – that is much more difficult and, in some respects, can strike fear – of accepting the challenge coming from the presence of the other.

Borders and conflicts in the Mediterranean basin

Also this book originates from the first International conference organized by the ICSR Mediterranean Knowledge in October 2015 on the topic of borders. Like the first volume of the series, the work does not include only the papers presented by historian on that occasion, but also proposes the essays of other scholars that contribute to widens the range of the topics, of the methodological approaches, of the historiographical interpretations. The chapters combine the analysis of single problems with a reflection on the historiography concerning the Mediterranean basin, with a long-term perspective (from the middle age to the most recent times). If ideas, research, analysis and conclusion could be triangulated, it would be easy to observe that the prospective angle move from that individual of each scholar to a common and shared point, that is no longer located on the land, but in the middle of the “Internal Sea”. This is, indeed, the aim of the ICSR Mediterranean Knowledge: rethinking the borders between Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as «the boundaries means rethinking the current idea of Europe and the Mediterranean. Only from such a rethinking can the foundations for the construction of a real and different European identity be laid. The knowledge and cultural values of the Mediterranean can be the driving force to overcome the impasse of which Europe cannot free itself» (Benguerna M. & Mangone E., 2016, p. 7).

The book is organized in three parts that structure the reflection on borders and conflicts around three topics: the historiography on the idea of Mediterranean; the cultural aspects in the historical and historiographical interpretation; the combination of the words “conflicts” and “borders” realized in the wars that have caused bloodshed in the area.

The book starts with a chapter by Mohieddine Hadhri, Emeritus Professor at the University of Manouba (Tunis) and now Professor at the University of Qatar. Hadhri reflects on the concept of Mediterranean, both as a bridge between the Arab-Muslim Orient and the European-Christian Occident and as a space of East-West cultural confluences. Hadhri argues that, contrary to the tendentious theories of Samuel Huntington, the Mediterranean has always been a place of exchanges and proximity between Orient and Occident, both during the ancient eras - the Egypt of the Pharaohs, the Phoenicia (motherland of the princess Europe kidnapped by Zeus and brought to Crete) Greece, Carthage, Rome – and during the Middle Age through Spain, Sicily and Levant, which were real bridges between Islam and Christianity. Actually the examination of history easily shows that the Mediterranean has been a cradle of civilizations and a crossroad of cultures. There is no doubt that the dawn of the third millennium, with its tragedies, misunderstandings and intolerance, contributes to give a greater role to culture, among the nations of the Mediterranean and in the world.

The first section of the book collects chapters on the Mediterranean borders between pope Gregory the Great and Fernand Braudel, thus analysing the problem of the borders during the centuries.

The chapter of Claudio Azzara (University of Salerno), titled *Rebuilding a Lost Unity. Pope Gregory the Great, the Empire and the Regna in the Mediterranean Space of Early Middle Ages*, considers the very articulated international relations of Gregory the Great. The pope, indeed, was at the same time leader of the Christianity and a political man engaged in a continuous diplomatic action toward the emperor of Constantinople and the kings of the *barbarae nationes*. Taking into account important works of the pope (mainly the *Regula Pastoralis* and the *Register epistolarum*), Azzara provides a short, but clear, framework of the international relations and of the thought of the pope, also proposing a discussion about the different interpretations of the papacy of Gregory the Great.

The second chapter, by Luca Zavagno (Bilkent University di Ankara) is titled *Islands: not the Last Frontier: Insular Model in Early Medieval Byzantine Mediterranean, c. 650- c. 850* and focuses on the byzantine historiography. The author highlights that the great Mediterranean islands have been often regarded as mere peripheral additions to the Byzantine heartland and on the different interpretation given, for example, by Fernand Braudel, according to whom the system makes up a coherent human environment in so far as similar pressures are exerted upon them, making them both far ahead and far behind the general history of the sea.

Author of the third chapter of the section, titled *From Permeable Frontiers to Strict Border Divisions: The Geostrategic Construction of the Mediterranean on the Ruins of the Ancient Narrow Seas* is John Chircop (Mediterranean Institute of Malta). In his work Chircop underlines that by the late 19th century, rival Western European powers – particularly the British and the French – projecting their imperial strategies/operations in the region, came to construct homogenised (unidimensional) geostrategic representations of the Mediterranean Sea. These ascending Eurocentric Mediterranean vistas accompanied the Western industrial powers’ financial, commercial and colonial projections, legitimising the complete dislocation and devastation of the various, overlapping, ancient narrow-sea complexes as that in the Central Mediterranean. Against this background, he will direct attention to, and build on, that historical literature which engages with these issues in order to at least reconstruct *the central Mediterranean narrow-sea nexus*.

The second part of the book “Borders and conflicts between culture and history” examines the issue under the cultural point of view, focusing on the relations/conflicts present in different areas of the Mediterranean. The section includes four chapters.

The first, written by Elisa Vermiglio (University “Dante Alighieri” of Reggio Calabria) is titled *A fertile border: the Mediterranean in Sicily. Ethnic Components and Social Stratification in the Sicilian Urban Realities of the Late Middle Ages*. Vermigli explores the different urban realities of Sicily between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, as a result of the historical layers of the dominations that alter-

nated (sea as a battle vehicle) and of the shopping immigration (sea as a culture and economics vehicle). A particular attention is paid to the major port cities, now border towns, now military outposts, now a vehicle for trade of people and goods, highlighting how the sea has conveyed short and long-range migrations and shaped the *facies* of the territory.

The article by Massimo Siani (University of Salerno), *From the Middle Ages to the Modern Age. The "Royal City" of Cava: Power and Privileges in the Formation of the Borders. A Research Approach* addresses a specific, but emblematic, subject: the city of Cava de' Tirreni in the late medieval centuries. Siani shows that the political and social transformations, started between the end of the XIII and XIV centuries, have made Europe, even in the XV century, a combination of several overlapping layers, where the territory and jurisdiction hardly coincide and where any institution rarely spread over a contiguous area. Therefore will be better to study it like a mind-border or even as an identity devised by different actors. Discussing about the history of Cava in the XV century shows how both characters interacted each other, how created their identity and how everyone of these survived and contributed at the birth and growth of the Kingdom of Naples.

Maciel Morais Santos (CEAUP - Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto), in his work about *The Suez Crisis seen from a Minor Imperialism. Portuguese Diplomacy in Egypt (1956-1957)*, deals with the Suez crisis of 1956, as seen by a minor imperialism and analyzes the Portuguese policy in 1956-57. According to Santos, the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and the anti-colonial policies followed by the new Egyptian government did not take long to become a target for the old European imperialist powers. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal made them decide to act – some of them directly as Britain and France, others indirectly such as Portugal. The essay exploits the records of the 1956-57 Portuguese diplomacy towards the Egyptian government in several European capitals and as part of the SCUA – the international organisation of “users of the canal” (meanwhile created to sabotage the Egyptian nationalisation). It aims to show the contradictions of minor colonial power, not flexible at any of its own decolonisation processes but forced by the circumstances to be especially attentive to every subtle change of the general political environment.

The chapter by Erminio Fonzo (University of Salerno) – *A Historiographical Border. Use and Abuse of History in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*–, is dedicated to the public use of history within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Fonzo shows that the two parties in conflict use to propose an one-sided narrative of the conflict and of the history of Palestine. Indeed history, along with religion, is an important motivator for the two contenders, as both want to be recognized as the rightful «owners» of the disputed territory, and it also serves to seek support on the international scene. The most popular media (textbooks, press, television, public ceremonies, museums) of Israel and Palestine often propose a quite biased narrative, aimed at strengthening the reasons of one side rather than to offer a fair knowledge. In that context, indeed, history and memory have immediate political consequences and

directly affect the life of millions people. Frequently scholars and historians follow this trend but in recent decades some intellectuals have analyzed in a more critical way the history of the «Holy land».

The third section addresses the topic of the conflicts – at least some of them – that have affected the Mediterranean, taking into account the combination peace/war, but also social, cultural and economic aspects.

The first chapter is *Fragile Borders Beyond the Strait. Saracen Raids on the Italian Peninsula (8th-11th century A.D.)*, by Giuseppe Perta (University Dante Alighieri of Reggio Calabria). The author highlights that the incursions of the Saracens in Italy have rarely achieved territorial gains. Yet the Saracen presence on the mainland was consistent, invasive and wide-ranging. It was not the result of a rhapsodic policy, but the consequence of political and economic conjunctures that involved the entire Mediterranean arena. Autonomous territorial entities were founded in the West as real Muslim enclaves. Apart from Bari, the Muslim presence was widespread in Campania (from Agropoli to the Garigliano river), Calabria (from Reggio to Amantea), in Basilicata (through the valleys of its main rivers) and in the north-western part of Peninsula as well. The Arab presence was not limited to mere military actions, but contributed to increase the internationality of the Italian cities.

The second article, *Conflict and Peace in the Mediterranean. Barbary Privateering in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries*, deals with a similar theme, but seen in a different time and from a different perspective. Jorge Martins Ribeiro (University of Porto and CITCEM - Transdisciplinary Research Centre of Culture, Space and Memory) shows that by the end of the 18th century the young independent United States, suffered attacks from the denominated “*Barbary pirates*”. There existed both European and North African privateers, although nowadays we tend only to consider the Barbary corsairs, which is true for the epoch the author deals in the paper. For the United States merchantmen, the Mediterranean was not an unknown ground, but after the treaty of 1783, by which Great-Britain recognized the independence of her North American colonies they could not count any more with the protection of the Royal Navy. The Portuguese fleet, however helped to protect both its ships and trade. After 1801, however, American policy changed and they sent war vessels to the Mediterranean which led to attacks to Tripoli and Algiers. After 1816, the corsairs ceased to be a threat to United States ships, and only a few vessels were stationed in the area for patrolling purposes until 1830, when France occupied Algiers.

Caterina Miele (Independent Researcher) dedicates her chapter on *Colonial Enclosures. Notes on War and Peace, Land and Modernity in the Italian Colonization of Libya* and shows that the Italian implemented in Libya processes of enclosures, expropriation, separation of workers from their means of production, accumulation and production of subaltern subjectivities, exploitation of natural resources. Within the colonial context of the “pacified” Libyan colony (1932-1943), “peace” is represented both as result and continuation of the war. In a short but crucial phase of the

Italian colonial rule in the Mediterranean basin, the epistemological and material conflict between colonized and colonizers was played around the notions of land and labour, so contributing to shape the final transition of the two countries to capitalist modernity but also to strengthen the imaginary boundary between the human being and its environment that characterizes the global present.

The final chapter, *Old Conflicts and New Borders: Chronicles from the Zones of the Anglo-American Landing of 9 September 1943*, by Giuseppe D'Angelo (University of Salerno), focuses on the reconstruction of the events of 8 and 9 September with a micro-historical view, reporting what happened in the places of the landing in the hours before and after the beginning of the "Operation Avalanche", with some digressions that better delineate the conditions in which the Italian soldiers operated, the local population lived and the way in which they react to a new, unexpected and dramatic event such as the armistice with the Anglo-American forces.

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The Mediterranean: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

MOHIEDDINE HADHRI

La Méditerranée a été une arène, un champ clos où, durant trente siècles, l'Orient et l'Occident se sont livrés des batailles. Désormais, la Méditerranée doit être comme un vaste forum sur tous les points duquel communieront des peuples jusqu'ici divisés.

La Méditerranée va devenir le lit nuptial de l'Orient et de l'Occident.

Michel Chevalet (*Le Globe*, 12 February 1832)

Introduction

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war between East and West, one of the most significant phenomena of international relations is the rebirth of the East-West division in often archaic terms, which appear borrowed from the late XIX century or even earlier. Many people believe that this new debate is just a new development of the long history which opposes the peoples of the two shores of the Mediterranean since time began and, mainly, after the rise of Islam (Pelletier, 1996; Said, 1996). Hence in the West, some voices consider that a new confrontation Islam-West and, more in general, East-West, appears above the horizon. These few voices are supported by the theory of the American Samuel Huntington on the «clash of civilizations», theory which has caused much ink to flow during last ten years and which made Islam an ideal enemy of the New America (Huntington, 1996).

This article starts from the hypothesis that, contrary to the tendentious theories of Huntington, the Mediterranean has always been a place of exchanges and proximity between Orient and Occident, both during the ancient eras - the Egypt of the Pharaohs, the Phoenicia (motherland of the princess Europe kidnapped by Zeus and brought to Crete) Greece, Carthage, Rome – and during the Middle Age through Spain, Sicily and Levant, which were real bridges between Islam and Christianity. Under this point of view, two very interesting historic moments deserve to be highlighted and studied in order to measure the intensity of the relations between Islam and Christianity in the Middle Age: the Omayyad Andalusia and the Norman Sicily.

Actually the examination of history easily shows that the Mediterranean has been a cradle of civilizations and a crossroad of cultures. There is no doubt that the dawn of the third millennium, with its tragedies, misunderstandings and intolerance, contributes to give a greater role to culture, among the nations of the Mediterranean and in the world. Our conviction is that the crucial stage of the late XX cen-

tury give us an exceptional occasion for the birth of movements of solidarity, of dialogue and of cultural partnership among the Mediterranean peoples, in order to counter identity closure, xenophobia, extremism.

Therefore the idea of a new Mediterranean dialogue – a mainly cultural dialogue based on the acknowledgement of the other as a partner – is today required as a *conditio sine qua non* of a true interfaith and intercommunity reconciliation among peoples and nations. At a time when we are looking at an awakening of a Mediterranean conscience and to the proliferation of initiatives to establish a partnership between Europe and Arab-Mediterranean countries, the East-West cultural dialogue becomes a determining factor of understanding and coexistence (Hadhri, 2005).

The Mediterranean of yesterday, a bridge between the Arab-Muslim Orient and the European-Christian Occident

The Arab-Muslim civilization, as developed in the European territory of Spain, was at the root of the path culminated with the Renaissance. And this not only (contrary to what many historians argue) by the transmission of the Arabic translations of Greek and Indian works, but also by building a scientific, economical and artistic culture of unprecedented vitality. This culture will overcome that of Merovingian's and Carolingians, mainly thanks to the revolution of the language.

With reference to the Arab-Muslim civilization, Paul Balta, well-known French writer and journalist, did not hesitate to speak of «Arab miracle of the Middle Age» (Balta 2003) in front of the immense progress carried out by Arabian scholars in all fields.

This contribution of the Arab-Muslim culture to the development of Modern Europe will be strongly contested or ignored by many Western historians, if not by the majority of them.

Al-Andalus, the 'Bright Jewel of the World' in the Middle Age.

From IX century CE, Andalusia was one of the wonders of the world. Arrived on Spanish coasts in 711, in the following century Arabs began to build an urban society modelled on that of Baghdad – the city of peace which, built from 762, became a flourishing industrial, agrarian, commercial, scientific and artistic centre, whose influence expanded to East, as far as China and India (Miquel, 1978).

However the greatest wonder is the progress of knowledge. Richness of manufactures and trade would not be possible without the promotion of science as a driving force of technologic progress and economical growth. Like the Abbasids in Baghdad, the Andalus rulers encouraged education and arts in order to raise the cultural level of people. Abd al-Rahman I in 785 begins to build the great mosque, a large and wonderful building which will become the religious and educational centre of the capital. The great mosque will be enlarged by his successors, Abd al-Rahman II and III, and terminated by al-Hakam II.

During the IX and X centuries, the schools of the mosques will turn into universities, the first in Europe. Each city had one, attracting Muslim, Jew and Christian students and scholars from all over the world.

Al-Hakam himself was a scholar, who had read a discrete number of the 400.000 books which filled his famous library, as demonstrated by his margin notes¹. Persian and Syrian books will become famous in Andalusia. The city of Cordoba used to produce about 6.000 books per year, a work eased by the invention of paper, which Arabs had learned by Chinese people. All main cities had their paper mills. Cordoba, the pearl of Andalusia, was renowned in all Europe. In a poem written in a Saxon monastery, the abbess Hroswitha praises Cordoba, «brillant joyau du monde, la jeune cité merveilleuse, fière de son pouvoir de résistance, fameuse pour les joies qu'elle renferme, rayonnante dans l'entière possession de toutes choses» (Weissbach, 2001).

In summary, in the case of Muslim Spain we can speak of a perfect osmosis between two cultures that, although characterized by unavoidable wars, had given the humanity one of the most renowned medieval libraries, built by al-Muatassar Ibn Abderramane from 961 to 986, which will be the core of the present Escorial (Miquel, 1986)

The Norman Sicily, a bridge between East and West

Sicily, crossroad of civilization, was the cradle of the Greek-Roman civilization, of the Arab-Muslim civilization, and of the Norman civilization. In the XIII century under Frederic II it rises from its ashes and becomes an exceptional model of tolerance, scientific progress and culture in a world where religions and ideologies confronted one another. Sicily hosted one of the greatest centres of translation of Arab scientific works, which contributed to the transmission of the Arab knowledge and culture in the West, easing – as argued by the historians of literature - the rise of the Renaissance in Europe (Kharchani, 1994).

Heir of the Norman court, Frederic II was immersed in an oriental mood – far beyond the infatuation felt by the Occident, after the Crusade, for Arab culture - mainly in fields such as astrology, mathematics, medicine, philosophy.

This way the Arab-Christian culture dominated Sicily for time. Since the Norman conquest, in 1091, until the kingdom of the Hohenstaufen, the legacies of the previous kingdoms of Muslims, from language to architecture, to music, to poetry, to science, will assimilate. In 1140 Roger of Sicily establish rigorous criteria to the certification of physicians on the basis of the Baghdad model. Fredric II (1215-1250), for whom Arabic is the first language, calls at his court scholars from Baghdad, as well as musicians and poets. He was so Arabized that the Pope Innocent IV accuses him to be a crypto-Muslim. Fredric and Roger are known as the “baptized sultans of Sicily”.

¹ The first catalogue of this library was edited by the Lebanese Michael Gharizi and published in Latin in two volumes under the title *Arabici-Hispana Escorialensis Bibliotheca* in 1760 and 1770 (Asin Palacios 1982).

The “Crusade” of Fredric in Jerusalem scandalizes the Holy Siege because, instead of making a war to conquer the territories, Fredric negotiates with Muslims and spends his time in philosophical discussions with their scholars. Later he will send a series of questions on the nature of God to the Andalus philosopher Ibn Sab’in, whose answers are published in *Sicilian questions*. In 1224 he establishes the University of Naples on the model of the Andalus centres of studies. The university, with benefits from a royal charter, proposes a program of oriental studies, from which also Thomas Aquinas benefits. Fredric II keeps the Muslim system of taxation, which had been adopted by Normans. His son Manfred, a perfect land-surveyor, continues the policy of his father. His liberal approach toward a number of Muslims provoke a papal condemnation, as well as in the case of his brother Conrad (Weissbach, 2001).

Sciences and civilizations in the Mediterranean: knowledge and Orient-Occident cultural transformations

Since the VIII century CE, the scientific and technical results of Greece and Persia are developed in cities such as Toledo, Cordoba and Seville, which become real distribution centres towards all the medieval Europe.

This path of Muslim science from East to West is symbolized by the rationalist message of Averroes, which will reach France and was on the edge to reach also Germany. Actually, the emperor Fredric II, who was also King of Sicily, had continued to surround himself with Muslim scholars; to him, along with others, is dedicated the major work of the great Arab geographer whose name is Abu Abdullah Mohammed Ibn al-Sharif al-Idrissi and called *Kitab Rudjar*, the Book of Roger (Maqbul, 1992).

Later this rationalist and universalist thought will continue its journey in Europe, resulting, in XVII century, in the great philosophers-mathematics-physicians Descartes, Pascal and Leibniz (the latter is a German, but he writes a part of his works in French; great scholar of Aristotle, he also made translate a philosophical allegory of Ibn Tufayl, friend and wannabe of Averroes), before to culminate in the French Enlightenment of the Encyclopaedia, of Voltaire and Rousseau.

This thought will reach its apogee with the French Revolution, carried out under the flag of the universal Reason, but leads to a philosophy of Freedom, fully elaborated by Hegel, in which the triumphing Reason appears to be mixed, but also subordinated, to the main construction of human spirit, that of its Freedom.

Therefore promoting and making know this Arab-Islamic scientific legacy, which has its centre in the medieval Mediterranean, could contribute to improve the perception of the other and to establish new bridges of dialogue and communication between the two shores of the Mediterranean (Hadhri, 2010).

The Mediterranean of the present and of the future: a space of East-West cultural confluences

In the present historical and political condition the Mediterranean appears as an intermediary between West and Islam. It is a territory of mediation which eases encounters of any kind, establishing a possible common identity of the coastal peoples.

In summary, the cultural realities of the present Mediterranean Basin are incontestably an inexhaustible field of crossed variables, styles, imageries, born by the synthesis among cultures. In other words, the Mediterranean is a complex place of contact among culture, a permanent space of interaction among Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the cultures of the Ancient East and of the Ancient Egypt, along with Phoenician, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Arab and Andalus, Ottoman, European civilizations. No region of the world has ever seen such mixture, synthesis and loans among so different and so rich cultures. Therefore there is an essential question which should be asked to the protagonists of the future Mediterranean cultural heritage. This question is even more relevant as the Mediterranean, place of meeting among cultures and civilizations, finds itself in a crucial moment of its history, for at least two reasons:

- First, at level of the Mediterranean itself, where contradicting forces are deeply working to make this geo-historical space both a place of encounter and integration and a zone of cleavages and borders;

- Second, at global level, with gives the challenge of adapting their cultural legacy with the phenomenon of the pervasive globalization, so as to preserve the opportunities of a Mediterranean reconciled with itself and with its near and far past.

Hence the crucial questions are:

What bridges are to be built in the Mediterranean in order to overcome the apathy, the misunderstandings of the past and get ready for future?

How to identify strategies, mechanisms and actors able to contribute to lay the foundations of the XXI century Mediterranean, giving it a new geopolitical centrality, which it has lost for time?

Under this point of view, the concept of reconstruction has never been used so much by the academics, the writers and the politicians of the two shores of the Mediterranean, as demonstrated by these few titles of books and quotes, published here and there: *L'Euro-Méditerranée, une région à construire* (Bistolifi, 1995); *Méditerranée, le Pacte à construire* (FMES, 1997); *La Tunisie méditerranéenne, un pont entre les deux rives* (Hadhri, 2004); *Mostar, un pont entre deux mondes* (Matvejevic, 2003).

There is no need to say that today the challenge of future and peace, of stability and freedom in the two shores is huge. The target is clear: reduce the cleavage, the misunderstanding, the economical, political and cultural disparities. In this regard five areas of cultural activity appear essential and constitute the pillars on which any project of reconstruction of the Mediterranean building for the XXI century should be founded:

1) Reconstruct the legacy of Abraham around the monotheistic message in the Mediterranean and strengthen the basis of the Islam-Europe dialogue

Among the two civilizations – Arab-Islamic on the one side and Judaic-Christian on the other – there is a sort of evident cultural chasm, a historical misunderstanding which acts as an obstacle to the search for a common ground of dialogue. Suspicion and reciprocal fear, with their stereotypes and prejudices, permanently stand in the relations of these two geo-political entities, these two civilizations located on the two shores of the Mediterranean.

Live in peace in a world of diversity.

The new millennium announces the end of the crusades and of the cultural misunderstanding among the Mediterranean nations? Or, on the contrary, it announces a new stage of ideological and religious fights on a Mediterranean and global scale? This is the question!

Even if the reality of religious relations in all the world is at the stage of expectations and hopes of both civilizations, we must not leave out any effort to clarify the misunderstanding, to identify the positive factors and signs of dialogue among cultures and religions: «Live in peace in a world of diversity», this should be the safe word and the motto of the free men and of the Mediterranean intellectuals who love peace and progress.

This beginning of century represents an exceptional historic moment, which involves the consciences of both civilizations in order to define a new model of relations among nations, not on the basis of uniformity, but of pluralism and diversity.

In this sense someone invokes the Abraham's legacy, common to the followers of the three revealed religions, Jews, Christians and Muslims. We believe that the stability of the Mediterranean Basin, the pluralism of cultures and the coexistence of the three monotheistic religions are essential resources for the peace and the prosperity of this crucial area, shackled by many ideological fights. In a similar vein, we also have to overcome the antagonism of the three religious worlds, namely:

- Christianity in the North of the Mediterranean, in the European West;
- Islam in the South and in the East of the Mediterranean;
- The Orthodox world of Balkans and Eastern Europe.

In the search for a better respective perception of the three religions, a reflection based on the general condition of the integration of Islam in the European societies proves to be necessary to strengthen the reciprocal understanding, the cultural interaction and the interfaith reconciliation between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

II) Reconstruct and reshape the old distorted lens of the historical relations of the Arab-Islamic world and the European-Christian West.

a) *Clarify the common legacy of the Mediterranean people, beyond the Islam/West cultural differences, making the young generations to know the role of mediator among civilizations and the ethnic-cultural osmosis developed in the Mediterranean since time began. The Mediterranean has always been one and plural. So the influence of Ancient Egypt was crucial in the Hellenistic civilization of Greece, as well as the Roman civilization involved all the Mediterranean peoples in the stages of birth, realization and glorification. Could we today deny the Maghrebians the role played by their ancestors in the Roman civilizations? Later the Mediterranean saw the flourishing of the Arabism, sustained by Damascus, Baghdad, Kairouan², Cordoba and Granada, which ease the development of the Italian republics of the Modern Renaissance.*

b) *Underline the dynamic of the cultural bridges, such as Andalusia in Spain. Actually, through Seville and Cordoba – two very symbolic cities (Seneca and Lucan were born there) the essential elements of the Greek thought spread across the medieval Europe. A similar role was played by Sicily at the time of Aghlabids and Normans, by the harbours of Palestine at the time of the Crusades and, finally, by the Ottoman Turkey, which is a bridge between the Islamic East and the Greek-Orthodox Balkans.*

Under this point of view, the valorisation of some symbolic figures of this cultural mediation and of this trans-Mediterranean identity syncretism is one of the path to be followed by the supporters of the Mediterranean project. This valorisation could take the shape of books, documentaries, movies and TV series. Among these figures:

Augustine of Hippo (354-430), also known as Saint Augustine, born in Tagaste, in North Africa, in the second century CE, lived in Milan and then in Rome. Augustine who was a bishop became an early Christian theologian and philosopher whose writings influenced the development of Western Christianity and Western philosophy and contributed to the ecclesiastic exegesis.

*Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126-1198) in the Andalusian Spain, better known in the Latin West as Averroes. Thanks to Ibn Rushd (Averroes) Aristotle was re-discovered through his famous *Commentaries*, This influential commentaries and unique interpretations on Aristotle revived Western scholarly interest in ancient Greek philosophy, whose works for the most part had been neglected since the sixth century. Ibn Rushd famous *Commentaries* were condemned by the Sorbonne University in 1270, but served as basis for the European modern rationalism and materialism.*

Jawhar al-Siqilli which means “Jawhar the Sicilian”, a Sicilian Christian converted to Islam, who became one of the most illustrious figures of the Fatimid dynasty in Mahdia in Ifriqiya around the middle X century CE. Jawhar was chief of the

² Qayrawan (or, in French and English, Kairouan; in Arab: القيروان, al-Qayrawān) is the city of Tunisia which, during the Islamic Caliphate, was the capital of the governorate (*wilāya*) of Ifriqiya

Fatimid armies arrived in Egypt and contributed to the foundation of the city of Cairo in 969 CE. He died on February 1st 992 CE.

Leo Africanus (Jean-Léon de Médicis, called Léon l'Africain) who is simply Mohamed al-Wazzan, a Muslim ambassador from the Maghreb captured by Sicilian pirates in 1518, converted to Christianity and become a high dignitary of the Holy See from XV to XVI century at the time of Léon X, the Great pope of the Renaissance. Amin Maalouf, Lebanese writer, dedicated to him one of his most important works "Leon l'Africain" (Maalouf, 1983).

Curious destinies of these few figures, mentioned as example, whose stories testify the alternation of interferences and confluences in the two shores of the Mediterranean.

III) Reconstruct the crossed imageries East-West, North South, at literary and artistic level

Everybody knows that collective imageries constitute the *lieux de mémoire* of peoples and generations. These imageries are alimented by the great myths and epic poems. Both the Mediterranean and the Orient saw the production of the great mythologies of human history, with the *Odyssey* of Ulysses, the legend of the Carthaginian queen Dido or, finally, with the *One thousand and one night* and captain Sinbad, as well as with many others myths of universal value (Balta, 1996).

In short, the epic travels of Sinbad in the hot seas of India and Far East are similar, under many respects, to the adventures of Ulysses in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the tales of Sinbad, like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, belong to the crossed imageries of Orient and Occident.

Studying these imageries contributes to spread them and to make clear the elements of the common cultural identity, rich and diverse, of the Mediterranean, and it is a significant and exciting task for the supporters of the intercultural dialogue.

IV) Reconstruct the tourist networks and create new Mediterranean paths of history and culture, in order to make the cultural tourism a trans-Mediterranean factor of dialogue and reconciliation.

Among the great challenges on which the future of the Mediterranean will depend there is tourism as a vector of contact, reconciliation and trans-Mediterranean dialogue. More of a simply activity of economy, tourism is a highly strategic sector, a real cultural bridge among the different Mediterranean countries.

In substance it is necessary to reconsider the exclusively economic approach to tourism and to add to it the dimension of culture. The Mediterranean is an ideal ground for cultural tourism, thanks to its treasures of historical monuments and sites of the world heritage, in the Egypt of the pharaohs, in the ancient Greece, in Carthage or Rome, to mention only the ancient heritage.

Therefore we need to reconsider the touristic itineraries, planned at national level in every country, in order to make them integrated circuits on the scale of the Mediterranean space. As an example we can mention *La route des Phéniciens*, a touristic circuit limited to renowned localities of Southern Europe in Sicily, Sardinia, Provence and in the Balears, until Carthage, which was the centre of the Phoenician civilization and the cradle of its splendour.

a) Build a network of confluence -cities in the Mediterranean.

The creation of such a network is destined to establish bonds of friendship based on the pluralism of the cultural, intellectual and artistic exchanges among the Mediterranean cities. It is necessary to establish new solidarities in concrete projects of cooperation and through twinning activities, which would be fruitful if developed in all the Mediterranean cities, such as Cordoba, Seville (Spain), Fes and Marrakesh (Morocco), Oran and Constantine (Algeria), Kairouan and Carthage (Tunisia), Nice and Marseille (France), Naples and Florence (Italy), Alexandria (Egypt) Byblos (Lebanon), Latakia (Syria), Izmir and Istanbul (Turkey), as well as in other symbolic cities.

b) Establish a North-South cultural bridge towards the Sahara, understood as a cultural and touristic affluent of the Mediterranean.

In a similar vein, making tourism and cultural heritage decisive factors of understanding and intercommunity coexistence in the Mediterranean passes through a valorisation of the Saharan cultural heritage, as an element of the South Mediterranean heritage.

House of religious monotheism and spirituality of the ancient world, source of inspiration of poets, mystics, writers, travellers, the desert was, during all the Middle Age, a driving force of the crossed imageries of the Arab-Islamic East and the European-Christian West. The Orient of the *One thousand and one night* with its mysteries and its symbols, the Orient of palaces, jewels, pearls, the Orient of the caravans full of gold and spices.

From the late XIX century the fascination for desert and East, in general, has been strongly influencing European writers and, mostly, painters. Delacroix was the first to genially paint a new Orient, already sublimated by the German intellectual Goethe and later by Nerval and Proust. This contact between East and West testifies the cultural confluences between two worlds, two civilizations, and shows how these artistic exchanges enrich the art and generate masterpieces of universal value.

This oriental dream has always animated the western imagery, much time before the centuries of the European colonialist expansion; this dream persists and is even greater as it is marked by the seal of the permanence. Is this attraction for the Orient only an exoticism, a temporary artificial curiosity? Or, on the contrary, is it the expression of more complex relations between two worlds, two civilizations located on the two shores of the Mediterranean?

After the Crusades, this fascinating Orient will obsess the spirits of writers and philosophers until the XIX century and later. Generations of travellers will move towards this desert, from Chateaubriand to Lamartine, from Guy de Maupassant to Gustave Flaubert, without forgetting Rimbaud, Pierre Loti, Isabelle Eberhardt, An-

dré Gide, Théodore Monod and others. In the artistic field a generation of great painters, from Delacroix to Matisse, Kandinsky and Klee, represented the confluence between East and West in great works. All of them not only acknowledge the nature and the prodigious lights of the Orient, but they also met the Arab-Islamic civilization and its fine, voluptuous, mystic features. (Hadhri, 2004)

In this Oriental dream, always alive and renewed, the desert, with its myths and its landscapes, its symbols and its representations, has always been occupying a privileged place. This oriental dream sometime blends in with the call of the desert, a sort of irresistible attraction toward the South, this South symbol of “solar fullness”, to use the expression of Goethe in his *West-östlicher Divan*.

Although appearing paradoxical, the interest of a people for another people has never mobilized so many energies and in so considerable dimensions. Where this attraction for Orient and desert, which has not equivalent in history, comes from? One of the possible explanations is the exceptional encounter between the two greatest religion of the present world: Islam and Christianity. Actually, for almost fourteen centuries – as underlined by the English historian Arnold Toynbee – a dynamic of challenge has not ceased to raise the most dramatic fights, but also exchanges and fruitful influences between these two worlds. Attraction, fascination, sometimes love, repulsion, hate and reciprocal fears have characterized the relations between the Christian Occident and the Arab-Islamic Orient.

In this regard, the Saharan cultural heritage, important element of the legacy of the South-Mediterranean peoples, could contribute to enrich the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. For its part, the Saharan cultural tourism constitute a new pole of interest for the countries of North and South and its increase would be able to contribute both to the development of the concerned regions and to a better understanding of the peoples located on the two shores of the Mediterranean.

More than ever, the desert should serve to build a platform of dialogue, of encounter and co-development between Europe and the South Mediterranean, or better, the desert is a crucial issue for the XXI century, in its cultural, touristic and ecologic triple dimension (Hadhri, 1997)

Re-establish and valorise the Andalusian model in the North-South cultural relations

In this search for a new model of the North-South cultural relations, the consensus for the Andalusian model deserves attention. Why the history of al-Andalus appears as a golden age? Why it raises a growing interest among researchers and historians?

The exceptional coexistence among cultures – Islamic, Jew, Christian – developed in Andalusia during a part of its history explains why it appears, in spite of its vicissitudes, a privileged space where men who, in the same era, hate one another in all the world, in Andalusia meet, talk and work together.

This form of unparalleled coexistence had huge consequences of which now we hardly begin to measure the extent. Not only the Iberian peninsula and the Maghreb

got richer, but also Europe. Through al-Andalus the foundations of the Greek culture, with the philosophical and scientific contributions of India, Persia and China, were transmitted to Europe. This Andalusia not only connected East and West, but was also a junction between past and future, the ancient world and the Renaissance. In this Andalusia some important places, such as Seville and Cordoba, without forgetting Granada and Toledo, were the centres of the cultural exchanges with Christianity. (Thoby Huff, 2009)

Two testimonies appear very significant and deserve to be quoted, in order to highlight this exceptional conjuncture in the historical relations of Christianity and Muslim world in the Middle Age. The first is a page of the Spanish writer Vicente Blasco Ibañez who, in 1903, wrote in his book *La catedral*:

La regeneración no llegaba a España por el Norte, con las hordas de bárbaros, se presentaba por la parte meridional, con los árabes invasores. Al principio eran muy pocos, y sin embargo, bastaban para vencer a Roderico y sus corrompidos próceres. El instinto de la nacionalidad cristiana revolviéndose contra los invasores, el repliegue de toda el alma española a los riscos de Covadonga para caer de nuevo sobre el conquistador, era una mentira. La España de entonces recibió con agrado a las gentes que venían de África; los pueblos se entregaban sin resistencia; un pelotón de jinetes árabes bastaba para que se abriesen las puertas de una ciudad. Era una expedición civilizadora, más bien que una conquista, y una corriente continua de emigración se estableció en el Estrecho. Por él pasaba aquella cultura joven y vigorosa, de rápido y asombroso crecimiento, que venía apenas acababa de nacer: una civilización creada por el entusiasmo religioso del Profeta, que se había asimilado lo mejor del judaísmo y la cultura bizantina, llevando además consigo la gran tradición india, los restos de la Persia y mucho de la misteriosa China. Era el Oriente que entraba en Europa, no como los monarcas asirios, por la Grecia, que les repelía, viendo en peligro su libertad, sino por el extremo opuesto, por la España, esclava de reyes teólogos y obispos belicosos, que recibía con los brazos abiertos a los invasores. En dos años se enseñorearon de lo que luego costó siete siglos arrebatárselos. No era una invasión que se contiene con las armas: era una civilización joven que echaba raíces por todos lados. El principio de la libertad religiosa, eterno cimiento de las grandes nacionalidades, iba con ellos. En las ciudades dominadas, aceptaban la iglesia del cristiano y la sinagoga del judío. La mezquita no temía a los templos que encontraba en el país: los respetaba, colocándose entre ellos sin envidia ni deseo de dominación. Del siglo VIII al XV se fundaba y se desarrollaba la más elevada y opulenta civilización de Europa en la Edad Media (Blasco Ibañez, 1907, pp. 529-533).

This testimony on the Muslim-Christian coexistence is corroborated by another statement on the Judaic-Arab convergences in Andalusia. Haim Zafrani, Professor of the Chair of Hebrew at the University of Paris VIII, in 1991 wrote in one of his books on the Muslim Occident in the Middle Age:

Jamais, dit-il, le judaïsme ne s'est trouvé dans un état de symbiose si fécond avec une autre culture que dans la civilisation de l'Islam andalou. La condition de Dhimmi³ que connaissaient Juifs et Chrétiens en tant que gens du Livre constituait un statut juridique somme toute libéral (très haut degré d'autonomie légale, administrative, fiscale et culturelle) comparé à celui que connaissaient les Juifs dans le reste de l'Europe».

Le caractère largement sécularisé de la civilisation islamique andalouse permettait par ailleurs aux gens du Livre de se sentir les héritiers d'une grande et respectable tradition culturelle. Et la langue dominante, l'arabe, moins étroitement attachée à la religion régnante que le latin ne l'était à l'Eglise

³ A *dhimmi* was a non-Muslim subject in a State ruled by *shar'ia*

de Rome et d'Orient, était utilisée couramment et sans réserve quand ils abordaient l'étude de leurs propres textes sacrés (Zafrani, 1991).

Raising again the Andalusian dream, which consecrated the values of tolerance and coexistence among Muslims, Jews and Christians, should be today and tomorrow a platform for overcoming the irreducible divisions, the deficit of understanding from which the Mediterranean region suffers. Real cultural bridge, al-Andalus, with its ethnic mixture, its multilingualism, its Judaic-Arab and Islamic-Christian convergences, multiplied real contacts among its three civilizations. Hence the necessity to make today al-Andalus a metaphor of the Mediterranean harmony, allowing the climate of peace to live again in the minds of men.

Conclusions

In this hard time, marked by the uncertainty of the political and economic international conjuncture, but also by the rebirth of religious and theocratic factors, the dialogue among cultures and civilizations is more than ever an essential force of the Euro-Mediterranean project in its totality. Hence: clash of civilizations or dialogue among civilizations?

In truth, these are two leitmotifs, two terms of the difficult equation on which the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations will depend, as well as of those of Europe and Arab-Islamic world. The reconciliation and the cooperation of these two geopolitical entities will be a guarantee of peace and security in the Mediterranean and in the world. Hence the necessity of a renewed reflection on the best strategies to create a global Mediterranean society for the XXI century.

May the climate of peace and concord of al-Andalus shine upon the Mediterranean of this beginning of century, a tormented and lacerated Mediterranean, in order to make this geo-historical space a «new Andalusia of the XXI century!».

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Part I

*Mediterranean Borders between pope Gregory the Great
and Fernand Braudel*

Rebuilding a Lost Unity. Pope Gregory the Great, the Empire and the Regna in the Mediterranean Space of Early Middle Ages.

CLAUDIO AZZARA

During the papacy of Gregory the Great (590-604) the general framework of the Christian oecumene, with whom the holy see had to contend in its complex pastoral and diplomatic activity, appeared extremely fragmented, causing a number of problems and challenges to Rome and requiring careful interventions and articulated responses.

Inserted in the Roman and Christian empire of the “New Rome” Constantinople, with a sense of full cultural and institutional belonging, that did not disappear on the occasion of sporadic conflicts, the pontificate, in the passage between VI and VII century, should counter a Western world definitively fractioned in a plurality of kingdoms with very different features, after the attempt of Justinian to restore the imperial unity of the Mediterranean Basin through the wars against Ostrogoths, Visigoths and Vandals. To mention only the major entities, there was a kingdom of the Franks, friend but weakened by the internal fights among different members of the Merovingian dynasty; a Visigoth monarchy in the Iberian peninsula, recently converted to Catholicism but cold toward the holy see, seen as the expression of the empire that a short time before had assaulted the Goth kingdom and was continuing to occupy the Southern region of *Betica*; finally, the far and almost unknown kingdoms of the Anglo-Saxons beyond the English Channel, one of which, that of Kent, by initiative of Gregory the Great had received the Christian preaching, opening itself to the values of Roman Catholicism. The ability of dialogue of the pope with all these interlocutors had a different intensity, due to specific situations, showing the main interest of spreading and strengthening the Catholic religion and of protecting the institutions of the Church within the different kingdoms.

A situation of greater and more dramatic emergence was represented by the consolidation of the Lombards in Italy, hostile to the Roman population and predatory toward the goods of the Church. Although being located in the Northern part of the peninsula, the king Agilulf had dangerously approached the city of Rome, also threatened by the raids of the Lombard dukes of Benevento and Spoleto.

The numerous variables offered by this general framework forced the pope to operate with particular care and complexity, animated by different preoccupations and aims, with a pragmatism imposed by the reality of the situation, in the continuous search for a dialogue with the political leaders of the different *gentes*, as well as with his own *dominus*, the emperor.

The complexity of the political action of Gregory the Great, of his dialectics with the holders of the royal and imperial power seems to be determined not only by the multiform nature of the issues at stake and by the different rooms for manoeuvre of the individual contexts, but also by the multifaceted aspects of the office of pope, at the same time leader of the Christianity as successor of Peter, primate of the Western Church, in front of the Eastern churches, metropolitan bishop of the suburbicarian Italy and bishop of Rome. The different duties coming from these offices contributed to made it impossible to separate political and diplomatic issues from religious and pastoral preoccupations. With both the *christianissimus imperator* of Constantinople and the *reges gentium*, the call for conversion or for the defence of religious orthodoxy and respect for the Church went hand in hand with the preoccupation to ensure peace, mainly in the troubled Italy of the Lombards, and to create political, diplomatic and cultural relations between *regna* and empire, in order to reduce tensions and establish minimum criteria of international order.

The notable complexity of the work carried out by Gregory the Great in the political context of his time has generated in the modern historiography very divergent interpretations about his personality and the value of his initiatives. Indeed, he was depicted, on the one side, as the pope of the rising nations and the Christian master of the European West, somehow pioneer of the European political balance, because worried to build, for the benefit of the papacy, a support basis constituted by the Christianized barbarian kings in opposition to Constantinople, felt more and more politically and emotionally far; on the other side, as the last pope of the late antiquity, loyal to the empire and natural heir of the values of Roman aristocracy, including a certain cultural disdain and a substantial hostility to the *barbarae nationes*.¹

¹ The double reading of the figure of Gregory the Great, pope-monk animated by spiritual and pastoral motivations or Roman aristocrat who acted with a real political concreteness, was generated in the historiography of the late XIX century and early XX century, often resulting in moralistic evaluations, that even later have not completely disappeared. As an example for the first case see Delaunelle (1960); for the second, Vinay (2003, pp. 5-27). A late-ancient Gregory, in the wake of his predecessors Leo I and Gelasius I, is proposed by Demougeot (1986). On the contrary, W. Ulmann (1972) depicts this pope as the architect of a first, significant, breakthrough of Rome in anti-Constantinopolitan key.

Intermediate interpretations, that have not always avoided fluctuations, critical embarrassments and formulas of compromise, are found in the works of some of the most acute scholars, such as Ottavio Bertolini: see his evaluation of the Gregorian policy (Ottorini 1967). Finally, for the attitude of the pope toward the barbarians, along with the mentioned essay of Vinay, according to whom the pope felt a substantial "roman disdain" for the *gentes*, see, about the value assigned by him to the word *barbarus*, Vitale Brovarone (1980). For a more complete synthesis of the figure and the papacy of Gregory the Great see Markus (1997) and Boesch Gajano (2004).

The anachronism of the first perspective is evident, but the second seems, in turn, too rigid and reductionist. In the evaluation of such phenomena it is opportune considering the action of the institution as a whole and in the long term, rather than the specificity of the individual persons that embodied it from time to time.

To fulfil the numerous and difficult duties of his office, first of all for the interests of the Church and of the Catholic religion, Gregory the Great should necessarily and constantly interact with the emperor and the kings, as well as with officers of several ranks, both in the *respublica* and in the *regna*, very different among them for the problems raised and for the opportunities of dialogue.

Even in the heterogeneity of the cases it is possible to identify a theoretical model in the thought and in the written works of the pope, an uniform *speculum principis*, that represented the conceptualization of the figure of the catholic monarch, of his prerogatives and his duties, for a virtuous governance of men and a right working of the whole Christian society. This model - built on the basis of an ancient Hellenistic-Roman tradition, later re-elaborated by Saint Augustine and identifiable, in its basic lines, in the products of the papal *scrinium* at least since the V-VI century (Reydellet 1981; Azzara 1997) – for Gregory the Great was at the same time an example to suggest to the different interlocutors, so that they could be guided by it in their action, and a yardstick for the work of each one, as well as a scheme to ideally rationalize the apparent dystonia between the uniqueness and the universality of the Christian empire and the existence of a plurality of kingdoms, by now spread all over the West.

The figurative place where all Gregorian features of power amalgamate and mix is the word-concept of *rector*, real synthesis of the superior office, called to govern men within a Christian political community, regardless to the fact that he was a political leader (the emperor, a king, a high rank officer) or the holder of a religious office (a bishop, an abbot) (Markus 1986; Batany 1986).

The semantic versatility of the word-concept of *rector*, that overcomes and cancel any border between secular and religious institutions and confirm the mixed nature, both religious and political, of the authority of late-antiquity origin, for which the cleric had both religious and political duties, finds its full celebration in one of the most known literary works of Gregory, the *Regula pastoralis*, work of extraordinary fortune in the Middle Ages and in the later epochs. Understood as a manual for bishops, the *Regula* offers precepts valid for anybody is charged of governing men. It represented, for example, the basic text for the effort of elaboration of a political theory and praxis by the king Alfred of Wessex (871-899), who made translate it into his own language (Judic 1986; Crépin 1986).

At the root of the Gregorian *speculum* of the *rector* there is the key reason of the conception of the power as a service (*ministerium*): understanding one's own activity of leading as a *ministerium* means to take as an example the supreme action of Christ, the King of the kings who wanted to be in the service of men, humiliating the power and strengthening the soul with the virtue of the *humilitas*, in opposition to the danger of the *elatio*, typical prerogative of the devil (Sancti Gregori I Magni,

Regulae Pastoralis Liber, III, 20)². Who governs must always remember the all men are generated equal for nature and only the guilt of sin has differentiated them, creating hierarchies and the slavish dependence itself. Mindful of this, he must not glorify himself for his power, but rather must be glad for receiving by God the charge of benefiting to his underlings, exercising the governance in legitimate terms. At the same time the subjects must, in turn, obey who has been made responsible of them by them, without claiming to judge him even if he mistakes, aware that an evil ruler is a tool of the divine punishment for the sins committed by a community expressed by *Reg. Past.* III, 4 on the basis of I Samuel 24:4. Such an approach to the dialectics between rulers and ruled is effectively expressed in the Gregorian works, on several occasions, with regard to the relation between a father and his sons, with the first called to punish the seconds in order to correct them, in their interests, and the sons obliged to obey and respect their parent³.

The paradigm of the Christian *rector* is further defined by the catalogues of *virtutes*, findable in many letters to the monarchs collected in the correspondence of the pope, that in several cases are traced back to the reflections on royalty of the classical Greek philosophy, for example of Stoicism. The Christian kings, as well as the priests, are urged by Gregory the Great to follow, in their action, the set of ethical values, summarised by the *virtutes* of *benignitas*, *bonitas*, *prudentia*, *largitas*, *sapientia*, *clementia*, *mansuetudo*, and mainly by the essential *iustitia*, *aequitas* and *humilitas* (*Reg. Past.* III, 9, 16, 20-23). Their counterpart is constituted by the absences of virtue of *ira*, of *superbia-elatio*, of *malitia*, of *invidia*, of *discordia*, into which it is easy to slip for the fragility of human condition and for the inclination to sin (*Reg. Past.* III, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 20, 22) (Azzara 1991).

The mixing of secular and religious levels in the figure of the *rector*, determined by the sharing of common duties and prerogatives, is strengthened and confirmed by the repeated mention of exemplar models of kings-priests, starting from David and Solomon. David, in particular, is mentioned as a paradigm of wise moderation, incorruptibility, ability to mend one's ways in front of the divine punishment for a mistake, wisdom, sense of justice. He was also an emblem of the humility that strengthens the soul against the temptations that unavoidably come by the exercise of power. David is the symbol of the humility of the saints, Moses, Solomon, Peter and Paul wannabe. He is the emblem of the eternal adhesion to the Scripture, that is the guide of the kings, as well as of all men. On the opposite side there is Saul, paradigm of the *elatio* of the powerful men, so much blinded by the arrogance of the

² See also Batany 1986; Crépin 1986.

³ In *Reg. Past.* III, 4 this is explicitly stated and, in the wake of Colossians 3, 20-21, is often expressed in the Gregorian letter sent to imperial officers, such as the exarch, and to the several *reges gentium* (Azzara 1991).

lead to become similar, by forgetting the natural equality of all men, to the apostate angel (*Reg. Past.* I, 3; II, 8, 11, 26; III, 2, 4, 26)⁴.

Along with the biblical figures, also a number of historical models are mentioned and proposed. As can be expected, Constantine results the example of Christian *princeps* par excellence, indicated both to the emperor, in order to spur him to respect the priest, and to the neo-converted Aethelberht to urge him to drive his people to the Gospel (*Reg. Epist.* V, 36; XI, 37). For queens the role model is Helen, mother of Constantine, but also Pulcheria, exalted in the letters of Pelagius II, predecessor of Gregory, for her special relation with the pope Leo the Great (*Reg. Epist.* XI, 35; XIII, 42) (Consolino 1991). On the opposite side there are the Roman emperors, pagan and persecutors, in particular Julian the apostate, but also barbarian leaders such as Theoderic and Totila⁵.

In the dialogue of Gregory the Great with the kings of his time, that can be reconstructed through his correspondence, the reference to the Bible is constant, not only for the continuous use of citations and for the repeated invocation of the exemplar biblical characters (as those above mentioned), but also because all the Gregorian reflection about royalty, its role in the world, its prerogatives and its duties toward subjects and ecclesiastic institutions is based on the indispensable biblical message. The explicit quotation of biblical texts is intensified when the sensitivity of the situation requires the inappealable support of the authority of the Scripture (Manselli 1963; Dagens 1977, pp. 55-81, Azzara 1991, pp. 27-32).

The concept of Christian *rector* resulted functional to a theory of the *regalis potestas* and to the production of precepts of immediate use and easy to understand also by the interlocutors with a minor intellectual capability, following a Christian-Hellenistic tradition. The innovation of the papacy of Gregory consisted of the necessity to extend to realities of new evangelization, such as Angles and Visigoths, a model of royalty of the Christian people able to transmit specific values and to work as a tool of acculturation, previously applied by the papal *scrinium* only to Francs (Azzara 1995), and modelled on that valid for the emperor himself. The proposal of the same *speculum* to the *princeps* and to the *reges gentium* did not entail a will, by Gregory the Great, to equate them – impossible for the papal institution between VI and VII century, not only under a theoretical point of view but also under that of the political options; it was more an invitation to share a system of common values, based on the Christian faith. The kings of the peoples ideally became part of the area power of the Christian emperor, that reflected on them and redefined their power on the basis of Roman models. However they were not put at the same level of the *princeps*; the effort of an ideal “coordination” among the nu-

⁴ The model of David is also suggested to the king of Visigoths Reccared for analogy of a behaviour of the Iberian monarch with that attributed to the Jewish king by 1 Chronicles 11: 19 (Gregori I papae *Registrum Epistolarum*, IX, 228).

⁵ Julian is indicated as example not to be followed in two letters to the emperor Maurice ad to his personal physician and advisor Theodor (*Reg. Epist.*, III, 61, 64). On the Gregorian representation of the king Theoderic and Totila see Azzara 1997, pp. 64-67.

merous kings and the unique emperor, which should conceptually solve the antinomy among the plurality of the kingdoms and the idea of an unique and universal empire, was concretized in the proliferation of images that suggested a connection like that between sons - the kings - and father - the emperor - or else between the latter and his officers, to which the kingdoms were equated in the legislation (Azzara 1991, pp. 13-36). The awareness of plurality, articulation, even in the substantial unity of a system, is explained by Gregory the Great in several parts of his works. He does not refer exclusively to the merely political sphere, with the beautiful image of the pomegranate, whose fruits holds together a plurality of individual seeds (*Reg. Past.* II, 4)⁶.

The participation in the same system of values did not cancel, on the other side, the prevalence of the imperial power over that of the *reges gentium*, expressed by the formula of classical descent that distinguished the *imperator reipublicae* or *Romanorum*, sole authentic *dominus liberorum*, from the *reges gentium, domini servorum*; the superior dignity of the emperor was based on the law. In the Gregorian works this formula is often accompanied by the image of the victorious *princeps*, unique defender of *libertas*, at the foot of whom the defeated enemies lie (*Reg. Epist.* V, 30; VI, 16; VII, 6; XIII, 41; *Liber diurnus Romanorum pontificum*, 60)⁷.

Holder of an *auctoritas* of divine origin, tool in the hands of God - who, according to the Scripture, holds his heart and strengthens his soul through the Holy Spirit (*Reg. Epist.* V, 36, 39; XIII, 34, on the basis of Proverbs 21: 1 and Job 12: 15) - the emperor, adorned with all the *virtutes* of the good Christian *rector*, must imitate God in order to govern fairly and to ease the way of his subjects to the celestial salvation. The right fulfilment of his functions make the emperor to deserve the divine reward of his merits, also for the intercession of the clergy, expressed in a good governance on Earth and in the celestial award after the death: a *regnum cum santitatis* in the afterlife would follow a victorious and fortunate *imperium* on Earth.

Cardinal function of the office of the emperor, even among the uncountable *solicitudines* “pro christianae reipublicae regimine”, is the task to intervene in the religious and ecclesiastic field to defend the orthodoxy of the faith and to save the *pax ecclesiae*. The duty of the *custodia fidei*, of keeping the *catholicae rectitudinis integritas*, as defender of the Catholic faith for divine will, entails that the emperor must intervene against any kind of heresy and religious dissent, aware that such a repression benefits not only the Church but the whole State. The defence of the souls of the subjects from the poison of heresy, diabolic fraud that corrodes from

⁶ It is recalled Exodus, 28: 34: «nam sicut in malo punico, una exterius cortice multa interius grana muniuntur, sic innumeros sanctae Ecclesiae populos unitas fidei contegit, quos intus diversitas meritorum tenet».

⁷ See Mc Cormick 1986, pp. 239-240. The argument of the superiority of the emperor as *dominus liberorum*, instead of *dominus servorum*, for the discriminant of the law under which the only true freedom can stand, is expressed in two letters sent one to the former consul Leontius and the other to the emperor Phocas (*Reg. Epist.* XI, 4; XIII, 34).

inside, is even more meritorious than the defence of their bodies from the temporal enemies (Azzara 1997, pp. 108-127).

Along with the *custodia fidei*, the other essential duty of the *princeps* in the religious field, continuously recalled in the Gregorian correspondence, is the defence of the *pax ecclesiae*, on which the *pax reipublicae* depended, because “recte terrena regere” is not possible if one does not know how “divina tractare” (*Reg. Epist.*, V, 37). The emperor therefore is called upon to monitor any scandal or dissent that could undermine the greater good of the *unitas* of the Church. The insistence on this argument – typical in the papal letters to the emperors already before Gregory – seems to acquire a new urgency during the papacy of the latter because of the new escalation of the polemics about the assumption of the title of *oikumenikos* by the patriarch of Constantinople. Its meaning seems to be “orthodox”, “guarantor of orthodoxy”, but it was translated in Rome with the Latin word *universalis*, with a stronger juridical significance, and the Pope suspected that his colleague of Constantinople could claim to exercise a form of jurisdictional primacy all over the Church (Tullier 1964; 1986; Magi 1972, pp. 161-194).

The imperial intervention in the ecclesiastic field is completely legitimate, or better, necessary, but it must be carried out in the constant exercise of an opportune *reverentia* toward the priests. The emperor must at the same time protect them and ensure their discipline. An example of this argument is found in the mention, in a well-known letter of Gregory the Great to the emperor Maurice, of an episode attributed to Constantine by the tradition of the “ecclesiastica [...] historia”, namely by the *Histories* of Rufinus, Socrates and Sozomen. The first Christian *princeps*, after receiving written accusations against some bishops, had burned the documents in the presence of the persons concerned, stating that he could not judge those called “gods” in the Scripture, “a vero Deo constituti” (*Reg. Epist.*, V, 36).

Among the areas of intervention of the *princeps* there is, first of all, the duty to guarantee right relations between the *imperialis auctoritas* and the ecclesiastic institutions, with the frequent attestations of the special zeal of the Christian emperors toward the Church: an acknowledgement that is not only a mere *laudatio*, but it spurs to take care of this issue, by virtue of the special tie that unifies the *princeps*, but also the *reges gentium*, to Peter and, thus, to the Roman Church.

Along with this first preoccupation, well understandable in the papal perspective, also precepts about the right accomplishment of the royal duties in the field of administration and management of public structures are proposed. The first letter sent to Phocas, on the occasion of his accession to power (*Reg. Epist.* XIII, 34), has a special programmatic value: its contents are a part of the precise use of the papal *scrinium* at the moment when a new emperor accesses to the throne, but also a need of reiterating wishes and directives after the death of Maurice, with whom many problems had arisen. Urged to defeat the external enemies in order to give a new vigour to the republic, Phocas had also to protect individual property and wealthy, as well as to ensure the freedom of anybody, exercised in the Roman way under the rule of the law of the State. In the past there had been no lack, in a letter to the wife

of Maurice, the empress Constantina (*Reg. Epist.*, V, 38), of more specific indications about the repression of the administrative abuses of *iudices* (mainly in Sardinia, Sicily and Corse) who extorted their citizens with excessive exactions, if not with real extortions; this for the desire, that must never be abandoned, for listening to the *oppressorum gentium* and helping the so bullied subjects-*fili*.

The full availability of the imperial office, as well as of any power, lies with God, who disposes of it according to his inscrutable designs. He uses to give men, from time to time, either kings that, under his mercy, console them or evil monarchs, whose *duritia* is a punishment for the sins of subjects. The violent substitution of Maurice with Phocas could be read in this dyad, after a violent coup d'état by the latter. In the East the death of Maurice was interpreted as a martyrdom, but, on the contrary, Gregory welcomed it as the providential removal of an evil emperor and as his substitution with a new monarch full of hopes (Wortley 1980, pp. 382-391; Consolino 1991, p. 235). This dramatic event expressed the interpretative key of Gregory and, more in general, of the pontificate of Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages about the significance, the nature and the function of the monarchic power, completely reduced to God who, according to authority of Daniel 2: 21, is the only one “*qui mutat tempora et transfert regna*”.

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Not the Last Frontier: Insular Model in Early Medieval Byzantine Mediterranean, c. 650 - c. 850.

LUCA ZAVAGNO

The image of islands in Mediterranean historiography has often been an ambivalent one. Braudel (1996) confesses to its fascination for islands as miniature continents or as small but indispensable landfalls (like in the very case of the Aegean Archipelago) along the sea routes and between islands themselves and the sea-coast. Nevertheless, although not doomed to an irredeemable isolation, he dwells upon the main characteristics of islands regarded as secluded, precarious and often dangerous environments; places of emigration which finds a convenient and significant parallel in the mountains as they often should be regarded as worlds apart from civilization (Van Dommelen, 1999; Papacostas, 2014).

Paul Rainbird (2007) has recently and effectively set forth the archaeological implications of this Braudelian penchant for islands as a special although unintelligible places. Indeed, after having explored the role islands played popular literature from fifteenth century on, Rainbird identifies in Evans (1973) and in his “biogeographical” approach a major turning point in the interpretation of insular spaces. Evans consciously applied the supposed direct relationship between area and distance ratio to island communities to prove how restricted encounter with people, light natural selection, conservatism, and isolation combined in shaping the behavior of islanders. Although Evans (1977) later recognized that Mediterranean islands do not fully fit in this categorization for they are «less isolated, not scattered across large stretches of water [...] but above all visible from any other island or coastline» (p. 13), his biogeographical model has often been used by the archaeologists and even historians focusing on the political, social and cultural trajectories of islands.

One must, indeed, admit that bio-geographical approach as well as its critique as developed by scholars like Broadbank (2000), Fitzpatrick (2004) and Rainbird himself, have often been developed not in response to the questions brought about by the historiography and archeology of Mediterranean islands but has rather focused on the islands and insular communities of the Pacific islands. Nevertheless, it has remained useful in order to reassess the role and propose a diverse definition of Mediterranean islands. In this light, we are encouraged to embrace an archaeology

of the islands which would bring together landscapes and seascape and more important should consider the importance of local insular communities in perceiving and reinterpreting local insular contexts as often mirrored by their material culture. Indeed, objects are often incorporated into local contexts and tend to continuously acquire new meanings (what Rainbird defines as the ‘mutability of solid things’ Rainbird (2007) although not all innovations come from external sources for expectations of contacts can lead to change.

The idea of connectivity heavily relies here on the seminal work of Horden and Purcell (2000) which defined the Mediterranean as a sea of connectivity. The idea of remoteness and periphericity of conservative and isolated insular spaces is countermanded through the importance given to what Veikou (2015) describes as «ways in which specific physical and social features of these [insular] sites emerged and were determined by their role in land and maritime networks» (p. 48). Moreover, the idea of islands as gateway communities promoting social encounters and cultural interchange vied with the active role played by insular communities, for as Rainbird (2007) states: «those who live with the seas may be regarded as having a keen perception of the elements, a willingness, at same level, to participate in the [...] expectations of continual encounter with otherness, at home or elsewhere».

As will be seen this concept lies at the very basis of some of the recent reflections upon the concept of insularity in the Byzantine empire, for it is now clear that the concept of insularity should be paired with that of ‘islandness’, that is, as Veikou (2015) states «the sum of representations and experiences of islanders which structures their territory». (p. 360). It is therefore clear that we should contextualize the importance of islands within a larger context for as Abulafia (2011) concludes the history of the Mediterranean islands from the great civilizations of ancient times to rival empires of medieval times is the history of regional interaction. If this seems obvious for the Roman Empire as the only polity capable of unifying the whole Mediterranean coasts under a single rule, it is less so for the Byzantine and Medieval period. Nevertheless, Valérien (2014) has recently stressed that «dominating shipping routes required the control of crossing points: straits and islands. In this respect, changes of rule over islands, corresponded to change in control of sea routes, thus providing criteria for periodizing the political history of the Medieval Mediterranean» (p. 81).

Notwithstanding the latter assertion, however, and the increasing importance of insular archaeology in the scholarly debate, Byzantinists have remained rather uninterested to an history and archaeology of the islands under Constantinopolitan domination. In particular, if the small Aegean archipelagos attracted some interest due to their vicinity to Constantinople and their importance along the shipping routes linking Italy to the Peloponnese and Anatolia (McCormick 2001), major islands like Crete, Cyprus, Sardinia, Malta, Corsica and the Balearics (with the partial exception of Sicily) escaped from scholarly attention and were often regarded as “sons of a lesser god” by Byzantine historiography. Many recent syntheses like the *Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies* (Jeffreys-Cormack-Haldon 2008), the

Blackwell Companion to Byzantium (James, 2010) or the *Palgrave Atlas of Byzantine History* (Haldon, 2010) (to quote just a few) have toned down the role of major islands of Byzantine Mediterranean to that of mere peripheral additions to the Byzantine heartland, which in fact Wickham (2005) defined as the «uneasy coupling of two wildly different geographical zones: the Anatolian plateau and the Aegean, one of them ecologically poor and devastated by political events, the other in parallel systemic crises» (pp. 29-32). The traditional historiographical approach regards islands simply as marginal to the political, social and economic changes the Byzantine heartland was experiencing, from the seventh century until they were recaptured by the gravity of an expanding Empire in the tenth century (Crete and Cyprus) or were lost forever (Sicily, Malta and the Balearics).

This does not imply that the above mentioned islands did not attract the interests of Byzantine archaeologists or historians. One could for instance think of the important monographic volumes offering a full historical account (as based upon an interdisciplinary and archaeologically aware approach) of the fate of some Byzantine islands like those published on Cyprus (Metcalf, 2009), Crete (Tzougarakis, 1988), Sardinia (Corrias, 2012) and Malta (Bruno, 2009); to these one should add the long and exhaustive contributions of Nef-Pringent on Sicily (Nef & Pringent, 2006) and Signes-Codoñer on the Balearics (Signes-Codoñer, 2005). Nevertheless, it seems to me that Byzantine historiography has not yet produced an all-encompassing alternative to the only existing systematic account on the history of the Byzantine insular world, that is the volume written by Elizabeth Malamut (1988) entitled *Les Iles de l'Empire Byzantine, VIIIeme- XIIeme siècle*. Although other scholars like Jeffrey and Pryor (2006), Lounghis (2010) and Cosentino (2013) (to quote just a few) have later partially dealt with the problem of Byzantine insularity, Malamut remains the unavoidable starting point for any research on the topic. In her book –as Zanini (2013) commented- we are presented with a refined concept of insularity. For the Byzantines an island was defined by the intercourse between the land and the sea: «for the former the sea is important but nevertheless accessory, for the latter it is essential and more so if the island is small and far from the continent» (p. 2) This, as Cosentino has rightly concluded, clearly stemmed (at least partially) on the traditional prejudice of the Roman and later Byzantine world against the sea. «The concept of insularity shared in the ancient imagery both characters of the sea [...] on the one hand [...] they evoked marginality and remoteness, on the other their function in commerce and connectivity could not be ignored» (p. 67). Eventually, however, it was the idea of an eccentric (although sometimes even happy and “original”) periphery to emerge. In particular, Malamut distinguishes between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean basin where islands are too pulverized and close to the continent to have any real political or economic role in the historical trajectories of the Constantinopolitan empire. Cyprus and Crete, however, remained the exception to this rule owing to their strategic relevance along the frontier with the Muslim world.

As partially mentioned already, only Veikou (2015) and more recently Vionis

(2016) have tried to propose an multidisciplinary and anthropological approach to the history of Byzantine islands which mainly relied on material culture although considering the traditional way of describing and defining islands on the part of Byzantine chroniclers or hagiographers (Cosentino, 2013). Indeed, Veikou (2015) has included the traditional Byzantine concept of insularity as a peripheral microcosmos - a reduction of the whole world- in a broader contextualization based upon the developments of a hierarchy of settlements (mainland-city-island). In turn this has allowed her to overcome issues of marginality and to consider insularity as the «dynamic relationship that has evolved between insular space and the society living in it» (p. 360). In this light, Vionis (2016) has tried to use architectural, artistic and archaeological evidence to sketch a draw of the insular responses to newcomers and the imperial centers. Although, he focused his research on the small Aegean island of Naxos during the Arab-Byzantine conflict, his approach has nevertheless proved a methodological validity for other and larger insular contexts. This because «the material cultural record mirrors the process of reaction adaptation, translations and accommodation on the part of local societies [allowing us] to examine the dynamics responses and identities of insular communities within their individual local and historical context» (forthcoming).

Leaving the latter contributions aside, it seems to me that Byzantine historiography on islands has therefore seldom moved away from Malamut's interpretative framework and has not yet fully weighed in the methodological and anthropological implications of the recent debate on the archaeology of islands. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that, when dealing with the great Mediterranean islands of the Byzantine Empire, scholars have often simply lingered on their importance as strategic and military bulwark against the Arab invasions or raids (Crete, Cyprus and, partially, Sardinia) or as neglected outposts soon to be engulfed in the twirls of western Medieval European politics (Malta, and the Balearics). The only exception to this rather bleak insular picture is represented by Sicily, which remained – according to Nef and Pringent (2006) – «un pôle de pouvoir essentiel, un element précisément 'central' de l'Etat imperial, à la fois base de projection de la puissance Byzantine et source de richesse» (p. 36) the latter mainly because of its importance in supplying Constantinople with grain after the disruption of the Egyptian tax-spine in 640s. In other words, it seems to me that Byzantine historiography on islands has seldom moved away from Malamut's interpretative framework and has not yet fully weighed in the methodological and anthropological implications of the recent debate on the archaeology of islands.

Nevertheless, we should be resistant to the idea of islands as simple maritime continuation of the Arab-Byzantine frontier as recently proposed by Loungis (2010) for the eastern basin of the “Great Sea”. At the same time, one should aim to reassess the concept of periphericity of the Byzantine insular world for Sicily and Cyprus (and to a lesser extent Crete, Malta, Sardinia and the Balearics) seem to have acted as a third political and economic pole between the Anatolian plateau and the Aegean Sea in the Byzantine Mediterranean. in this sense, and although en-

sconced into peculiar local and regional trajectories, islands have recently produced substantial archaeological evidence pointing to some parallel economic and political trajectories and allowing us to develop the idea advanced by Laiou and Morrisson (2007) when they defined the constitutive pillars of the eighth-to-tenth century empire (Sicily-Crete-Aegean vis-à-vis Western Asia Minor). In this regard, one must admit that in some of these islands, like Malta, the Balearics and, partially Crete, archaeology is still in its infancy as analysis of ceramics is often missing and seals and coins are only published piecemeal.

To the contrary, a recent attempt to propose a diachronic archaeological approach to the Byzantine insular spaces and their societies have been proposed in the volume edited by Enrico Zanini, Demetrios Michaelides and Philippe Pergola (2013). In particular, the contributions on Sicily are revealing for those pair with some recent works of Nef and Pringent (2006), and shed some light on an island that used to be a real black hole of western Mediterranean archaeology. Indeed, as little as a decade ago, it was only possible to say that in the eighth century Sicily should have been of rather more importance to Byzantium (which continued to rule it until the ninth-century Arab conquest) than Byzantinists tended to assume, because its coinage (both copper and gold) maintained itself with far better continuities than did that of Constantinople itself in the Aegean half of Byzantine heartland (Morrisson, 1998).

The reference to the status of the archaeological research on islands serves the purpose of introducing a first, methodological, point. In this contribution, islands will be analyzed and explored through a more cautious and aware use of the wide range of material evidence available in a comparative perspective. In other words, the focus will be on ceramics, coins, and seals not only because they are usually better understood and studied than, for instance, glass, textiles or metalwork but also because in my interpretative frame their developments deeply resonates with the economic and social profile of Byzantine islands in the period under scrutiny. This not to diminish the importance of literary and documentary sources or simply regard them as a corollary to material evidence. On the one hand, as Wickham (2009) concludes it is true that «early medieval history-writing is a permanent struggle with the few sources available, as historians try, often over and over again, to extract nuanced historical accounts from them» (p. 12). On the other hand, it is also clear that there is a wide gap between the material culture available for the Late Antiquity and that of the early Middle Ages. However, I must stress that archaeology allows us to better grasp patterns and changes in commercial and non-commercial exchange (Haldon, 2010).

Archaeology, for instance, prompts us to sketch a better, comparative, picture of the process of socio-economic transformation experienced by Byzantine islands during the fragmentation and localization of the Mediterranean exchange system. As Cosentino (2013) points out: «throughout the seventh and eighth century islands seem to remain an economic space relatively more developed than northern and central Italy, the Balkans or Asia Minor» (p. 73). Ceramics and coins are the main indi-

cators of the economic resilience of the insular world. For Sicily, for instance, Wickham (2005), Morrisson (2001) and in more detail Molinari (2013) and Nef and Pringent (2006) have sketched a picture of an island roughly divided in its western and eastern half as based upon ceramic links. This is mirrored by the fact that western Sicily was part of the Tyrrhenian system of exchange as pointed out for instance by the Sicilian oval lamps recovered in Naples and Rome whereas eastern Sicily was more linked to the Aegean and Constantinople via the «ancient trunk route» as identified by McCormick (2001).

This should come as no surprise considering that Sicily had a strong fiscal link with Constantinople, for – as already mentioned – after the loss of Egypt it became the main source of grain for the Byzantine capital. The specialization of Sicily in grain production and its role within the shipping routes linking Tyrrhenian and the Aegean via the Ionian Sea also explain the changes in the Sicilian monetary circulation from the late seventh century onwards for the rarefaction of bronze emissions vis-à-vis metrological and ponderal adjustments have been proven to owe less to an economic maelstrom than to the revised fiscal needs of the state¹. In other words, the less-monetized economy did not imply a point-blank collapse of the economic life on the island or a role as a simple military and administrative bulwark at the frontier of the empire. This is further enhanced by the analysis of the abundant sigillographic evidence yielded on the islands. Indeed, lead-seals prove that – at least until the ninth century – the Sicilian elites identified themselves in full with the imperial administration reproducing a model (that of an aristocracy of function reflected by the resilience of a diminished monetary economy), which allows us to document the extraordinarily strong political bound with Constantinople.

A parallel development can be sketched for Cyprus for which we can conclude with Walmsley (2010) that an «increasingly demonetarized economy does not necessarily imply a decadence but might rather mean continuous levels of wealth, as sourced from and expressed within a different lifestyle» (pp. 39-40)². In fact, a recent reassessment of imported and locally-produced ceramics (Armstrong, 2006) has enabled us to identify the island as a convenient hub across trans-regional and intra-regional networks frequented by travelers and merchants (as well as armies and diplomats). On the one hand, one of the main trading routes identified by McCormick (2001) began in Constantinople and linked the Aegean with the southern shore of Asia Minor, eventually reaching Cyprus. Here localized and medium-distance exchange systems coexisted, with the state playing the major role in the movement of goods. On the other hand, and to the contrary of Sicily, Cyprus was an ideal place for both the Umayyad Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire to attract

¹ «Une telle réforme fiscale expliquerait d'ailleurs assez bien que l'empereur ait pu simultanément quadrupler le poids du follis, les exigences du système fiscal n'appelant plus d'émissions massives de bronze pour «rendre la monnaie» aux contribuables» (Pringent, 2006, p. 299). Moreover, one should not forget that the island retained its own mint until 878 A.D. (Morrisson 2001)

² In fact, the quotation does not refer to Cyprus but in my opinion, it fits the situation on the island as well (Zavagno, 2009).

traders and merchandise from all across the eastern Mediterranean basin owing to its blurred and volatile political status. Therefore, the location of the island at the intersection of two pairs of interlocking economies (Muslim Egypt and Syria-Palestine vis-à-vis Byzantine Aegean and South Anatolia) benefited from the commercial routes that reached outside the territories within the imperial boundaries (Zavagno, 2011-12).

Also the Cretan elites and the local economic infrastructures they underpinned (in particular in the capital of the island, Gortyn) (Zanini, 2009), show remarkable similarities with the trends we have just traced in Cyprus. Indeed, in Crete we can document the persistence of good level of local demand as underpinned by the Cretan secular and ecclesiastical ruling classes who were also members of the local Byzantine administrative structures (Baldini et al., 2012). This is showed, for instance, by the analysis of the available lead-seals pointing to the provincial status of Crete within the Byzantine administrative system as well as the peculiar high-decorated locally-made painted wares yielded in Gortyn and Pseira, the importance of the local ecclesiastical authorities (with the Archbishop at their head) and, above all, the relatively high degree of monetization the island could boast in the seventh and eighth centuries (Cosentino, 2013).

If, however, the importance of Sicily and Cyprus (across diminished and more fragmented regional and trans-mediterranean shipping routes was (at least partially) related to the continuous role played by the Byzantine state and political elites, the economic vitality showed by Malta cannot be explained in terms of politically or military factors alone. (Bruno, 2009; Bruno & Cutajar, 2013). In fact, the analysis of amphorae as indicators of economic activity on the Maltese archipelago has led Bruno and Cutajar to conclude that Malta moved along “emporion” lines in a way similar to that documented in the northern half of the Adriatic rim for instance in Comacchio and Civitas Nova Heracliana in the Venetian lagoon (Gelichi et al., 2006; Calaan 2006). Apart from containers for trading we can also document eastern Mediterranean source of importation for coarse wares, enabling us to conclude that Malta acted as a commercial bridge across the political divide between the Arabs and the Byzantines, and above all connecting the central and the eastern halves of the Mediterranean basin.

Indeed, as repeatedly mentioned, connectivity is intrinsic to the insular world as a corollary to the strategic position islands hold across Mediterranean shipping routes. This being so it is possible that the large amount of sixth to ninth century amphorae unearthed in Malta were transiting through the island from the East on their way to third parties (Bruno & Cutajar, 2013). Evidence from Malta and Gozo points to both eastern (globular) and African vessels showing that trade did not stop because of the arrival of the Arabs in North Africa and Spain. Moreover, although the settlement pattern of the Maltese archipelago changed with elevated and fortified sites becoming more important, coastal harbor facilities –like Saint Paul Milqi or Tas-Silg remained frequented well into the ninth century (Bruno, 2009). Moreover, large dock structures in Marsa and Marsascala boasted an «overwhelming presence (at least

80%) of Byzantine amphorae (datable to mid-end seventh century to ninth century)» (p. 79). Even during the «conflict between the Arabs and the Byzantines in the central Mediterranean, the Maltese islands could have adopted very liberal business practices [with] an ambiguous role as bridge in the *fronteria berberorum*» (p. 213) As will be seen when examining the situation in the Balearics and Sardinia, the Byzantine state was part and parcel of this strategy for it clearly had a role in supplying the archipelago which remained vital to Constantinopolitan interests in western Mediterranean; this is proved in Malta by the sigillographic evidence for a lead seals belonging to one Nicetas, *archon and droungarios* of Malta and dated to the eighth century (Brown, 1975; Pertusi, 1977) points to the Maltese archipelago as a possible station for a squadron of the Byzantine navy (*droungariate*) (Ahrweiler, 1961).

This also means that the last stop along this shipping route could have been Sardinia or the Balearics. In fact, numismatic and sigillographic evidence allow us to assert that these islands remained (if only loosely) under the Byzantine political sphere of influence. In particular, Sardinia boasted a mint, which remained active until the first quarter of the eighth century and a cache of lead-seals pointing to the continuous correspondence between the local authorities and the Constantinopolitan court (Mascarò & Moll Marcadal, 2013). As for the Balearics, a recently discovered seal belonging to one Gordo, archon of Mallorca, and dated to the eighth century, has pointed to the existence of a 'Byzantine' maritime *archontate* as established in the Balearics sometime after the loss of Africa (Cau Ontiveros & Mas Florit, 2013). The *archontate* seems to have lasted until the tenth century when the archipelago became part of the Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba. As I will return on the archons in few moments, I just want to mention here that the lifespan of the *archontate* seems to be confirmed by the numismatic evidence, for Byzantine coins continued to circulate in the Balearics well into the ninth century without any tangible gap (Cau Ontiveros & Mas Florit, 2013).

Furthermore, the Balearics allow us to drive home a second point besides the above-mentioned economic vitality of early medieval Byzantine islands. This has to do with the historiographical perception of islands as lying at the margins of the political, military and strategic interests of Byzantium. In particular, the political status of the Balearics has prompted some analogies with Cyprus, for the Arab sources include both islands in the *Dar-al 'Ahd* ("the territory of the pact", a form of nominal truce between the Muslims and the local inhabitants who retained a degree of independence from the Byzantines). Indeed, the Balearics, like Sardinia, Cyprus, Crete and Malta, never became part of a formal thematic organization like Sicily (Signes-Codoñer, 2005). In fact, sigillographic evidence seems to show a rather deliberate strategy on the part of the Byzantine authorities slanting towards the creation of themes in areas regarded as political and military important, whereas –as we have just seen in the Balearic islands- archons (possibly chosen among the ranks of the local elites) were appointed as head of local administration in areas of the empire remaining formally under control of Constantinople (because of their strategic importance), although *de facto* enjoying a large degree of autonomy. In other words,

we may trace the sort of adaptation of the insular structures of governance common to territories that were integrated into the empire's culture and religion though located on its fringe.

The “informality” of the rules of the insular political game is more noticeable in Cyprus due to the size of the island and its vicinity to the Umayyad centers of power and the economically lively Syrian-Palestinian region. For Cyprus, I have therefore proposed the model of Middle Ground prompted by its location «betwixt the Greeks and the Saracens» (Zavagno, 2011-12). This allows us to show that seventh to ninth century Cyprus was not simply a land of cursory encounters but a critical point where relations between the Umayyads and Byzantines developed not only in response to external pressures or military conflicts. As one side cannot impose full control over the island by ousting the “enemy”, a peculiar condition hardly found anywhere else in the eastern Mediterranean, we can trace the emergence of an elaborate network of social, cultural and economic ties created by two people living side by side. This in turn would lead to some episodes of *convivencia* that, without discounting the element of violence, could be documented in other insular contexts across the Mediterranean like Naxos.

In Cyprus we can witness the actions of important local notables (*Phaggoumeis*) for they were reported by Constantine Porphyrogenetos as participating in a Byzantine embassy to Baghdad (together with one representative of the Emperor) in order to negotiate the release of some prisoners. The *Phaggoumeis* may indeed be regarded as one of the many examples of cultural brokers produced by the island in the course of the seventh and eighth centuries as a peculiar result of its exceptional position on the edge of cultural frontiers and at times political-military borders; for brokers can be defined as «agentes qui servant de stimulants ainsi que d'exécuteurs et qui se distinguent les uns des autres par leur motivation, leur capacité et leur degré d'implication dans ces processus» (Abdellatif-Benhima-König-Ruchaud, 2012, p. 10).

Merchants and less obviously religious authorities can be also seen acting as brokers in Cyprus. One can mention here of those Cypriots pictured in the Acts of the Seventh Ecumenical Council (787) as busy sailing to and from Gabala in Syria a good parallel to those eighth century Arab cargo owners who left Kufic inscriptions on some amphorae discovered in Paphos (Zavagno, 2016). However, another example of a Cypriot broker in action is offered by the bishop of Kytherea Demetrianos, who in the late ninth- early tenth century headed a delegation to Baghdad to free some Cypriots who had been taken prisoner during an Arab raid.

The latter episode could also help us to redefine the role of local ecclesiastical authorities, for they should be regarded as more in tune with the function and role of the administrators and local landowners as mediators and cultural brokers. This role inevitably required accepting the occurrence of confrontational episodes between two rival polities, but also a critical, creative and constant activity of mediation.

To external observers, for instance, the commonality between Muslims and Christians was totally unfathomable and to an extent uncomfortable as witnessed by the famous episode reported in the tenth century life of Saint Constantine the

Jew. «While he [the Saint] was performing prayer in one of the churches of the island the Ismailite Saracens came upon the sanctuary for they had part in the government of Cyprus. This prompted the blessed man quickly to leave the island» (Delehayé, 1925, pp. 635-638.) Constantine was a pilgrim from Anatolia and therefore one can only excuse his inability to fully grasp the creative arrangement of a social space and the establishment of social relationships within the island.

In the light of the flexible and creative arrangements documented in Cyprus as defining aspects of the relations between Muslim and Christian, one could also mention the rather unique case of visual arts in the Aegean island of Naxos. As Vionis (2013) has convincingly argued, material cultural evidence and the stylistic analysis of the aniconic fresco decoration in some local churches show «two insular responses towards the imperial center and the newcomers. The first points to material connectivity and religious affiliation with Constantinople [...]; the second points to an intense encounter with new people and accommodation of new artistic trends from the Arab world resulting in economic stability, survival and possible hybrid art forms» (p. 116). This in turn speaks volume of the role of islands as zone of cross-cultural interaction rather than impermeable frontiers.

In this regard, a slightly similar situation can be documented for the Balearics, which were indeed smaller than Cyprus and too far away from Damascus but larger than Naxos and strategically important to Constantinople in political terms. Nevertheless, the recognition of a *de facto* independence on the part of the Arab sources, the lead seals witnessing the existence of a new administrative organization in the eighth century and the presence of some *mulûk* (a term referring to local notables and loose representatives of the Byzantine political power-), seem to indicate that Balearic society preserved a good degree of political coherence as revolving around local elites.- These, like their Cypriot counterparts, were capable not only of facilitating process of commercial as well as political communication across the western Mediterranean boundaries, but also to adopt flexible tactics of political survival as showed by the 798 Balearic petition of aid to the Carolingian empire which brought the Frankish fleet to fight and defeat the Muslim navy in the Mallorcan waters.- Here the acts of mediation and the adoption of creative adaptive processes emerges with regard to the political sphere of action, but these could be easily compared with the actions of commercial, religious and diplomatic brokers documented in Cyprus or with the existence of artistic and cultural links between Arabs and Byzantines as visible in Naxos.

Indeed, the role and actions of cultural brokers help us to better frame the importance what Zanini, Pergola and Michaelides (2013) have defined as the “Byzantine Insular System”. In particular, two transversal themes have been enhanced in this brief contribution. The first revolves around the economics of insular societies and the second stresses the importance of islands as connective hubs with unique local political, social and cultural structures. The reader must be merciful here as I am perfectly aware that this represents only the beginning of a long journey as some islands (like Corsica) have not been included while others (like Sardinia or

Malta) require further archaeological attention. Nevertheless, I remain positive about having presented at least some of the elements that can help to define islands as economic and political resilient spaces rather than simply marginal frontiers, while at the same time proving that the darkness that supposedly engulfed the periphery of the empire in the aftermath of the Muslim invasions can be illuminated by the new light brought about by material culture. Here, coinage, seals and ceramic allow us to tip the unbalanced dialogue between margins and metropolis pointing to a relatively higher welfare of the insular world compared to the Anatolian plateau and the Aegean region - a welfare that reflected both the uninterrupted, although diminished, role the islands played within the Mediterranean shipping routes linking the eastern and western basin of the Mediterranean with the Aegean and Constantinople - and the continuity on local production of artifacts (ceramics) pointing to the persistence of levels of demand and regular if not frequent regional and sub-regional contacts; and, eventually, the peculiar political and administrative structures as molded by the political or military difficulties of the hour. After all, as Braudel (I, 1996) stated: «whether large or small (...) islands of all size and shapes make up a coherent human environment in so far as similar pressures are exerted upon them, making them both far ahead and far behind the general history of the sea» (pp. 148-149).

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From Permeable Frontiers to Strict Border Divisions. The Geostrategic Construction of the Mediterranean on the Ruins of Ancient Narrow Seas

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By the late 19th century, Western European powers (particularly the British and the French) projecting their respective imperial strategies and operations in the region, came to construct a geostrategic representation of the Mediterranean Sea, thus reconfiguring and epitomizing it either as a strategic ‘corridor’ or ‘passage’ (the British) or as their ‘lake’ (the French) (Blais & Deprest, 2012; Corbett, 1904; Maguire, 1899, p. 123; Monk, 1953). These totalizing, Eurocentric views – which copiously depicted the *Middle Sea* as a homogeneous, unidimensional Sea – accompanied and legitimized the Western industrial powers’ colonial penetration, hegemony and piecemeal conquest of ever larger areas in the region (Gough, 2014; Porter, 1994). This was done – as the present research study seeks to demonstrate – through the disruption and profound dislocation of the various, deep-rooted, narrow-sea economic complexes which had been founded on flows of exchange of indigenous agriculture and manufactured products and the customary use of maritime resources, in different areas of the Mediterranean. As a result of this process of fragmentation, these ancient narrow-sea complexes would actually be deleted – as if they had never existed – from ‘official memory’, and from a whole historiography of European national histories of the Mediterranean (Abulafia, 2011; Holland, 2013; Kennedy, 1991; Norwich, 2006). Quite a number of recently published histories are still, implicitly or explicitly, rooted in the nation-state centred view of the Middle Sea and totally neglect the past realities of these narrow sea economies – although a fresh critical mass is building up against this conventional interpretative framework (Herzfeld, 1991; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992; Sutherland, 2008).

It goes without saying that the actual reconstruction of these historical narrow-sea economic complexes – before their dissolution with the laying out of national and colonial borders in the course of the nineteenth century – is imperative for our understanding of the livelihood and habitus of their inhabitants. Of course, a historical, and empirically based, reconstruction of these maritime orbits is problematic, if anything because of the scarcity of readily available primary sources as well as

the lack of a corpus of literature treating the subject matter. Moreover, thinking and writing in this alternative way on narrow seas requires a conceptual shift in our mode of conceiving Mediterranean history at large. This can be achieved by embracing and elaborating upon, what one can term the ‘indigenous narrow sea dimension’ of the local maritime and coastal communities, in our research approach.

With this in mind, most of the original primary sources employed in this study comprise local *portolani*, travel accounts and descriptive guides supplemented by early hydrographic charts (Adamo, 1798; Du Val, 1665; Gorgoglione, 1705; Norie, 1848) as well as a panoply of colourful maritime votive paintings still found in Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches throughout the region (Alessi, 1989; Azzarello, 1986; Canta, 2000, pp. 178-180; Maschopoulos & Cosmetatos, 1989, pp. 319-320; Prins, 1989). From this wide combination of historical material, one can gather detailed knowledge especially in relation to the geo-ecologic history of these narrow-sea complexes (information on the coastal seascape, use of prevalent winds and sea currents, location of creeks, anchorages, *scali*, ports). At the same time, one immediately perceives the impact left by human agency in exploiting the common resources found in these same water and coastal areas; local sea-borne practices and seafaring intelligence – much of which have either disappeared or been suppressed – and actually criminalised as illegal activities (such as happened to earlier exchange practices in the narrow seas which came to be declared as contraband by 1860-1870s). It is also important to include *oral history* as a primary source. This owing to the fact that the narrow seas communities transmitted maritime intelligence and practical knowledge (including basic skills and strategies of survival) of their adjacent waters, on the customary laws and rights, and forms of belief, from one generation to the next, normally through the verbal arts. Much of this knowledge is still deposited in these communities’ shared memories and needs recording (Chircop, 2015a).

It is through the creative use of this range of primary sources that the complex regional, narrow-sea ‘indigenous’ – certainly not homogenous but rather hybrid – dimension becomes more tangible and can be better contextualised and explored. In so doing, this study will also seek to develop an inclusive research frame, critically drawing and building on more recent literature, employing notions and insights from the theoretical literature pertaining to a variety of topics: from geo-ecologic histories to ‘common property’, customary rights and practices (Feeny et al., 1999; Ostrom, 1997; Thompson, 1991), as well as from political geography and frontier studies (Hall, 2000; Hastings & Wilson, 1999).

This means that from the outset we have to make clear the conceptual difference employed in this paper between *frontier* space (an open, fluid, permeable space, characterised by continuous negotiation, exchanges and contacts between neighbouring peoples) and *borders* (restrictive, inward-oriented, defensive regulators of movement) constructed by Western European nations and colonial powers. As Peter J. Taylor (1988), elaborating on world-systems theory, puts it: «Whereas a boundary is a definite line of separation, frontier is a zone of contact» (pp. 144-146). This distinction is crucial for our study, as it allows us to visualise the histor-

ical transition, which in our case the central Mediterranean underwent, from open frontier arrangement to restrictive national and colonial borders. The deep transformations which this imposed process brought about in the economies and ways of life of local communities of the narrow-seas – ones that were previously embedded in an open frontier – will be more easily investigated.

Since in the English language border and frontier have been – and in fact are still frequently – used interchangeably, a more specific working definition of both is a must. *Frontier* is in our case, the ‘frontier space’ in which narrow seas economies were entrenched (and overlapped with similar nexuses) from time immemorial. The frontier space was exemplified by a high measure of native protagonism, incessant negotiations and conflict resolution between local actors for the management of the seaways, the rights of way and the sharing of resources. The surrounding frontier stretches of sea water were perceived as commons. On the other hand, the term *border* – or *boundary* – comes to demarcate a definite linear edge dividing two or more separate territories under different politico-administrative jurisdictions (nation states or colonial possessions). ‘Borderline’ is therefore a line that divides people in national or colonial territories.

One alternative way of exploring ancient narrow seas economies is by investigating the ways and means, by which European colonialism, powered by Western industrialisation (in the form of technological, commercial-financial, military-naval and cultural-hegemonic means) (Das Gupta, 2007; Headrick, 1988), crept in, disrupted and eradicated these same maritime economies to make way for modern nation state and imperial border divisions – leading to their subdued integration in the global economic system (Kasaba, 1987; Keyder & Tabak, 1986; Pamuk & Williamson, 2000). This will also help explain how the historical memory of such ancient geo-historical narrow-sea orbits, so central to the livelihood of their communities has been totally eradicated from ‘official’ national and Mediterranean histories. Of equal importance, this analysis will also increase our knowledge of how such complex attachment of islands and coastal communities, embedded within open frontier waters (or, in our case, the Christian-Muslim frontier space), survived down till the 19th century, underpinned by an incessant exchange of labour and local products and vibrant human movement.

The narrow-sea perspective framing this study at large also requires the inclusion, and examination, of Western European discourse that, in its earlier descriptions of the Mediterranean, provide detailed accounts of the dynamic human activities, movement, encounters and trade that comprised the narrow seas. These narratives and descriptive chronicles can – paradoxically – now be used to support the historical reconstruction of these same narrow-sea arrangements such as the one we are focusing on in the central Mediterranean. For these reasons it is necessary to examine official correspondence, travelogues, journals and literary accounts left by European travellers, consuls, colonial administrators, agents and functionaries on the spot (Gadsby, 1869; Galt, 1812; Grosvenor, 1830; Hoare, 1819; Jackson, 1810). This extensive pool of colonial and orientalist textual evidence, in conjunction


with hydrographic surveys, cartography and classified reports by British or French – and later Italian and Spanish – naval authorities, is indispensable for our research purposes (cf. Smyth, 1854; David, 2008; Kefalas, 1986, pp. 244-46), providing eyewitness reports on the incessant movement of local labour and exchanges in indigenous goods, and the vessels employed to carry these within the narrow-sea economy.

In seeking to reconstruct the realities of central Mediterranean narrow-sea exchange, this study engages with several historiographic issues and debates. We can start with a discussion of the most influential, one might say foundational, texts in Mediterranean history which discuss the historical use of narrow seas mainly as geo-physical areas. In Fernand Braudel's (1972) view «the Mediterranean is not a unitary whole but a succession of smaller seas that enable communication through wider or narrow entrances. Within the two great eastern and western basins of the Mediterranean are a series of highly individual narrow seas with their own characters». He argues that «as a rule the narrowest seas are the richest in significance and historical value [and that] these seas are broken up by islands, interrupted by peninsulas, ringed by intricate coastlines». Braudel also attaches – in a section entitled *The Narrow Seas, Home of History* (1972, pp. 108-133) – great significance to the long-distance trade routes that facilitated communication between these maritime spaces that comprised the Mediterranean world. Other works have stressed the pattern of routine shipping by vessels (by tramping from island to island and to/from mainland ports) as being a fundamental dimension to this 'Mediterranean system' (Braudel, 1972; Braudel, 1977; Wallerstein, 1979). In this interpretation, the *narrow seas* are mentioned in terms of wider mercantile webs of regional routes, hence making sense mostly, if not only, as part of much broader mercantile networks.

Apart from a number of historical accounts that deal with the formal trading capacities of these islands, archipelagos and coastal ports, research on the patterns of exchange and linkages – but mostly the nature of trade within the narrow seas has been sparse. Historians influenced by world-systems theories – particularly Immanuel Wallerstein's work (1979) – together with authors from the *Annales* school (Aymard, 1978), have concentrated mostly on reconstructing the Mediterranean world and detailing the incorporation of its parts into a world capitalist economic system from the sixteenth century onwards. Since, according to this approach, the global economy enveloped all regions in concentric circles within Mercantilism, the existence of separate, yet overlapping, deeply-entrenched narrow-sea economic arrangements from time immemorial has been ignored (Braudel, 1972, pp. 108-133). One main turning point in the historiography has been the volume by Peregrin Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean Histories* (2000), which articulated – in an encyclopaedic format – older and fresh research on the Mediterranean as a Sea made out of separate areas with their own geo- and eco- histories emphasising the long-term evolutions which brought them about, going back to thousands of years. The *Corrupting Sea* has become a reference point for historians taking an inclusive approach towards the variety of seas making up the *Mare Nostrum*. It corroborates much of the wider views taken by the

present study which however concentrates on the narrow seas and associated exchange flows as economic formations in themselves – although intersecting similar others – an aspect that is not really defined and explored in this way by Horden and Purcell’s magnificently detailed book. Another aspect that is definitely more pronounced in the present paper is the role of human agency as central to the vitality and continuous reproduction of these narrow-sea complexes. Local inhabitants, mariners and coastal folk are here taken as protagonists in the weaving together and the shaping of these ever-changing economic nexuses, in synergy with their environment and especially the surrounding seascape.

The central Mediterranean narrow-sea complex in open frontier waters



Source: Duval (1665), *La Carte General et Les Cartes Particulier*

By concentrating on one separate narrow sea complex – within the wider open frontier of the central Mediterranean sea – this study constructs a paradigm that can help us to further explore similar narrow sea economies, in other parts of the re-

gion, essentially as deep-rooted patterns of exchange accumulating between clusters of islands and coastal ports in spatial proximity to each other. Although this research endorses the thesis – represented by the work of Stephen Epstein (1992) – that by and large from the late Middle Ages¹ narrow seas were connected to wider and more distant regional trade networks, it also emphasises that these orbits matured into strongly attached economic formations characterised by intense trade in their own indigenous agricultural and manufactured products. This, in turn meant the presence of a narrow sea market catered for by their own domestic goods till at least the first thirty years or so of the nineteenth century.

Appreciating how this central Mediterranean narrow-sea economy operated and was able to survive for so long – thus demonstrating solidity and resilience – requires a detailed geophysical definition, followed by a meticulous analysis of the products exchanged and the routine activities found within. Southern Sicilian ports, the Maltese archipelago, Pantelleria, Lampedusa, the Kerkenna Islands, Djerba, Tunis, Tripoli and other coastal ports and anchorages on what was known as the Barbary coast, were all embedded within the same narrow-sea complex. Aside from numerous other smaller inhabited islands, coastal villages, ports and *scali*, sets of uninhabited isles, reefs, enclaves, coves and creeks also formed part of this narrow-sea arrangement.² All these localities were utilised by inhabitants and mariners of all types for different tasks and activities, mostly for the extraction and exploitation of a range of maritime resources including a diversity of fish, seafood, sponges, and coral (Adamo, 1798; D’Avaloz, 1818). Various other zones were marked and utilised by sailing vessels to shelter, hide or for provisioning. These sea patches and coastal areas were perceived by locals as common property on which they had ancient customary rights of navigation, access and use. Rugged coastal patches, sea channels and lanes – as well as *cul de sacs* – marked the narrow sea commons for all seafarers, sailors and fishers, indigenous to these waters, who were well informed of this seascape through experience and the received wisdom passed on from one generation to the next (Chircop, 2015a; Lentini, 2010, p. 256).

Mapping the positions of islands and ports within this specific narrow sea at the centre of the *Mare Nostrum* or *al bahr al-Abjad Mutawassit* (the White Middle Sea) makes much more visible the resilience and survival of this orbit in time, being founded on exchanges in basic necessities of livelihood for their communities but also for distance markets. Hence, for example, Sicily was known as the granary of this part of the region (Braudel, 1972, pp. 603–604; Verga, 1981) – supplying the

¹ Stephen Epstein argues that the late Middle Ages was a period that evolved an economic system characterised by ‘increased specialization’ in the Mediterranean (Epstein, 1992, pp. 1–2).

² Detailed information of the geography and the seascape of this narrow sea formation has been obtained from: *Il Consolato del Mare nel quale si a beneficio di Marinai come di Mercanti, & Patroni di Nave & Navily Con il Portolano del Mare con Ogni piu esatta Diligenza* (1637); Duval, *La Carte Generale et les Cartes particuliers de la Mer Mediteranee* (1665) and Gorgoglione, *Portulano del Mare Mediterraneo* (1705); Adamo, *Descrizione Geografica dell’ Isola di Sicilia e dell’ Altre sue adiacenti* (1798); *Portolano ovvero Nuova Guida per il Mare Mediterraneo, l’ Adriatico, O Golfo Veneto, Mar Nero, L’ Archipelago Greco, Il Mar Marmora e d’ Azof* (1849).

coastal and island communities of this central Mediterranean narrow sea but also beyond. The Maltese archipelago traditionally cultivated and manufactured cotton for export to several ports in the proximity – but also to the more distant Barcelona. Djerba was known for its olives, Tunis for oil and hides and Tripoli for its ostrich feathers, gold dust and Arabic gum which were very much in demand in the European capitals (Braudel, 1972; Bres, 1798; D’Avalos, 1818; Jackson, 1810, p. 255; MacGill, 1811, pp. 148-150; Micacchi, 1937).

While in mainstream historiography of the Mediterranean, these islands and coastal zones are considered as being inseparable parts of either southern European or North African politico-administrative systems, in real terms their communities were immersed in deep-rooted orbits of exchange that permeated the above political (Christian-Muslim) divides. Sicilian ports and towns, the islands of Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Linosa, Malta and Gozo, were on the southernmost periphery of ‘Christian Europe’ – though emerging research is showing that these were also perceived as ‘part of Africa’ – while Tripoli, Tunis, Djerba and other islands and enclaves formed part of the Ottoman Empire, with formal allegiance to the Sublime Porte. Yet, all these coastal ports and islands were much more in routine contact with each other than with any remote centre of administrative power, lying engrossed within their own economic and cultural narrow sea complex.

Focusing solely on formal economic, legal and politico-administrative aspects, has led many a historian of the Mediterranean to define, and actually over emphasize the central Mediterranean waters as a divisive ‘border’, a historical cutting-line between Christian Europe and the Muslim / Arab world – and even as one great «fault-line of civilizations»³. In contrast, reliance on the narrow sea dimension as defined above, coupled with an in-depth investigation of the dynamic activities which replenished this particular central narrow-sea nexus, reveals a complex picture of continuous human contacts and commercial flows. In fact a routine connectivity webbing together the ports and *scali* of these islands and coastal towns with vibrant movement made this liquid space one of unstoppable negotiation and infusion of ideas, beliefs and practices. Ongoing research is still uncovering layers of attachments that communities in these maritime zones developed with each other, not only related to trade and a common market and their customary engagements on the use of maritime resources, but in relation to the frequent religious and cultural encounters, which led to a measure of cross-fertilisation and shared world philosophies, between the plurality of religious practices found in this narrow sea (Chircop, 2000; Filesi, 1983, pp. 55-56; Greene, 2002a). Although much more research is required in this field, it is safe to conclude that commercial exchanges, human movement and cultural infusion, cut across official ideological-religious boundaries (Greene, 2000b) which, according to a corpus of Mediterranean histories, strictly divided the central sea into the Christian northwest and the Muslim southeast.

³ For a fresh critique of this ‘Clash of civilization’ literature see ‘introduction’ O’Connell & Dursteller (2016). See also Greene, 2002 (b).

One needs to highlight this point because, as already argued above, with only some few exceptions, historians have failed to recognise, let alone investigate, these complex narrow-sea formations. The rigid employment of north-south and east-west divisions, which become the preponderant analytical categories of previous generations of historians and social scientists studying this region as from the 16th century, has led to bold markings and the hasty projection of strict borders – or frontier lines – on landscapes and seascapes in history. This distorting or even hiding the narrow-sea constellations from Mediterranean histories.

Back to our central narrow sea complex which remained vigorously active and, similarly to other such maritime economic nexuses, survived the intense processes of dislocation of long-distance regional-wide trade routes, and the radical shifts in the established political-administrative systems in both the northern and southern areas of the region. Historians have claimed that by the eighteenth century, the so-called commercial “centrality of the Mediterranean” in the world had already been eroded, largely because of the prevalence of the Atlantic trade routes and, partly as claimed by Richard T. Rapp due to the waves of penetration into the Mediterranean by the British and the Dutch (Davis, 1973; Rapp, 1973) although the extent and intensity of this so called “Northerners invasion” – a thesis taken on by Braudel – is currently being critically reconsidered. Historians such as Molly Greene argue that actually the “Northerners’ presence” in the Mediterranean was not as thick and prevalent as previously thought (Greene, 2002a). In any case, despite all the changes which occurred in the wider mercantile networks within the region and beyond, the patterned exchanges within the narrow-sea orbit in the central Mediterranean resisted till the first three to four decades of the nineteenth century, manifesting a still active market for – and continuous tides of exchange in – indigenous goods. It is therefore imperative to examine in some detail the nature of the main part of the products making up these exchange patterns. From the outset it becomes evident that trade in agricultural produce – with perishable food forming an important component – together with processed and manufactured goods, provided a lifeline to islands and coastal ports within this orbit, with the sea acting as a fluid unifier and carrier, rather than an obstruction or a divisive insulating element (Chircop, 2002).

At this juncture it is to be emphasised that indigenous products made up the bulk of routine trade activities within this central sea. Agricultural surpluses were of crucial importance in these flows of exchange. Grain, that most vital of foodstuffs, was continually supplied from Sicilian ports to all of the communities within the fluid parameters of this complex of coastal zones and islands. Hence, the ports of Girgenti, Licata, Sciacca, Terra Nova and Scoglitti provided the neighbouring ports, islands and archipelagoes with most of their grain needs from the interior of Sicily (Blacquiere, 1813, pp. 121,157; Bresc, 1989, pp. 57-60; De Non, 1789, p. 254; Hoare, 1819, p. 287). Pantelleria and Malta were renowned for their indigenous breed of donkeys: the *asino Pantesco* being much sought after by farming communities in the region and beyond (Antonelli, 1846, p. 352; Mc Gill, 1839, pp. 12-13). Meanwhile horses of ‘Arab breed’ were in constant demand throughout the region, being supplied principally

from the Tunisian and Tripolitanian coasts. Livestock was also delivered from both these areas in North Africa as well as from Djerba known for its exports of live cattle. The Sicilian zones of Victoria, Syracuse and Marsala were also known for their wines, which were in perpetual demand. Olives, figs, dates, all types of nuts were traditional articles regularly supplied all over the central sea from Tunis as well as from Sicily. Olives, dried fruit and asparto grass were also shipped from Tripoli. Both Tunis and Tripoli furnished the Sicilian ports and Malta with coffee and a rather broad range of spices, but also with tartaro, soda, nuts and Arabic gum. Pantelleria and Malta procured brushwood from Lampedusa. Malta and neighbouring islands and ports were also regularly provisioned with ice from Mount Etna, especially during the summer (Chircop, 2002, pp. 52-53; Cockburn, 1815, p. 100; Henique, 1888; Lushington, 1829, p. 207).

In addition to this patterned flow of surplus agricultural and farming products, the habitual trade in the central narrow sea encompassed exchanges in a wide array of processed and manufactured commodities. Sicilian ports supplied flax and silk, while Tunis and Tripoli specialised in the processing and distribution of camel and other animal hides (both dried and salted), but also of wool and silk textiles. Pottery wares, tobacco and coral articles formed part of the usual supplies from these two north African zones. Varieties of Maltese manufactured cottons (largely sailcloth and garments) found customary outlets in the neighbouring and more distant coastal ports and islands. Tunis also supplied several grades of wool, manufactures, which early in the 19th century were still renowned as of the best quality. Ionian soap – together with olives and currants – was usually forwarded from the islands of Cephalonia and Zakynthos (Chircop, 2002, p. 51; Lunzi, 1859). Djerba was known for its making of shawls, and linen cloths, which were held in high esteem. Maltese decorated stone, slabs and tiles were furnished to the nearby islands and ports on the Tunisian coast, but more routinely to Tripoli (Chircop, 2002, pp. 52-53).

Driving all commercial flows, but also engaged in numerous other maritime activities – ranging from fishing to sponge and coral gathering, from corsairing to banditry and of course as travellers, seasonal labourers or migrants – inhabitants of these islands and coastal towns were constantly on the move. Certainly, this vibrant human movement was at the basis of a long-established connectivity; acting to consolidate a sense of neighbourhood and of a common belonging within this narrow sea. If one had to highlight the one typical form of human traffic within these waters, the seasonal flow of agricultural labourers and migrants from the islands to the nearby coastal ports and towns and vice versa can be taken as the most tangible. Inhabitants of the Maltese archipelago, Pantelleria and Djerba and the other central sea islands and coastal towns travelled from one point to another, many crossing to parts of Sicily in search of agricultural work trade and social opportunities. Some would establish communities in various locations there. Maltese farmers settled in Lampedusa and in various other locations in Sicily such as Pachino and Girgenti (Fragapane, 1993; Aliffi & Cassola, 2013). Sicilians and others from the smaller islands moved to areas on the North African coast for work, trade, and social op-

portunities. This plethora of human encounters was enabled, sustained and actually expressed in a customary pidgin language – the lingua franca or *sabir* – which, drawn from different languages and dialects (Wansbrough, 2013) was ably used in dealings, exchanges and socialising between peoples with different cultural-religious backgrounds. Besides facilitating trade dealings, the lingua franca also allowed the exchange and passing on of knowledge and transmitting received wisdom on maritime affairs, skills, technology, medicine and treatment (Chircop, 2002, pp. 54-55).

Corsairs and sea bandits, were endemic in the central narrow sea, restlessly scanning over waters for exploits – plundering passing vessels heavy with staples and other commodities and conveying all booty back to their home ports, or else exchanged on sea. Barbary – and island-based – corsairs remained protagonists in what they considered to be *their* narrow-sea waters as late as the 1830s and even later (Azuni, 1822, pp. 211-212; Filesi, 1983, p. 20). Historical research is increasingly confirming that Christian corsairs operated with few, if any, religious or ideological scruples, preying on both Muslim Arab and European Christian vessels that traversed their immediate waters. Sicilian and Maltese corsairs and privateers attacked North African, Greek and European vessels. As Alberto Tenenti has argued in one of his best works, these maritime practices «transcended religious barriers» (Tenenti, 1967). Corsairing was not really a show of religious prowess within the context of a perpetual war between Christian and Muslim civilizations, as previously interpreted by various historians, but another form of sea-borne exchange. As such it resulted in further contacts and negotiations, in pledges and deals (Bono, 1993; Fontenay, 1988; Mola & Shaw, 2004, pp. 21-43) made but also broken; duplicity, skirmishes and other shows of strength were integral to such pursuits as this which involved competition for scarce resources.

In other words, *corso* and piratical activities were part and parcel of the narrow sea economies, sustaining the archipelagic, island and coastal populations, most notably in times of famine, bad harvests, outbreaks of epidemics and regional disturbances, such as happened during the Continental Blockade (1806-1813) (Crouzet, 1958; Filesi, 1983, pp. 20-21). All in all, these were tolerated and, more often than not sanctioned by the inhabitants so that corsairs and privateers enjoyed authority and respect. They were seen to be performing a necessary function in the economic and social life of their respective communities to the extent that they were usually provided with shelter, support, water and food supplies. Yet, a distinction was still made between the two practices. Corsairs armed their vessels for the *corso* by permission and under license from local authorities («*previa un'autentica permesso, o patente del suo Sovrano*») (Azuni, 1822, p. 211). They were therefore presumably regulated by strict rules and obligations. Privateers, in contrast, armed vessels and looted passing ships on their own initiative («*soltanto con propria, e privata autorità ed effetto da depredate*») (Azuni, p. 213) and in most cases prizes were shared by the crews. The latter are best defined as sea brigands, to use Eric Hobsbawm's term (1985). One direct consequence of these depredations was the

capture of prisoners. For both Muslims and Christians, captives brought in their home ports could be repatriated, either by being ransomed or exchanged as slaves. This customary law was accepted by all parties. Another traditional rule supposed equal and similar treatment of captives by both Muslims and Christians, providing them with a place for worship and religious practice (Bekkaoui, 2010; Cassar, 1968).

This range of activities, coupled with the various forms of exchange already mentioned taking place in this central narrow seas – as in similar, overlapping, maritime economies – shaped the local perceptions of the surrounding sea as a beneficial, vital lifeline, mediator and interlocutor, with other ports, communities and cultures. Such a deeply comforting conception formed part of a world view that embodied a myriad of beliefs and wisdom most notably that related to the common rights of custody, jurisdiction and arbitration over their immediate waters. An ancient culture was this which manifested a collective sense of reliance on the sea, sustained by an accumulation of maritime intelligence «including detailed knowledge of the physical characteristics of the rugged coastline, islands, reefs and rocks – much of which was orally transmitted from one generation to the next» (Chircop, 2002, p. 52).

Such a thick, inherited, volume of maritime lore was most visibly articulated in the sailing vessels built for the specific environmental conditions of the narrow sea waters, and the practical trading and carrying requirements of the inhabitants. Boats were actually designed for specific functions. Hence, transport of perishable goods – mainly vegetables, fruits and cheese – required a fast sailing boat: the *speronara*, which remained the most popular vessel, typical of the central Mediterranean (Allotta, 2000, p. 4; Bresc, 1989, p. 60; Brydone, 1775, pp. 155-156; Dumas, 1902; Hennique, 1888, pp. 49-50).

The *speronara* and other medium to small, locally-constructed, wooden sailing vessels were indeed still gainfully plying the central Mediterranean for a substantial part of the nineteenth century, mostly employed for the short-distance transportation of indigenous products. As a rising number of steamships entered and traversed the Middle Sea after the 1840s – when technological innovation augmented speed and the carrying capacity and raised the safety of these vessels – most of the larger native sailing ships came to be gradually abandoned, leading to the decline and extinction of centers of traditional ship construction in the regional ports. Besides this, steamships left a deeper impact on the narrow-sea formations as these technologies began to forge maritime shipping networks across the region connecting the latter directly to the major ports of industrial Europe (P&O Pocket Book, 1899; Howarth & Howarth, 1986). Steamships – similarly to other technological innovations such as railways and the cable telegraph – came to be used by the European powers as tools of empire (Headrick, 1981). They came to play a progressively crucial role in driving Western European political hegemony and colonial expansion in the Mediterranean and subsequently facilitated the control and incorporation of a larger number of regional ports into the global capitalist system. Integral to this industrially, financially and technologically propelled imperial expansion – starting as from the early 19th century – Britain, for one, added command

over Malta and the Ionian Islands, together with its century-old rule over Gibraltar. This supreme industrial and naval power constructed an imperial network cutting across the Mediterranean which incorporated – and enhanced the strategic value of – the mentioned islands, outposts and coastal territories, as these came to operate specifically for colonial trade and naval-military requirements in the region. For much of the nineteenth century, Malta, Corfu and the Ionian islands (till 1864), Gibraltar and later also Cyprus, served as nodes for connecting Britain to the Mediterranean, the Levant and – after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 – directly with the Orient and India (Chircop, 2015b; Holland, 2012).

During the nineteenth century, in rivalry with British colonial and commercial expansion in the Mediterranean, other European powers spread their commercial and colonial shipping and communication networks, founded on the control of islands, coastal ports and enclaves dismembered from their ancient customary narrow-sea complexes and integrating them in the world economic system. In this way, referring again to the emerging British network cutting across the Middle Sea as a lucid example, the subdued inclusion of the islands and coastal ports in this imperial sea-based linkage at first impeded access to, and then destroyed their customary trade in indigenous products and ruptured the human flows and cultural intimacies that had characterized their narrow seas complexes.

The dominant imperial and nation-state geo-strategic view of the Mediterranean (as articulated for instance in the use of the Mahanian theory of sea-power (Mahan, 1892) concealed the very existence of these diverse narrow-seas nexuses and the ways in which these had been displaced and disintegrated by the emergence of the world capitalist economic system. In like manner, the nationalist and irredentist ideologies which, for instance, reflected and sanctioned the Greek and Italian processes of national unification, neglected, distorted, and actually sought to delete from national history – or as Michael Herzfeld puts it from their ‘monumental History’ (Herzfeld, 1991) – the material existence of past narrow-seas complexes. Nationalist and irredentist historical narratives (similarly to Western colonial ones) were employed to legitimize the seizure and absorption of neighbouring territories – fragments of previous narrow sea nexuses – into their national or imperial systems, which now came to mark the territorial borders of separate nation states. The subsequent geostrategic configuration of the region was, as a matter of fact, characterized by, and actually constructed on, the imposition of such divisive, and increasingly restrictive, borders cutting across the central Mediterranean. With the Risorgimento Sicily, Lampedusa and Pantelleria would be attached to a unified Italian kingdom. Tunis came under French colonial rule in 1881 as had already been the case with Algiers as from 1830. Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar, were all consolidated as British naval-military and coal-bunkering stations on the strategic route to India, via the Suez Canal – Egypt coming to be attached to this same British Empire in 1882.

A new political-economic order was imposed, underpinned by the marking and laying out of new national and colonial borders that partitioned the Middle Sea,

mostly reflecting the financial, commercial and geo-strategic designs of the Western industrial powers and the incorporation of the Mediterranean into global networks centred on imperial metropolis. Paradoxically, for the local peoples, the adjacent sea, which had historically been the medium and interlocutor of their attachments, was transformed into a restrictive border, rupturing their shared histories and use of the sea, and devastating their sense of belonging, whilst wreaking havoc on their customary narrow-sea economies.

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Part II

Borders and Conflicts between Culture and History

A Fertile Border: the Mediterranean in Sicily. Ethnic Components and Social Stratification in the Sicilian Urban Realities of the Late Middle Ages.

ELISA VERMIGLIO

Introduction

On the concept of the Mediterranean as a sea that unites, but at the same time it hosts different identities, the historiography produced numerous studies and essays starting from the Braudelian conception of the phenomenon, aimed at investigating the meaning or meanings in historical, sociological, political, economic, geographic patterns. From the Braudel's theory until the more localized and differentiated vision of Horden and Purcell of the Mediterranean as a reality of a multitude of microcosms (Braudel, 1953; Horden & Purcell, 2000).

There is no doubt that the Middle Ages represented the period when the Mediterranean interconnections had reached its highest level. The sea was a determining factor of contamination and collision -encounter of civilizations, as a liquid platform which over the centuries has united the known world. From the XI century the medieval Mediterranean becomes undoubtedly, for the West, a unique and particular commercial space of interaction and fruitful meetings of cultures through trade and migration, exchanges of people and goods that shaped and diversified the identity of the territories (Jacoby, 1994). In this context, the South of Italy offers a wealth of themes and a complexity of meanings which influenced the spatial and cultural development of European cities between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries: the Islamic presence, the opening to trade during the Norman Age, the strategic organization of the land wanted by Frederick II, the fourteenth-fifteenth-century immigration, the Catalan trade. As a contact region between East and West, Sicily represented a summation of encounters between the Latin-Germanic component and the Greek and the Arab world.

The island not isolated

In the recent historiographical debate on the Mediterranean as a privileged place in which it is possible to test identity forms (Ducellier, 2001; Cardini, 1999; Daniel, 1981), the Medieval Southern Italy, and Sicily particularly, appear as a «microcosm of ancient civilizations, a melting pot of different ethnicities, a reality of border since ever swinging between Mediterranean gravitation and European polarization» (Fonseca, 1999, p. 359).

From an overview of the Sicilian long-term cultural stratification, I would like to highlight the role taken by the sea (the Mediterranean) in the migratory inter-ethnic dynamics of cities and in the formation of the *facies* of the territory.

The Mediterranean is described in the *Libro dei climi*, through its geographical boundaries, identified between Constantinople and the kingdom of the Franks into the west, up to the borders of Toulouse in Spain. Centrally located in this Mediterranean space – as the geographer al-Istakhri writes (1880-82, I, pp.5-6) in the Muslim perspective of the Dar al-Islām – it is «in front of Sicily», the nerve center between two worlds, the mirror of East and West, according to the definition of Roberto Sabatino Lopez (1965, p. 436).

As a strategic place for commerce, the island was not perceived in the Middle Ages for its insularity, unlike its populated coasts, frequented by merchants and predators (Al-Istakhri, 1880-82, I, 8), and it took on a role not as a border, but as a continuous space between land and sea. Interesting information on the perception of the Mediterranean area and the geographical position of Sicily can be derived from Arab sources and in particular from the descriptions of geographers such as al-Muqaddasi, Ibn Hawqal or Yaqut, or in those of the Norman Age as Idrisi and Ibn Giubayr (Amari, 1880-82). Their descriptions are careful to reconstruct spaces, routes, ways taken, with a particular curiosity about the settlements and the etymology of the places; but beyond geographic information, not always reliable or verifiable, what is most interesting is the reconstruction of the employed time, the covered space, the safety of the sea; such information become useful tools for other travelers and provide the historian with other elements of a mapping of the travel migration in the Mediterranean area. A space that connected, between the ninth and eleventh centuries, all areas under the Arab influence: Egypt, Ifriqiya, Spain and Sicily. With the Norman conquest, the island extends its commercial space in Africa, Italy and Europe (Ibn Al-Abbar, 1880-1882, pp. 533-534¹), fitting the Western geographic and political chessboard. Between the twelfth and fifteenth century, Sicily opens its borders to migratory flows fostered by some substantial restocking strategies, by historical, economic and political circumstances. Before analyzing the different ethnic components and the stranger presence on the island, it is useful to make an introduction to understanding the genesis of a cultural ethnic differentiation process that has left traces up to the present day.

¹ Its geographical position at the center of the Mediterranean would be, according to the testimony of the Spanish erudite Abu Bark Ibn al Abbar, the cause of the Muslim expedition led by Asad Ibn al Furat.

Sicily or the Sicilies? Ethnic and religious elements in Norman times

A key element that characterizes the geographic reality of Sicily is its internal differentiation still perceptible nowadays, in the socio-cultural and ethnic substratum of the area.

Already in Norman times we can identify those ethnic-social elements that will characterize the island of later centuries: that is a heavily Islamized west part, a north-eastern Greek rooted area and the gradually Latinized southeastern part. They are a sort of sub-regions identified with the term “Valli” (Valleys) (Val di Mazara, Val di Noto and Val Demone)² with different ethnic settlements that, at the end of the thirteenth century, also differ in production systems and urban structures (Epstein, 1996, p. 33).

The groups settled in Sicily, named in the Norman age chronicles as Muslims, matching a varied picture composed by Berbers, above all, that were African indigenous religiously Islamized and linguistically Arabized, as well as by Arab Andalusian, by Tartars, Persians, Egyptians, Sudanese, Slavs, Greeks and also by mercenaries. (Tramontana, 2014, p. 84; Vanoli, 2012)

The Latin sources attest Saracens and Moors, probably wanting to distinguish the Muslim Arabs by native North-African Mauri. But the cultural mosaic is even more complex if we think that the Christian religious component is the most diverse set of ethnic elements not only across the Alps, but also coming from various parts of the Italian peninsula, as for example the Lombard colonies.

In the mix of cultures between Muslims and Christians of Greek rite, another religious component is represented by the Jews, heirs – at the end of the thirteenth century – of the Arab culture on the island, through the use of the language (Bresc, 2000).

Sicily of Roger II is an island still Islamized, despite the Latinization of the territory favored by immigration coming from northern Italy and the French groups in the wake of the conquerors. We can find traces in material evidence as places of worship, described by geographers, but especially in terminology, in anthroponimics and onomastics.

Frequent statements are included in the royal record's office or in the notarial deeds that also testifies the use of Arabic language for official documents next to the Greek and Latin writing. We may consider, for example, the letter of the Queen Adelasia in Greek and Arabic on 25 March 1109, the oldest written document of Europe, now housed into the Archives of State in Palermo. (Cusa, 1868-1882; Mandalà & Moscone, 2009) In the north east of the island, still Graecised, the integration for the so-called Mozarabs of Sicily, Arabic-speaking Christians, had occurred on the linguistic level, but not on the religious one (Bresc & Nef, 1998).

In this varied ethnic and religious context, a cultural synthesis is realized, that

² The division in the three valleys begins to be outlined already during the phase of conquest of the Muslims which gradually settled into the area, primarily focusing on the Val di Mazara and the Val di Noto. The Val Demon, defense and attack outpost, remained a predominantly militarized and sparsely populated area, an encounter/clash zone with the Byzantines settled on the other side of the Strait of Messina.

finds expression in the royal court of Roger II in Palermo, an attractive center for Arab and Byzantine intellectuals, learned men who arrived in the island from Ifriqiya, Andalusian Spain, Egypt, Syria and Malta (De Simone, 1997, p. 63). However, the Arab legacy is reinterpreted with new patterns and forms of expression and adapted by Norman kings in a cultural mixture that gives life, for example, to the Arab-Norman artistic model (Morrone, 2006, p. 9).

Arab elements, but also Latin and Byzantine ones flow in this cultural syncretism. The construction, for example, of the Palatine Chapel, of the Cathedral of Cefalù or of the Monreale Cathedral are a clear example of the cosmopolitanism capable of assimilating elements by Islamic, Byzantine and Romanesque-Latin arts.

At the end of the reign of Roger II, the record's office and the central administration suffered a Latinization process that led to the gradual replacement of the Greek and Arabic element with new officials of Lombard origin (M.Aymard & H.Bresc, 1974, pp. 957-958), nevertheless Palermo remained predominantly Muslim throughout the Norman period, maintaining the control of the entire neighborhoods with mosques, markets and Koran schools (Ibn Giubayr, 1880-1882, I, p. 164). The Muslim settlement had spread in the territory of the island especially in the Val di Noto and Val di Mazara until the end of the reign of William II. In the *Libellus de succession pontificum Agrigenti*, you have evidence of how the Christian element was in the minority compared to the Arab population also in the Agrigento area. The diocesan curia was built near the castle «propter timorem innumerabilium Saracenorum habitantium in Agrigento, quia erant pauci christiani ibi usque ad mortem regis Guillelmi secundi» (*Libellus de succession pontificum Agrigenti*, p. 307)

In the Swabian period, the Arab ethnic component is gradually disappearing, until the deportation of the Muslim community in Lucera. A cultural influence remains, favored by migration of intellectuals at the court of Frederick II and by the scientific interests of the sovereign. While traces of integration in the customs and traditions are found, for example, in the habits of Christian women who wore like the Muslim people, speaking Arabic well in Palermo (Tramontana, 1993, pp. 22-23).

From the second half of the thirteenth, the trade and political upheavals cause large migratory flows from Provence and Anjou area before and the Catalan later. In this context, the ports of the island's main cities become the contact points and poles of attraction for the allocation of a stranger colonies that enrich the urban social composition.

Intercultural effects in the topography of the main port cities

Intercultural effects can be traced in the topography of the major port cities such as Palermo and Messina, whose most wonderful harbor is described as a popular and busy trade square, animated by a constant coming and going of merchants of all nationalities (Ibn Giubayr, 1880-1882, I, pp. 144-145). Ports are relational spaces that mark the territory and encourage settlement dynamics around the market area.

But it is also the analysis of the territory, with its visual demonstrations, to show the degree of settlement of a foreign component. Examples are churches, lodges, Consulates that from the port are distributed in the heart of the city.

The port assumes, in this context, an important value not only because it conveys the trade and the city's economic vitality, but because it becomes an expression of the social composition and development (Simbula, 2009).

It is important to note the attractiveness of the port for economic activities and social and demographic consequences of the phenomenon. Observing and analyzing the documents, they show the presence of numerous stranger colonies, which settled in the city initially with consulates and lodges, then with a final immigration.

It is apparent in several acts of sale and purchase of properties or in the contracts of matrimonial nature that allow to establish a network of links with the territory (Penet, 1998; 2005; Ciccarella, 1986; 1987; 2005).

The main cause of migration between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries which favors anthropic and cultural exchange and therefore linked to the economic factor is the trade, that drives merchants from Venice and Barcelona, in particular, but also from Marseilles, Genoa, Naples. They are to be recorded presences even of merchants of Candia or Chio (Figliuolo, 2013, pp.772-774). They are flows that change in intensity according to the political upheavals that guide the geopolitical chessboard, redrawing from time to time the routes and the main exchange circuits. In this way, for example, the trade towards East by Charles of Anjou's policy which had its center in the city of Messina, after the Vespers, leads to the Aragonese influence fostering other ports of western Sicily like Palermo and Trapani.

The commercial circuit embraced is very extensive, and includes the western areas from Sardinia to Corsica, from Barcelona to Marseille, up to Bruges and London (traffic transmitted and managed by the Venetians); in the eastern area from Venice to Albania, up to the Greek islands, Romania and North Africa.

Next to the Mediterranean circuit, a growing trade in medium and short course sustains, which was run mainly by local ethnic groups or neighboring immigration that feeds the local handicraft industry (Vermiglio, 2010).

Ethnic components and foreign merchants in Sicilian cities: historiographical excursus

The conquest of Sicily by the Normans causes a distortion of the social structure due to the reduction of the role of Muslims forced to switch to a condition of "peasants" and to a massive immigration in the main towns of the island (Peri, 1978).

The same Altavilla gave start to the repopulation of the island through an open trade policy.

The Latin element presence in the social fabric of the island where there were other population groups in Norman times, was particularly deepened by Illuminato Peri that, by analyzing the distribution of the population in the major cities, identi-

fied among the Latins arrived in Palermo «big feudal lords, prelates natives of France, of England, and also the Spaniards, at the time of the regency of Margaret, who gave the County of Montescaglioso to one of her brothers; they were of the South, and they were Genoese, Pisan, Amalfitan or Venetian people» (Peri, 1954, pp. 351-352).

The new Latin element, along with that Greek coming from the South of the Peninsula, caused a penetration within the noble classes. As a result, Latin people, settling in the city, occupied the economic roles managed by Muslims, which, though they continued to hold a position in crafts and trades, were intended to be mostly deported in the Swabian age.

We can notice, therefore, that with the conquest of the Altavilla the guidelines and assets of Sicily changed, which did not address toward eastern Damascus and Baghdad, or to Byzantium, but it opened its traffic to the western Mediterranean exercising, even more than in past, an attractive role for the people who gravitated around it. From the Norman age, with the opening of markets, an intensification of exchanges with different communities of the peninsula begins, but it was not destined to grow with the successive Swabian and Angevin dominations, leading to a local roots (Abulafia, 1991).

The most obvious result of this policy is the immigration of foreign merchants that are inserted into the Sicilian trade context sometimes to the point to take root in the island and to reach a so-called "*sicilianitation*" (to use an expression of Petralia (1983) on the presence of families and Pisan merchants in the fifteenth century in Sicily).

In this way Sicily is set up as "a nation", that merged together a set of groups for purchasing a nationality, rather than a homogeneous body for the origin. (Dentici Buccellato, 1988, p. 239).

The origin of the foreigners, in fact, far from being homogeneous, is revealed in all its diversity through a scrutiny of archival documents revealing the onomastics of the names in the space of the 1300 and 1400: Tuscans, Genoese and Catalans are the most presences between 1300 and 1460 (Bresc, 1986, II, pp. 985-987). The Catalans, inserted in the commercial trade circuit of the island after the Aragonese conquest, managed to consolidate a strong presence in Sicily highlighting «the link, always difficult to be grasped, between the political component and the economic one, in the great expansionist firms of the Middle Ages»; this relationship «is revealed, in the case of the Catalan-Aragonese component in Sicily, in a narrow dependence of the economic expansion by a military conquest and a political affirmation» (Del Treppo, 1972, p. 149).

This new component, within the island market, however, did not exercise a monopoly position, but it took place in the commercial landscape, within which some merchants outside the reign were already operating and they – maintaining an extreme prudence policy» and almost absolute neutrality against the royal power – assure a continuity in trade relations despite the succession of royal monarchies (Dentici Buccellato, 1988, p. 236). Genoese, Pisans, Venetians, but also Florentines, great supporters of the Angevin policy «found a way to fit into the island's

economic life through personal concessions: the big companies of the Bardi and Peruzzi could hardly give up those markets» (Del Treppo, 1972, p. 153).

With the Aragonese conquest, therefore, the island did not become a monopoly of Catalan trade, but it kept its mercantile vitality and its basic strategic role for supplies of grain victuals in the middle of the Mediterranean for the merchants of different nationalities who were able to secure trade in the island.

It can be assumed that the merchants represent the most obvious type of migration and, therefore, the most discussed among the various foreign parts of the island, a presence justified by mercantile interests and concentrated in this port city.

The studies in this regard are numerous; among those of particular relevance and scientific usefulness there are the pages about the foreign merchants in the Kingdom of Sicily in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by Georges Yver (1903) (study of the early twentieth century, but still useful).

Equally rich in interpretive ideas, there are numerous studies of Carmelo Trasselli (1964; 1965; 1973a; 1973b; 1982) who – in addition to identifying several foreign components, in several essays – tried to understand their social weight and role in the island's economy.

Henry Bresc (1986) has also dealt with the merchants and the ethnic structure and he, in analyzing the Sicilian population, gave wide space to the role and the rooting of foreign merchants in the socio-economic structure.

More generally, Rosa Maria Dentici Buccellato (1988) focused on foreign components in the island and their commercial role (retracing the outdated studies on the subject, although still useful, such as those of Saporì (1952), or on Amalfi people, of Giunta (1975), of Coniglio 1944-45, Del Treppo and Leone (1977), of Imperato (1980) and Sangermano (1982), and proceeding to a discussion of the individual groups in Sicily.

Buccellato found that the medieval studies have not particularly analyzed the Genoese presence in the island; historiography can only count on a few works such as the contribution of Trasselli outlining the movement of the Genoese to Sicily as a steady migration of merchants that fit into the society's tangles at various levels by binding with the urban oligarchy and the aristocracy. We may think of the Doria, who will inherit the Admiralty of the Kingdom (Trasselli, 1969; 1980; Gulotta, 1983).

There is, instead, a more extensive bibliography for the Tuscans, also due to the wealth of documentation traceable in the archives of the region. As well as several works of a general nature, we may remember the scientific contributions of Lioni and Trasselli on the operations of the Florentine companies in the island and the Sicilian banks of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that have been an important source for reconstructing the economic context and the role of the Tuscan in Sicily (Lioni, 1908; Trasselli, 1956) Interesting is the migration of Pisan to Sicily in 1400, that «responded to a specific need of technical resources and human, expressed from the island for the proper functioning of its market economy». It is a movement that takes on connotations of long term and continuity, and it is rooted in XIII and XIV centuries, «connecting – and together helping to support it and di-

rect it – to a stream that was typically Tuscan». The study thoroughly addressed by Petralia (1989; 1984) also through a prosopographical survey and an output population census from Pisa, highlighted how in Palermo dominated by a foreigner merchant class, «the nodal functions of banking and finance, insurance (and even – by public brokers – those of commercial brokerage) were all in the hands of the group of naturalized Pisan people» (p. 385).

We must consider, however, that the Pisan and Tuscan immigration in general (from Florence, Siena, Lucca *in primis*, but also from San Gimignano, Castelfiorentino, San Miniato, Pistoia, Poggibonsi, Colle Val d'Elsa, Prato, Empoli) does not end only with relevant financially groups as merchants and bankers, but it includes classes of artisans and wage earners and it often gives rise to a kind of settlement on two levels; a first stable stage, but reversible and a second deeply ingrained, revealed by elements such as citizenship, weddings, real estate.

Around the island's eastern coast, particularly in Messina, however, Venetians gravitated and started their business with the opening of the roads of Flanders. Studies on this trade group are not numerous, as well as pages dedicated to Bresc in *Un monde méditerranéen* (where sporadic appearances of Marseilles, Nice, Narbonne people, etc. are attested in the island commercial distribution) see for example the contributions by Carini (1876) and Corrao (1981).

Do not take on a major role, however, especially in a demographic survey, other merchant presences “secondary” that «are mostly absorbed in the small trades that have almost no weight in the island economy and in trade» (Dentici, 1988).

Sporadic, for example, are some visitors from Ragusa, registered in the eastern part of the island, Greeks from Candia, from Rhodes and Kefalonia attested in Trapani.

The *excursus* on the presence of foreigners in Sicily, traced through an examination of trade relations in the orientation of historiography, however, can not fully understand the social structure in its multiplicity of island-outsider components. Then, we must refer to those sectors of the economy in Sicily that required an immigration of foreign labor: agriculture and crafts.

Toponymy attests, in fact, the presence of strangers in the fisheries and sugar sectors: the way of Liparitanian and the courtyard of Iskisani in Palermo in the Kalsa district.

We can not fail to mention in this context, the immigration from Calabria that, according to a study by Pietro Corrao on the floating population of Palermo in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, represents «the most important innovation of the labor market in Palermo regarding the origin of the immigrant work force» (Corrao, 1984).

This presence, although it mainly affects the lower layers of society, acquires a major significance in the fifteenth century in order to compensate the labor force required from the island.

The fifteenth century is, therefore, the moment of maximum expansion and centripetal pull toward Sicily that is presented as a place of natural flow of the entire exorbitant population of the Reign and as a main merger, beyond Naples, Messina

and Palermo (Galasso, 1980).

The areas that interest and attract this kind of migration are manifold and not only related to trade and cultivation. Frequent relations, often of a seasonal nature, between Calabria and Sicily also promote development in the production of silk, in the art of weaving and coloring, by fostering, therefore, an exchange of techniques.

Also in the fifteenth century, the presence of strangers is documented in some highly specialized sectors, such as mining (Trasselli, 1964), and some recent researches conducted by Dentici Buccellato led to believe that «precisely the foreign operators do not only try, but they also solicit, with the help of the state, this type of productive enterprise, certainly in the wake of the Northern Italy» (Dentici, 1984).

Conclusions

As mentioned above, it is not easy to delineate an overall picture of the cultural and ethnic stratification of the Sicilian cities in the long run, because it is not a one-off process but it will have been structuring over the centuries, influenced by various political and economic factors affecting dynamics of populating.

First of all, some difficulties are encountered in trying to quantify the distribution of the population. The historical demography studies from those of Maggiore Perni to those of Pardi and Beloch highlighted the difficulty of reconstructing the Sicilian population, reaching to results necessarily approximate, considering the fragmentary nature of the sources. According to the most recent historiography (Epstein, 1996, p. 67), demographic fluctuations in the late medieval Sicily did not diverge from European general trends and suffered for the total late medieval upheaval in the Mediterranean. To the strong depopulation - after the crisis of the fourteenth century and involving different regions of the peninsula - follows in the fifteenth century a slow recovery that explodes after the 50s with a population increase leading to a doubling of the population with «demographic fluctuations – according to Stephan Epstein (1996, p. 35) – much wider than those usually permitted».

The calculations relating to the fifteenth century, put forward by the numbers of the data of the fires in 1374 and 1501, show that – in the long term – some external causes (wars) and internal (plagues) re-balanced the distribution of the population in the island and maintained the annual population growth to a minimum, almost steady, level.

The survey of written sources, particularly on fifteenth notarial registers of the major Sicilian cities, shows a strong dynamism not only internally but also with a considerable presence of immigrants concentrated particularly in the port cities of Messina and Palermo.

From this mobility, it happens that in the fifteenth century the population is concentrated in urban areas and some depopulated centers, after the crisis of the fourteenth century, are occupied by immigrants. A significant percentage of this population growth was due to immigration from the southern regions of the penin-

sula, from northern Italy and from the current Albania towards the low-density inhabited areas of the island, but also with a strong potential for economic development (Epstein, 1996, p. 67)

However, it is difficult to give figures, even approximate; the reconstruction of the Sicilian population, even in its different ethnic groups, must take into account a wide economic and social survey or – as Francesco Natale (1957, p.20) stated – «the history of production of agriculture, handicraft production, [...] and the “*mercatores*” and the “*banquerii*”, the “*rustici*” and the “*artifices*”, the “*cives*” and the peasants, and the *milites* and the clerics, and the subjects of the Kingdom and the “*forastierii*”, the Sicilians scattered around the Mediterranean basin, and the Pisans, the *januenses*, the Venetians, the *amalphitani*, *appuli*, *francigenae*, *teuthonici*, *Anglii*, *cathalani*, “*the Lombards*”, *Agareni*, *Judaei* flocked to conquer a place in the open, too open island markets».

Ultimately, therefore, in the late Middle Ages and especially in the last two centuries, the sea has conveyed a continuous immigration which has contributed to making Sicily most dynamic and has determined *transfers* in prime locations of contact with a fruitful anthropic and cultural exchange.

The numerous foreign communities in the island and the different areas of origin are a testimony of how Sicily, in late Middle Ages takes an attractive role for different types of immigration that shaped the *facies* of the territory.

Investigating the phenomenon of migration, we may identify multiple factors that regulate and influence the flows. The number of foreign components in the late Middle Ages became rooted in the island both in order to manage their commercial interests, taking a role in the administration and in the society³, and in order to work in the agricultural and economic structure of the island.

We may think of the Greek-Albanian colonies formed after the Turkish pressure and settled permanently in the island, sometimes after having temporarily allocated in southern Italy, or we may think of a qualified immigration that developed in different levels, such as the Aragonese nobility integrated into the aristocracy ranks after the conquest of the island, the Castilian administrative staff, the various Catalans merchants and bankers or coming from northern Italy as the Lombards, Genoese, Tuscan or *iuris periti* o *doctores* (Giunta, 1953; D’Alessandro, 1963; Del Treppo, 1972).

Alongside these large flows, a parallel immigration of artisans, farmers and wage earners from Lombardy, Liguria and Calabria develops, such an immigration is presented as «the most significant aspect of the foreign presence developed already from 1300 as a floating population around stable groups» (Santorusso-Sanfilippo, 1991, p. 24).

They are, in this case, short and medium-haul movements affecting Sicily in the

³ The Aragonese conquest did not mean the closure of the island markets to other foreigners who were working here and held the ranks of the business. In fact Sicily, a large producer of grain victuals, was to remain, thanks to its geographical position at the center of the Mediterranean, a confluence point of the routes with the East and Africa, in a position of neutrality.

Middle Ages: they are regular and sometimes seasonal movements which, though less obvious, and certainly less studied, make an important contribution to the workforce needs.

By analyzing these different types of migration, we could notice what Giuseppe Petralia already sensed, by finding a correlation between distance and qualification, says: «After all, between the two, qualification and distance, there is a definite correlation: it is a constant of each migration phenomenon, the fact that - with the distance of the new settlement - the degree of social and professional qualification and specialization of migrants tends to increase»; therefore, in relation to Pisa «with a not exhausted commercial vocation, the social wing of emigration, qualified and at sufficiently long distances, could only be the one with commercial connotations. Meaning thereby, not a class of *mercatores* rigidly defined, but a section of the urban society typologically varied and differentiated, which included all possible activities – related to trade in a very broad sense – required by the operation of the overall system of an evolved economy of exchange » (Petralia, 1984, p. 379).

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From the Middle Age to the Modern Age. The “Royal City” of Cava: Power and Privileges in the Formation of the Borders. A Research Approach

MASSIMO SIANI

It is complicated to define where borders were at the time of the change from the Middle ages to the Modern age. Especially when speaking about them in such an open context as the Mediterranean, as it was not perceived as a definite geographic space during this particular time frame.

The political and social transformations, which began in the late XII-early XIII century, made Europe, even in the XV century, a combination of several overlapping layers, where a territory and jurisdiction hardly ever coincided, and where any institution rarely spread onto an adjacent area.

In such a situation, which awards a relationship (even though often unequal) rather than a conflict, it may be helpful to recognize the mental perception of a border, or rather the fluid identity which was being created by different social factors joining together, and the forms it takes.

Institutionalization and the building of this identity are therefore the things we should look more closely if we want to try and define what can be called a border in the centuries XIV through XVI.

Looking at the history of Cava in the XV century, we can see the way numerous factors (such as overlapping of the administrative and territorial districts and the coexistence of different forces) interacted with each other and generated various effects, both local and general.

The result was creating a specific organization of society, the process which both unites and at the same time divides the society, and uses privileges and common interests rather than an anachronistic feeling of belonging to a community.

In this work I focus my observation on three points – the first will be more general, the two others more specific and will emerge after the initial analysis.

The latest book by Giovanni Vitolo (2014), as well as the study done by Giorgio Chittolini (1990) have explained that the status of a city and the functions a territory performed were not connected with each other inextricably.

We usually speak of a place as of “a city” when it was the residence for the episcopal seat or when the place had reached a certain number of residents.

However, in the Kingdom of Naples, though not exclusively there, there also existed what Prof. Giovanni Vitolo calls “other cities,” which had some of the characteristics of traditional cities without having the legal status of a city.

These two types of territories both played their roles in the history of the Kingdom of Naples and, at the same time, in the development of the local identity.

The existence of a single united kingdom does not mean the parts that formed it should cease to exist. They preserved a certain autonomy and were part of the historical background where many diverse processes were taking place, all with the common goal, survival.

In my opinion, the history of Cava in the XV century shows how different components interacted with each other, creating a unique identity, and how all of them contributed to the birth and growth of the Kingdom of Naples.

Various forces were at work here: the *Universitas*, the Abbey, influence of neighbouring feudal lands (first of all, the Principality of Salerno), the Crown and, last but not least, the Pope.

How these became the foundations of the city’s identity requires some explanation.

The objectivity of the accounts of the main historical events of the City of Cava in the early Modern Age can sometimes be doubted, as they tend to give some particular events more importance than the events actually had.

I am going to illustrate this by referring to the recent interpretations of these events. Cava legally became a state-owned city after Pope Boniface IX issued the papal bull of 7 August 1394.

It used to be thought that the Abbey of Cava received the right of administration over the territories, which today correspond to Cava, Vietri and Cetara through the privilege granted by Gisulfo II (1058). But this opinion was discarded after the study of the document was conducted, and it was shown that it is a forgery made in the late XIII century (Carlone, 1984).

So, if we accept that the document is a fake, then the abbey, most likely, only exercised several administrative functions that rulers of the time usually conceded to abbeys and bishoprics (such as administration of civil justice, control over the state-owned forests and the port of Vietri etc), and it seems plausible to suppose that these lands were under the jurisdiction of Prince of Salerno.

Indeed, Charles I of Anjou, King of Naples, tied the title of Prince of Salerno to the royal title, and the King nominated his son Charles (future Charles II) the first Prince of Salerno of the House of Anjou. Therefore, it seems probable that Cava belonged to the Crown and was under its control at the time.

The papal bull of 1394 granted the territories of Cava the status of a city, but above all, honored the abbey by making it the residence for the episcopal seat for the newly set-up diocese, which, at the time, was necessary for a territory to become “a city”.

In fact, this document by Boniface IX reorganized the administration of the monastery: the abbot became the bishop, and the Roman Church took control of the

abbey. All these details can be found in the text of the bull (Elevazione delle Terre della Cava a città).

Moreover, as the Pope had close ties with the new royal dynasty of Anjou-Durazzo, which substituted that of Anjou of France, the bull could be seen as a way to support and reinforce the new royal family.

This is only a supposition at the moment, one that can help us explain the events which took place both before and after the proclamation of this bull.

Some years before the bull of 1394 was issued, Pope Boniface IX had sent a few letters to the residents of the territories of Cava in which he asked them to accept with happiness the election of Margherita and Ladislao as the Kingdom's new sovereigns.

The Holy Father was addressing the local community directly, bypassing the mediation of the abbey.

In 1384, Queen Margherita established the forms of the administration over these territories. At the same time Ligorio, the abbot of the monastery, negotiated with the members of the community the boundaries of the abbey's authority.

On 3 August 1419 Queen Joanna II, grateful to Martin V, the new Pope, for his investments in the realm, transferred "*castrum civitatis cavae*" under the jurisdiction of Lorenzo Colonna and Angelotto De Fusco (bishop of Anagni and, since 1426, also of Cava). For the same reason, the Queen gave Giordano Colonna (the Pope's brother) a part of the Principality of Salerno and lands in the Duchy of Amalfi to hold as a feudal lord.

He also had the "*omina iura civitatis Cavae*," but he did not legally own the city (Milano, 1996).

When Giordano Colonna died in 1424, these privileges came to Antonio Colonna, who confirmed the city's freedoms. However, the situation was changing.

On 31 October 1419 the Queen, "supplicated" by the citizens, reassured them that the city of Cava is free from the obligation of obedience to any lord other than the King. Perhaps Joanna's acting in this way shows her plans to restrict both Colonna and the Pope's interference in the affairs of the realm (this might have also been the reason for her having divided the lands among Giordano, Lorenzo and Angelotto).

In 1431, Martin V died, and Eugene IV became the new Pope. Eugene was an enemy of the Colonna family, so Joanna declared the Colonnas deprived of all their possessions and declared the return of their land to the Crown.

The next year (10 July 1432) the Queen promised the city that it would never belong to another lord (Milano, 1996).

The Queen's promise was broken only between 1506 and 1518, during the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic, when Cava was given to Joanna IV, the widow of King Ferdinand II (Ferdinand the Catholic's grandson).

But it was the events at the Abbey that now worried the citizens most. The monastery was merged with that of S. Giustina of Padova. In these circumstances the Abbey was to lose the episcopal seat, and Cava – its status of state-owned territories, both legally connected to the residence of a bishop in the city.

The bull "*Sancta Devotionis*" by Pope Leo X (on 22 of May, 1514) allowed the

city to form an autonomous diocese with Cava in its centre, and the death of Joanna IV resolved the issue.

The new attitude shown by Margherita, Ladislao and Joanna shows how the relations between the Roman Church and the Crown were changing.

This brought the city many privileges both from the Pope and the Crown, both negotiating with Cava directly, skipping the mediation of the abbey.

Therefore, it is not correct to think that the Crown-owned lands were always in direct subordination to the king, while on the lands belonging to a lord, such lord was always the mediator between the king and the local institutions. This model was alive in many places, but, as we see, not everywhere, especially not on the territories in which the Crown had more interest.

Sixty years later, from 1458 to 1463, King Ferdinand I, son of Alfonso I, and John of Anjou, son of Duke of Lorraine, contested for the crown of the Kingdom of Naples.

John was supported by the biggest vassals of the realm, Antonio Centelles, the dukes of Taranto and Rossano, and Iacopo Piccinino, a great commander of a mercenary army.

Ferdinand, in his turn, was supported by Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan, and Pius II, the Pope. Besides, the King counted on the help of the cities, and among these was Cava.

What is important to us now is, firstly, the events at the Sarno on the 7 July 1460 (though the actual course of events is open to debate) and secondly, what happened afterwards.

In short, on the 17 of June 1460 the armies of Aragon and Anjou were engaged in a battle near the Sarno (Squitieri, 2011).

On the 7 of July, the Aragon's cavalry attacked the enemy's encampment inside a town, ending up in trap in the narrow streets.

The army of Anjou would have won the day and John would have become the new King of Naples, had it not been for the 500 men of Cava led by captains Joshua and Marino Longo who at this very moment attacked John's army and saved King Ferdinand.

For the courage shown by the citizens of Cava in the battle of the Sarno, on 4th of September the King gave them a blank parchment already bearing the King's seal and signature. On this parchment, the citizens of Cava could write any request they wished granted. However, the citizens returned it blank, the way it had been received. A few weeks later, on 22 September 1460, Ferdinand conferred upon the city a new privilege, declaring Cava "*fidelissima*" – the most loyal city of the Crown. It also exempted the citizens from the taxes on all merchandise both imported and exported.

Perhaps it was Ottavio Beltrano who was the first to tell the story of the King's rescue at the Sarno. Agnello Polverino wrote about it in his narration called *Descrizione Istorica della Città fedelissima della Cava* (1716-1717). After Polverino, we can read about the bravery of the citizens of Cava in every version of the history of the city. Thus, their bravery played a great role in forging the identity of the community as a city in the royal jurisdiction and, above all, *fidelissima*.

As for the Pope's bull earlier, the question is not as much as whether Cava was loyal but what its position was among the Crown-owned cities. I think it is a good idea to try and find the real motivations behind granting these privileges, and their role in forming the identity of Cava during the XV century, which is different from that of the XVII century.

Recently Prof. Francesco Senatore (Senatore, 2012) has shown (in such a way that makes it difficult to dispute) that the participation of the citizens of Cava in the battle of the Sarno was a legend born in the XVII century.

Giovanni Pontano, De Candida and even Antonio del Trezzo, who wrote about the events at the Sarno between the 17 June and 7 July, all spoke about the bravery of the citizens of Cava on the 7 July.

The accounts by Guglielmo di San Marco and Giovanni Catino of the King's escape to Naples through Nola have been verified. They are confirmed by a receipt for a payment from the royal treasury.

«Then why did the King offer the city the famous blank parchment, which is confirmed as a unique case in the Kingdom?» asks Prof. Senatore. A closer look at the facts may help us.

The defeat at the Sarno set in motion the usual shift of forces from one side to another. Among those who switched sides was Roberto Sanseverino, future Prince of Salerno. Right before the battle of the Sarno he had joined forces with John, but switched sides to join Ferdinand before the decisive battle of Troia (1462).

By an agreement with Felice Orsini, Prince of Salerno, the French army conquered Castellammare and moved towards Cava.

It was very common in that period for the victor to demand surrender from the cities and lands of the loser.

It used to be thought that the blank parchment and the siege of the city (18-28 August, 1460) were the effects of the battle of the Sarno, but today the reconstruction of the events made by using Antonio del Trezzo's letters to his lord Francesco Sforza show us the real motives behind Ferdinand's gift.

In two letters (of the 21 and 29 August, 1460) Antonio Del Trezzo informs that Cava was besieged by Giovanni Cossa (in the service of Anjou), between the 18 and 29 August 1460.

Giovanni Cossa intimidated the citizens «*di fargli il guasto*» (to ruin all the area outside the wall). The citizens showed their fortitude by replying that they would gladly do it for him themselves if Giovanni promised them safety during the operation (Senatore, 1994).

We know that people of that time were realistic than idealistic. The courage of the citizens of Cava cannot be explain only by their "*fidelitas*".

Both sides of the siege were more or less aware of what was happening around. The army of Ferdinand was marching towards Cava from Naples. In the XV century the defensive arms were better than offensive ones; and Cava was «*de sito e de mura (...) fortissima*» (was fortified with a wall) and «*di homini molto parziali et affectionati alla maiestà del signore*» (the men were experienced and devoted to

the king) (Senatore, 1994). Moreover, for Cava to surrender would mean to return under a jurisdiction of a feudal lord, Felice Orsini, perhaps.

A few days before the siege, Onofrio Scannapieco, the mayor of Cava, had set out to Naples in order to confirm the city's loyalty to the Crown.

Could this dangerous trip have been justified if the citizens had gone to the Sarno and had saved the King?

On the 4 September 1460 the mayor received from Ferdinand a blank parchment, which was accompanied by a letter, the only paper document in the city archive, except the privileges and bull of 1394. In the letter, the King does not speak about the help at the Sarno, but of the «*guasto*» during the siege.

Therefore, it is the fortitude that Cava showed during the siege that would be behind the King's gift of the blank parchment.

Now I would like suggest some hypotheses on why the parchment was returned blank. Perhaps Onofrio Scannapieco, the Mayor, had not been expecting a gift like that from King Ferdinand. It does not seem implausible that, perhaps, the Mayor hopelessly tried to realize what the king was expecting to hear. And being unable to come up with the answer, returned the paper in its original form.

It would be very interesting to research if the king, as Prof. Francesco Storti writes, was skilled and trained in the art of disguise, which should be perceived differently from our usual take on the situation in which Ferdinand is believed to be trying to look a rightful legitimate sovereign responding to the great loyalty shown by Cava with justice.

Or maybe, the city had nothing substantial to wish, and the Mayor chose his answer to be a strong symbolic gesture, which perhaps could be the proof of certain awareness of the political situation.

Other examples can help us confirm that the community of Cava was aware of the transformations that were happening both to the city's identity and on the historical background in general.

In 1432 Joanna II told them that «mai più sarebbe stata uscita dal demanio» (The city would never be out of the state property) (Milano, 1996)

In 1450, the city had a pact with the community of Franciscans in order to build a church in the hamlet of Scacciaventi that would be also to operate as a school. There are reasons to think that this school was free, a unique case on the territory of Salerno, and among the people who went, there were not only those who could not afford going up to the schools in Naples and Salerno. King Ferdinand invested a lot in the instruction of the public officials. In fact, those who had to travel to study were exempted from many taxes. At the school of Cava, for example, Ferdinand, son of Frederick II, King of Naples and Ferdinand I's uncle, studied there.

Moreover, the Franciscan school was listed among the schools of the province in the Order's General Chapter in 1593, and among the schools of the second level by that in 1676. As we can see, this church was very important for the community. It was school, it was the communal church and also it was the place where the city's archive was kept.

We also have to remember the privileges, especially fiscal privileges, that Cava had been granted by previous kings and lords. These privileges were constantly reaffirmed and expanded up to the point of complete exemption from taxes, which Cava received just eighteen days after the situation with the blank parchment.

On the 22 September 1460, a delegation of six notable citizens of Cava arrived in Naples. They asked King Ferdinand to specify in the new document that this new privilege of exemption from taxes was the king's spontaneous gift like the previous one of 4 of September, perhaps, in an attempt to recreate roughly the situation of 4 of September. It is clear, however, that King Ferdinand was not a fool (Senatore, 2012).

The king approved of the delegation's request but they had to pay 65 ducats, which was the usual tax to pay for the Crown's seal, and also a large sum, which is mentioned at the end of the document. So on the 4 of September Cava may have lost the chance to receive and confirm some privileges without having to pay the taxes to the Chancellor's Office (Senatore, 2012).

While on the 22 September the citizens of Cava requested, paid for and were granted some privileges, now they didn't only had the honours but also, as it happens to all supporters of the Crown, the obligations resulting from being part of the royal domain.

Whichever was the task – to negotiate privileges, collect taxes, govern a territory or organize the defence – an institution that performed these functions was de facto “a city” and constituted, in fact, the first line of a kingdom.

Therefore, I believe that “a Royal City” would be functioning as a jurisdictional border, which the city could keep if it was efficient, i.e. managed to answer its needs and the needs of the general background of which the city was a part.

In conclusion, it is the legend about the citizens' help at the Sarno, created by chroniclers in the middle of the XVII century that perhaps makes this point, very clear in itself, a bit abstract.

The main direction of Cava's later intentions in the XVI- early XVIII centuries was protection of the status of the city, and its citizens, and not the encroachment on the privileges of others.

This can be explained by the events that were taking place: the inclusion of the kingdom into the structure of Imperial Spain in the beginning of the XVI century, bringing multiple complications, the increasing insecurity, caused by the war between France and Spain, the threat of Saracens, bandits and feudal lords, and the subsequent economic crisis in the territories of the Spanish Crown.

These new motivations are very different from those that made Mayor Onofrio Scannapieco and the delegators go to Naples twice in only eighteen days.

In their eyes, the status of the city was something that still needed to be defined and confirmed.

For the citizens of Cava from the XVI century to the early XVIII century, however, the main task was to protect what their ancestors had once achieved.

But whether ancestors or descendants, both groups were being moved by a common spirit and a common need, and it is “survival”.

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Major and minor imperialist contradictions in the Middle East: the Suez affair (1956-1957) seen from Portugal

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Sixty years after the Suez crisis, is there anything else to be said about it? «Millions of words have been written about the causes and effects, the rights and wrongs» (Jackson, 2016:5) of this process. Yet, many of its secondary and even front line episodes remain obscure, not to mention some main evidences.¹

These gaps certainly result from the political embarrassment evolving most of its Western actors and the efficient policy of oblivion that followed the 9-months “crisis”. Nothing worth remembering and certainly nothing to commemorate, as the passing of its 60th anniversary will certainly show.

Still, the Suez “affair” is probably the most significant turning point the Middle East *political* history between the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. More than the 1967 war – another episode often referred as a hallmark– it meant the handover of hegemonic power in the region, from Britain to the United States. This outcome was immediately perceived by all. Many others were not, especially the fact that the major share of the Middle East oil had already slipped from British to American interests within the last previous years.

The main goal of this chapter is to highlight major and minor aspects of this conflict using the point of view of Portuguese diplomatic sources. Portugal was one of the “18 Powers” that played a direct role in the diplomatic engineering of the Suez Affair. Its Foreign Minister files of the “crisis” extend from July 1956 up to the re-opening and “normalisation” of the Canal use in May 1957. No documents corresponding to the period of the military operations and the subsequent United Nations display in the canal are considered here. The bias resulting from this approach – giving the time gaps and the narrowness of its scope - is perhaps offset by

¹ Such as the Sèvres Protocol, the minute of the secret conversations among the British, French and Israeli governments (22-24 October 1956) in order to invade Egypt. Of the original document three copies were made: the British one was immediately destroyed, the French one got “lost” and the Israeli one, kept for 40 years in the Ben-Gourion personal archive, was for the first time displayed in a 1996 BBC documentary film (Shlaim, 2001, pp. 238;748).

the focus on a few forgotten political issues.

To make the most of this information, the first three items aim to brief the broad lines of what was at stake in 1956: the control of the Middle Eastern oil, the geopolitical interests of the main state actors and the what the “Affair” meant up to the beginning the Israeli invasion (29 October). These items deal with what may be called the major imperialistic contradictions, such as they can be inferred from the Portuguese sources and cuttings of the main-stream press. The last items focus the events, again such as they can be inferred from the Portuguese sources and focus only in the issue that divided the most the Western allies – the boycott to the Canal. They allow nevertheless for grasping the minor imperialistic contradictions of some “junior partners”.

1 – Imperialism in the Middle East, 1956

1.1. The Middle Eastern oil

In 1956, the Middle East had already become the epicentre of the oil industry. The United States remained the major oil producer (42% of the crude output) but nearly half of its oil reserves were already used up. The future was elsewhere: it was estimated that «the discovered oil of the Middle East is nearly two-thirds of the proved reserves» of the Western world². In spite of this potential, in 1943 the Middle East produced only 5.7% of the world output. Then and now, the importance of the Middle Eastern oil was not just a matter of volumes but rather of its cost of production - and of the differential rents that could be made out of it³. Oil corporations operating in the Middle East usually get higher rates of return than the ones operating elsewhere⁴ and capital in the oil industry gets higher rates of return because of marginal energy producers, such as most of the coal corporations.

In 1944 an Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement had urged for a joint world exploitation but, as the US oil interests were openly against it, this protocol was never ratified (Dalemont & Carrié, 1993, p. 66). In 1947 the majority of the Middle Eastern crude (79%) still belonged to the British corporations (Cliff, 1947, p.190). American capital had already joined the big Iraqi syndicate (the Iraq Petroleum Company, former Turkish Petroleum Company) and had meanwhile gained the Saudi and Bahrain concessions. As the oil exports of the Arabian peninsula were still small the US corporations controlled just 16% of the Middle East output. These positions changed very fast:

² *Middle Eastern Oil, Core of the Suez Problem. The New York Times*, 23 September 1956. In 1947 the US petroleum Administration for War still estimated that the Middle East would just have 30.7% of the world proven reserves. (Cliff, 1947, p. 190).

³ The commodities whose marginal producers (operating with the highest individual costs of production) establish the market price provides an extra-profit (differential rent) to all the other capitals.

⁴ «More than 13,000 barrels of oil have been proved per foot drilled in the Middle East, compared with twenty and thirty barrels in the United States, and between 600 and 700 barrels in Venezuela. In short, Middle Eastern oil is unbeatable». *Middle Eastern Oil, Core of the Suez Problem. The New York Times*, 23 September 1956.

Table 1 – Middle Eastern Oil in 1956

Territory	Output - tons (200)	% of Middle Eastern Oil	Synstate	British Corporations	British Corporations share - %	US Corporations	US Corporate share - %	British share in total M.E. Output - %	US share in total M.E. Output - %
Kuwait	54 982	0.32	Kuwait Oil Company	D'Arcy Kuwait Oil Company (British Petroleum subsidiary)	0.50	Gulf Kuwait Oil Co. (Gulf Oil subsidiary)	0.50	0.16	0.16
Saudi Arabia	47 874	0.28	Aramco			Texas Oil, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey (30% each), Mobil (10%)	1.00	0.00	0.28
Iraq	31 325	0.18	IPC	British Petroleum (23.75%) and Royal Dutch Shell (23.75%)	0.475	Near-East Development Corporation (Standard Oil of New Jersey, Mobil)	0.2375	0.09	0.04
Iran	26 530	0.16	IOP	British Petroleum (40%) and Royal Dutch Shell (14%)	0.54	Standard oil of New Jersey, Mobil, Standard Oil of California, Gulf Oil, Texas Oil (7% each)*+Independents* (5%)	0.40	0.08	0.06
Qatar	5 876	0.03	IPC	Petroleum Development Qatar (IPC associated)	0.475	Petroleum Development Qatar (IPC associated)	0.2375	0.02	0.01
Neutral Zone	1 600	0.01	AMINOL, Getty Oil			10*Independents* and Getty Oil	1.00	0.00	0.01
Egypt	1 500	0.01	Aramco			Texas Oil, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey (30% each), Mobil (10%)	1.00	0.00	0.01
Total Middle East	169 687	1						0.35	0.58

Sources: for oil outputs, Bervely, 1958: 236-237; for shares, Bervely, 1958; Dalemont and Carré, 1993.

*Excluding Egypt, Turkey and Israel.

Within the decade following the end of the Second World War, American corporations had come to own almost twice as the British⁵ share of the Middle Eastern oil.

⁵ The stock capital of Royal Dutch Shell was not fully British and so the British share of the oil output in Table 1 is overstated.

1.2. Imperialist contradictions in the region

The political control of the region did not change as fast as the oil output split. In 1956, the “security” of the region was still mainly in charge of the United Kingdom. Corporate control and political power were thus *unbalanced* in the Middle East.

In 1947 the Foreign Office had stated the US State Department that it could no longer cope with most of its responsibilities abroad (Isaacs & Taylor, 2008, p. 43). But the British withdrawal from the East Mediterranean (Greece, Turkey and Palestine) did not apply to the oil-strategic positions hold in the Middle East: Egypt (the Suez Canal), Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait and the Trucial Coast. The empire had just been repositioned though at a high cost: defence spending in the 1950’s amounted to about 10% of value of British exports (Cain & Hopkins, 2002, pp. 630-631). This could not last for long and some kind of adjustment was inevitable.

The French stand in the Middle East was simpler: the *Compagnie Française du Pétrole*’ percentage amounted just to 6% of the 1956 region’s oil output, due to small shares still hold in the Iraqi, Qatar and the Iranian syndicates. Yet it was in France that the Suez invasion plan was achieved; France ended the “affair” as the sole major western power determined not to compromise with the Egyptian government.

Thus, the Suez military option was a high-risk option taken by the 2nd and 3rd powers in the region, not by the first one. In fact, American interests in the region not only afforded but also required a more flexible approach to the rising nationalist forces in the Middle East. For instance, the “50-50” profit share formula implemented by Aramco⁶ in Saudi Arabia – made possible by the tax bonus granted to the American oil firms back home - could not be easily matched by their European competitors elsewhere. The experience of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 was there to show how much this handicap could cost to British capital (two years of Persian oil boycott and the allowance for the Americans to enter the I.O.P.⁷ syndicate). Moreover, the 50-50 split was soon to be overtaken: the agreements made by the “Independent” newcomers: American (Aminoil and Getty Oil in the Neutral Zone), the German C. Deilman Bergbau (in Yemen), the Japanese Arab Oil Exploration Company (in the Saudi off-shore) or the Italian ENI-Sirip (in Iran) were already pushing towards the 75-25 formula in “posted prices”. (Berreby, 1958, pp. 248-249).

The bargaining position of the Middle East *rentier* States towards the old oil syndicates such as the I.P.C.⁸ could only be strengthened by this harsh competition. To prevent “further damage”, the use of force was more and more the option to protect British interests. During the 1951 nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian a military operation was not implemented just because the British Cabinet did not want to take the risk of breaking with the United States «on an issue of this kind» (Kyle, 1991, p. 8). But the price of American mediations was henceforth a factor to be considered in future threats to British stands. In the case of the Suez, as a Portuguese official put it:

⁶ Arabian American Oil Company.

⁷ Iranian Oil Participants, Ltd.

⁸ Iraq Petroleum Company, former Turkish Petroleum Company.

It was much to be feared that if Nasser's policies were to remain unpunished, great corporations such as the "Iraq Petroleum Company" or the "Kuwait Oil Company" might well consider embarking on nationalisation experiences⁹.

In fact, Britain was *already* militarily engaged not to let "unpunished" the interests of the I.P.C. against Saudi Arabia since 1952. The Bureimi border conflict that opposed the British client sheiks of Oman and Abu-Dhabi to the Saudis was in fact an I.P.C. versus Aramco conflict. But while the British were militarily present behind the I.P.C. the Americans could use their Saudi proxy (Berreby, 1958, pp. 188-199).

So, some often disregarded Middle East features of these years are:

-to face the pressure of rising nationalisms, British power was now too weak to deter defies and too tied to local interests to assure all-encompassing protection for the constellation of Western oil corporations;

-Saudi Arabia (Aramco) remained the *main* threat of the British oil interest in the Middle East during the years 1955-56. Saudi Arabia was the main Arab supporter of the Egyptian regime¹⁰. This was an important factor of the US policy towards Nasser in 1956;

-In spite of the United States military absence in the region, American oil firms (either the Major or the "independents") were already present in *every* Middle East oil-producing states, as table 1 clearly depicts.

American interests were therefore much more complex to handle than, for instance, the French one whose three priorities in the Arab countries were Algeria, Algeria and Algeria (Shlaim, 2001, p. 222). The big oil corporations, which had massively supported the Eisenhower election in 1952 and had placed two of his men as top officials (Allan Dulles in the CIA and J. Foster Dulles in the State Department)¹¹ were aware of that. In spite of all the anti-Soviet rhetoric, for instance, Washington preferred to let Britain expose herself alone to the rising Arab nationalism by forcing her Arab clients, Iraq and Jordan, to enter the CENTO¹² treaty (in which there was a *non-Arab* majority). The CENTO suited the US policy against the Soviet Union (and against Arab nationalism) but an American participation therein in the wrong time – that is, with Britain still holding general responsibilities in the region - would had the negative side effect of mixing American interests and British policies. As Dulles put it: «it would have been disastrous for us in any plan in the Middle East if it seemed to be inspired by the British» (Kyle, 1991, p. 526). Besides, American soft power worked well in frequent colonialism-disengagement

⁹ AHD-MNE- Lucena, *Relatório Anual*, 1956, p. 4.

¹⁰ The American press highlighted the support given to Nasser during the tripartite summit (Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt) of 22-24 September 1956. Communiqué of Three Arab Leaders. *The New York Times*, 25 September 1956.

¹¹ For the connections of the brother Dulles with the oil lobbies (Scott, 2015, pp. 53-55).

¹² Central Treaty Organisation, also known as the Baghdad Pact. It had been signed in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom.

statements which drove the British Establishment-press mad¹³. Shortly, for the United States, the Middle East in 1956 was suitable for the old T. Roosevelt policy of «gentle words and a big stick». For Britain and France, it was soon to be proven that by then not even a big stick was enough.

If the “junior” partners of the United States could not fully rely on the American support for their Middle East colonial interests, their strategies in the region were neither always convergent. British policy for Jordan, for instance, was one the frictional points. London wanted to secure the Hashemite monarchy and in 1956 this implied to have Iraqi troops entering in Jordan. Because of her Israeli connections and of her Syrian dwindling interests, France was not keen to accept it and Israeli stated that it would be considered as an act of war. Tension was rising on this issue *while* the three respective chiefs of staff were secretly negotiating the invasion of Egypt¹⁴. That in spite of such deep conflicts of interest the Suez operation could be launched shows the how much the British and French governments already depended on the military option to recover influence in the region.

1.3. *The real issue in the Suez affair*

On 19 July 1956 the US Secretary of State Dulles informed the Egyptian Embassy in Washington that the American Government had decided to withdraw the loan-offer of USD \$56 millions for the project of the Aswan Dam. This project stood at the core of Egyptian program of agrarian reform and industrialization; it had been resumed by the new Nasser regime and was supposed to grant it a wide social and political support. The following day the Egyptian Embassy in London was told that the British Government would also no longer hold the USD \$15 million loan due for the same purpose. On the 20 July the World Bank stated that on those conditions the USD \$200 million loan to Egypt was cancelled¹⁵.

The estimated cost of the Aswan project (including construction of the dam, power stations and land reclamation) by the Egyptian Government was of USD \$690 million but international appraisers estimated it at nearer USD \$1 million¹⁶. The State Department justified the American reverse of the loan-offer with doubts about whether Egyptian finances would be able to subscribe its capital share in the project. It was said that in April the Egyptian cotton output (roughly 75% of the country's

¹³ Such as the State Department Secretary Dulles made at the height of the Suez crisis: «that the US cannot be expected «to identify itself 100 per cent either with the colonial Powers or the Powers uniquely concerned with the problem of getting independence as rapidly, and as fully as possible». He admitted to differences of approach by the three nations to the Suez dispute and added that «any areas encroaching in some form or manner on the problem of so-called colonialism found the US playing a somewhat independent role». US Mediator Role in Shift from Colonialism. *The Times*, 03 October 1956.

¹⁴ AHD-MNE- Lucena, *Relatório Anual*, 1956, pp.31-33.

¹⁵ AHD-MNE- Lucena, *Relatório Anual*, 1956, pp.1-2.

¹⁶ Egypt Points with Pride to Smooth-Running Canal. *The New York Times*, 23 September 1956.

exports) had been mortgaged to pay for the arm deal with Czechoslovakia¹⁷. In fact, it was the deal *itself* (and the Cairo refusal to join the CENTO) rather than its impact on the Egyptian finances that irritated the State Department. Besides, being expected that left alone the Soviet Union would not keep her engagement to finance the Aswan Dam, this would cause either the Nasser's fall or, at least, the downgrading of the Soviets to the Non-aligned states. One week later, in the 26th of July, the Egyptian government found an alternative source of income by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. Nasser's speech in Alexandria on the 26 July explicitly linked the two issues¹⁸. The American press agreed: the US loan refusal was the starting point of the "crisis", at least its detonator¹⁹. According to some French views, American responsibility had started even before and was much larger²⁰.

The Canal was owned by the "Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime du Suez", whose capital stock was mainly French and British; its headquarters were in Paris. Nevertheless, the "Compagnie Universelle" was an Egyptian registered corporation and had never had sovereignty rights over the canal. The seizure of its assets by the Egyptian Government against proper compensation to the shareholders was thus perfectly legal. It juts meant anticipating the end of a concession, due for 1968. This was known by all the parts involved even if not publicly admitted²¹ because, of course, that was not the point.

The point was neither the free navigation in the Canal. In 1888, imperial powers had signed the Constantinople Convention that guaranteed the freedom of navigation of the Suez Canal. The Egypt Government became explicitly engaged to abide by it when it signed the 1954 treaty (by which the British forces would withdraw from Egyptian soil two years later) and kept repeating it in every official state-

¹⁷ Paying the arms in cotton and rice was cheaper than paying in dollars or pounds. (Daumal and Leroy, 1971, p. 105)

¹⁸ «This year, from the \$100 million net return of the Canal, Egypt got \$ 3 million; the money will not keep flowing abroad; our money will build the Great Dam ...» (Daumal and Leroy, 1971, pp. 107-108)

¹⁹ «American action has been too little or too late. It has been a series of improvisations and inconsistencies (...) The State Department was well aware, from the reports of Ambassadors Caffery and Byroade, before the summit meeting in Geneva, that Nasser would seek arms and economic assistance where he could find it». *Too Little and Too Late*. *New York Herald Tribune*, .23 September 1956.

²⁰ «America's responsibility in the whole Affair can hardly be overstated. It was America that inflated Arab nationalism since 1951 making bids on British policy; it was America who pushed the British out of Egypt; it was American ambassadors who pushed Nasser to the top of the government; it was the State Department who changed tack about the Aswan Dam and gave the pretext for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal». Double Danger. *Le Monde*, 11 September 1956.

²¹ As the 27 July 1956 Cabinet Minute the British Government clearly states: «From a narrow legal point of view his (Nasser's) action amounted to no more than a decision to buy out the shareholders». (Jackson, 2016, p. 18). Publicly (and even in NATO meetings such as the one the 5th of September) the British Government claimed that the seizure was illegal for not having been made without prior notice and because of the international status of the Company. Britain' allies were aware of the juridical nullity of the arguments, as the confidential report of a Portuguese official confirms. AHD-MNE – Coutinho, *A Aventura do Suez*, p. 36.

ments after the 26 of July. Everyone knew that in the case of a boycott due to a single-country control of the canal, all the Western interests and especially Britain's would be severely damaged. In 1955, out of 14.666 ships going through the Canal, 4.538 were British-registered (over 30%). Moreover, 75% of Britain's oil consumption was carried along the Canal²². The British "principal requirement" (in official statements and in the main-stream press) was thus that «Canal should be insulated from politics of any one country»²³. But it was known that the Egyptian government would never take the initiative of a Canal boycott because it would mean the end of the Aswan project, even admitting that Suez revenues would ever be enough for paying for it²⁴. Besides, British allies were also aware that until 1954 the control of the canal had never been insulated from Britain's *own* policy:

It should be said that Great Britain never looked favourably upon the Constantinople Convention and only in 1905 [that after 23 years of British Condominium in Egypt] had abide by all its articles and only because of French pressure. During the two World Wars she did not respect the Convention, hindering passage to enemy's ships. She opposed twice to the project of internationalisation of the Canal. It was not easy to invoke the Convention unless Egypt repealed it and Nasser never showed any intention to do it²⁵.

The secondary argument that the Egyptian Government did not know how to run the Canal was even less suitable for a *casus belli* because it had yet to be proven (and it never was)²⁶.

For some Portuguese officials there were no doubts of what was at stake. The freedom of navigation in the Canal was a pretext: Britain and France wanted to occupy it *only* to overthrow the Egyptian regime. The Cairo's anti-imperialist influence irradiated eastwards (British CENTO client States) and westwards (French Algeria)²⁷. Both countries were running out of time to topple Nasser. By the 1954 agreement signed with Nasser, the last British troops were about to leave Egypt in June 1956. For the Foreign Office, the expectation that meanwhile CENTO could make pressure on Egypt was dashed by the 1955 anti-colonial rioting and the results of the 1956 election in Jordan. Instead of isolating the Nasser regime, Iraq had now become Britain's only "safe" State in the region, apart from the Gulf sheiks. For Paris, as the war against the FLN²⁸ entered into a political impasse, it became

²² AHD-MNE- Lucena, *Relatório Anual*, 1956, pg. 4.

²³ AHD-MNE – 2ºP, A.1, M. 478 - British Embassy in Lisbon, 29 April 1957.

²⁴ It was estimated if Egypt got all the canal tolls that were previously going to the Suez Company it would add USD \$32 million, - much less than the annual \$100 million referred by Nasser in his 26 of July speech and still too little for the funding of the Aswan Dam. *Canal Seizure Threatens Egypt's One-sided Economy*. The New York Times, 23 September 1956.

²⁵ AHD-MNE- Lucena, *Relatório Anual*, 1956, pp. 12-13.

²⁶ Two months after the nationalization of the Canal, the passage of ships through the waterway had been sped up by reintroducing the three-convoy a day system. *The Singapore Times*, 25 September 1956.

²⁷ AHD-MNE- Coutinho, *A Aventura do Suez*, pp. 44-46.

²⁸ *Front National de Libération*, a platform of political movements that started the anti-colonial war in French Algeria since November 1954.

urgent to topple the Cairo regime, seen as the main military and political supporter of the Algerian nationalists²⁹.

To achieve it, British and French policy towards Israel had to be changed. Their 1950 joint commitment with the United States in order to maintain the military *status quo* between the Arab States and Israel was no longer convenient. Less engaged than the British in the Middle East, the French could move faster in that sense. In October 1955, the Paris Government started delivering their *Mystère* aircrafts order to Israel³⁰. But it is now established that the secret summits between French and Israeli top military officials proceeded regularly since 1954. The Israeli Chief of Staff had been pushing for a “preventive” war against Egypt since at least the end of 1955. In September 1956 top Israeli officials (M. Dayan and S. Peres) were already trying to fit it into the French move against Nasser. The Challe plan³¹ was the natural outcome of this convergent evolution (Shlaim, 2001, pp. 224-225). For the British, the Challe plan also came at the right time because there was the risk of entering into two wars at the same time: against Egypt with Israel and against Israel with Jordan³². Of course none of these agreements were publicly known at the time but it could be noticed that the sequence of events was peculiar: «Israel began to mobilise [during the 3rd week of October] and there was the “feeling” that she would invade Jordan. On the 29 October the Israeli army invaded Egypt»³³.

2- The Suez diplomacy

2.1 – The London Conferences before the S.C.U.A.³⁴ (August-September 1956)

The British government’s started planning the overthrow of the Egyptian regime at least from the 29 July. On the 2 August, the Prime Minister Eden informed that «measures of military nature were in course», reservists were called up and joint Mediterranean manoeuvres with the French fleet were under way. This was meant to pressure the Cairo but, of course, it was not bluff. The first setback was that by the end of that week the two Cabinets were told that they could not count

²⁹ «Nasser was the champion of the Arab world and if he could be toppled the psychological effect on the Algerian fighters would be decisive». AHD-MNE – Coutinho, *A Aventura do Suez*, p. 11. It was nevertheless unclear whether the Egyptian support to the FLN was more of an excuse to justify some of the French military upsets in Algeria. AHD-MNE, Lucena, *Relatório Anual*, 1956, p. 11

³⁰ That French’s priorities were others than the maintenance of Israeli-Arab military balance is the fact that even after Nasser’s arm deal with Czechoslovakia, France promised to sell arms to Egypt in the Cairo “Voice of the Arabs” broadcasts towards Algeria was silenced. (Jackson, 2012, pp. 14-15).

³¹ The French general Maurice Challe designed the plan of the “preventive” war of Israeli against Egypt and the “mediation” of Britain and France). Shlaim, 2001, pp. 199-240.

³² In that case, and if there was an American reaction to the Israeli aggression on Jordan/Arab side (which it was plausible considering the intimate connections of the USA and the Saudis), Britain «and the US would be fighting on opposite sides». (Jackson, 2016, pp. 42.)

³³ AHD-MNE – Coutinho, *A Aventura do Suez*, p. 39.

³⁴ Suez Canal User’s Association.

on the American support for the «use of force». According to Portuguese sources the American stand in the forthcoming talks among the “three Powers” in London can be summarised like this:

- “yes” to sanctions and credit cuts to Egypt; “maybe” to American ships stop paying the Canal tolls directly to Egypt (though the US Government could not impose it to the shipping companies); “no” to a premature United Nations debate;

- a single step to be immediately taken: in order to mobilise public opinion and to give Britain and France a “majority mandate” to deal with the Nasser regime, an international conference of the Canal’s users should be called³⁵.

London and Paris expected more but they could use the idea of the Conference. The military operations could not be implemented before September; meanwhile an international conference could produce a legitimate but unacceptable note (“a virtual ultimatum”) to the Egyptian Government³⁶.

The Conference invited 24 States to gather in London and took place from August 16 to 23. Egypt and Greece refused to participate (Greece because of the Cyprus conflict with Britain). Eden later explained at a NATO summit the criterion used for the invitations: the 8 signatories of the Constantinople Convention, the 8 major users of the Canal (in tonnage) and the 8 countries with a major external trade dependence on the Canal³⁷. Portugal was probably invited under the last criterion but as regards oil supplies surely applied also to the third. Anyway, the invitations had been made just to assure a majority for the Anglo-American plan³⁸. This was the case: the approved resolution stood for 18 states and urged for «the establishment of international in place of Egyptian control over the Suez Canal, and stipulating for sanctions»³⁹. Dissidence came only from India, Ceylon and Indonesia – that demanded *direct* negotiations with Egypt - and from the Soviet Union. Nasser could not accept the «collective colonialism»⁴⁰ of the “18 Powers” and, as expected, the proposal was turned down. The Anglo-French had already their *casus belli*.

So far, so good but for Britain and France the next steps would be harder. There was a planned next step: «a users’ association to be organized by the 18 sponsors of the proposal» to run the Canal and collect the tolls⁴¹. Eden announced it in the

³⁵ AHD-MNE, Lucena, *Relatório Anual*, 1956, pp. 16-17.

³⁶ From the minute of the Egyptian Committee of the London Cabinet: «If Colonel Nasser refused to accept it, military operations would then proceed» (Jackson, 2016, p. 26).

³⁷ AHD-MNE – 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478. NATO - *Procès-verbal de la reunion du Conseil tenue au Palais de Chaillot*, 05 September 1956.

³⁸ AHD-MNE, Lucena, *Relatório Anual*, pp. 17-18.

³⁹ On 8 September the “proposal” was presented in Cairo by a five-power Committee that had a selected Afro-Asian majority (USA, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia). It was headed by R. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister. AHD-MNE – 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478. Egyptian Legacy in Lisbon – Diplomatic note.

⁴⁰ Menzies verbal report of the “5 Power-mission” stated that the failure of the mission should be laid upon Nasser’s prejudices and slogans such like this one. AHD-MNE – 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478. Portugal Embassy in London, 11 September 1956.

⁴¹ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478. USA- Information Service., Dulles Press Conference of 13 September 1956.

British Parliament on the 12 September but it was not a secret that the plan had come from Washington⁴². The same day the British Embassy invited the “18 Powers” to join the new organisation and three days later invited them to a second London Conference⁴³.

From this moment onwards the main paths took different directions. The US Secretary Dulles had envisaged the two London conferences and the plan of the internationalisation of the canal «but for him that should be the basis for negotiating. Britain and France wanted that to be the minimum demand»⁴⁴. In short, for the Americans the London conferences and the user’s association that came out of it were a device to avoid war and for the Anglo-French a device for the legitimating of war. To make things worse the difference was now made public by the American Government through press-conferences of the President Eisenhower and of Dulles himself. From the one of 13 September in which the later gave details about the future user’s association, the press (and the Portuguese Embassy in Washington) took special note of the following excerpt:

Mr. Secretary, the British press today says that Britain plans to use an armed convoy to go through the Canal (...) Would the US support Britain in such a venture? - Well, I don’t know what you mean by “support”: I have said that the US did not intend itself to try to shoot its way through the Canal⁴⁵.

As soon as the agenda of the 2nd Conference was made public the Egyptian government stated its total rejection of a user’s association that implied «threats to peace»⁴⁶. In Cairo it was clear that the internationalisation of the canal was meant to by pass the payment of tolls to Egypt (and ultimately to cover military action). The Egyptian government was trying to organise a parallel international conference, which would force the canal users to choose camps. In a public speech Nasser had already spoken about guerrilla warfare in the Canal⁴⁷. No wonder that during the week of the call for the second London Conference the great majority of the “18 Powers” signatories of the Menzies proposal had serious doubts of what to do. The Portuguese Government, for instance, wanted primarily to know what consequences Washington would draw from an Egyptian blockade of the Canal⁴⁸. In a draft dispatch of questions to be made to the Foreign Office it was also asked, under the cover of juridical doubts about linking the 1888 Convention and the user’s association, if it was intended to go to war and what obligations this would imply

⁴² Dulles admitted publicly that «there has been given very intensive thought here in Washington, but not by just the Department of State». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç USA- Information Service, Dulles Press Conference of 13 September 1956, p. 7.

⁴³ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, 12 and 15 September 1956.

⁴⁴ AHD-MNE, Lucena, *Relatório Anual*, p. 17.

⁴⁵ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478. USA- Information Service, Dulles Press Conference of 13 September 1956, p. 12; Portugal Embassy in Washington, 13 September 1956.

⁴⁶ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Egyptian Legacy in Lisbon, 17 September 1956.

⁴⁷ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 15 September 1956

⁴⁸ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 12 September 1956.

for the user's association members⁴⁹. That is why Dulles's reassurance that America would not go «shooting its way through the Canal» came as first deflator of the tension and certainly saved the 2nd London Conference. But by disengaging the United States from any military initiative, he was pushing the Anglo-French to a narrower path on which they could hardly “go along” for much more time⁵⁰.

Dulles just wanted of a «small operating staff which would be ready to assist our ships» and to collect tolls but kept the door open to negotiate with Nasser (the new body would assure the Egyptian government a share of the Canal revenue)⁵¹. The Anglo-French, who still had some time to waste in diplomatic solutions they did not care about (their planned landing, due for Alexandria the 15 September had been changed for a Port Said landing⁵²) still «went along». For all the others, the main issues before the Conference were:

- what if Egypt refused access to the ships that were not paying directly to the Suez Canal Authority (the Egyptian agency recently created to run the Canal)?
- did the belonging to the user's association implied adhering to the boycott of the Canal?
- was there going to be some sort of mutual compensation for those (States of ships companies) who decided not pay Egypt?
- how was to be funded the running expenditure of the user's association?

The second London Conference opened on 19 September. Four days before the Portuguese Ambassador Teotónio Pereira had a private conversation with Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister, in which the Dulles reassuring statements were confirmed. Lloyd still expected that American ships would enter the Suez refusing to pay Egypt and were forced to reroute around the Cape so that another *casus belli* would arise⁵³. Pereira was therefore told that Dulles pacifist statements would not deter the Anglo-French. On the other hand, “nothing” (i.e., military duties) was expected from the allies⁵⁴. The Portuguese were also more aware of the deep gap between the Anglo-French and the Americans: their Ambassador in Washington was plainly told by Dulles that the user's association device was just meant to hinder the Anglo-French from having only two options, war or capitulation⁵⁵. The Confer-

⁴⁹ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Ministry, Draft Minute, Questions to be made in London, (...) 12 September 1956.

⁵⁰ Eden did not think much of the American idea of the User's association «but if it brings the Americans in, I can go along» (Jackson, 2016, p. 20).

⁵¹ «Is this association to be charged solely with the operation of the waterway or are Egyptian agencies to be recognised for operation of canal equipment on the land? I would say that there is no thought in my mind whatever that this agency would attempt to supersede the Egyptian authorities as they handle the canal equipment on land – the signalling stations, the operation of the draw bridges, and the like» AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, USA- Information Service, Dulles 2nd Statement.

⁵² The change of plan took place only on the 10 of September. Jackson, 2016: 29-30.

⁵³ Certainly based on official sources, a pro-governmental Portuguese newspaper published the next day the description of a supposed plan of an American Guinea pig ship sent to the Canal to be blocked by the Egyptians. *Diário de Notícias*, 15 September 1956.

⁵⁴ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 14 September 1956.

⁵⁵ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 18 September 1956.

ence validated that the use of force was out of the question, approved the international operative body now labelled S.C.U.A., and ratified the toll refusal to Egypt⁵⁶.

2.2. *The S.C.U.A. and the failure of the first boycott (September-October 1956)*

If force was not to be used and Egypt refused to give way to ships not paying tolls to her authorities, there was going to be a boycott of the Canal. In that case, the costs would be very unequally shared.

As regards the Middle east oil producers, it was estimated that a blockade of the Suez would imply production cuts of about 0,5 out of an output of 3,5 millions barrels per day. British interests would be the most harmed: Saudi Arabia could always increase its exports to the Asian markets, Iran had assigned quotas because of the recent I.O.P. agreement, Iraq had its own pipelines to the Mediterranean and so the majority of cuts would be imposed on Kuwait (the Middle East major oil producer and special reserve of British Petroleum)⁵⁷.

As regards oil consumption, Britain would also suffer the most. In 1956 about 80% of European oil consumption depended on imports from the Middle East and more than half of it came through Suez. In Europe, the United Kingdom was the chief Middle East oil importer⁵⁸.

Table 2 – Middle Eastern Oil in Europe (millions of barrels per day) – year 1955

<i>A - Total Euro- pean consumption of oil</i>	<i>B - Oil Imports from the Middle East</i>	<i>C - Oil Imports from the Middle East passing the Canal</i>	<i>B / A (%)</i>	<i>C / A (%)</i>
2 364.1	1 880	1 100	80	47

Source: *The New York Times*, 23-09-1956

A boycott of the canal could be afforded by the United States, whose Middle Eastern oil imports were roughly 3% of the American consumption, but not by Britain. With the majority of the British press against it the London Government accepted the idea because, as it is known, it had *something else* going on. However if the boycott was to come, it had to be short and effective.

By then, British and French shipping companies were still paying dues to the old Suez Canal Company outside Egypt⁵⁹. Many others, such as the Portuguese

⁵⁶ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Statement of the London Conference, 21 September 1956.

⁵⁷ *Es casi seguro que Egipto cerrara el Canal de Suez a la Asociacion de Usuarios. El Universal*, 01 October 1956.

⁵⁸ *Middle Eastern Oil – Core of the Suez Problem. The New York Times*, 23 September 1956.

⁵⁹ That was certainly a dangerous situation that urged Dulles to stop it: «So far President Nasser has been letting boats go through, although many of them are not paying effectively anything for the privilege of going through. How long will he allow that? I do not know». AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, USA - Information Service, 19 September 1956.

ones, had already switched payments to the Egyptian Government account. About 35% of the tolls were already being paid in Egypt, directly or under clearance agreements such as Italy had. It was plain to see why: for a ship of 28,000 tons (an average oil tanker), the additional expenditure of the Cape route over the Suez tolls could be estimated in 32%.⁶⁰ Martino, the Italian Foreign Minister, reminded that 24% of the oil refining industry was now centred in Italy and that eight Italian shipping lines were using the Canal, «some of which could not possibly reroute round the Cape, and would go inevitably out of business if the canal was boycotted». The Scandinavian countries and West Germany presented similar objections⁶¹. The Greek and American ships flying the flags of the Panama (12% in 1955), Liberia (7% in 1955) would hardly follow the boycott.

It did not take long to realize that as long as the payment of tolls to the S.C.U.A. was not mandatory, the pressure of the boycott on the Egyptian Government would be irrelevant⁶². To counter this, the American engagement was at first expected to be decisive. Before going to London, Dulles had said that the United States would not «try to bring about a concerted boycotting of the Canal» but assured that:

- the American ships would be instructed to avoid the Canal;

-to the European countries boycotting and with a dollar-gap, the Export-Import Bank would provide loans for the purchase of American oil⁶³.

About the first pledge it is not likely that Dulles, an oil-man and who had already stated that the US Government had no power to force shipping companies, wanted to make much more than statements⁶⁴. But that was not clear at the time and for some of the 18-Powers dragged into the venture (by NATO commitments and by their own colonial policies, like Portugal) some difficult times involving double-standard statements were about to begin. The Portuguese diplomacy may be used as a proxy to most of the remaining 18.

Right at the end of the 2nd London Conference, Paulo Cunha, the Portuguese Foreign Minister that had personally attended, was pleased to point out that it had been possible,

by giving new features to the association and stressing the voluntarily character of the user members within it, to do away with the risk of a near canal boycott which, once in course, would cause serious upsets in oil

⁶⁰ Dulles urges Nasser to Help Effort. *The Baltimore Sun*, 23 September 1956.

⁶¹ 18-Power Declaration on Suez. *The Times*, 22 September 1956.

⁶² As Egypt's share of the tolls under the "Compagnie du Suez" administration amounted only to 7%, it was figured out that not even a full boycott would have impact upon the Egyptian budget. *El Universal*, 01 October 1956.

⁶³ AHD-MNE - 2^o P., A. 1, Mç 478, USA- Information Service, Dulles Press Conference of 13 September 1956, pp. 4-5.

⁶⁴ Though some of these statements were masterpieces of diplomatic language: «Immediately upon my return steps will be taken with our Treasury officials and with the representatives of owners of American Flag vessels which largely transit the Suez Canal with a view to perfecting this co-operation in terms of actual operating practices». AHD-MNE - 2^o P., A. 1, Mç 478, USA - Information Service, Dulles to Sewin Lloyd, 21 September 1956.

supplies; at least for now we can expect that our tankers will keep passing throughout the Canal⁶⁵.

However, on the 26 September the Portuguese Embassy in London reported about the pressure of the Anglo-French on the US Government to make it compel American ships not to pay tolls to Egypt. «So far there has been no reference to Portugal» but things could change fast. The Ambassador was alarmed enough to suggest that Portuguese shipping companies should centre their Egyptian accounts to zero and start paying as they did before, i.e., by cheques on London or Paris. Two days later a relief telegram was sent to Lisbon: the list published by the “Daily Telegraph” of countries paying tolls to Egypt «does not mention us»⁶⁶.

Paulo Cunha sustained his reassuring view: the matter should be let as it was (a private decision of the shipping companies). Considering that at the Conference neither the United States had moved forward any kind of boycott/support aid, nor the British Government had in any way pleaded for it, it would be «inconceivable» that once the Conference was over, «we were expected, on our own initiative and without aid assurances, to change the system of toll payments, risking the Egyptian objection»⁶⁷.

To keep it this way, the Portuguese Government had to be sure that the S.C.U.A. administration remained controlled by the prevailing will among the 18 – that is, a non-mandatory toll payment system.

A third London Conference was due for the 1 October to formally organise the S.C.U.A. Right on the note in which Lisbon confirmed accessing, it was added that the Portuguese Government «reserved the right to intervene in the redaction of the statutory rules»⁶⁸. Lisbon had no interest in be part of Executive bodies, in pointing out names for that purpose or in hosting the association but insisted in two principles:

-that all political resolutions should be of the exclusive responsibility of the Plenary Council (if the statutory norms were to be redacted by a small Committee the Plenary should have always the final word);

-«that nothing would be done to invalidate the doctrine, established at the 2nd London Conference, that the State members and it ships were fully free not to use the Association’s services for crossing the Canal and that toll payments to the Association would only occur voluntarily»⁶⁹.

⁶⁵ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 22 September 1956. In the first half of 1956, the Portuguese oil demand was supplied by 28 round –trips in the Canal (17 Portuguese and 11 freighted tankers) totalling 462,424 tons of crude, which must have corresponded to 95% of the oil consumption in that period. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Informação, 08 January 1957, p. 2; SACOR, Relatório e Contas, 31 December 1956.

⁶⁶ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 26 September 1956; 28 September 1956.

⁶⁷ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 28 September 1956.

⁶⁸ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 27 September 1956.

⁶⁹ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 29 September 1956. There was also a private avail: before going to London Dulles had already told the Portuguese Ambassador that ships of the User’s association might well continue passing the Canal because he was not all confident that a concerted boycott would make Nasser to give in. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 18 September 1956.

The focus put on Plenary decisions laid also on the argument that a «small Committee should not be allowed to decide about the financial contribution of each member, assessment system and magnitude of expenditure of the Association». The Portuguese Government suspected that the French wanted to transfer liabilities of the former “Compagnie Universelle” to the S.C.U.A., mainly the wage expenditure with her dismissed Canal pilots⁷⁰.

In his telegram reply, T. Pereira assured Lisbon that it would be feasible to oppose to the French debt transfer and to keep membership expenditure within the financial terms sent by Lisbon. However, he was not so sure about the tolls issue. Except for the United States ships and for dummy companies of Panama’s and Liberia, the only major fleets paying directly to Egypt were now the German and the Italian. His telegram hinted again a subtle disagreement with the Minister: «One may wonder if it was not preferable that our shipping companies had not rushed to accept the new regime. It is predictable that behind the scenes of the Conference a strong lobbying will be made upon the association members not to pay Egypt». Moreover, the who’s who of the boycott would soon become known: «S.C.U.A. staff will be called to closely look upon who, where and why such tolls (are being) paid. It will be seen that some of those who are paying directly could very easily do it otherwise if they really wanted». And to show that personal view was based on principles rather than on the fear of a Portuguese insulation, he added:

I do not believe that we will lack companionship for our two shipping companies stand but I just wonder if they could not voluntarily and gradually take another route⁷¹.

In Pereira’s dissent it is possible to grasp the traditional Salazar (and Portugal’s) traditional reliance on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, which the new generation of the Minister and of his entourage tended to pragmatically downgrade⁷². But Pereira was right about the expected pressure. That was why the composition of the Executive bodies could not be completely indifferent to Lisbon. The discreet support given by the Portuguese delegate to the Italian appliance to the Board was thus a natural outcome. On 2 of October Pereira was asked by the Italian Ambassador to support it.

He told me that Italy was much more interested in the seat than in taking the S.C.U.A. headquarters to Rome. About the toll payments he told me that France was deeply outraged (as we already knew) because of Martino’s statements and that very strong pressures had been made on the Italian delegation. Italy was in a difficult situation because she had a clearance agreement with Egypt with a large deficit. Three years of payments would not be enough to cover it⁷³.

On the last day of the Conference, Italy got the seat in spite of the French open

⁷⁰ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 28 September 1956.

⁷¹ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 29 September 1956.

⁷² T. Pereira was considered a close political proxy of Salazar while P. Cunha had been appointed by Marcelo Caetano, the future Salazar’s successor in 1968.

⁷³ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 02 October 1956.

opposition and «we did not have to face much difficulties»⁷⁴. Almost a month later, the Portuguese Foreign Ministry «still had no elements» pointing to a change of stand and Portuguese companies kept paying only to the Egyptian Agency. Cunha justified it this way: «The problem of liquid fuel is so acute and delicate that only under exceptional circumstances, still not occurring, should the Government order those Companies to stop paying Egypt».

Besides, several of the “18 Powers” (including the United States) were doing the same and «since the main interested States had not yet undertaken actions with a new common solution, we must keep waiting». Thus, only if a massive Western platform was gathered with that purpose or under the framework of a formal demand, «we should consider this problem otherwise». And in that case, «we would require to be informed about the kind of aid that we could expect to find in those main interested countries as regards defaults in oil supplies». In short, «we do not exclude a change of policy» if all the others change it but «we must not get ahead»⁷⁵.

It is to be remarked that by then nobody no longer was paying attention to Dulles’s other pledge in the 2nd London Conference (and repeated in private conversations)⁷⁶: the American “aid” to the boycotters. Neither the State Department really wanted to sustain it because of the costs involved⁷⁷ nor did the majority of the “18 Powers” really wanted to use it, at least for a boycott.

On the 25 October, the Portuguese Ambassador in London still considered that the US stand remained the «principal open question»⁷⁸. But for the Anglo-French (Governments and main press) there were no doubts about it almost a month ago⁷⁹:

⁷⁴ «France demanded that Italy, by entering the Executive Body, took the engagement of stop paying tolls to Egypt. Italy escaped under the Machiavellian procedure of taking the engagement so far as every other executive members (which included the United States) proceed the same way. (...) It was relatively easy for us to avoid too much explanations about how we are paying tolls». AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 06 October 1956

⁷⁵ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 23 October 1956

⁷⁶ The charm operation before the 2nd London conference included conversations like the one in which a top American official requested the Portuguese Foreign Ministry a draft evaluation of the Portuguese demand for oil and tankers. «I asked what was the purpose. He told me – stressing the “confidential” and “personal level” of the information – that they had got a State Department cable asking for it». AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Ministry, Note, 15 September 1956. Dulles had also told the Portuguese Ambassador before going to London that the Department of State had been studying for two months the device of the dollar-loans for oil. AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 18 September 1956.

⁷⁷ «As a US Senator commented recently: the cost of putting Nasser in his place seems to have skyrocketed from 40 million a year to half a million». Nimble Diplomacy in London. *New York Herald Tribune*, 24 September 1956. Nevertheless, the project interested Standard Oil of New Jersey and it was certainly not by Dulles’s fault that it did no go ahead: in times of an oil buyer’s market the prospect «of running down their East-coast deposits» (Kyle, 1991, p. 523) through Federal loans to the Europeans certainly pleased the big oil interests.

⁷⁸ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 25 October 1956.

⁷⁹ Using the pretext of Dulles’s recent statements linking the Suez issue to “colonialism”, the Anglo-French were about to «abandon the existing alliance». AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 03 October 1956.

the State Department had deliberately turned the boycott plan into a stillbirth⁸⁰. On the 2 October Dulles had already felt obliged to deny any that the United States were trying a separate deal with Egypt⁸¹. London and Paris took their first public actions against the State Department, such as going to the United Nations. Therein they did not better because from the debate came out a quasi consensual Declaration (the Six Principles) that would drive them back into direct negotiations with Egypt⁸². They were now ready to try *something* different.

On 29 October the Israeli invasion of the Suez started and it was followed by the Canal wreckage obstruction. The toll issue would not be raised again until March 1957, when the Canal was reopened. When it did situation on the ground was much different.

2.3. *The S.C.U.A after the failed invasion (December 1956-May 1957)*

Until 1956, the imperialist *statu quo* in the Middle East suited the American big oil interests. They had been cheaply safeguarded under Britain's "security" while making advances at her expense. But Britain had been less and less able to hold the job⁸³ and her blunt Suez adventure jeopardized it definitely. After the Suez invasion, it was no longer possible to fit the interests of American oil corporations that were present in *every* oil-producing Middle Eastern States with the protection of the second most hated European power in the region (the French were probably the first). The 1957 Eisenhower doctrine⁸⁴ was designed to meet the requirements of the changing situation. By explicitly assuming military duties in the Middle East, the US Government readjusted the unbalanced oil share and political control that had lasted in the region for a decade. But "filling the vacuum" left (this time involuntarily) by the British also meant that the American policy was now able to focus in the anti-colonial Arab nationalism which so far had been left for the British to handle. That was not only possible but also necessary because the American's main client State, Saudi Arabia, could not stand *alone* against the rising tide that would come out of a Nasser's triumph. Thus, the handover of imperialist powers in the region implied also rebalancing the power among the Arab states. In short, the 1956-57 turning-points implied other adjustments, which would only be accomplished during the years 1967-70 (Corm, 1983, pp. 45-40). Portuguese officials

⁸⁰ «Since then [1st London Conference]Mr Dulles has indicated that in all essential matters, such as use of pilots, payment of dues, passage itself of the canal, the user's association is to have no real powers of collective bargaining but the master of each ship is in most cases to be left to fend for himself». *Distorting the Issues. The Times*, 03 October 1956.

⁸¹ *US Mediatory Role in Shift From Colonialism. The Times*, 03 October 1956.

⁸²The 4th Princip read: «4. The manner of fixing tolls and charges shall be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users». AHD-MNE - 2^o P., A. 1, Mç 478, United Nations, Security Council, 13 October 1956.

⁸³ Dulles praised Britain's century-long action «against Czarist and now Soviet ambitions» (Kyle, 1991, p. 529) but the paradox of being such a "bulwark" for the protection of American interests was much recent.

⁸⁴ Labelled after the Eisenhower's speech of 5 January 1957, «Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East».

could not but enjoy the change:

The so called “Eisenhower Doctrine” for the Middle East allows for the United States to follow the excellent precedent of the “Truman Doctrine” of 1947 (...) The revolt of the Nasserites in Jordan against the King was unexpectedly choked with the support provided by the Iraqis and mainly by King Saud (who so far seemed unable to counter Nasser). This was the first political defeat of the Soviet policy in the Middle East in recent times and it is expected that many others may follow⁸⁵.

Although the desired effect of countering the Arab nationalism was not as rapid as it looked⁸⁶, it was a fact that the American policy on the Suez issue was different immediately after the invasion. The Americans still had to keep distance from the Anglo-French but *some* pressure on Nasser was now at hand without endangering, rather pleasing, the Saudis. On the other hand, the Egyptian Government let it be known that it did not want tripartite negotiations (with Britain and France) and favoured a broader negotiating body «with two or three other countries, which should not be the Great Powers»⁸⁷. This asked for the reanimation of S.C.U.A. right from December 1956. So far the User’s Association had been useless to every interested part (it had neither prevented war as the State Department wanted nor achieved any Egyptian concession as the Anglo-French had for some time had expected). The Americans wanted to keep it anyway because it could be now used to press Egypt.

The second life of S.C.U.A. started with an American proposal for the Association «to undertake a study of the possible establishment of a priority system» once the shipping in the Canal was resumed. It was expected that at the outset only «a single channel will be opened to a depth of 25 feet throughout the length of the Canal» and so «only fifty percent of the pre-crisis volume of traffic should be accommodated»⁸⁸. This would affect Portugal’s oil traffic in the Canal because her full tankers in the return trip would exceed the 25th feet depth but not her Indian traffic⁸⁹. But more than the assessment system it was the mission of S.C.U.A. itself that caused much of the discussion. For the moment, the Americans wanted it as an advisory body⁹⁰ while the French were far from wanting «a passive body, whose

⁸⁵ AHD-MNE – Coutinho, *A Aventura do Suez*, pgs. 49-50.

⁸⁶ The optimistic point of view of this Portuguese Cairo report is worth quoting: «It should be considered that: the nationalization of the Canal produced in the Arab bourgeoisie a reaction that is pushing its Governments to insulate the Cairo; this way the old quarrels between the Saudis and Jordan and Iraqi dynasty are over; States that were apart such as Libya and Lebanon, Turkey and Sudan make arrangements among themselves without consulting the Egyptian Government; an African conference in Khartoum is being organized and the old claim that Egypt should lead is not increasing but fading away». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 29-03-1957.

⁸⁷ Norway, owner of the one of the largest merchant navies, was to be one of those countries. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57PSR/1, 10 January 1957.

⁸⁸ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, American Embassy in London, 28 December 1956.

⁸⁹ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Informação, 08 January 1957, pp. 2-3.

⁹⁰ «It is United States view that if SCUA is to continue, and prove important in the future of the canal, its best chance is by becoming the central source of all available information regarding the canal, its traffic and the service through it, which information should be made available as required to the United Nations and to interested parties». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57/D/4, 10-01-1957

mission would be one of study». They were now openly in collusion route with the Americans⁹¹.

The *cordon sanitaire* that the American Administration wanted to keep from the Anglo-French invasion passed also along the S.C.U.A. when it came to salvage operations in the Canal. A Memorandum presented by France and Britain assured that the «addition of Anglo-French vessels would at least double the working capacity immediately». However, the Egyptian refusal to accept it until the complete evacuation of the expeditionary forces was not disputed within the User's association and the Anglo-French proposal was archived⁹².

The salvage operations took less than expected and from March onwards the issue of the Canal boycott was raised again. The British Cabinet was aware that if the Canal clearance was achieved before an agreement with Egypt had been made, there would be no conditions «to give boycott any chance of success» (Kyle, 1991, p. 544). Forestalling any S.C.U.A. move, on the 18 of March the Egyptian Government issued a Note reiterating its commitment to abide by the Constantinople Convention, that rises of dues would also abide by the 1936 Agreement (i.e., not superior to 1% each year) and, of course, that «Canal tolls are to be paid in advance to the Suez Canal Authority in Egypt, or its nominees»⁹³. A few days later, talks conducted by the United Nations and the American Administration started in Cairo⁹⁴. A last (and necessarily short) push was on the way but this time the Anglo-French would enjoy some more American backing. The astonishment caused by the State Department's new approach on the most of the "18 powers" was considerable. In the telegram sent from the Portuguese Embassy in Washington informing about the Western reaction to the Egyptian Note, the excerpt: «Main idea United States is boycott Suez Canal. Under Trading Enemy Act Government may forbid US citizens, whatever flag ship-owners to pay tolls Egyptian Authorities» was in Lisbon underlined in red and sided with a huge question mark⁹⁵. But, surprising as it was, the Portuguese Ambassador was not wrong: from the 18 of March to the 27 of April a new tandem, this time Anglo-American, tried discretely to bluff a second boycott (the French were discreetly kept at bay). On the 9 April, the Portuguese Ambassador in London confirmed the Washington telegram: the Foreign Office secretary had informed him that they were doing «all they can to suspend all pas-

⁹¹ France wanted now to get back to Dulle's first idea: «The Suez Canal Users' Association should also undertake as was provided in The Declaration of 21 of September, Paragraph 6, the study of the means that may render it feasible to reduce dependence on the Canal and especially the building of new pipelines». The French delegate «recalled the reservation which his Government had made when they joined the Association, and added that present circumstances seemed to lend weight to these misgivings on the part of the French Government». AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57/D/4, 10 January 1957.

⁹² AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57/D/5, 10-01-1957. «The Representative of the United States said that it was his understanding that the French and British statements were submitted for information only». AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57/PSR/1, 10 January 1957

⁹³ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Egyptian Government, 18 March 1957.

⁹⁴ Nasser's Terms. *The Times*, 25 April 1957.

⁹⁵ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 22 March 1957.

sages of the main countries for at least 10 to 15 days» and that the «United States have been pressing as much as possible their ship-owners flying Liberia or Panama flags to stop all passages»⁹⁶. According to the same Embassy, the International Chamber of Shipping could assure a boycott of around 80%, a figure never heard of during the September-October boycott attempts⁹⁷. These were alarming signals for the Portuguese Government although by then Lisbon already knew that this time the boycott *was planned to last only a couple of days*. Anyway, it was always possible to get back to old scheme, as the cabled instructions sent by the Minister to his London Ambassador on 10 April clearly show:

Your Excellency should mention that [Portuguese] shipping companies just accepted the Government plea to stop crossing [the Canal] for a short time. It must not be shown that the Government has the authority to impose it. In fact, it may occur that we need to let our ships go and pay Egypt under the cover that Companies proceed that way under no Government responsibility (as we did during the Suez crisis before the closure of the Canal); and so our explicit thesis must keep showing that what the Government can do is to appeal to the good will of the Companies.⁹⁸

On the next day, the British Ambassador in Lisbon acknowledged in a discreet “Bout de papier” that two Portuguese ships had already been instructed to reroute the Canal, that the Belgians were pressing her two shipping companies to do the same and, most important, that «talks conducted by the American Ambassador in Cairo» were on-going with the Egyptian Government. The “quasi-Note” ended like this:

We are not contemplating a formal boycott nor is it intended that the policy of restraint should continue for more than a limited time. But now is the time to exert all possible pressure on the Egyptian Government, and the coming days will be crucial for the long-term interest of the users⁹⁹.

To give the American talks enough time the S.C.U.A. meeting due for 17 of April was postponed. On the 20 of April there were rumours that something had been achieved in Cairo and that American ships would pass the Canal paying tolls to Egypt (though still under protest just like they had done from August to October last). Time was not on the Anglo-American side and it was feared that the Egyptian concessions made by Nasser’s «phraseology» were just meant to extend negotiations until the number of passages through the Canal afforded him to switch them off for good¹⁰⁰. In fact, the cracks were coming in: on the 19 April the first British ship, the “West Breeze” crossed the Canal paying tolls to the Egyptians authorities (worst still,

⁹⁶ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 09 April 1957.

⁹⁷ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 06 April 1957.

⁹⁸ Portuguese Foreign Minister, 10 April 1957.

⁹⁹ To make it less formal but no less credible, the Ambassador Stirling had crossed out “Aide-Memoire” and explained that unwittingly the Embassy staff had redacted as such. AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, 11 April 1957.

¹⁰⁰ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 20 April 1957.

in Swiss francs!) and a next one, the “Poplar Hill” was about to do the same¹⁰¹.

On the 24 of April, the Egyptian Government issued a revised version of the Suez Canal regime that came out of the “American talks” in Cairo. The most significant addition to the 18 of Mars Note was that the Suez Canal Authority and the National Bank of Egypt were negotiating with the Bank of International Settlement «to accept on its behalf payment of the Canal tolls»¹⁰². The Americans insistence on “something” to recognise the internationalisation of the Canal (Kyle, 1991, p. 544) in order to lessen the unilateral Egyptian settlement had achieved as much as this: to have the tolls deposit in a clearance institution owned by central banks. In fact, even this concession was already implicit in the 18 of March Egyptian Note¹⁰³.

Anyway this was enough for the State Department: Egypt had come closer to the “Six Principles” of the UN Declaration of 13 of October and that had been achieved through *bilateral and almost exclusive* American mediation.¹⁰⁴ That fitted the Eisenhower Doctrine and on the 27 of April Egypt was given a US “de facto acquiescence” (the Canal running could now enter a probationary period)¹⁰⁵. The American green light was followed by a landslide within S.C.U.A, whose most of its members were now decided to cross the Canal under the Egyptian terms¹⁰⁶.

But it was not enough for the Foreign Office. From the 27 of April to 13 of May the British Government continued its efforts to stop the crossings. It was not alone because it now formed a most unlikely new tandem with Portugal for that purpose (the French were unconditionally pro-boycott but were no longer concerting their action with London). The same day of the American “acquiescence” at the United Nations, the British Ambassador delivered the S.C.U.A. Members a sort of enquiry in which the first question suggested that the boycott attempt should proceed without United Nations and United States participation¹⁰⁷. Two days later the Minister Paulo Cunha replied that Portugal favoured negotiations without the United States

¹⁰¹ The Note of the British Embassy added that the «West Breeze (in spite of her reassuring name) was charter to a Hong Kong firm whose main function is trading with Communist China». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, 20 April 1957.

¹⁰² AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Egyptian Government, 24 April 1957.

¹⁰³ L. Fernandes, the Portuguese Ambassador had already remarked that the reference to «Canal authorities or its nominees (...) would allow Nasser a graceful way out before the Arab public opinion». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 22 March 1957. Brandeiro, in charge of the Cairo Legacy had also reported on 1 April that a Swiss-based bank would be selected. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 1 April 1957.

¹⁰⁴ The United Nations financial negotiator had been John McCloy, chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, closely associated with the Standard Oil constellation (Kyle, 1991, p. 544)

¹⁰⁵ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, USA- Information Service, Statement of Ambassador Cabot Lodge at the UN Security Council, 27 April 1957.

¹⁰⁶ Italy and Spain openly acknowledge that their ships were already using the Canal. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 30 April 1957.

¹⁰⁷ «Do Users favour negotiations with Egypt? If so, what negotiating machinery would be appropriate? (Should it be done by Secretary General of the United Nations, by United States or by a negotiating committee, or under cover of future debates in Security Council?» AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, Aide-Memoire, 27 April 1957.

and so the continuation of the boycott until further agreement with Egypt¹⁰⁸. On the 1 of May, the British Embassy informed that London was calling for another United Nations debate for the 6 of May and so «will continue to urge Portuguese ship-owners to avoid use of the Canal»¹⁰⁹. That is, Britain asked for another week for a last round of *bilateral* talks with Egypt.

The S.C.U.A. was now useless for that purpose. Informing about the S.C.U.A. meeting of the 2 of May, in which Britain was left almost alone on the issue of extending the negotiations, the Portuguese Ambassador could say: «I am sure that all the resistance will end by next week»¹¹⁰. In fact, it did, at least in S.C.U.A. where prevailed a consensual will to settle the matter on the basis of the American proposal: that passing the Canal under protest did not imply to accept the Egyptian's terms. This did not prevent the Portuguese delegate from saying that Lisbon maintained the point of view that only through a tough and far-reaching stand with Egypt would be possible to get the «indispensable guarantees»¹¹¹.

The S.C.U.A. last episodes are apparently odd. Something had made Britain press Egypt again without her senior partner's agreement (and at a time the British Government was doing his best for a US-UK rapprochement)¹¹²; at the same time Portugal was holding hard-line positions in S.C.U.A. which were utterly against her previous low-profile of toll-payer to Egypt.

2.4. *Dual diplomacy at the S.C.U.A – two cases*

British and Portuguese foreign policies during the last period of the Suez “affair” are examples of dual diplomacy worth considering more closely.

The first one because it touches a crucial aspect of the imperialist power: the international currency. The dollar-pound competition is a least spoken factor of the Anglo-American policies in the Middle East and surely a forgotten item in the Suez crisis but it is a major element of understanding both of them¹¹³.

As Portuguese diplomatic sources were central to the selection of facts shown above, it seems consequent to give them further use by analysing Portuguese stand *itself*. Portugal had by then colonial territories and Portugal's main interest in Egyptian politics was directly linked with Portuguese colonial policy. This might be considered a minor aspect compared to the Anglo-American relationship. Still, connecting the Suez crisis to colonial policies other than the British and French ones may also contribute for a broader view on late colonialism. It is obvious that

¹⁰⁸ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 29 April 1957.

¹⁰⁹ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, 01 May 1957.

¹¹⁰ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 02 May 1957.

¹¹¹ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 08 May 1957.

¹¹² In Parliament Macmillan talked about «the closer association of the United States with the Baghdad Pact, and to what I hope will be fruitful and success cooperation between the great oil companies of the western world. So what has happened has led to greater, and not less, Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East. (Opposition laughter.)» Prime Minister's Defence. *The Times*, 16-05-1957.

¹¹³ For a recent synthesis on petrodollars versus the euro, see Clark, 2006.

in both cases what follows in this last item is little more than the naming of subjects liable to further research.

a) Britain

Most of the dual diplomacy of the “Affair” was unsophisticated and did not work out well. Britain’s use of the UN and of the S.C.U.A. to cover military action was exposed in real time, with some relevant media exceptions¹¹⁴. But the later weeks of British dual diplomacy the goal was different and she got what it wanted.

Britain was aware that after the United States of the 27 of April at the UN no effective boycott was possible; still Egypt was not fully assured about the all the S.C.U.A. members and the situation could drag on. There was *something* that Egypt could give in exchange for a British final appeasement and for which Britain could never count on American backing: that the Suez Canal toll be paid in sterling.

The international recovering of the sterling was for the British ruling class (the City) more important than anything else «even the future of empire which, it was assumed, would fall into place once the prior financial problem was solved» British finance capital was trying once more to give London a chance to become the world market for non-dollar trade and this implied to hold the convertibility of the sterling, gradually introduced between 1955 and 1958 (Cain & Hopkins, 2001, p. 626). The payment of the canal dues in dollars or any other currency would cause a considerable drain of gold and currency for the British banking system that would certainly harm the sterling convertibility.

Delivered on the same day that the Americans gave Cairo a green light at the UN, the British 27 of April Aide-Memoire included this paragraph:

3. Her Majesty’s Government requires information on the question of the possible use of transferable Sterling for payment of the Canal Dues and has initiated a pure technical enquiry through Banking channels in terms which make it clear that it is made without prejudice to Her Majesty’s Government’s ultimate decision on the use of Canal by British shipping. This enquiry is of the most confidential nature¹¹⁵.

That is, Britain was counting pounds among her S.C.U.A. allies while urging them to boycott. Having settled the main lines of the “affair” with Egypt, the Foreign Office delivered the Portuguese Ministry another “Confidential” Note, two days before the Parliamentary debate in which the Prime Minister Macmillan let down Britain’s opposition to the use of the Canal. The Note thanked the «staunch support given by the Portuguese Government» but informed that the British Cabinet had given further consideration to the use of the Canal: boycott was no longer possible. Besides,

¹¹⁴ As this excerpt about the Anglo-French intervention in the United Nations shows: «This move is an earnest of the good faith and good intention of the Western powers. They are trying to exhaust every peaceful means of settlement». Suez and the U.N. *The New York Times*, 24 September 1956.

¹¹⁵ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, Aide-Memoire, 27 April 1957.

the United Kingdom has a particular problem which is not common to the members of the Suez Canal Users Association as a whole, namely that sterling was not specified by the Egyptian Government as a currency in which dues could be paid. Provided that this problem can be resolved, Her Majesty's Government propose to announce next Monday (May 13) the withdraw of their present advice to shipping.

The "problem" was solved on time. In Parliament, Macmillan made public that «Payments made in connexion with the canal – for canal dues and other purposes such as port dues, or water – will be made in sterling». And more: a new transferable account had been opened in the Bank of England in the name of the national Bank of Egypt¹¹⁶. In fact, even this time this last minute dual diplomacy did not go completely under covered in the press. After the Parliamentary debate, the Conservative but non-City connected Daily Telegraph put it bluntly:

Dues are to be paid in sterling, and a special transferable account has been opened for the purpose. Obviously, there is economy advantage to ourselves in not having to pay in hard currency, as had been feared; having decided that we must swallow the pill, we succeeded in getting it sugar-coated. But this does not detract from Nasser's political victory¹¹⁷.

b) Portugal

In 1955 the new Egyptian regime looked up for inspiration in the "New State" Portuguese Constitution¹¹⁸ but this could hardly lessen Lisbon's suspicion of the Egyptian Afro-Asian policies. It was not a coincidence that Portugal and Belgium were two of the European States more opposed to changes in their African colonies and more hostile to the Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" Radio. However, the stand of the Belgium towards the Egyptian Government corresponded more to what should be expected from a colonial metropolis¹¹⁹. Contrary to what Paul H. Spaak, the Belgium Foreign Minister demanded early in September 1956 (nothing less than NATO backing for a military operation against the Cairo)¹²⁰, the Portuguese diplomats made since the beginning of the Suez crisis reassuring statements towards Egypt.

Right after Portugal's entrance to the "18 Powers", Brandeiro, then in charge of the Cairo Legacy, was asked by the Egyptians if the Portuguese participation in such a scheme mean that «qu'il est pour la guerre». Brandeiro's reply was that decision about entering the S.C.U.A. was not yet taken but that if Portugal did enter,

¹¹⁶ This new account would be free from the British Government interference. The previous account of the National Bank of Egypt in the Bank of England had been frozen and remained so «until satisfactory arrangements covering all financial claims against Egypt. (Laughter.)» But even the older was now allowed to make payments for British exporters who had entered in contracts with Egypt before 28 July 1956. *British Ships to Use Suez. Payment in Sterling*. The Times, 14 May 1957.

¹¹⁷ *Humiliation and After. The Daily Telegraph*, 14 May 1957.

¹¹⁸ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 477, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 14 December 1955.

¹¹⁹ «(Mr. Spaak at the Belgium Senate.) He said that any kind of success, whatever small, of Colonel Nasser would bring serious consequences for the West (...) As for Belgium in particular, the problem of Congo will arise sooner or later. Nasser's self confidence, if inflated, will know no limits and the blow suffered by Western Powers will get to the heart of the African Continent (should be read: Congo)». AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Brussels, 21 September 1956.

¹²⁰ AHD-MNE - 2° P., A. 1, Mç 478, NATO, Minute of the Board Meeting, 9 September 1956.

«it would be because in our view such plan would not lead to war». Portugal was for a «peaceful solution»¹²¹.

That was not false and the Portuguese delegate in NATO was pleased to report the positive contribution of the British Labour Party (!) and the Soviet (!) statements had recently given to the peace cause¹²². It was seen *supra* the importance the Portuguese Government gave to prior guarantees that there would be no duties implicated by participation in the second London Conference. Paulo Cunha himself went to Paris before going to London because he wanted to meet Pineau [the French Foreign Minister] first, «considering the dubious character» of the London Conference (it was obvious that the French would be the most openly pro-war participants)¹²³. The Portuguese Government was also more than aware that a possible colonial turmoil could follow its entering into a war coalition against an Afro-Asian country¹²⁴.

In the Conference, the Portuguese Minister reiterated that Lisbon would join a User's Association only if it mean the «permanent continuity of the peaceful and legitimate action» of the first (!) Conference. The anti-war arguments used by Cunha were so emphatic (he said that at first he thought the association idea was “provocative” for Egypt)¹²⁵ that important international media, including the Asian press, highlighted them. It is hard to see this as a totally involuntarily effect because some of the versions issued by Portuguese colonial media were similar¹²⁶. This was *meant* to produce these results:

The intervention of our Minister at the second Suez conference caused a very good impression in Cairo, whose political “milieu” were pleased to see how highly Portugal considered Egypt's sovereignty. (...) The newspaper Al Goumorich, close to the Government and which is sometimes unpleasant for us says in banner headlines: Portugal supports Dulles's good faith on the condition there is collaboration with Egypt¹²⁷.

¹²¹ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 14 September 1956.

¹²² The question mark sided along this dispatch that was added by the Ministry staff was of the same size of the text. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, NATO, Portuguese Delegation in Paris, 15 September 1956.

¹²³ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 16 September 1956.

¹²⁴ The Soviet Note sent to the Portuguese Foreign Ministry later made it explicit: «If a foreign invasion of Egypt occurs, it is sure that (...) it would cause a deep outrage among the African and Asian peoples against the Governments of the countries involved in such aggression». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Soviet Embassy in Paris, 17 September 1956.

¹²⁵ The Ministry felt obliged to ask to the London Embassy for the correct version because the Censorship Services (to which the Portuguese Press was obliged to undergo) had «contradictory versions» of the Minister's speech. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 20 September 1956; Portuguese Foreign Minister, 20 September 1956.

¹²⁶ The Portuguese-controlled Goa Radio today appealed to the Western Powers to «bury» the idea of a Suez Canal User's Association, which will surely lead to a world conflagration. The Radio, which was reviewing the Suez problem in its Gujarati broadcast, said Britain and France would do well to bury the user's plan once and for all and attempt to settle the problem through peaceful negotiations.. Lisbon Attacks West's Plan. *The Indian Express*, 20 September 1956.

¹²⁷ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 22 September 1956.

It was also seen *supra* how the Portuguese shipping companies had immediately switched their Suez toll payments to the Egyptian authorities and continued doing so until the blockade of the Canal in November. The Portuguese Government decision of not interfering was not only justified by the additional freights or the possible oil rationing. There was an additional cause for “upsets” in the Canal:

The liquid fuels are not the only sensitive issue for us: there is also the civil and military transit to Goa¹²⁸ and the problems arising from the fact that Egypt is currently our mediator in several of our difficult business with the Indian Union¹²⁹.

The Egypt Government was playing this broker role because the Indian Union was one of its main supporters and because the New Delhi claims over Portuguese colonial territories in India had led to the break of diplomatic relations in 1955. The Canal was of course a key factor: during the first semester of 1956, 10 round trips of Portuguese ships to Mormugão (the main port of Goa) had passed the Canal.

The Portuguese stand became difficult to hold in April 1957 during the second boycott attempt. On the eve of the troubles, Brandeiro had a conversation with Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister in which the Egyptian reassurances were too explicit and repeated to be just casual:

Referring explicitly to Portugal and after highlighting the Portugal’s moderate and sensitive stand in the Canal affair, he told me that he wanted to reassure me that the Egyptian Government, in spite of his good relations with the Indian Union would not hinder nor comment in any way the passage of ships transporting troops to Goa, because he was sure that the Portuguese Government did not nourish imperialist goals. He added that this statement would not be made public neither in Cairo nor in New Delhi but that he could fully reassure me that it would be so. He repeated me: «Egypt will not be against the passage of Portuguese troops throughout the Canal». I thanked the Minister.

Egypt knew that Portugal could be easily pressed on this issue and Portugal was now made aware that Egypt knew. This is an important factor to understand why the Portuguese Government tried so hard to extend the negotiations with Egypt beyond the point the American Administration and later the Foreign Office had walked out of it. The Portuguese colonial government did not want to be left alone to become dependent of a Canal «non insulated from one’s country politics». It was more than plausible that once there was no more international control of any sort over the Canal, the Egyptian close relations to India would sooner or later reverse Dr. Fawzi guarantees about the passage of Portuguese ships. So, after the 27 of April once again a dangerous double game had to be played by Portuguese diplomacy: to make her best to support whoever was pressing Egypt (until the 13 May it

¹²⁸ Goa was the capital of “Estado Português da Índia”, an ensemble of colonial territories in India that also included Damão and Diu in the Gujrat. In 1954 the Indian Union had already occupied two of those territories, Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli.

¹²⁹ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 22 September 1956; 28 September 1956. In the first half of 1956, 10 round trips of cargo and passenger ships were made between Lisbon and Goa. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, *Informação*, 08-01-1957, p. 2

was Britain) and to keep it as discreet as it could be. It is interesting to see how the argument used before to justify that Portuguese companies were paying tolls to Egypt «because the Portuguese Government had no authority to hinder it» (which was false) could be reverted if now, as it was the case, the boycott was to proceed. In a private note to Stirling, the British Ambassador in Lisbon, Cunha commented this way an episode of the late S.C.U.A. meeting:

According to what Ambassador Pereira told at the meeting we do not have in Portugal legal authority to force the companies to boycott the Canal but we do have the *moral* force to be sure that those Companies would abide by it. The Portuguese Government was ready to make this step if the great bulk of Users did the same¹³⁰.

This passage resembled the Italian stand during the S.C.U.A. meeting of October 1956 (see above 2.2) but this time it did not go so well. Egypt got his way, there was no boycott and worst still, the Cairo came to know about the Portuguese new stand. On the 10 of May the “Daily Express” published the following list of

which countries in the User’s Association will send their ships through Suez now:
Almost certainly – The U.S., Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Turkey, Persia and Holland.

Probably – Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

Probably not: Portugal.

Definitely not: France¹³¹.

Pereira tried to explain the leak, «certainly based on the statements we made at S.C.U.A and which strongly contrast with prevailing mildness of the majority»¹³². Anyway, Portugal was ending the Affair in a very bad company.

Conclusions

The Suez “Affair” allowed for the readjustment of hegemonic power in the Middle East. The American oil interests were progressing therein for the last three decades but until then the United States had no political or military responsibilities in the region proportional to its size. Henceforth American imperialism would be the umbrella for the minor European ones.

This was not to happen without frictions: the smaller any former colonial metropolis was the harder it became for her to rely on a super Power whose global interests had more complex issues to balance. Reporting what the American press said about a recent visit to France of Dulles, the Portuguese Ambassador selected this topic:

To the question raised by Mollet [the French Prime-Minister] that under the terms of the Egyptian

¹³⁰ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, private note, 06 May 1957.

¹³¹ Who Goes? «The Daily Express», 10 May 1957.

¹³² AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 10 May 1957.

Memorandum [of 24th April] Nasser will control the Canal, the American Secretary of State replied that the Suez problem is not vital and can be solved with big tankers around the Cape or by building new pipelines. The problem of Suez, added Dulles, is part of the Middle East problem which in turn is part of the general combat between East and West.

Fernandes added: «He seems not to have convinced Mollet and Pineau who insisted that such issue should be dealt separately»¹³³.

The French and Portuguese colonial withdrawals did not take long after the Suez (Argelia, 1962; Portuguese India, 1961). The problems of fading colonial empires were now lesser contradictions of a rising hyper-imperialism. That these minor contradictions were still important can be clearly seen when it comes to the erratic trend of the S.C.U.A. boycotts: only *national* strategies were followed, as the cases of Britain and Portugal show.

But the Suez crisis impacted the correlation of forces in the Middle East in a twofold way: if it consolidated the amalgamation of “Western interests” it also allowed for the breaking of any potential anti-Western front. By assuming the imperial delegation in full charge, the American Administration was freer from regional ties than the British had been. This allowed for a better selection of friends and foes that accelerated the class struggle within each Middle Eastern state; there would be no unified Arab bourgeoisie and no more conditions for a consensual pan-Arabism.

Sixty years later, both trends seem on going. It is hard to say for how much longer but the aftermath of Suez “affair” showed they are inversely correlated.

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¹³³ AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 08 May 1957.

The Colonization of the Past. Use and Abuse of History in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

ERMINIO FONZO

In October 2015 the prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, gave a speech at the 37th Zionist Congress and stated that the decision to exterminate the Jews during World War II was not taken by Hitler, who just wanted to expel them from Europe, but by the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni (sometimes transliterated Hussein¹). Accusing the Palestinians for the Holocaust is an old temptation of Israel: in 1961, during the Eichmann trial, al-Husayni was mentioned several times as an instigator of the Shoah; in 2012 Netanyahu himself had already made a similar allegation against the mufti («Hussein¹ was among the architects of the Final solution») in a speech at the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) (*Haaretz*, 25 January 2012).

Actually al-Husayni was an ally of Hitler and a fanatic anti-Semite but Netanyahu's theory is without foundation, and, indeed, it was rejected not only by historians from all over the world, but also by the Israeli ruling class and even by the German government, which once again acknowledged the Nazi responsibilities (*The Guardian*, 21 October 2015). Anyway, the words of Netanyahu are an example of the abuse of history that can be done in a disputed land, such as Palestine.

In that context, indeed, history and memory have immediate political consequences and both peoples, the Israelis and the Palestinians, aim at demonstrating that the territory belongs to them and that they live there since unmemorable time. In particular Israel, as is known, claims to be the legitimate heir of the ancient Israelites, conquerors of Palestine under the auspices of God, who gave them the possession of the land. The Palestinian people, on the contrary, claims to have been inhabiting the territory for centuries before the arrival of the Jews.

Both people, furthermore, want to show that they are not responsible for the

¹ Full text of the speech on <http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechcongress201015.aspx>, retrieved 22 May 2016.

conflict that has been causing bloodshed in the Middle East for over a century. They often use history to demonize the enemy, by presenting him as responsible for the conflict and capable of committing the worst crimes. The memory of some events is used to justify political choices and military actions and serves to create hatred against the enemy. As highlighted by Tzvetan Todorov (1996), memory lends itself to frequent abuses.

Of course any nation needs to create a tradition and to «invent» a past, a sort of «sacred history», in order to strengthen the devotion of citizens (Renan, 1882). The «sacred history» is an essential element of the civic religion and, in disputed lands and in situations of conflict is even more necessary than usual.

Therefore it is not a surprise that generally the most popular means of communication of Israel and Palestine offer a biased narrative: in textbooks, national ceremonies, mass media, museums, public discourse, history is often narrated on the basis of a nationalist and unfair interpretation. Under certain respects, it is an unavoidable situation, because it is almost impossible that the contenders speak fairly of the conflict in which they are directly involved.

History, however, is not the sole element used to strengthen the devotion of the people. Another tool is religion, whose importance has grown in recent decades. An essential turning point was the Six-Day War, after which religious movements grew both in Palestine and in Israel. In Palestine the Muslim brotherhood increased its weight and in 1988 gave birth to Hamas; in Israel religious Zionism became an important movement and, in addition, since the 1980s also the orthodox Judaism (opposed to Zionism) became prominent on the political scene, influencing the choices of many governments. The growth of religious movements and of the weight of religion in the Israeli and Palestinian societies is also due to international phenomena (collapse of Soviet Union and end of the socialist alternative to the capitalist system) and to demographic reasons: in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas is prevalent, population is increasing faster than in the West Bank; in Israel the birth rate among religious Jews is higher than among secular citizens.

Anyway, if history is not the unique motivator of the contenders, it is one of the most important, as it persuades the fighters that they have right to occupy Palestine.

History, moreover, is necessary to seek support on the international scene. The conflict, indeed, is fought not only in the «Holy land», but also in the capitals of the world, because both Israel and Palestine need to get the endorsement of other countries.

In the Arab world the pro-Palestinian account is the most popular; in the West it is easy to find both narratives, but for many years the Israeli account has been the most popular, partly thanks to the «orientalist» view of intellectuals (Said 2003). The Israeli narrative, furthermore, benefits from the support of the Jewish communities, mostly in the USA; the Palestinian account, in turn, benefits from the numerous associations and political groups supporting the Arab cause.

In these circumstances, understanding how the Israelis and the Palestinians tell their story is not an erudite curiosity, but a way to comprehend the conflict and the

motivations of the two contenders. Discussions among scholars, media and politicians are not only academic debates, but directly involve the life of millions of people. The «colonization of past», in other words, is necessary to enhance and strengthen their own political position. Consequently, controversy is very harsh and the two narratives are often irreconcilable.

Not by chance, history causes frequent political discussions and, in some cases, even provokes charges in the court. As is usual in a situation of conflict, the critical intellectuals, not in line with the «official» version of the events, are accused of treason. Two Israeli historians, Ilan Pappé and Shlomo Sand, were even threatened of death by Jewish extremists, who did not appreciate their anti-Zionist ideas; another scholar, Zeev Sternhell, in 2008 was wounded by a bomb set by a terrorist near to his home. Even if these actions were mainly provoked by the political engagement of these intellectuals as peace activists, it is clear that history, in the disputed land of Palestine, has a strong political relevance².

Media and politicians of both countries very often refer to the history of the conflict, on the basis of an one-sided point of view.

Moreover, one of the most important places for the dissemination of the «official» narrative is the school. The textbooks adopted by teachers have been a very controversial issue since the days of the British mandate (T. Khalidi, 1981). Today the books of both countries are blamed for offering an unfair narrative, frequently depicting the enemy in absolutely negative terms, without any acknowledgement of the reasons of the other (Peled-Ethanan, 2012; Impact-SE, 2011; Pinson, 2007). The ministries of education of Israel and of Palestine have the power to ban the textbooks not in line with the «official» version of the events. For example, in Israel a book adopted by some Arab schools was prohibited in 2009 because it used the word *Nakba* (catastrophe), by which the Palestinians indicate the exodus of the refugees in 1948-49. The book had been authorized in 2007 by the minister Yuli Tamir (Labour Party), but its use was prohibited two years later by decision of the minister Gideon Saar (Likud), who stated: «In no country in the world does an educational curriculum refer to the creation of the country as a ‘catastrophe’» (*The Guardian*, 22 July 2010). The decision was backed by the Prime Minister Netanyahu, but criticized by many intellectuals and politicians. The following year, the minister Limor Livnat (Likud) started a campaign against the presence of revisionist assertions in the textbooks, explaining: «No nation studies its history from the point of view of the enemy or the point of view of the United Nations. The State of Israel is a Jewish and democratic state and this should direct the perspective of its education system» (quoted in Al-Haj, 2005). In 2010 an interesting initiative, the publication of a textbook which proposes both narratives (Adwan & Bar-On, 2003), was rejected by the ministries of education of both Palestine and Israel,

² In recent years, only one historian has received death threats for his work outside Palestine. The Turkish professor Reşat Barış Ünlü in 2015 was threatened to be killed because, in a written exam, he asked his students a question on the Kurdistan manifesto written in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK. (*New Statesman*, 10 June 2015).

which forbade its use in the schools (*The Jewish Daily Forward*, 3 December 2010).

Recently a dispute has arisen in Israel about a Dorit Rabinyan's novel, *Border-life*, which describes a love story between an Israeli woman and a Palestinian man. The Ministry of education, led by the ultra-nationalist Naftali Bennet, banned the book from the schools, stating that it could jeopardize the national identity (*Haaretz*, 12 December 2015). The decision was strongly criticized by writers and intellectuals, according to whom the current government is transforming the Jewish State into a racist and narrow-minded country.

In Israel, another important tool for the nationalization of the masses is the army. All citizens, males and females, are obliged to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces for some years and the army has a great importance in the Israeli society. The IDF also have the task to strengthen the devotion to the country and a special unit, the Education and Youth Corps, is in charge of enhancing the national values among soldiers. For this purpose, it organizes seminars and guided tours in the most significant sites and museums, describing the Israeli past from the «official» point of view. The Corps has been commanded by prominent intellectuals, such as Yitzhak Arad (1968-1972), who later, from 1972 to 1993, became director of the Yad Vashem, and Avner Shalem. Furthermore, sometimes the swearing-in ceremonies of the IDF recruits take place in historic sites, such as the Western Wall and, previously, Masada.

Another element that separates the Israelis and the Palestinians is constituted by the place names: after the establishment of Israel, almost all towns were renamed with Jewish names (in general by Hebraization of the Arabic names; sometimes using names coming from Bible). For example, Lydd became Lod, Lubyia became Lavi. The Palestinians, however, have continued to use the Arabic names. In Jerusalem the Haram al-Sharif (the noble sanctuary) of Muslims is called Temple Mount by Jews. The name itself of the city is disputed: Yerushalayim for the Jews, al-Quds for the Arabs, but in Israel it is translated into Arabic as «Urshalim - al-Quds» (Arabic is one of the official languages of the Jewish State).

Furthermore, many Arab villages, depopulated during the 1948 war, were covered with forests or Jewish settlements and today no trace of them remains (Pappe 2006).

Even the tour guides, in the disputed land of Palestine, create political problems, mainly in Jerusalem. The guides, indeed, use to explain history according to their own point of view: the Arabs on the basis of the Palestinian account; the Jews according to the Israeli narrative. Both people need to gain international support and tourists are to a large extent foreigners. Therefore the information provided by guides have political relevance, so much so that in Israel some members of Knesset in 2010 proposed to ban the Arab citizens to do this job in Jerusalem (*Haaretz*, 19 October 2010). The proposal was not accepted, but sometimes the guides are fired because of their political ideas (*Jerusalem Post*, 19 June 2014).

Another dispute is related to the anniversaries, in particular to 14 May, day of the establishment of the State of Israel: for the Jews it is the Independence Day, a

national holyday celebrated in all the country, while for Palestinians and Arab citizens it is a day of mourning, dedicated to the commemoration of the 1948 catastrophe. Many Israelis do not accept the Arab celebration and in March 2011 the Knesset passed a law, the so-called Nakba bill, allowing the State to impose financial penalties to the public entities which join the commemoration (*Jerusalem Post*, 23 March 2011).

Another tool to disseminate their own point of view is constituted by the historical maps. In the internet it is very easy to find maps of the alleged loss of land suffered by the Jews or, more frequently, by the Arabs, which display images false or presented in a misleading way.

The same thing happens in the museums. Think, for example, to the Haganah Museum in Tel Aviv, which explains the 1948 war on the basis of the Israeli official narrative.

In this context, historians might play an important role, as they are able to offer a more accurate account of the events. However, they often propose the same narrative of the mainstream media and of the political leader: it is normal that, in a situation of conflict, most intellectuals support the positions of their State; in general critical interpretations are ignored by citizens and are not the most common beliefs of the public opinion.

The historical dispute between Jews and Arabs arose at same time as the beginning of the Jewish emigration to Palestine. In the first half of XX century, indeed, the debate between Arabs and Zionists was largely a debate about historical rights on Palestine (T. Khalidi, 1981).

In those years, anyway, also a dispute among Jews was underway, in particular between Zionists and Diaspora Jews³. The Jewish pioneers moved to Palestine needed history to promote Zionism and thus scholars such as Ben Zion Dinur and Yitzhak Baer, founders of the historical school of Jerusalem and of the journal «Zion», highlighted the tragedies of the Diaspora (in Hebrew *galut*, exile, a word marked by a negative sense), arguing that only in Eretz Israel the Jewish people could find serenity (Myers, 1988, Shmueli, 1986). On the other side, non-Zionist historians, such as Salo Wittmayer Baron (1953-1982), living in the US, and Cecil Roth (1970), living in the UK, struggled against the «lachrymose conception of Jewish history», underlining that the Diaspora was characterized not only by persecutions and discrimination, but also by the establishment of flourishing communities (Fonzo, 2014a). The dispute, obviously, was closely linked to the political ideas of the authors, as their works aimed at endorsing or rejecting Zionism.

In the same years, a Palestinian national identity was forming and a Palestinian historiography was being born, with a gradual shift from a sort of antiquarian history to a nationalist historiography (T. Khalidi, 1981).

Following the establishment of the State of Israel and the exodus of the Palestinian refugees, the dispute between Arabs and Jews became harsher.

³ Today a sort of rivalry between Israeli and Diaspora Jews is still alive, at least under certain points of view.

Today both ancient and modern history are often narrated by an one-sided perspective. It is impossible, in the short space of this article, go into detail about all historiography and public use of the past. Therefore we will provide a general overview, indicating books and articles to deepen single issues.

With regard to ancient history, it is known that Israel was established on the basis that in antiquity Palestine was inhabited by Jews and that it was «the promised land». It is the story told by the Bible, which spurred Zionists to choose «Eretz Israel» to establish their State. Therefore the Biblical Age is regarded with particular attention and often the Israeli scholars try to demonstrate that the story told by the Bible is true, that in antiquity Jews created a flourishing civilization in Palestine and that, as a consequence, the land belongs to them.

In the Declaration of Independence, issued on 14 May 1948, it is stated:

Eretz Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.

Since the XIX century European and North-American archaeologists, such as William Albright, made excavations in order to prove the reliability of the Bible. After the establishment of the State of Israel, Jewish archaeologists, among which Benjamin Mazar, have continued the work and after 1967, when the Jewish State conquered the West Bank (hearth of the Biblical Israel), other excavations were made, mainly by nationalist scholars, such as Yigael Yadin (Masalha, 2007).

In addition, in the wake of the 1967 war religious Zionism arose as an important political movement and, under the leadership of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, started to propagandize the necessity of colonizing the West Bank in the name of the Bible. The first Jewish settlements, such as those in Hebron, were founded on the basis of this ideology.

Today the Biblical Age is mentioned very often by media, ruling class and, mainly, by the Israeli settlers who live in the West Bank. Biblical history and archaeology, indeed, play an essential part in the «historical fight» against the Palestinians. The hearth of the dispute is represented by the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, namely Mount Moriah, where, according to an identification made after the Muslim conquest of the «holy city» in the VII century, the two Temples of the Jews stood in antiquity (the first built by Solomon, the second after the Babylonian exile). Today, as is known, the top of the hill is occupied by the Dome of the Rocks and by the Al-Aqsa Mosque, two of the holiest Islamic sites, and the clashes between worshippers and Israeli soldiers are continuous.

The dispute is related not only to religion, but also to history. Israel, indeed, needs to demonstrate that the site was actually occupied by the Solomon temple and by the Second temple; the Palestinians, on the contrary, aim at denying this claim. Their assertions are blamed by the Israelis as «Temple denial», something similar to the Holocaust denial.

The control of the site is essential for both contenders, because it allows them not

only to use the Mount to pray, but also to carry out excavations and research. In the Oslo Accords of 1993 the status of Jerusalem remained indefinite (it was one of the five «red lines» which should have been defined in a future treaty), but in the following negotiations, aimed at achieving a definitive peace agreement, the issue was discussed. At the 2000 Camp David summit, the question of Jerusalem and of the Mount was one of the points that prevented Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak to reach an agreement. The mediator, the US president Bill Clinton, proposed a «vertical sovereignty» on the Mount, offering the control of the surface to the Palestinians and the underground to the Israelis. The proposal, in its substance, was refused by both parties. In the event, Arafat also claimed that no archeological evidence proves that the Solomon Temple was built on Mount Moriah.

Since 1967 excavations have been carried out both by Jewish archaeologists and by the Jordan Islamic Waqf (the authority charged with the administration of the Dome of the Rocks and of the Al-Aqsa Mosque). In particular, soon after the conquest of the Old city Israel started to dig a tunnel under the Mount, in spite of the strong opposition of Muslims.

In 1997 the Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, decided to open a new exit door of the tunnel within the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem. The Palestinian people strongly contested this decision, fearing that the door could be the pretext to claim the Jewish ownership of the quarter. In the clashes that followed, 70 people died (Pieraccini, 2015). It is a unique case: generally archaeology provokes scientific debates among scholars and, at most, political discussions, but Palestine is the only place where it causes bloody fights and victims.

Today the Israeli archaeologist Dan Bahat, who dug the tunnels under the Mount, is one of the scholars who most resolutely affirm the reliability of the story told by the Bible, claiming that the Temple was actually built on Mount Moriah (Bahat, 2013).

All excavations in Jerusalem, moreover, create problems between Israelis and Palestinians. The latter accuse the Israeli archeologists of privileging the strata of the ancient city related to the Jewish history and to disregard those related to Muslims and Christians (R. Khalidi, 1997). The Israelis make the same allegation to the Palestinians, in particular because the Waqf transformed the so-called Solomon's stables, situated under the Mount, into a mosque. Israel, anyway, is advantaged because it controls the city and the excavations.

On several occasions, the polemics have involved the UNESCO, which has repeatedly condemned Israel for its actions. The latest resolution on «Occupied Palestine», presented by some Arab countries, approved on 12 October 2016 by the Executive Board of the agency and confirmed in following meetings, strongly criticizes the Jewish State for its policy in the Old City of Jerusalem. In particular, the Board points the finger at the excavations, at the management of the Temple Mount and at the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, also reaffirming that two disputed sites, the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron and the Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem, belong to Palestine. The document only uses the Arab names of the concerned places and,

although stating that Jerusalem is sacred to the three monotheistic religions, never mentions the ties of Judaism to the city. The approval has been obtained thanks to the votes of the Arab countries, China, Russia and others, while some countries (including USA, UK and Germany) voted against and some others (including Italy and other European countries) abstained⁴.

After the approval the government of the Jewish State decided to suspend all cooperation with the UNESCO, explaining, through the voice of Naftali Bennett, that the resolution «deny history and ignore thousands of years of Jewish ties to Jerusalem and the Temple Mount» (*The Guardian*, 14 October 2016). Benjamin Netanyahu himself expressed his criticism for the «absurd» resolution, which raised concerns and protestations in many countries.

Also outside Jerusalem the ancient sites provokes debates and conflicts. An example – along with the mentioned Ibrahim Mosque and Rachel's Tomb - is the alleged Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, which for the Israelis is the burial site of Joseph, son of Jacob, and for the Palestinians is an old mosque. Around the site numerous clashes took place between Nablus residents and Israeli settlers.

In the last few decades the traditional account of the ancient history has been criticized by some Israeli scholars, who highlighted the unreliability of the Bible. Of course it is impossible to summarize the dispute about the historical reliability of the Scripture, started at least with Baruch Spinoza in the XVII century. We can just say that since the 1970s a «minimalist» approach, mainly supported by scholars from US and from other countries, has demonstrated the historical untrustworthiness of the Bible. Generally these studies are criticized in Israel, but some archaeologists of the Jewish State have begun to call into question the biblical account. In particular, we have to mention the works of Zeev Herzog and, among the most recent research, *The Bible unearthed*, by Israel Finkelstein and Neil A. Silberman (2001). The authors questioned many points of the Biblical narrative (the Patriarchs era, the David and Solomon's kingdom, the reform of Josiah, the origin of monotheism, etc.) and their work was praised by intellectuals from all over the world, but criticized by many Israelis.

Very harsh controversy, furthermore, was raised by the books of another scholar, Shlomo Sand, in particular by his study on *The Invention of the Jewish People* (2009), which proposes a heterodox narrative of the Jewish history. According to Sand, Jews are not the descendants of the ancient Israelites, but they come from converts; a Jewish «nation-race» with a common origin never existed; Russian and Polish Jews (the two most numerous groups in the XX century) come from the Khazars, a semi-nomadic Turkic people converted to Judaism (a theory already proposed by some intellectuals, such as Arthur Koestler (1976)).

The Invention soon became a bestseller but it, along with the other works by Sand, caused fierce controversy and in Israel was criticized both by media and historians. For example Anita Shapira wrote a very critical review, stating the Sand had only political purposes and that he put misrepresentations and half-truths under

⁴ The full text of the resolution «Occupied Palestine. Draft decisions» is in <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002462/246215e.pdf>. Retrieved on 14 October 2016.

a scientific mantle (Shapira, 2007). Only few Israeli scholars, among which Tom Segev (2009), praised the book, which, however, was also appreciated by an historian such as Eric J. Hobsbawm (2009).

After *The Invention*, Sand published two more studies (2012, 2014) about Judaism and Israel, raising new disputes.

The Palestinians, for their part, sometimes claim to be descendants of the ancient peoples living in the country, the Canaanites or the Philistines, which has no foundation. More often, they argue that the territory had been inhabited by Arabs for many centuries before the arrival of the Jews and thus they have been tied to the land since an unmemorable time. In the Palestinian Declaration of independence, issued in 1988, is stated:

Palestine, the land of the three monotheistic faiths, is where the Palestinian Arab people was born, on which it grew, developed and excelled. The Palestinian people was never separated from or diminished in its integral bonds with Palestine⁵.

The origin of a Palestinian identity, anyway, is disputed. According to Rashid Khalidi (1997), an embryonic national identity developed in the latest years of the Ottoman rule and strengthened after the British conquest of 1917.

Until the '70s (and, sometimes, even later) the Israelis had denied the existence itself of a Palestinian people, believing that they were only Arabs, lacking of a national identity. In 1969, in a famous declaration, the Prime Minister Golda Meir stated: «It was not as if there was a Palestinian people in Palestine and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist» (*Sunday Times*, 15 July 1969); the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, published in 1970 under the auspices of the State, did not mention the Palestinians at all. Since then, things are changed and today a majority of Israelis, albeit reluctantly, has to recognize the existence of a Palestinian people, with its own identity.

Furthermore, the Biblical Era is not the unique period of the antiquity to have political significance. For the Israeli nationalization of the masses an essential event is the siege of Masada of 73 CE. According to Josephus Flavius the last stand of the Jewish rebels against Romans took place in Masada, a rock near the Dead Sea. Some 960 people, belonging to the sect of the Zealots, committed suicide, after a strong resistance, in order not to fall in the hands of the enemy. The event is considered a symbol of the Jewish strength and love of freedom, as the rebels preferred to die instead than become slaves. Many points of Joseph Flavius' account have been questioned by scholars but, nevertheless, for many years Masada has been a very significant *lieu de mémoire* (Nora, 1986-1992) and, despite its importance has decreased after the conquest of Jerusalem in 1967, the myth is still alive (Ben-Yehuda, 1995; Fonzo, 2014b).

The centuries of the Jewish Diaspora are mainly discussed among the Israelis.

⁵ Full text on <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal3.htm>, retrieved 24 May 2016. The Declaration is incorporated in the current Constitution of Palestine, issued in 2003.

After the dispute between Zionist and non-Zionist historians, in recent decades a sort of reconsideration of the Diaspora experience is underway both in Israel and in the Jewish communities abroad (Endelmann, 1991).

Debates and polemics, however, are quite common, frequently with political consequences. One of the harshest disputes was caused by the publication of Ariel Toaff's *Pasque di sangue* (2007). The author is an Italian Jew, son of Elio Toaff (one of the most prominent rabbis in Italy) and professor at Bar Ilan University. In his book Toaff argued that the blood libel – the allegation of committing ritual infanticides, made against Jews in the Christian Europe for many century – in some cases was true. Jews have always denied the validity of the allegation, correctly retaining that it was created by fanatic Christians. *Pasque di sangue* was sharply criticized, both in Italy and in Israel, not only by historians but also by politicians and Jewish authorities. Some Members of the Knesset even threatened to file a lawsuit against the author (*Haaretz*, 26 February 2007). Toaff, stating to have been misunderstood, withdrew the book from the market few days after the publication and the following year published a new version (Toaff, 2008), with an emended text.

For the Palestinians, the most important event of the Medieval and Modern age is represented by the Crusades, which are often indicated as an example of a foreign invasion defeated and forced to leave by Muslims. Many Palestinians aspire to do the same with the Zionists and are waiting for a new Saladin, able to expulse the Jews and free the country (Ohana, 2006). Therefore the myth of the Crusades lead to wish a complete destruction of Israel⁶.

Another dispute, mainly limited to scholars, concerns Moses Maimonides, the well-known Jewish philosopher and theologian lived in XII century. Religious Zionists use Maimonides' works to justify their claims on the Palestinian territories (a position not endorsed by Orthodox Judaism); on the contrary, some Palestinian intellectuals retain Maimonides «the most illustrious example of the Arabo-Islamic-Judaic symbiosis of the late Middle Ages» (Masalha, 2007, p. 186).

The disputes with the most significant political value concern the Contemporary Age. The first event that we have to mention is the Holocaust. As is known, the extermination of the Jews boosted the Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel. After the genocide, indeed, most anti-Zionist Jews changed their mind and realized that finding peace and serenity in Europe was impossible; all world powers, including USA and USSR, acknowledged the right of the Jews to have their own State.

In Israel, in the first years after the World War II the Holocaust survivors were pitied, but also scorned, as they represented an old kind of Jew, weak and ready to be led to slaughter. Two laws passed in the '50s, one for the foundation of the Yad Vashem museum and one for the «Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day», focused attention on the revolts carried out by Jews against Nazis and on the heroism of the fighters, rather than on the commemoration of the victims.

⁶ Also in other Arab countries the Crusades represent a myth. For example, they were often mentioned by Hafez al-Assad, former president of Syria, who dreamed of defeating Israel like Saladin had done with the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Things started to change after the Eichmann trial (1961-62), which raised the attention for the Holocaust in Israel and in the Jewish communities abroad. After the trial, the genocide began to be seen as one of the most important events in the history of the Jews (Segev, 2000).

Since the '80s, the memory of the Shoah has become more and more significant in Israel: the schools began to organize tours to visit the extermination camps; the Ministry of education commissioned a textbook, *The Holocaust and its Significance*, which narrates in detail the Shoah and presents it as a unique event. In 1980, furthermore, a law established that the Holocaust is a mandatory subject in schools, within the curriculum of history of the Jews (until then, only Diaspora and Arab-Israeli relations were mandatory for all students) (Porat, 2004).

The genocide is also used to straighten out the ethnic quarrels that affect Israel: the Holocaust is presented as an event regarding all the Jews, not only the Ashkenazi (European Jews), which were actually victims of Nazism, but also the Mizrahi (Jews of the Arab countries, belonging to the Sephardic group), who did not suffer directly persecution. Today, the uniqueness of the Shoah and its importance for Jewish and Israeli identity are no longer questioned by almost all the Israeli citizens (Foa, 2009; Porat, 2004).

The reasons of this change in the perception of the genocide are several. After the Six-Day War, Israel became the strongest power of the Middle East and the risk to be destroyed decreased. By then the new Jew, strong and able to fight for his freedom, was a reality and, therefore, it was possible to commemorate the extermination of the «submissive» Jews of the past. Furthermore, in 1977 a right-wing party (the Likud, led by Menachem Begin), which had a different view of the Shoah and of its memory, came to the power. Since then, the remembrance of Hitler's victims has turned into a real «religion of the Holocaust» and the genocide is a seminal element of the Israeli identity (Segev, 2000; Zerthal, 1998).

Within the memory of Holocaust there are some debated points, such as the behavior of the *Yishuv* during the genocide and the role of the Jewish «collaborators» of Nazism, such as the *Kapos* in the lagers and the members of *Judenräte* (the Jewish councils in the ghettos).

However, apart from these issues, any criticism of the traditional narrative of the Shoah is strongly rejected. Think, for example, to the polemics against the famous book of Hannah Arendt (1963), *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, sharply criticized by Israeli media and scholars (Lipstadt, 2011). More recently, the survivor Eli Gat (2013), fighter in the Warsaw ghetto uprising of 1943, questioned the traditional narrative of the rebellion, arguing that the fighters were only a small minority of the ghetto people and that their initiative decided the fate of all the inhabitants, who after the repression of the uprising were deported and killed. According to Gat, in 1943 the rate of deportations had decreased compared with 1942 and, without the revolt, the Jews of the ghetto had the possibility to survive. It is a very questionable assumption and, indeed, it has been rejected by historians and Holocaust survivors (Dreifuss, 2013).

In Israel, however, the memory of the Shoah is also used to justify political decisions and military actions. The fear of a «second Holocaust», more or less sincere, influenced many political initiatives. For example, one of the reasons which, in the '60s, urged the prime minister David Ben Gurion to start the construction of the nuclear bomb was the fear that, without it, the Jews could be exterminated again (Cohen, 1999). After the Six-Day War the Holocaust was invoked in order not to return the occupied territories to the Arabs; during the 1982 Lebanon war Begin and his government mentioned the Shoah to justify the invasion. Furthermore, some enemies of Israel, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Yasser Arafat, Saddam Hussein and Mahmud Ahmadinejad, were labeled as «the new Hitler».

This kind of rhetoric has always been common among the Israeli leaders and Ben Gurion himself used it very often. Also the current premier, Benyamin Netanyahu, uses to remind the Holocaust, for example about the threats issued by Iran.

Furthermore, as we explained above, the Israeli leaders tried on several occasions to accuse the Palestinians of being responsible – or, at least, co-responsible – for the extermination.

Conversely, the genocide is also cited by the anti-Zionists or by the critics of the Israeli government. For example, the soldiers who refused to serve in Lebanon and in Palestinian territories invoked the Shoah in defense of their position (Segev, 2000).

The memory of the Holocaust should be used to fight any racial discrimination and to defend human rights. Unfortunately, in Israel it is also used in order to justify political and military actions against the Palestinians.

The latter, in general, do not deny nor minimize the Shoah, but argue that they are paying with the loss of their country for a crime committed by Europeans. However in Palestine there are some Holocaust-deniers and even the current president of the State, Mahmud Abbas, is accused of denying the Shoah, as in its PhD dissertation, discussed in 1982 in Moscow and later published in Arabic, argued that the Jews exterminated by Hitler were far fewer than six millions. Nonetheless in 2003 Abbas declared: «the Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind. The Holocaust was a terrible thing and nobody can claim I denied it» (*Haaretz*, 28 May 2003). Some Palestinians intellectuals, such as Edward Said and Mahmoud Darwish, explicitly repudiated the Holocaust denial and in 2001 signed a protest statement against a negationist conference held in Beirut (Leon, 2001).

The Jews, in any case, do not accept that the Palestinians participate in the remembrance of the Shoah. For example, in 1998 Yasser Arafat was prevented, under pressure from the Jewish authorities, to visit the United States Holocaust Memorial and Museum, where he should go during an official visit to the U.S. (*The New York Times*, 17 January 1998).

Another issue is related to the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*, the fabricated pamphlet, published for the first time in Russia in 1903, which describes an alleged Jewish plot to dominate the world. The forgery was proved beyond reason-

able doubt in 1921 by *The Times* of London, but in some Middle Eastern countries the Protocols are still printed and distributed as an authentic text. Also in Palestine some people believe that the pamphlet is a genuine document. In the charter of Hamas, issued in 1988, the Protocols are mentioned as an evidence of the Israeli plan to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. In the West Bank the pamphlet has been mentioned by some newspapers, including the official paper of Fatah (Arafat and Abbas' party). Even a schoolbook quoted the Protocols, but, after some protestations, the quote was removed. Furthermore, an Arabic translation of the pamphlet appeared on the website of the Palestinian ministry of information, but it was removed in 2005 upon request of the Anti-Defamation League (*The New York Times*, 19 May 2005).

The most heated disputes among scholars and media of the two countries concern the 1948 war. For both people, indeed, 1948 is a turning point and an essential *lieu de mémoire*. The Israelis consider the establishment of their State not only as the first Jewish State since millennia, but also as the birth of a new type of Jew; for the Palestinians, on the contrary, the 1948 war is the catastrophe in which they lost their land and became refugees. They have never accepted this condition and continue to demand resolutely to come back to their homes. Not by chance, one of the symbols of the refugees is the key of the houses that they (or their parents) left in 1948.

The traditional Israeli narrative of the conflict is based on some firm points: the war was provoked by the intransigence of the Arabs, who did not accept the presence of the Jews in Palestine; the UK opposed the establishment of a Jewish State; there were few Jewish soldiers, so that the war was like the fight between David and Goliath; the enemies of Israel was a compact group, aiming at destroying the Jewish *Yishuv*, and no contact was established between the two parties; at the end of the war, peace was not achieved for the obstinacy of the Arabs; the Israeli soldiers did not commit any atrocities, basing their behavior on the *Tohar HaNeshek*, the purity of arms.

The most important issue is that of the refugees, who in number of more than 700,000 fled their homes and moved to the near Arab countries and to the areas that now are known as Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip). Today, the refugees question is the thorniest problem of the conflict, as the Palestinians demand their return, while Israel resolutely refuses it. According to the Israeli traditional narrative, the Arabs fled voluntarily or by order of their leaders, with the intention to come back after the war.

Even scholars have supported this narrative for many years. It must be remembered that the «old» Israeli historiography of the 1948 war is mainly composed by works of veterans and political leaders, often based on personal memory, given that until the late '70s the documents were not accessible to historians. Among the most important books, also distributed outside Israel, we can mention those of Netanel Lorch (1961,1976), founder of the IDF historical division, ambassador and general secretary of the Knesset, and that by Abba Eban (1972), minister of foreign affairs during the 1967 war. It must be mentioned, moreover, the biography of Ben Gurion

written by Shabtai Teveth (1987).

Israel has never acknowledged its responsibility for the exodus of the refugees (Masalha, 2003). During the '80s, however, many things changed. First, sources were finally available, given that in the Jewish State official documents are declassified after 30 years. Furthermore, political climate and attitude towards the Palestinians were evolving: Israel was now a consolidate and strong State, which no longer risked to be destroyed, and this allowed a more serene approach towards the Arabs. Finally, the time elapsed since 1948 was now long and citizens could look at the war of independence with a minor emotional involvement.

Thanks to this climate, in the late '80s the traditional account was called into question by a group of Israeli scholars. Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé and Avi Shlaim, which became known as «new historians» (expression coined by Morris) proposed a different narrative of the 1948 war: Pappé (1988) focused on the English role, arguing that the UK did not oppose the establishment of a Jewish State and claiming that it was Israel to refuse to sign a peace agreement with the Arabs; Shlaim (1988) questioned the relations between Israel and its enemies, telling the «collusion» with Jordan and the meetings between king Abdullah and Golda Meir; Morris (1988) addressed the problem of the refugees, refusing both the Israeli and the Palestinian narrative and underlining that the Arabs fled because of the war itself: some of them were expelled by the IDF, others escaped for fear or threats. Anyway, according to Morris the exodus was not voluntary, as claimed by the «old» Israeli historiography, and the Jewish Agency was responsible for it⁷.

The new historians also argued that the Israeli army was not inferior to the Arab armies and, as a consequence, that the war was not a conflict between David and Goliath.

The new historians' books caused a bitter dispute (Fonzo, 2013; Morris, 2007; Pinto, 2003; Rogan & Shlaim, 2001; Shlaim, 2004). Many intellectuals and politicians rejected their assertions, stating that the «post-Zionists» plaid into the hands of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. One of the most severe critics was Shabtai Teveth (1989, 1990), who mainly attacked the work of Morris about the refugees, reiterating the traditional narrative of the voluntary flee. Also other scholars (Rabinovitch 1991, Sela 1992) criticized their research, albeit with more measured tones.

Despite the criticism, the new historians' research – all based on primary sources and carried out with scientific rigour – gradually reached media and schoolbooks, partly thanks to the political atmosphere of the '90s, when, after the signature of the Oslo agreement, the peace seemed to be closer to hand. Scholars have continued to carry out their research and to publish important books (Morris, 2001; Pappé, 2004a; Shlaim, 2000). Other «revisionist» researchers, including Tom Segev (2000), Hillel Cohen (2004), and Zeev Sternhell (1998), studied the Israeli past with a critical eye; it must be mentioned, furthermore, the group of the «critical sociologists», such as Baruch Kimmerling (2001), who in turn highlighted some incongruence of the Israeli society.

⁷ Intellectuals such as Simha Flapan (1987) and Tom Segev (1986) had anticipated some assertions of the new historians.

After 2000, however, the climate changed again. In last fifteen years the Israel political scene has been dominated by the right – first led by Ariel Sharon and then by Benjamin Netanyahu – and the new historians' assertions have lost ground. In 2000 Sharon (at that time only leader of Likud) stated: «the children must be taught Jewish-Zionist values, and “new historians” must not be taught» (quoted in Shlaim, 2004).

In addition, the new historians took different paths. Benny Morris walked into a real conversion, starting to strongly support Israel (Morris, 2008; 2010). In a famous interview (Morris, 2004b) he denied that in 1948 the Jewish armies conducted an ethnical cleansing against Palestinian people and even expressed disappointment because not all Arabs were expelled. These assumptions, resolutely questioned by the Palestinians and by some Israeli scholar, have recently given rise to a debate between Morris and Daniel Blatman, an Israeli historian specialized on the Holocaust, in the newspaper *Haaretz* (Blatman, 2016a; 2016b; Morris, 2016).

Pappe, on the contrary, deepened his criticism of the Jewish State, arguing that in 1948 Jews conducted an ethnical cleansing against Palestinian people (Pappe 2006). Pappe, moreover, has become one of the most prominent pro-Palestinian activist and has left his chair at the University of Haifa to move to England, at the University of Exeter. The polemics between him and Morris (Morris, 2004c; Morris, 2011; Pappe, 2004b) are constant.

More generally, the Israeli academics continue to give rise to fierce debates. The most severe critics of the new historians are researchers such as Efraim Karsh (1996, 1997, 2005), Anita Shapira (1995, 1999) and Yoav Gelber (2008, 2011). Pappe is the man targeted most often by Israeli academics, but he is admired by the Palestinians. Morris, on the contrary, is more and more praised in the Jewish State, even if some of his claims are rejected. Shlaim, for his part, continues to be critical of the Israeli policies and to publish non-Zionist books. Nowadays it is impossible to speak of new historians, as the differences among them are too big and they do not constitute a school. Anyway, a part of Israeli public opinion and intellectuals still consider them a group that undermines the national identity.

The research carried out by post-Zionist scholars, however, cannot be completely rejected, not even by the most nationalist academics, and today there is a consensus about some of their conclusions.

Palestinian scholars, for their part, looked with interest at the new historians' works, but they also highlighted their limits (Masalha, 1991; Said, 1998).

It should be remembered that the Palestinians never accepted the Israeli narrative of the 1948 war, mostly about the refugees. They have always claimed that the Arab people did not flee voluntarily, but was expelled by force. This belief is not only common among public opinion, but it has been also supported by intellectuals. For example, in 1947-52 the historian and politician Aref al-Aref wrote six volumes in Arabic on *The catastrophe: The catastrophe of Jerusalem and the lost paradise*⁸, using for the first time the word Nakba to define the Palestinian exodus. Some years later Walid Khalidi

⁸ Never published in English, except for some parts translated by the Institute for Palestine studies.

(1959, 1961) wrote two essays, arguing that the Palestinians were expelled by the Israeli army on the basis of a precise plan (the plan Dalet). Also Edward Said strongly denied that the Palestinians fled by order of their leaders (Said 1992).

This narrative, partly thanks to the new historians' research, has proved to be more truthful (although not completely exact) than the official Israeli version.

In addition, after the «Palestinian renaissance» of the '60s-'70s, also the historiography evolved⁹. Scholars started to study history mainly on the basis of a Marxist perspective, focusing on the struggle against the occupiers, on the resistance of the peasants and on the class struggle against the landowners, considered betrayers who had sold the land to the Zionists (Sfeir-Khayat, 2005).

Intellectuals and media, however, have been proposing an one-sided narrative for many years. Only at the beginning of the '90s the Palestinian historiography started to look at contemporary history in a more accurate way. Scholars such as Walid Khalidi (1990), Rashid Khalidi (1997, 2007, 2009, 2013), Nur Masalha (1992, 2003, 2007, 2012) and others investigated some important points, among which the national identity of the Palestinian people, the condition of Palestine before Zionism, the role of religion in the conflict, the diplomatic relations, the role of the US, the exploitation of historical myths by Israel, etc. Anyway, there are still some black spots, which historians did not examine yet.

Of course in Palestine the situation is problematic: people are still struggling for statehood and a debate similar to that is ongoing in Israel is impossible. Also the access to sources is different: in the Jewish State there are public and private archives open to researchers, while in Palestine the access to documents is much more difficult.

In Israel in recent years a debate has arisen about the Six-Days War of 1967. The dispute has started partly thanks to the fact that the documents on the war are finally accessible to scholars. Generally the Israelis believe that the war was provoked by the threats of the Arab countries, which had deployed their armies at the borders and were ready to destroy the Jewish State. This assumption is also accepted by historians. The most important book is *Six Days of War*, by Michael Oren (2002), researcher and former ambassador to the US, which affirms that the war was provoked by a chain of events, even fortuitous, and describes the conflict on the basis of the Israeli point of view. A different interpretation has been proposed by Tom Segev (2007), which claims that, even though a part of the Israeli population actually feared that their country could be destroyed, the Jewish State did not risk to be attacked and the government provoked the war intentionally. Oren (2007) criticized Segev's conclusions, arguing that the author contradicts himself and ignores the appeals of Egypt and Syria to destroy Israel. More recently, a new book on 1967 was edited by Avi Shlaim and William Roger Louis (2012), with the contributions of several scholars.

The responsibility for the outbreak of the hostilities is the main, but not the unique, controversial issue about the war of June. Other questions are related to the

⁹ It should be mentioned the establishment in Beirut in 1963 of the Institute for Palestine Studies, which later opened offices in Washington, Paris and Ramallah and today is still operational.

right of Israel to occupy the Palestinian territories (which today represent the hearth of the conflict), to the alleged murder of Egyptian prisoners by the IDF, to role of the US and to the sinking of an American ship, the USS Liberty, by the Israeli air force.

What is certain is that, with Segev's book, the «historiographical hostilities» on the Six-Day War have begun. Probably this conflict, for its importance in the present status of the Middle East, will be the main «battlefield» of historians in the coming years.

In conclusion, the one-sided narrative of overall the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still prevalent in both countries, especially as regards the most popular communication means.

Therefore, the initiatives aimed at disseminating both narratives should be encouraged and it is to be hoped that the critical intellectuals, such as the Israeli new historians of the '80s, may become the most popular voices. As Edward Said (1996) stated, the national solidarity of intellectuals should never take precedence over the critical spirit.

Indeed the way to peace, which at present appears to be ridden with insurmountable obstacles, also passes through a more truthful narrative of the conflict, not in search of an impossible «shared memory» but, more simply, acknowledging the reasons of the other. A less biased narrative is at once a cause and a consequence of peace: on the one side it is necessary to improve the mutual understanding; on the other, a peaceful situation allows the two people to narrate in a fairer way their own history.

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Part III

Conflicts on the Sea

Fragile Borders beyond the Strait. Saracen Raids on the Italian Peninsula (8th-11th century A.D.)

GIUSEPPE PERTA

Geographic proximity has always influenced relations between the Italian peninsula and North Africa, from where almost all those that eastern sources call «pagans», «infidels», or «Saracens» come. The geographic factor has its role but the Arab-Berber expansionist wave reached Italy later than the Iberian peninsula, because the Byzantine thalassocracy was still very strong between the seventh and eighth centuries. Moreover, while Southern Italy had remained anchored to the Hellenistic-Roman civilization, Spain had been overwhelmed by Swabian, Vandal and Visigoth occupations. The conquest of Spain had been an extension of the arrival of the Arabs in Maghreb. Otherwise, only the achievement of favourable conditions allowed the Muslims to occupy Sicily more than one hundred years later.

Yet the first offensive against Italy occurred after the redistribution of powers, once the Abbasid Revolution had been accomplished (750 AD). Relations between the West and Islam must be contextualized in the evolution of the whole scenario that resulted from the separation between Baghdad and Cordoba. Stages of conflict and compromise alternated at that time.

Medieval studies stressed that the incursions of the Saracens in Italy had rarely achieved territorial gains. With the exception of Sicily (827 - 1091), few seem, at first glance, to have been long-lasting occupations. However, the Saracen presence on the mainland became increasingly consistent, invasive and wide-ranging. It was not the result of a rhapsodic policy, but the consequence of political and economic conjunctures that involved the entire Mediterranean arena. Autonomous territorial entities were founded in the West as real Muslim enclaves.

The early initiatives of the Arab-Berbers against Sicily revealed they had acquired the ability to dominate the maritime space from the end of the seventh century (Canard, 1965, pp. 37 ff.). Ibn Khaldûn (*Al Muqaddima*, II, pp. 517-524) explains how the Arabs had overcome their initial aversion to the know-how of maritime technology. The turning point came with the third caliph, 'Uthman (634-644)

and the observation of Roman history, and the Byzantine example after the conquest of Syria and Egypt. The Arabs immediately restored their port activities and shipbuilding in the provinces. Following their conquest of power in North Africa, the Aghlabid, thanks to the creation of the arsenal in Carthage, gained possession of a closer contact point. They began by trying to establish good relations with Christians, in particular at commercial level.

Even before the landing at Mazara (827), which marked the beginning of the occupation of the Trinacria, incursions and brief occupations had affected the Peninsula. In the early ninth century, the Byzantine navy declined further. The crisis of the Empire under Irene had substantial effects on the Mediterranean geopolitical chessboard. The attacks came not only from Maghreb; Andalusian invaders, for example, occupied Sardinia (Rizzitano, 1965; Talbi, 1966). The Saracens constructed camps that served as transfer stations for the “raids” or “ghazwa” in Italy and this is what happened in the same period in Provence around Jabal al-Kilal (*Fraxinetum*) and at the mouth of the Garigliano river, which marks the border between modern-day Lazio and Campania (Sénac, 1980).

With the conquest of Sicily, the Strait of Messina assumed a boundary function in the same way as the Pyrenees did between Islamic Spain and Christian France. Although the Muslim fleets crossed it frequently, it continued to divide the land of believers, the *dar al-Islam*, from that of unbelievers, the *dar al-harb* (land of war). Byzantium, the *Langobardia minor*, the Papacy, the Franco-German Empire, and the Duchies of Campania were all raided. The holy war (*jihad*) had sunk to the level of sacking.

There is scant documentation on the history of relations with peninsular Italy in the Muslim historiography of the time. The historians of the Maghreb documented the conquest of Sicily, but made little mention of the actions on the mainland. Yet the Arab presence on the continent is recorded by the Latin chronicles: Leo of Ostia, Erchemperto, Liutprand of Cremona, and others (Gabrieli, 1997, p. 111; Berto, 2001; Kujawinski, 2008).

Before focusing on conflicts, we must first mention the encounters, examining the role of the Saracens in Italy from an economic point of view, since the territorial occupations were the cause and effect of trade policies. Pragmatism often wins over ideology. The Saracens were vendors of rare (spices, silk, and so on), and high value (slaves, gold, and so on) goods. Western merchants traded with Egypt, which was the bridge towards Asia, and the Maghreb, which offered a direct link towards Black Africa. Islam was not only a new political counterpart but also a business partner.

One of the most original features of Amalfi - which was born in the orbit of the Duchy of Naples, and then became a prototype of the so-called Maritime Republic - is to have established contacts with the Muslim world very early on, since the ninth century in fact (Coniglio, 1946; Citarella 1967 and 1969). Amalfi owed its fortune not only to privileged relations with Constantinople but also to its *funduks* in Ifriqiya and Egypt, many of which were established during the Fatimid era. Some scholars underlined the early demise of Amalfi from the markets of the southern shores of the Mediterranean as a consequence of the Norman conquest

(1074). In the twelfth century, Pisa and Genoa seemed to supplant Amalfi on the international circuits (Renouard, 1969, I, pp. 61-73). Yet, even after the defeat against Pisa (1137), Amalfi remained a centre for the exchange of products coming from the Near East (Leone & Del Treppo, 1977, pp. 207-212). Following its example, other southern Italian ports became business partners of the Saracens. Even at times of heightened tension, the sailors of Amalfi, Trani, Gaeta and Salerno benefited from a favourable reception in the Egyptian (Goitein, 1971) and the Tunisian ports (Bono, 1967). The Saracens attended trade fairs in Southern Italy too, some of which, like those of Bari and Amalfi, enjoyed a solid international reputation (Yver, 1903, p. 116; Coniglio, 1946, pp. 100-114).

An ancient motto echoes the long-term presence of the Muslims along the coasts of Campania: «Quattro sono li luoghi della Saracina, Portici, Cremano, la Torre e Resina» (MGH, SS, III, p. 538, n. 41). In order to defend itself from the Lombard invaders, the Duchy of Naples, enlisted mercenary troops from among the Saracens. After the Arab landing in Crete (826) and Sicily (827), contact between the Golden Horn and the Tyrrhenian Duchies (Naples, Gaeta, Sorrento and Amalfi) became more difficult (Cassandro, 1969, pp. 27-31 and 83-120). Naples, which was the most important Byzantine centre of the western Mediterranean, could no longer count on the steady help of Constantinople. The consequence of the great fragmentation of Italy was an inevitable conflict. In this fluid context, the Arab-Berber challenge took shape. In order to survive, Naples had to broaden its horizons and the Saracens became its constant interlocutors (Russo Mailler, 1995, pp. 83-151). At the time of John VIII, in the last quarter of the ninth century, the archbishop-duke Athanasius did not hesitate to move away from the Byzantine Empire and make pacts with the Arab-Berbers against the Pope. The relationship with Islam, inherently related to the *factum maris*, is one of the constituent factors of the autonomy of the Roman-Byzantine Duchy of Naples, since, due to the Arab-Berber threat, the *Neapolitana militia* took its first independent steps. Cassandro indicates in the year 812 the first clash between Neapolitans and Saracens, with the Islamic fleet defeated off the island of Lampedusa and the subsequent counterattack of forty Saracen ships against Ponza and Ischia (Cassandro, 1969, p. 50). Despite these first hostile contacts, after a few years the Duchy established commercial relations with Palermo, which was conquered by the Aghlabids in 831. Some years later, Duke Andrea sent an embassy to ask for help against the Lombards (Schipa, 1923, p. 51). The early years of the Sergian dynasty are characterized by conflict: in 845 the Saracens destroyed Miseno and the following year established themselves at Punta Licosa. The *Capitulare de expeditione contra saracenos facienda* issued by Emperor Lothair in 846 directly involved Duke Sergius of Naples (Cassandro, 1969, p. 76). In essence, two opposing approaches of the Duchy of Naples against the Saracens emerge. On the one hand, Naples was an implacable enemy of the Saracens, champion of Christianity at Ostia (849) and at the mouth of the Garigliano (915) as well. On the other hand Napoli was a commercial and political partner of the Muslims. Neapolitans took part in the capture of Messina in 842

together with the Emir of Palermo (Cassandro, 1969, p. 63) - Schipa (1923) warns that western source do not mention the battle -. At the same time, under Duke Sergius II (870-877), the city was full of Arab-Berber traders and mercenaries. The apostolic letters of John VIII bear witness to the existence of an Arab-Berber colony in Naples, with “maiores Saracenorum” (Cuozzo *et al.*, 2002, doc. 877 ff.). As a confirmation, the letter of Ludwig II to Basil I the Macedonian in 871 outlines the image of the Duchy of Naples in relation to the Arab-Berber element: «Ut facta [Neapolis] videatur esse Panormus vel Africa» (MGH, *Epistolae*, VII/2, pp. 385-394). The “exotic” presence of the Saracens made Naples similar to most of the multi-ethnic ports of the Mediterranean, not unlike Alexandria or Constantinople. The French emperor was surprised that Naples paid some *tributa* to liberate Apulia and Calabria from the Saracens, but at the same time controlled the Tyrrhenian Sea in agreement with the Aghlabid fleet of Palermo (Cassandro, 1969, p. 90; McCormick, 2001, p. 946). In dwelling upon this “unnatural relationship”, often defined also as an “unholy alliance”, twentieth-century historiography showed little knowledge of the Islamic world. It was simply pragmatism at a time when Naples had become isolated from Constantinople. The rain of excommunications from Rome had little impact because of the jurisdiction conflict between the Churches of East and West. Evangelized by Rome, Naples depended on its rite, but did not renounce its participation in the Byzantine oikouméné, in this way gaining some measure of autonomy.

In the rest of Campania, the encounter with the Saracens, who were pressing hard both on land and by sea, went far beyond the former commercial nature. In the mid-ninth century, the region was subjected to two waves of Muslim marauders: an Andalusian-Cretan gang headed by Abu Ja’far (Apolaffar in the Latin chronicles), whose headquarters were established in Taranto; the other headed by Abu Ma’shar (or Massar). The two qa’id played a key role in the struggles between the Lombard princes Radelchi and Siconolfo. Apolaffar was first hired by Siconolfo, lord of Salerno, until he moved on to defend Radelchi of Benevento, where Massar was active. In 841 the two qa’id had destroyed ancient Capua (Vetere), which was rebuilt on the Volturno. Both were assassinated by order of Radelchi who, in 846-48, got rid of these very dangerous leaders. In this period, gens Agarenorum seemed like “a swarm of bees” to Erchemperto because they were everywhere (MGH, SS, III, p. 239). In 847, after the sacking of St Paul’s basilica, some of the looters crossed Lazio threatening the natives, while Massar plundered the high valley of the Garigliano.

The Battle of Ostia in 849 marked a turning point in the history of Arab-Berber raids against Italy, with a symbolic value similar to that of the battle of Poitiers (732). Schipa (1923, p. 73) judged it as «the most significant naval battle of the Christians against the Muslims before Lepanto». In the spring of 849, a large Saracen fleet came from Africa and after crossing the Strait of Sicily, arrived at Capo Teulada, the southernmost tip of Sardinia. Fishermen and traders said that the Arab-Berbers had stopped in the inlet below the promontory, waiting for the good weather. The Pope ordered all the ships of the seacoast between Ostia and Porto to

gather together, to block the mouth of the Tiber. At the same time he made an appeal to all men-at-arms. Finally, the fleet of the Campanian cities arrived at the double port of Ostia. Caesar, «cum navigiis Neapolitanorum et Amalphitanorum» (Capasso, 1881, I, p. 87), came to the Pope together with Constantine, the hypatos of Gaeta (Tucciarone, 1971; Skinner, 1995). The “auxiliatores” met with the army of the Roman barons in front of the Cathedral of St Aurea. The battle took place the next day at sunrise, buffeted by continuous gusts of the libeccio winds. Caesar the Brave, at the head of the joint fleets of Naples and Amalfi, defeated the Muslims and saved Rome, which would no longer be directly threatened. The Christian army’s victory was facilitated by a violent storm that scattered part of the Arab-Berber fleet. The Saracen crews, thrown on the shore, were slaughtered by the Roman barons, while the luckiest were taken to work as slaves. The naval battle was celebrated in the Vatican’s Raphael Rooms and resonates in all Christian chronicles, but is ignored by the Muslim historiography, falling in the shadow of the “jihad routine”.

In 881 John VIII had given the wide and fertile lands from Formia to the Garigliano river to Pandolfo of Capua. His goal was to contain the Byzantine pressure through the social-political use of the Lombard presence. The Duke of Gaeta, Docibile, had enlisted Saracens from Agropoli. These last, making cabotage along the Tyrrhenian coasts, decided to establish an entrenched camp on the hills around Formia. Leo of Ostia writes that they came from the boats like swords from their sheathes (MGH, SS, VII, p. 609). For nearly forty years these Saracens, who fortified themselves on the top of a hill next to the estuary of the Garigliano river, together with women, children, prisoners and booty, battled on behalf of the Duke of Gaeta but also on their own account. Erchemperto summarizes the tragic effects of their presence: the earth, where no peasant lived anymore, filled with thorns (MGH, SS, III, p. 257). The Latin chroniclers saw the Saracen colony of the Garigliano as a scourge of God: it was considered the worst among the plagues of Italy (MGH, SS, III, pp. 296-297). In the autumn of 883 the Saracens burned the monastery of St Vincenzo at the Volturmo, then they destroyed Montecassino and slaughtered the abbot Bertharius before the altar of St Martin (MGH, SS, VII, p. 604). Muslim gangs occupied Farfa around 890: its abbot Peter, who had been able to resist for seven years, finally ran away. They even burned the monastery of Alife, which prince Arechi had enriched with goods and privileges (Fedele, 1899, p. 184). Coming from the Garigliano, the Arab-Berbers reached the lands of the *patrimonium Beati Petri*. Liutprando says they were occupied half by the Romans and half by the Saracens. In Rome, the citizens were closed inside the walls, but they seemed to have more desire to escape than to fight (MGH, SS, III, p. 297). The first attempt at revenge was inspired by Pope Stephen V, who encouraged Guido di Spoleto to fight, promising him the imperial crown. Guido attacked the entrenched camp on the Garigliano, came over the palisades and scattered the Saracens into the forests but they reorganized their camp in the nearby mountains (MGH, SS, III, p. 218). Later, Pope John X decided to assemble a league, although Pietro Fedele believes that the merit for «carrying forward the difficult negotiations»

has to be given to the Lombard princes of Capua, Atenolfo I and his son Landolfo (Fedele, 1899, p. 187 ff.). The Garigliano river, in fact, flowed between the Lombard lands under subjection to Capua and Gaeta, which is formally Byzantine. Subsequently, as Leo of Ostia relates, understanding that without a Byzantine consensus, they could not destroy the entrenched camp on the Garigliano, Atenolfo sent his son Landolfo to Constantinople. The negotiations with Leo VI - interrupted briefly by the death of Atenolfo in 910 and a few years later by the death of the Bbasileus - were successful. Byzantium saw the possibility to reopen the Tyrrhenian routes. The "strategos" Nicholas Picingli, an imperial patrician, arrived with a fleet. Landolfo of Capua and John of Gaeta were appointed as imperial patricians too and Guaimario of Salerno adhered to the League. In the early summer of 915, the Christian army approached the Garigliano. On the land side, John X marched from Rome together with Alberico, Marquis of Camerino and Duke of Spoleto (Arnaldi, 1954). Christian troops faced the entrenched camp on the Garigliano for three months. The Saracens, hemmed in on the land, could not even hope to win at sea, which was guarded by the Greek fleet and reinforced by the ships of Naples, Amalfi and Gaeta. The fight was fierce: «horrida satis denique inter eos pugna exoritur» (MGH, SS, III, p. 208). Marquis Alberico «factus est ut leo, fortissimus inter Sarracenos» (MGH, SS, III, p. 714); and the Pope himself, writing to the archbishop of Cologne a long time after the battle, showed himself to be proud that he had faced the swords of the enemies (Jaffé, 1851, n. 3556). The Christian armies, as Liutprand relates, saw the apostles Peter and Paul on the scene. The Saracens, defeated, set fire to the camp and fled through the woods. The author of the *Annales Casinates* writes, perhaps too peremptorily, that with the battle of the 915 «dispersi sunt Saraceni de tota Italia, cuius habitatio fuit in Gareliano» (MGH, SS, III, p. 172). Yet the battle had huge repercussions. Gregorovius judged it the «most distinguished achievement of the Italians in the tenth century» (Gregorovius, 1890, III, p. 262).

At the end of the ninth century Saracen piracy infested the northern shore of the Mediterranean too. Marseilles was attacked in 838 and in 848, Arles in 842 and in 850. In the year 869, Camargue was invaded by Saracens coming from Spain by sea. In 890 some pirates were shipwrecked off the coast of Saint Tropez. Having barely survived, they infiltrated the nearby town of Fraxinetum at night and surprised the residents in their sleep. Fraxinetum (Jabal al-qilâl, modern day La Garde-Freinet) became the basis of the Muslim raids along the coast of the Ligurian Sea. Thanks to reinforcements from the Balearic Islands, they made continuous raids on Provence, Liguria and Piedmont (Sénac, 1980). In 906 a band of Muslims was in Val di Susa, while in 912 they devastated the abbey of Novalesa. The abbot Donniverto abandoned his see and searched for refuge in Turin with his monks. Even the saints ran away. At the end of the ninth century or the beginning of the tenth, a little fleet driven by Bishop Sabatino moved the body of St Remo from Villa Matutiana to Genoa «in ecclesia S. Laurentii martyris sub altare» (Patrucco, 1908; Settia, 1987). Similarly, the body of St Calogero was transferred from Albenga to Mount Civate; St Caprasio from the island of Lérins, which was particularly ex-

posed to the threat of the Saracens of Fraxinetum, went towards Lunigiana, to the church of St Mary Assunta, under care of Marquis Adalbert II. In this area, Islamic attacks against travellers were recorded in the years 921, 923, 929, 936 and 939. In 940, the Saracens built a base camp in Saint Maurice d'Againe-en-Valais to spy on the movements around the monastery of St Bernardo. In 951 they began to demand a transit tax from travellers (Balletto, 1991). Byzantine naval actions along the Catalan-Provencal coasts between 931 and 942 began to contrast Muslim supremacy in that area, but were not decisive. It would not be an easy task to dislodge the Muslims from those rocky hills covered with pine forests. In 972 the Saracens captured Maiolo, the Abbot of Cluny. They asked for a large ransom, but they had gone too far. Arduino Count of Turin, Roubaud Count of Forcalquier and his brother William Count of Provence cleared out the Muslims from Cenisio and San Bernardo, then reached the mountains of Provence and set fire to the entrenched camp of Fraxinetum. After a century, the Muslim presence in Piedmont and Provence was removed, even though the Saracens would return to plunder the monastery of Lérins in the years 1003 and 1047. In this last case its monks were conducted to Denia, to the Muslim València, and sold as slaves in Sicily.

The Adriatic area from Venice to Otranto, though less accessible from Maghreb, was likewise crossed by Saracen bands. Sporadic operations had been conducted since the middle of the eighth century. We know of Saracen occupation of the Gargano promontory as far back as 747 and 774. Constantinople and Venice tried to respond to these random but frequent attacks. The protospatharius Theodosius, on behalf of the emperor Theophilus, proposed joining forces with Doge Pietro and preparing a joint naval expedition. Around 840, Saracens coming from Sicily took possession of Taranto. In the spring of the following year, Venetians moved towards Taranto with a fleet of sixty ships, but were defeated by the Saracens. In the wake of this victory, the new owners of Taranto sailed up the Adriatic sea to Istria. They sacked and burned Ossero on the island of Cherso. They landed at the mouth of the Po, but without being able to damage Adria. Ancona was burned and many of its citizens enslaved. Then the Saracen boats turned their prows southwards, and once off the coast of Otranto they captured some Venetian ships returning from Sicily (Giovanni Diacono, I, pp. 113-114). The Adriatic risked becoming a Saracen sea. In 842 the Saracens of Taranto made it as far as Kvarner; a Venetian fleet attacked them at Susak, but was forced to flee. Saracen victories strengthened the key role of Taranto, where Muslim ships arrived not just from Sicily, but also from North Africa and Crete, because they realized that the enemy was weak and the plunder easy and fruitful. Taranto was becoming a base both for maritime and land raids.

The creation of an emirate in Bari (*Barah*) was something different, and more significant. It was a new step in the history of the Islamic invasions of Southern Italy. Unlike Taranto, which was lost and retaken by the Saracens a few times before 880, Bari organized itself as an emirate, tied to the land of origin, but politically independent. The Saracen presence in Bari continued uninterrupted for twenty-four

years. A prior assault had failed in 841. Ibn al-Athir, mentioning al-Baladhuri (Amari, 1880, pp. XXXVIII-XL), tells of a second attack by Habla, on behalf of Muhammad I ibn al-Aghlab, successor of Ziyadat Allah I. It also failed, but new opportunities were offered by the rivalry between the Lombards. The Saracens were able to take advantage of the internal struggles between Radelchi and Siconolfo, who usually enlisted African or Iberian mercenaries. The latter, who initially arrived as “auxiliatores”, had gained the opportunity to capture and sell Christian slaves in the ports on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. For the same reason, around 846, the gastald Pandone had recruited a Berber chief named Khalfun who would go on to fight on behalf of Radelchi. Khalfun was a leader from the tribe of Rabi’a, «who came to seek his fortune in Sicily, and from Sicily went on to southern Italy» (Gabrieli, 1960, p. 64). Khalfun took possession of Bari in 847. He created a powerful emirate and immediately tried to make it independent. His successor, Mufarrag ibn Sallam, asked the Abbasid Caliph for recognition, but autonomy would only be obtained by his successor Sawdan, who continued the work of territorial expansion for the emirate, which eventually included some eighty castles. For many years, the Emir of Bari grounded its economy on profits from plunder. Sawdan took advantage of the weakness and the fragmentation of powers in Southern Italy. No land from one sea to another could be considered safe. In a short time the Muslims had transformed themselves from simple pirates into real warriors, from mercenaries into conquerors, conscious of their own strength. Nowadays nothing remains of Saracen Bari as the city was completely destroyed in 1156 by the Norman king William I. The only brief description of the time comes from a pilgrim, Bernard the Monk, who, while travelling to the Holy Land, arrived in Bari around 870: «De monte autem Gargano abeuntes, per centum quinquaginta milliaria venimus ad civitatem Barrem Saracenorum, quae dudum ditioni subiacebat Beneventanorum. Quae civitas, supra mare sita, duobus est a meridie latissimis muris munita; ab aquilone vero mari prominet exposita. Hic itaque petentes principem civitatis illius, nomine Suldandum, impetravimus cum duabus epistolis omne navigandi negotium» (Bernardi *Itinerarium*, p. 310). Bernard was accompanied by Teudemundo, a monk from San Vincenzo at the Volturno and by the Spanish monk Stefano. After having received a benediction from Pope Nicholas I, they had crossed the Appia-Traiana and then visited the sanctuary of St Michael on the Gargano. In Bari they found the «prince of that city, named Suldanus», who this source confirms to be a proper name and not a title. They got permission to travel on Saracen ships and received two safe conducts for the emirs of Alexandria and Cairo. It was a kind of passport containing information on the appearance of the pilgrims and the reasons for their journey. Pilgrims also passed through from Taranto. There the monk Bernard found three Muslim ships, ready to sail, with nine thousand Christian slaves on board (Bernardi *Itinerarium*, p. 311). The number, even if exaggerated, still represents the balance of power in the Mediterranean of the ninth century. Two ships were departing for Africa (e.g. Ifriqiya), two for Tripoli in Syria and two for Alexandria and the three pilgrims went aboard

the latter one. It was Ludwig II who made the decisive assault on the walls of Bari, on 3 February 871. Frankish and Lombard troops entered the city and took Sawdan prisoner. It was the end of what Giosuè Musca (1967, p. 114) called the «first crusade against the Muslims».

More than other regions, Calabria - due to its geographic location and its proximity to Sicily - had to face the advance of Islam (Gabrieli, 1960, pp. 53-58). Around 812 Saracen ships devastated the coasts near Reggio. It was recounted that St Faustino of Syracuse, who lived in Calabria in the fourth century, appeared on the beach of Seminara between lightning and thunderbolts, and sank an enemy ship. Yet the miracle must be postponed until the time of Leo the Armenian (813-20). Saracen hordes frequently came across the Strait of Messina. Ibrahim ibn Ahmad gained power in around 900. He was the bloodiest Emir of Kairouan, whom the contemporary Latin chronicles call "Brachimo". In September 902 Brachimo took Reggio and went up to the gates of Cosenza, besieging and blocking all the access roads. The emissaries of the local cities asked for his clemency but Ibrahim refused, ordering them to go home. Christians understood that there would be no compassion. Nevertheless, when Cosenza was close to falling, Kairouan's army was hit by a cholera epidemic. Christian chronicles noted that the Emir died in the midst of his own excrement. At that time, Islamic gangs came not only from Sicily but also directly from Africa, as in the summer of 918 when they sacked Reggio, or in the summer of six years later, when twenty boats attacked the castle of Sant'Agata, taking many slaves, both men and women (Panetta, 1973, p. 142).

Amantea was also involved in a series of various contacts, for nature and intensity, occurring over a wide time span. Like other settlements in Calabria, the Byzantine Amantea, *kastron* on the left bank of the Catocastro river, suffered a first wave of raids culminating in the sacking of 827, in conjunction with the Arab conquest of Sicily (Tonghini, 1997). It was sacked again in 846 and became an independent potentate, while Tropea and Santa Severina housed other organized military campsites, from which several armed expeditions set out in the name of the Prophet. It is also conceivable that different entrenched camps on the Low Tyrrhene, from the Strait of Messina to Agropoli in the Cilento, organized a coordinated cabotage to patrol a route that was always lively from a commercial point of view. In 868 Ludwig II received the emissaries of some Christian cities of Calabria (Casano, Bisignano, Cosenza) at court, who asked for help against the raids of the Emir Cincimo of Amantea. Count Otto of Bergamo and bishops Osco and Gariardo were charged by the emperor to come to Calabria. Starting from the Crati valley, the imperial army surprised the Saracens as they were harvesting their crops with the help of Christian slaves. The Imperial Army defeated the Saracens and freed the Christian slaves. Cincimo left the city and faced their opponents, but was repulsed and pursued up to the gates of Amantea. Otto and the two bishops returned triumphant while «pagani vero ... terga vertentes, fugire coeperunt» (MGH, SS, III, p. 236). Cincimo reacted by reorganizing a powerful army. Yet the efforts of Ludwig had been effective and the Byzantine reaction was even more powerful be-

tween 884 and 886. Muslims waited for assistance of troops coming from Agropoli and from the entrenched camp of the Garigliano, but the strategy of Nicephorus Phocas was completely successful. He attacked Santa Severina, Amantea and Tropea in succession, until the Arab-Berber contingents withdrew to Sicily. Nevertheless, the focus of the Islamic world on Amantea did not end. Exchanges and relationships with the Sicily and Ifriqiya were documented until the eleventh century. We even find a political and military resurgence by the emirate: Amantea was occupied again from 976 to 1005 and in 1031-32.

Hostilities for the overall control of the Strait of Messina resumed in the middle of the tenth century. In 950 al-Hasan al-Kalbi, the governor of Palermo landed at Reggio, together with the cavalry division from Ifriqiya. The Byzantines had concentrated their troops in Otranto. The landing of the Greek infantry was enough to stop the Muslims, satisfied with the usual depredation. But only two years later, the Saracens attacked Gerace, catching the Byzantine garrison unprepared and unable to reach the ships in port. The inhabitants accepted the invaders and even paid the tribute that Saracens imposed for the truce. Once again, Muslims under the leadership of al-Hasan attacked Italian coasts from Metaponto to Gargano, and the hinterlands as far as Benevento. Muslim power in Reggio was consolidated. A mosque with a minaret was built. The muezzin sang the prayers in Arabic and the first conversions took place (Ibn Khaldun, pp. 168-169). The unconverted Christians did not enter the mosque, but had to respect it. Every act against the worship of Allah, if held to be significant, could lead to revenge on the churches. Christians did not suffer only religious interdictions, but rather economic ones. As *dhimmi*, they had to pay the *jizya*, a *per capita* tribute. The Arab presence in Calabria drove Constantine VII to react. In 957 Reggio was recaptured and its mosque destroyed. The situation appeared to be stabilizing, but in 975 another Arab governor of Sicily, Abû al-Qâsim, after having suppressed a pro-Byzantine revolt in his territory, brought war back to Calabria. He started left from Messina, then landed on the other side of the Strait. A part of the Arab-Berber army encamped in Rometta besieged Reggio, then Cosenza and Taranto: the first was taken and the second was devastated. Muslims went on to attack Otranto and Gravina, which they plundered before returning to Palermo (Amari, 1880, p. 380).

At the end of the tenth century, the geopolitical scenario changed. The Zirids took the place of the Fatimids in Ifriqiya. The Roman-German Emperor Otto II tried once again to assert his power in Southern Italy against the Byzantines. Starting from Salerno, he attacked Taranto in 982. To block the road to the Germans, the Byzantines once again used Muslim mercenaries. The clash at Cape Colonna turned in favour of the Saracens, who resumed their usual looting: in 986 in Gerace, in 988 in Cosenza, in 991 in Taranto and in 994 in Matera. Again in 1002, Saracen bands rampaged across the South from Benevento to Capua. They even besieged Bari in 1004, which was saved by a Venetian intervention. In 1005 the Pisans defeated the Saracens and finally freed the city of Reggio. New players appeared on the horizon, namely the Maritime Republics and the Normans.

The history of the Muslim presence in Basilicata is far less well-documented. The Saracens were not content to create outposts and raid the coasts. They went up the rivers and settled in the middle of the mainland, not unlike the Normans who, in the same years, followed the course of the Seine and settled in France. Some of the Lucanian rivers now reduced to torrents by the construction of modern waterworks were indeed perfectly navigable during the Middle Ages. That is how the Arabs established themselves in Pietrapertosa, Tricarico, Tursi, Abriola and Guardia Perticara, all places in the heart of Lucania located at a short distance from the Basento, Bradano, Agri and Sinni rivers, which rise in the Southern Apennines and flow into the Ionian Sea. Around 826, Saracens from Africa appeared off the flat and sandy Metapontine coasts. In 842 Apolaffar established an entrenched camp in the Val d'Agri at Guardia Perticara, from where he aimed to subjugate the entire region. In 872 the Arabs sacked Grumento and in 907 they occupied Pietrapertosa and Abriola, led by Bomar, who later gave way to the Lombards. They exploited the road of the valleys. In 994 they besieged Matera for three months. Formerly raiders, the Lucanian Saracens had become settled, and several elements suggest they created settlements for the medium and long term. Despite Giacomo Racioppi (1889, II, pp. 87-92) belittling the weight of the Saracen presence, it was rooted and consolidated. It was not only the product of assault groups, but the work of communities who settled and devoted themselves to agriculture, farming and trade. This is confirmed by the references in the toponymy. In the middle of the ninth century the Muslims conquered part of the Metaponto plain and settled in Tursi, where a quarter is still known today as Rabatana (Fonseca, 2004). It was thought that the name derived from an Arab village called *Rabhàdi*, but it is probably linked to *Ribat* (fortified settlement) or Rabat (decentralized town). The Muslim influence permeated the collective memory. Muslim residential quarters (*rabatane*), also sprang up in Tricarico and Pietrapertosa, and they are still identifiable in the urban network. The places where Arab-Berbers established settlements were not randomly selected, but chosen for their strategic check-point position over the valleys below: Tursi controls the Sinni and Agri valleys; Tricarico guards the Bradano and Basento rivers, while Pietrapertosa is set on the highest point of the Lucanian Dolomites and has a view of the entire surrounding area. Tursi marked the border between Byzantine and Lombard territories for a long time. In 849 it was included in area ruled by the Lombard gastald of Salerno, but came under Byzantine control when the thema of Lucania was created (968-969), and Tursi became its capital. Tricarico had been equipped with solid fortifications. The consequences of the long settlement of the Saracens in Tricarico are confirmed by the persistence of toponyms such as *Rabata* and *Saracena*, by language survivals, and also by the presence of terracing outside the walls known as the *Orti Saraceni*. At the sunset of the Millennium, the Arab-Berbers had been attracted by the valley of the Basento, maybe even for the new dynamism that produced an increase in demand for goods, and stimulated agriculture and population growth, which may also have been favoured by the meeting of Latin, Greek and Islamic populations. A document issued

by the catepan Gregory Tarchaneiotes, lost in the original but transcribed by Mons. Assemani (1687-1768), the Orientalist prefect of the Vatican Library, reveals that a Christian renegade named Luke had gathered a band of Saracen mercenaries that looted and terrorized the areas surrounding Pietrapertosa Guillou and Holtzmann, 1984). In establishing the boundaries between the territories of Tricarico and Acerenza, the Byzantine catepan refers to the Arabs who had settled in the fortress of Pietrapertosa. It seems to have been a long-term settlement, so long that knowledge of the boundaries between the territories of Tricarico and Acerenza had been forgotten. Once the undesired guests had been driven out, Gregory Tarchaneiotes had tried to retrace the borders between the towns of Tolve and Tricarico, and opened an investigation that took place in December 1001. Luca, head of the Saracens of Pietrapertosa, «the first and only case of a conversion of this type in Southern Italy during the Greek period» (Guillou & Holtzmann, 1984, p. 51), controlled mountains that were difficult to access. The Arab potentate of Pietrapertosa lasted until the spring or summer of 1001, but it is hard to know when exactly it was founded. It can be assumed that after the unsuccessful descent of Otto II (980-82), the Arab-Berbers of Calabria and Lucania advanced again, without encountering any strong opposition because in the 990s the Byzantines were engaged against the Bulgarians and they could not send significant forces to Southern Italy (Gay, 1917, p. 365 ff.).

The Saracen presence in the South is linked to the hagiographic legend of St Luke of Armento, native of Demenna in Sicily. He had been a Basilian monk at St Philip of Agira, before fleeing because the Saracens were ravaging Sicily. Later he crossed the Strait of Messina and went to live under the discipline of St Elia Speleota, in Reggio. Soon, Saracen expeditions also made this area unsafe. Luke travelled towards Lucania, arriving at the famous monastic eparchy of Mercurion, on Mount Pollino, then went on to the territory of Noia, and finally to Agromonte, in the Val d'Agri, where he restored the monastery of Saint Julian. Luke devoted himself to helping the soldiers wounded in the conflict that had set the troops of Otto II against the Saracens. He fortified the castle of Armento and around 971 founded the monastery dedicated to Saints Elia and Anastasio del Carbone, which became his headquarters. Luke was personally engaged in organizing resistance against the Saracens. In the Middle Ages, when religion was the essence of daily life, politics, war and the monastery were all one, both for Christians and for Muslims.

The Italian reaction to the Saracen raids has to be read in a geopolitical context in which the balance of power between the players involved had changed. The situation for the Byzantines improved at the end of the ninth century (Ducellier, 1986, p. 129). The army, under the authority of Barda Foca and John Tzimiskes, gained safety at the borders in Anatolia, the Balkans and in Southern Italy. Apulia, Basilicata and Calabria came back under Byzantine control. The Popes, especially John VIII, played an important role acting as a glue between the Christian forces, though

a veiled intention to impose the political authority of the Holy See in the Italian context emerges.

The Emirate of Bari was certainly the most enduring success of the Saracens in peninsular Italy. It exerted a real influence. In a certain sense, foreign domination stimulated the emergence of a «civic consciousness and the formation of embryonic municipal structures, to react against the stranger» (Musca, 1967, p. 153). In the short term, the reconquest of Bari relaunched the Byzantines, who used the city as their headquarters against the Lombards and later against the Normans.

After the disappearance of Muslim power from Bari, Taranto, Agropoli, and the Garigliano, the pressure of the Saracens returned to being a ferocious, but basically episodic war of plunder, which was endemic in the Mediterranean. This kind of virulent war lasted until the middle of the eleventh century, when the anarchy of Muslim Sicily catalysed the Norman Conquest.

Wars and trade, swords and business. What did the encounter between Islam and Christianity in Italy give birth? Francesco Gabrieli (1997) underlined that nothing remains of the Arab presence in Southern Italy: no texts, memories of intellectual and religious life, or examples of some ephemeral mosques. The Saracens were not, as they were in Sicily bringers of techniques or masters of buildings and lifestyles. Unlike in Sicily, where much of the Christian population embraced the faith of the invaders, no such thing happened in the South of Italy, where the Muslims were too mobile to gain believers at the expense of the Christians. Gabrieli theorized the “fundamental sterility” of the Arab presence in the continent, proven by the lack of interest of the Muslim chroniclers in the marginal jihad carried out in the “Great Land”. Maybe the higher incidence of the Arab-Berbers in Sicily can be explained by returning to the differences between sedentary and nomadic elements. Where the Arabs came to settle permanently, as in Sicily - and to a lesser extent in Bari -, there was a greater contribution; where they remained nomads, there prevailed skills of surprise, violence and robbery. Yet the Arab presence in the South was not limited to mere military actions, but contributed to increasing the internationality of Italian cities. It is not easy to quantitatively evaluate the real effects of the Muslim presence, bearing in mind the nature of the traditions, which tend to mix different, old and recent accounts, even associating the Barbarian raids of the Early Middle Ages with the Barbaresque ones of the sixteenth century.

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Conflict and Peace in the Mediterranean. Barbary Privateering in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries

JORGE MARTINS RIBEIRO

The Mediterranean Sea has been for centuries a crossroads between the three continents of the old Western world (Europe, Asia and Africa). This interior sea (*mer Intérieure*), as Fernand Braudel calls it, contrary to what current events seem to show, has united peoples and civilizations more than it has separated them. While the political unity of the Mediterranean world did not survive the end of the Roman Empire, the actual rupture is cultural and, according to Henri Pirenne, occurred in the 7th and 8th centuries when Islam first appeared. After this era, as Fernand Braudel wrote, the Mediterranean world has never been, as in ancient times, a major axis of one single civilization, but rather the frontier, the borderline between two closed universes, frequently hostile, but always unknown to each other. After 1580, quoting Fernand Braudel once again, Fontenay (2010) wrote that once the Mediterranean left the *Big History*, the main and decisive clashes between competing hegemonies took place in the Atlantic and in the battlefields of continental Europe (pp. 24-25, 32-33).

When the British colonies of North America became independent at the end of the 18th century, the Mediterranean region was then, as it is now, a very important and sensitive part of the world. However, in the first years of the United States as a nation, they had to face, like the European countries, attacks from the so-called “Barbary pirates”. Note that the word Barbary in several European languages, at least since the 19th century, doesn’t mean Barbarian, as one might expect, but according to *Encyclopaedia Britannica* it is the geographic name given to the Northern African area extending from Egypt to the Atlantic, which also gives its name to the states that shared this area (Chidsey, 1971, pp. 1-2; Saint-Vicent, 1999, p. 159)¹. Donald Bar Chidsey (1971) wrote that «the Berbers consisted of Turks, Ar-

¹ «All Barbary was divided into four parts, and these were, from west to east, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. There was also the semi-independent province of Barca, but this was generally thought as a part of Tripoli, which handled its foreign affairs» (Chidsey, 1971, pp. 1-2).

abs, Kabyles, Moriscos, or Moors who had lately been driven out of Spain, and a sprinkling of late-coming Jews» (pp. 6-7).

It seems that privateering in its early stages was a reaction of the victims of piracy against the injustice they had suffered. So, according to French Historian August Toussaint, this was a way for the sovereigns to try to regulate this violence by legitimising and controlling this activity through their own authority (Saint-Vincent, 1999, p. 159). The first letter of marque appears to have been issued in 1206 by French King Philip Augustus or Philip II, but was only valid for the English Channel (Saint-Vincent, 1999, p. 159). Historian Gardener W. Allen (1905), however, was of the opinion that

during the late Middle Ages the relations between the Barbary Powers and the Christian nations were amicable. They traded together and made enlightened treaties. But with the dawn of the sixteenth century appears a change in the conditions, and henceforth a state of chronic warfare between Christians and Moors. Then began the period of activity of the Barbary corsairs which lasted about three hundred years.

The author explains this fact with the conquest of Granada in 1492, which forced a great part of this kingdom's population to go to Africa. Besides increasing the North-African population they also carried with them a lot of hate towards the Spanish. Raids against the Iberian coasts would then be a form of vengeance (pp. 2-3).

Privateers were both European and North African, although nowadays we tend to consider only the Barbary corsairs, which is true in relation to the era we are discussing in this paper (Garrity, 2008, pp. 395-396). We would just like to mention that, besides the corsairs, the actual object of this paper, the Mediterranean had what we can accurately call pirates. They sailed under a black flag, no one knew their nationality, and they destroyed the ships and killed all their crews to avoid leaving any traces. It seems that some were commanded by Turks and that part of the crew was of this nationality, as well as from the Greek islands (Panzac, 2005, pp. 89-90).

In a book published originally in France in 1999 and in English in 2005, almost one hundred years after the appearance of Garden Allen's work, French historian Daniel Panzac (2005) also advocated that although the sea had always been important to North Africans, it was after the 16th century «with the arrival of the Ottomans» that it acquired an «undisputed pre-eminence», as Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli became the capitals of new Ottoman provinces. It is also interesting to quote this same author (2005) when he states that for over 300 years these corsairs “stroke fear” into the Europeans' hearts and «plagued their imagination», while on the south shore «these seamen were considered the spearhead of Islam and were the pride of the Muslims». However, he wrote (2005) that by the end of the 16th century the Europeans' naval superiority in the Mediterranean area was broadly settled, which meant that North Africans seamen avoided attacking warships, but instead assaulted merchantmen and unprotected coastal areas. As a consequence of these activities, its maritime trade was seriously impaired, their coasts were attacked and their capital cities were often bombed. As Daniel Panzac states (2005), «these were real wars exacerbated on both sides by the religious issue, and wars in

which slavery was practiced on both sides». Although the majority of Western sources and literature talk about the Christian captives, it is fair to say that the corsairs' biggest fear was to be captured and ending up «in the Christian galleys». In fact, the mentioned author (2005) affirms that of the 12000 Louis XIV's slaves, almost a quarter were Ottomans and Maghrebians. After the 18th century, we can find also North African slaves in Malta and Spain (pp. 2, 21, 23).

Although there were negotiations between the European powers and the North African Regencies on the exchange of slaves, this was seldom effective. In fact, buying back slaves was considered to be a religious duty, so it was strongly encouraged, and the mere exchange was not so important (Panzac, 2005, p. 23). A Portuguese historian, Filipe Themudo Barata, claims in an article published in 2008 that in Portugal, in the 15th century, “buying captives” was an affair of state, with the king playing a very important role, so that it became a question of foreign policy (Barata, 2008, pp. 109, 122).

After several centuries of existence, in order to better control this enterprise, its regulation was definitely established in the 17th century. Privateering became almost institutional and was used by several countries as a weapon to inflict damage on the enemies' commercial exchanges.

French historian Michel Fontenay divides this activity, in the French language, into two categories, “course” and “corso”. The first word means privateering in general, but a seaman involved in the second activity is according to *Encyclopaedia Britannica* a corsair, for e.g., «a privateer of the Barbary Coast». Xavier Labat Saint-Vincent explains that this second undertaking is a kind of perpetuation of the crusades against the Infidels. In fact, besides attacking the ships of the powers against whom their state had issued letters of marque, the corsairs were always prepared to seize all the Muslim ships, mainly those of Northern African states. Under the cover of a Holy War this was an endemic activity for Malta and the Barbary Regencies. With the Counter Reformation, it achieved its apogee in the 17th century and declined during the 18th century. However, corsair activities were re-born, although in a modest way, in the last third of the 18th century. We have also to bear in mind that the 18th century was a “golden century” for both the Mediterranean as well as for international trade (Saint-Vincent, 1999, pp. 159-167).

On another hand, Patrick Garrity (2008) also explained that these North African political entities, commonly referred to as regencies,

fall somewhere between what we generally characterize today as “states” and “nonstate actors” and could even be “termed as quasistates”; it also seems that their rulers exercised a various and limited degree of control over the territories they claimed to control, especially the Berber (Moorish) and Arab peoples of the interior.

It is also important to explain that Morocco was an independent kingdom, while the other three regencies «were still nominally part of the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan still had important influence on them» (pp. 395-396). It is probably interesting to recall this detail to which Timothy Walker (2012) drew attention when he wrote

that «Morocco is sometimes credited as the first country to recognize US independence, but the Sultan of Morocco only did so formally on 23 June 178» (p. 280, footnote 104). However, «American officials did not treat its sovereign status differently from that of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers» (Garrity, 2008, p. 433, footnote 2).

So, during the three centuries of Ottoman rule over North Africa, we must bear in mind that these “states” enjoyed a considerable autonomy towards «the central power in Istanbul», an independence that gave them «diplomatic emancipation» and the possibility of establishing dynasties in Tunis and Tripoli (Garrity, 2008, p.3). Donald Barr Chidsey (1971) explained that these rulers «were to all intents and purposes independent princes, though they had no blood claims to their thrones and were only military adventurers or at best, the sons or grandsons of such» (p. 2).

Although they paid Istanbul an annual tribute, they were in fact «absolute monarchs answerable to nobody»².

Although exercising power in the sultan’s name, they tried to extend «their influence to the hinterland as they needed to have access to supplies for their «capital cities» and money to pay the janissaries. Due to the fact that after 1660 the naval supremacy was handed over from Spain to Great-Britain and France, by the end of the 17th century a lot had changed, their port capitals had managed to control the “inland territory”, they traded across all the Mediterranean countries, and signed treaties with several countries, prompting Daniel Panzac (2005) to state that «the corsairs’ period of glory was over» (pp. 10-12).

The 18th century saw “political stabilisation” as well as a more peaceful establishment of the “system of the succession” in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. All this stability helped the development of these young states that shared similar characteristics and *modus operandi*. In these three regencies, the Dey of Algiers, the Bey of Tunis and the Pasha of Tripoli whose main function was «to command the army» all ruled their “states” together with a trustworthy group of men (Panzac, 2005, p. 13-14).

Patrick Garrity stated (2008) that for the 18th century American minds the Barbary regencies were «based on a way of life fundamentally at odds with the United States and the rest of the civilized world». So, it was hard for them, even for someone like Benjamin Franklin, to understand why Great-Britain and France suffered this outrage. Nevertheless, the real truth is that this quasi state of war served all parties involved. As far as European powers were concerned, it was good to have someone else do the dirty work of harming the rival’s commerce, without having to go to war. What the regencies cleverly understood was that this was a way of receiving tributes and presents, as long as they did not go over the top with their attacks, so as not to attract heavy reprisals. On the other hand, as Patrick Garrity stat-

² «The words bey and dey are often confused. They mean substantially the same thing, though they come from different roots. Bey was the Turkish noun “beg,” which meant maternal uncle. It was a semiaffectionate nickname that might be given to any likable or admirable old man. Dey definitely was a title, meaning more or less lord or lord-governor. The offices were called beylik and deylik» (Chidsey, 1971, p. 151, footnote 1).

ed, these corsair activities helped the North African powers to maintain domestic peace (p. 396).

During the 18th century, European states managed to sign peace agreements with the Regencies, with the exception of Spain, Naples, Venice and the Order of Malta, all catholic powers whose fleets had fought against the Ottomans in the famous battle of Lepanto, in 1572. Eventually, these countries ended up negotiating with these powers, especially after the Seven Years War. So, by the end of the 18th century, Barbary regencies that had survived two centuries of pressure from the most powerful Western powers had won «de facto – then official – diplomatic recognition, in total independence of the Ottoman state» (Panzac, 2005, pp. 38-40).

The merchantmen from the independent United States had to face three threats in the Mediterranean, although these waters were not unknown ground to them. The American merchants had experienced difficulties in the 17th century, but as relations between Great-Britain and the North African Regencies improved they were able to develop trade. However, after the 1783 treaty, in which Great-Britain recognised United States' independence, they could not count any more on the protection of the Royal Navy. In fact, Lord Sheffield was of the opinion that none of the great maritime powers were interested in protecting American ships from the Barbary Corsairs. In view of this, the Congress decided to sign a treaty with Morocco in 1786, but with the other Regencies things were more complicated (Ribeiro, 1997, p. 325). Morocco, as we have seen, was an independent kingdom that had abandoned privateering at the end of the 18th century and only few captains carried on this activity in the early 19th century. In our opinion, as it was a very sporadic enterprise it did not do much harm to the Portuguese or American merchant vessels (Panzac, 2005, p. 201).

Nevertheless, in the last quarter of the 18th century, ships hoisting the flag of the new American nation sailing in Mediterranean waters could be attacked, without being at odds with Great-Britain. At the same time, the United States had not yet a Navy powerful enough to counterattack, so it was forced to sign treaties with these Regencies. In fact, the young Republic's trade was increasing rapidly, as described by Daniel Panzac (2005) – «several dozen American ships were in the Mediterranean» (p. 40). In 1797, the United States appointed three consuls to these states, William Eaton to Tunis, James Leander Cathcart to Tripoli and Richard Brian to Algiers, who was also «consul general for the entire Barbary coast» (Wright and Macleod, 1945, pp. 16, 18).

However, it is perhaps little known that in the first years of the United States as an independent nation, taking into account all we wrote about the quasi nonexistence, in the country, of a capable navy, the Portuguese fleet helped to protect the American shipping activity. In fact, after two naval expeditions against Algiers conjointly with Spain, Naples and the Order of Malta, Lisbon, incapable of signing a peace treaty with the Algerians, sent a squadron patrol to the Strait of Gibraltar to protect Portuguese ships, namely those involved in the Brazilian trade. In fact, as Spain and Algiers had concluded a truce, this made it possible for the Algerians to cross the Strait

of Gibraltar and enter the Atlantic Ocean. The Spaniards paid dearly for this cease-fire, but the Portuguese refused to pay a tribute. In 1786, the year following the seizure by the Algerians of two American merchant vessels, the *Maria* from Boston and the *Dauphin* from Philadelphia, off the coast of Portugal, the United States sent a representative to Algiers to negotiate an agreement between both parties, but as usual the Algerians demanded money (Walker, 2012, p. 283). In view of all this, the Portuguese government ordered its fleet in the Strait to protect American ships from the Algerian corsairs. This decision was particularly well received by American officials and this unilateral measure met the desires of Thomas Jefferson. In view of this, the Congress sent a letter to Queen D. Maria I expressing its gratitude for the help granted. This message was delivered by Colonel William Stephens Smith, son-in-law of John Adams and secretary of his country's legation in London. He had the honour of being received by the Queen and the Royal Family. During the audience, the protection to American merchantmen by the Portuguese fleet was reaffirmed and, at the same time, the Court of Lisbon expressed its desire to maintain good relations between both countries. In the report he sent to the United States government, Smith drew attention to the importance of Portugal's geographic position, the advantage of having its ports open to American shipping, and the Portuguese attitude towards the corsairs.

It was only because Portugal insisted that the federal government had to appoint David Humphreys (who among other things was aide-de-camp and a close friend of George Washington) Resident Minister with the Portuguese Court. We believe that one of the reasons why the United States complied with Portuguese wishes has to do with the fact that Lisbon, the capital, was a seaport, making it a good place to find information about the North African Regencies, policies and activities. Besides this being also the opinion advocated by Thomas Jefferson since at least 1785, Humphreys stated that this city was the best place to establish communications between the United States and Morocco (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 633-638, 709).

This is even more interesting if we think that Patrick Garrity (2008), in the paper we have been quoting, says that although the United States tried to obtain help from other European powers, France and the Netherlands turned it down. In fact, Britain did not want to have any post-war contacts with its ex-colonies and Lord Sheffield stated that he knew how valuable and strategic trade with the regencies was, and that any of the great powers would be interested in protecting American shipping (pp. 397-398). We would also like to stress that besides Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain also protected American vessels, which used forged or bought passes to pretend to be British merchantmen. The Algerians could not tell the difference, considering that both spoke English, and this avoided them the risk of being captured (Gardner, 1905, p. 15).

When the peace agreement was signed with Morocco, United States officials, like Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, were trying to conclude a treaty of Friendship and Trade with Portugal. Americans entertained high expectations with this agreement, so did the merchants that lived in Portugal and traded with

North America since colonial times. John Jay, Secretary of State in 1787 even wrote in one of his dispatches that «the treaty with Portugal it seems meets with obstacles. I wish they may not be insuperable, for I view a commercial connection with that nation and also with Spain, as beneficial to all the parties» (Ribeiro, 1997, 325)³

Two years earlier Thomas Jefferson had stated that all the negotiations in order to develop trade with Portugal would fail if Algerian plundering could not be avoided (Capon, L. (ed.), 1987, p.103; Magalhães, 1991, p. 41; Ribeiro, 1997, p. 325). Jefferson also thought that these political entities were only «partially covered by the law of nations» while John Adams regarded them as «nests of bandity». On the other hand, we must not forget that there were frequent dissensions between these regencies, except when they had to deal with the Christian countries (Garrity, 2008, pp. 396-397).

Thomas Jefferson believed that before the Declaration of Independence trade with the Mediterranean was very important, as the then British colonies sent to this part of the world about 1/6 of the total of the wheat and flour exported and 1/4 «in value of dried and pickled fish». It employed between 80 and 100 ships, annually, amounting to about 20.000 tons and 1,200 seamen. American officials wanted to divert «their merchants, financiers, and shippers» from the «English-oriented trade» and the Mediterranean seemed a good option (Garrity, 2008, p. 398).

Both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson realised that «the two agents at Algiers» were «money and fear» and that Tripoli was asking a very high price to sign a peace treaty. However, in the early 1780s, the US Confederation Congress had neither the money nor a powerful navy at its service. Earlier on, Adams had been in favour of paying a tribute to these Regencies, as the country had no power to fight them. He argued that the losses in money and reputation would be less than if United States shipping continued to be subject to these attacks. On the other hand, trade with North African states was not so important for the Americans. If these African States had to face a powerful navy, they would lose more than the United States.

Thomas Jefferson was not of the same opinion, but rather in favour of military measures. He therefore thought that if «a league of second-tier naval powers, such as Portugal, Naples, Venice, Malta, Sweden and Denmark, joined by the United States» it would be a blockading force with the expenses being shared by all those involved. On the other hand, with such a united front it would be very difficult for the Regencies to launch attacks against the European countries (Panzac, pp. 114, 116). This plan did not work as Spain had signed a treaty with Algiers, and Great-Britain as well as France did not show much interest in it (Garrity, 2008, pp. 398-400). Thomas Jefferson very realistically thought that once the American administration began to accept this kind of blackmail there would be no end to it. He even refused the offer

³ N.A.R.A. General Records of the Department of State, Central files, *Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. Foreign Letters of the Continental Congress and the Department of State, 1785-1790*, vol. 1 (14January 1785 – 23 December 1790), (National Archives microfilm publication, M61, roll 1), p. 234-235. Dispatch from the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, John Jay, to William Carmichael, New York, 4 January 1787.

made to him by General Lafayette to command a naval expedition against these “pirates” as he knew he had to deal with the «jealousies of the European powers» along with the isolationism and stinginess of his own government (Wright and Macleod, 1945, p. 23; Allen, 1905, p. 40). By 1789, with the new Constitution, the Federal Government had more tools to deal with this threat, but, at first, George Washington’s administration was more in favour of negotiating than using force, so the establishment of a powerful navy was delayed (Garrity, 2008, p. 400).

In fact, in 1791 Thomas Barclay was appointed special envoy to the Emperor of Morocco, with the main objective of obtaining the ratification of the treaty his predecessor had signed with the United States in 1787.

Adam’s negotiation penchant can also be seen when in 1791 he tried to free Americans held captive in Algiers, as until then negotiations had been conducted by the Spanish consul in that city, but Jefferson sent funds so that all the expenses could be paid by David Humphreys (Humphreys, 1917, p. 12; Ribeiro, 1997, p. 710). At the same time, Humphreys was informed of the state of the negotiations with Algiers for the release of the 24 American prisoners in that Regency and that until that moment those talks had been conducted by the Spanish consular agent. Unfortunately, Thomas Barclay only managed to travel in November, but only went as far as Gibraltar, having to return to Lisbon where he died in 1793 (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 709-711).

After Barclay’s death, Humphreys being one of the two people who, in Europe, knew about the contents of the dispatches, he decided to take the matter into his own hands. The other person who had full knowledge of the matter was Thomas Pinckney, at that time American representative in Great-Britain and later also Envoy Extraordinary to Spain. Although David Humphreys was in possession of all the dispatches, he was not able to find the whereabouts of the presents the United States government had sent to be given to the Emperor of Morocco. He even went to Gibraltar, from where he reported the Moroccan political situation to the Secretary of State and all the efforts he had made to free the captives held in Algiers. As he was also annoyed with the way the Algerian affairs were being conducted, he offered to conduct negotiations in that capacity. In fact, he was chosen to negotiate with Algiers and Morocco at the same time as Captain Nathaniel Cutting was appointed as his Secretary. As soon as he arrived in Lisbon in late August 1793, Humphreys decided to travel to Gibraltar, where he hoped to reach the Spanish city of Alicante so that he could travel to Algiers. The mission was however aborted as the Dey did not allow him to sail to his capital city. This setback changed Humphreys’s view on how to deal with this problem, making him support the creation of a naval force and to awaken the Americans to this outrage (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 711-713).

In 1793, Portugal’s Royal Court was caught by surprise when it was informed that the English Consul, contrary to Lisbon’s wishes and without its previous knowledge, had concluded a one-year truce with Algiers. Minister Sousa Coutinho also guaranteed that nothing would be paid in cash or in the form of presents. Besides, if the truce was ever to be signed, Portuguese officials would not allow Algerian ships to enter the Atlantic for a period of three months. After this interview,

David Humphreys was almost sure these conditions would be rejected by the Dey (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 717-719, 725).

This peace agreement seriously impacted on the security in the Atlantic. In fact, as soon as the truce between Portugal and Algiers was concluded on the night of 5 to 6 October 1793 «four Frigates, three Xebecks and a Brig of 20 guns have passed the streights into the Atlantic». Having received this information from David Humphreys, Consul Edward Church, after warning all the American captains in Lisbon, had an interview with Luís Pinto de Sousa Coutinho, who once again reaffirmed that the Portuguese Court was not happy with this arrangement, much less with the fact that Portugal had to pay «the Dey one third as much as he [received] annually from the court of Spain». At the same time, Portuguese authorities had increased the number of armed vessels «on the Mediterranean station» and also because they had no faith or great expectations in the ceasefire. This was also the opinion Edward Church conveyed in a dispatch to Thomas Jefferson on 30 October 1793. At the same time, Church had received intelligence from a «staunch friend of America» that there was «an infernal combination in Europe» against the United States, being France the only country not involved in it (Swanson, 1939, vol. I, pp. 46-49; Ribeiro, 2001, pp. 338-341). In spite of these dangers, the craving for profit, as well as the misleading publicity made by British merchants in United States newspapers, many Americans continued to trade in the Mediterranean, even if they could now be captured in Portuguese waters (Ribeiro, 2001, pp. 341-342).

Before all these difficulties, both David Humphreys and Captain O'Brien wrote letters to President George Washington and to Vice-President Thomas Jefferson advising them that the United States needed a navy to protect American merchantmen, to allow the country to trade. Consul Edward Church also expressed the same opinion to Thomas Jefferson. In view of this, the Congress voted for the establishment of a naval force to protect American ships from the Algerians. The decisions issued by both Houses of Congress are very important, as they mark the beginning of the United States navy, leading to what it is today (Allen, 1905, pp. 47-50; Chidsey, 1971, p. 25; Garrity, 2008, p. 401; Ribeiro, 2001, p. 342).

The American press such as the *Baltimore Daily Intelligencer* and two Boston newspapers, the *Independent Chronicle* as well as the *Universal Advertiser*, openly accused Great-Britain of being behind this affair. The *Baltimore Daily Intelligencer* went as far as to also implicate Spain. When Thomas Pinckney asked the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs for an explanation, Lord Grenville started by saying that London had intervened in response to a request from the Court of Lisbon and ended up confessing that this truce was highly advantageous to Britain, as the country needed the cooperation of the Portuguese Navy (Ribeiro, 1997, p. 720). Humphreys was also sure of Portugal's good faith as in letter written to the Secretary of State Edmund Randolph he clearly states:

Mr. Logie himself acknowledged to me, that rather he or anyone else was ever authorised on the part of Portugal to promise one single farthing of money for a peace with Algiers. And I only ask you,

in the name of common sense, whether Mr. Logie, or anyone else, could seriously expect or design to make that peace, without giving any money? (Ribeiro, 1997, p. 730)⁴.

We agree with Gardner Allen (1905) when he says that «both Colonel Humphreys and Edward Church were of the opinion that this truce was made through the influence of the British consul at Algiers and without the authority of the Portuguese government». The Secretary for Foreign Affairs assured them that although Portugal was eager for peace, he wanted to allow time to warn their friends

but the British Court, zealous overmuch for the happiness of the two nations, Portugal and Algiers, in order to precipitate this important business very officiously authorized Charles Logie, the British consul-general and agent at Algiers, not only to treat, but to conclude, for and in behalf of this Court, not only without authority, but even without consulting it (p. 47).

Portuguese officials, however, had not thought convenient to reject the cease-fire, but «they wou'd not be displeased if a plausible pretence shou'd offer to break it». In fact, now that Great-Britain did not need a powerful force this served both British and Spanish interests (Swanson, 1939, vol. I, p. 52; Ribeiro, 2001, p. 338)⁵. Consul Edward Church is harsher in his comments about this affair, as he wrote: «the conduct of the British in this business leaves no room to doubt or mistake their object, which was evidently aimed at us» (Allen, 105, p. 47).

Humphreys gave the British the benefit of the doubt saying that Consul Logie acted «on his own responsibility» and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Grenville, assured Charles Pinckney that the British government did not want to harm the Americans. It had simply done what had been asked «by their friend and ally the Court of Portugal» to achieve peace with Algiers. Following this request, Consul Logie was entrusted to do all he could to achieve this goal. As a peace treaty could not be signed immediately, he was able to negotiate a truce.

As we can see, there are two contradictory versions, the Portuguese one and the British one. The Americans were sure that this agreement had been concluded without Portugal's knowledge and that the real aim was to damage American trade.

After the truce was concluded, Edward Church tried to warn American shipping about the danger they were incurring in and managed to get from the Portuguese authorities a convoy for several of these vessels. Of course these escorts depended on

⁴ N.A.R.A. General records of the Department of State, Central files, *Despatches from United States Ministers to Portugal, vol. 4 (30 January – 29 November 1794)* (National Archives microfilm publication, M43, roll 3). Letter from the minister resident Colonel David Humphreys to Captain Richard O'Brien, dated Lisbon, 3 March 1794, annexed to dispatch no. 113 from the minister resident, Colonel David Humphreys, to the Secretary of State, Edmund Randolph, dated Lisbon, 6 March 1794

⁵ When we say that this served Spanish interests, we base ourselves on the following statement by Edward Church «Upon the presumption that such was the general opinion, and my knowledge that the Spanish Ambassador when at Court on the 15th Inst^l had been treated rather roughly by all the Nobility present when he congratulated the Prince on the happy event of the Truce.» (Swanson, 1939, vol. I, p. 52).

“occasional arrangements” (Allen, 1905, pp. 47-48; Garrity, 2008, p. 401). Note should also be made that both the British and the Spanish Ambassadors were against the Portuguese granting them a convoy, but as Edward Church puts it, «the British have lost ground by this left-handed policy» and the Minister and Secretary of State for the Navy Martinho de Melo e Castro was in favour of giving protection to American ships. At the same time, Church stated that the general opinion was not very much in favour of the United Kingdom and that this was a good moment to suggest a new commercial treaty to Portugal. Finally, the Secretary of War and Foreign Affairs Luís Pinto de Sousa Coutinho allowed United States ships to be escorted by the Portuguese navy (Swanson, 1939, vol. I, p. 53; Ribeiro, 2001, p. 338).

Although tired of this endless affair, David Humphreys was worried about the fate of the captives in Algiers and the security of the American merchantmen in the Mediterranean. He therefore continued to advise US officials on how to raise money to pay the ransoms, asking the European consuls in this Regency for help, and Minister Sousa Coutinho for the protection of the Portuguese squadron in the Strait of Gibraltar. It seems that Lisbon received this request favourably, which led President George Washington to mention this in the address he made to the Congress on 28 February 1795.

The information received from Algiers urged the United States to sign a peace treaty with the Dey. Besides the poor conditions under which the American captives were being held, there was always the possibility that both Spanish and British could make the negotiations more difficult, as these countries feared American competition and, moreover, it was not possible to trust either the French or the Swedish.

Needing money to negotiate with Algiers, which he could not obtain in Europe, and dreading a war between Portugal and France or a peace agreement between the Portuguese Court and the Dey, David Humphreys decided to travel to the United States with the intention of diverting the attention of those who did not want Americans to obtain peace, and to be able to talk directly with President George Washington about this sensible subject. Although his attitude was criticised, it was decided that the United States should use France’s good offices. Joseph Donaldson, consul in Tunis and Tripoli, settled peace with Algiers and a treaty was finally signed in September 1795, although all the problems with this Regency were only completely solved when the treaty was ratified in 1796 (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 737-749).

We must also take in consideration that for North African powers privateering had at the same time a religious and a political dimension, but, of course, as Daniel Panzac (2005, p. 101) writes, «its primary purpose was obviously an economic one». When chased by corsairs, the American ships, which already had to avoid the British Navy in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean they had to seek shelter in Italian ports for the first 40 years after the Declaration of Independence, the United States were involved in numerous negotiations, as well as with wars with North African Regencies (Wright & Macleod, 1845, pp. 16, 18).

James Simpson, American consul in Gibraltar, tried to renovate the treaty with Morocco, but as a war was going on between two brothers, pretenders to the

throne, this proved to be a difficult mission, especially for a country like the United States, which did not have a strong navy in the region. Nevertheless, in 1795 he managed to sign an agreement with this power (Ribeiro, 1997, p. 745). By 1796, before the real possibility of a war between Portugal and Spain, the Portuguese squadron had to stop patrolling the Strait of Gibraltar, making it possible for the Algerians to enter the Atlantic (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 749-750).

Allan Gardner (1905) alleged that England did this on purpose to allow «the Algerines to cruise against Americans» (p.15). Allan Garrity, (2008) quoting Ray Irwin, is of the opinion that this mischievous intentional attitude caused great harm to American trade, as the corsairs captured 11 ships and 100 seamen, while the rates of maritime insurance increased three times (p. 401).

At this stage, we should point out that although the laws passed in the Congress, they met with a lot of internal opposition, even if they paid off, as in 1795 a treaty with Algiers was signed, according to which the United States had to pay a yearly tribute of \$642 000 and send naval stores worth \$21 600, as well as “providing” a frigate and other “presents”. In this way they managed to buy the Dey’s good offices in making deals with the other Barbary powers, which, in fact, allowed treaties to be signed with Tunis and Tripoli. In a letter dated 9 January 1799, Colonel David Humphreys also credits the good offices of the Portuguese Consul in Tripoli, D. Bernardo de Sousa, for the achievement of this peace. This is especially important for the United States as the truce between Portugal and Algiers had ended in April 1794, allowing American hopes of obtaining a peace agreement with that Regency to be revived (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 744, 835).

Patrick Garrity (2008) stated that by 1797 the United States had established several treaties with the North African powers, which seemed to make it safe for Americans in the Mediterranean. However, the bases of this structure were not very strong and it quickly collapsed. To begin with, there was a great disparity between the terms of the agreements between Algiers and the other powers, which obviously made it particularly difficult. The United States were very slow in sending the presents and tributes they had agreed to pay, some of them arriving «months and years late» and many times were «unsatisfactory and incomplete».

In fact, when the US frigate *George Washington* arrived in Algiers in September 1800 with a long-delayed tribute, it triggered a series of demands from the three Regencies, but as they were not fulfilled by the Americans the United States Consul James Leander Cathcart warned his government and his compatriots «that hostilities were now likely» to restart (pp. 402-404).

In view of these circumstances, the consuls in North Africa advised to Washington on how to successfully handle this threat to American ships in the Mediterranean, recommending, at the same time, that the United States should review their relationship with the Regencies, all having come to the conclusion that the use of force would be a long lasting solution. This was also the opinion of David Humphreys, resident minister in Lisbon, while John Quincy Adams, American minister in Prussia,

according to a Swedish proposal, advocated a naval cooperation, in order to protect commercial shipping in the Mediterranean (Garrity, 2008, pp. 404-406).

On 15 July 1799, William Eaton, US consul in Tunis, reported that on 29 June the Portuguese and Sicilian Ambassadors had left for their countries and that Portugal had «concluded a peace agreement with this regency, for three years». For him, this was cause for alarm, as there was no one «to block the corsairs within the straits» and so, with a certain amount of exaggeration he wrote that no one could or would prevent them «from cruising from the cape of Good Hope to the Orkney Islands» (Swanson, 1939, vol. I, p. 332). This, together with the fact that Sweden had also signed an agreement with Tripoli, made the Secretary of State Timothy Pickering believe that the only way to handle Barbary powers was through force. But in fact, neither the United States nor the Barbary Regencies were pleased with the «existing relationship» (Garrity, 2008, pp. 406-407).

It is quite interesting to note the perception that Consul Eaton had of the Portuguese naval power in the Mediterranean in 1799, which in our opinion does not fit the facts. In fact, he wrote that «Portugal not only blocks them [the corsairs] within their seas, but dictates terms to them under their own walls» (Wright and Macleod, 1945, p. 48).

In October 1801, Eaton was worried because Tunis «had broken» a truce with Portugal and had consequently sent 6 vessels against Portuguese ships. In view of these circumstances, he feared that American ships would be the next prey. The goods American had promised to send to Tunis arrived late, upsetting the Bey. Had the boat with the supplies, convoyed by the *George Washington*, not arrived, Eaton was almost sure that the expedition sent against Portuguese vessels would instead be used against Americans (Wright & Macleod, 1945, pp. 96).

In the same year, Thomas Jefferson, who had always been in favour of a firmer policy in respect of Mediterranean privateering, was inaugurated as the 3rd President of the United States, at a time when the Quasi-War with France had been resolved. Under these circumstances, as the American Navy was free from any duty, he was able to send to the Mediterranean «a squadron of three frigates and a schooner». The squadron commander's Richard Dale had instructions to prevent the Barbary powers to disregard the existing treaties and to protect American ships and trade. To achieve this, he had orders to use the most extreme means, like sinking, burning or destroying the ships of the North African powers who did not respect the agreements in force. As Tripoli was now the major enemy, Richard Dale had instructions that in case of war he was authorised to blockade the port of this Regency's capital city. At the same time messages were sent to Morocco, Algiers and Tunis assuring them those American vessels were not in the Mediterranean to threaten them. However, through some of Thomas Jefferson's letters written to members of Congress, Patrick Garrity lets us know that the President did not believe that sending the squadron to the Mediterranean would solve anything.

In fact, as soon as this naval force arrived in Gibraltar, Commander Dale learned of the declaration of war to the United States and that corsairs were chasing American ships. However, the arrival of this unexpected squadron caught them un-

awares. At first, the Americans managed to capture some Tripolitan vessels, convoy their own ships in the Mediterranean, and even put on a show of force before Tripoli, by blockading its port, while at the same time they were trying to negotiate with the Pasha. When winter came, Commander Dale had to return to the United States and the mission was considered a success, as his presence in Mediterranean waters plus the cash given had prevented Algiers and Tunis from attacking American ships (Garrity, 2008, pp. 407-410).

In spite of all this, American consuls in North Africa were not so enthusiastic about the success of this display of force against Tripoli, as the surprise factor had not been well exploited. Even the Danes were of the opinion that if Jefferson decided to reduce the Navy, Americans would have to accept all the Barbary Regencies' demands. Under these circumstances, the United States had only one option left: take military action.

Although Jefferson's administration had plans for another display of force, the fact is that by 1802-1803, as Patrick Garrity wrote, «the American strategic position in the Mediterranean, apparently so promising in 1801, deteriorated rapidly». At the same time, Sweden and France were making peace with the Pashaw, by paying tributes in money and ships. The commander of the American squadron, Richard Morris, then in the Mediterranean, seemed not to be acting properly or according to orders received. On another hand, the blockade of Tripoli caused friction with Algiers and with Tunis, and lead Morocco to declare war on the United States. Pressed by the Louisiana question, as Napoleonic France had taken possession of this territory from Spain, which was seen by the American administration as a danger much closer to home, as well as the Treaty of Amiens, Jefferson decided on a combined solution: to negotiate with Tripoli and have a more forceful position in the Mediterranean (Garrity, 2008, pp. 407-416).

In 1803, the Americans sent another squadron to the Mediterranean under the command of Commodore Edward Preble, with the purpose of putting more pressure on Tripoli. However, as soon as he arrived he had to deal with Morocco, as the corsairs of this country had, without any declaration of war by the Emperor, captured American ships and imprisoned the US consul. Finally, when these matters were settled, any hopes of reaching an agreement with Tripoli were almost ruined.

In the meantime, the Tripolitans captured the U.S. frigate *Philadelphia* and the Pasha demanded a huge ransom to free both ship and crew, leading to a long period of negotiations. The Americans, however, had in the meantime scored a huge triumph, as they managed to burn the *Philadelphia* down right in the middle of Tripoli's harbour. Without the help of any of the European consuls in Tripoli, except for the Danish representative, Commodore Preble undertook a campaign against this Regency, by starting to bombard the capital on 3 August 1804, which was followed by other attacks over the next few weeks, at the same time as the negotiations were taking place.

After the replacement of Commodore Preble by Commodore Barron, who was in command of a mightier force, Americans interfered in the domestic affairs of

Tripoli by supporting the Pasha's brother's pretensions to the throne and opened a second front by launching a land attack. Finally, negotiations conducted by the American Consul-General Tobias Lear led to the signing of a peace treaty with Tripoli. The United States deployment of force before Tunis also led to successful negotiations with this Regency, allowing them to maintain a deterrent force in the Mediterranean (Garrity, 2008, pp. 416-426).

Once the war was over and peace had been established with the North African powers, Jefferson's administration attracted a lot of criticism at home. In reality, the costs of war were so high that the president had decided «to reduce the American profile in the region». Under these circumstances, Tobias Lear had to search for a not so costly settlement. The problems with Algiers persisted, but the United States were only in a position to solve this after the end of the 1812-1814 War (Garrity, 2008, pp. 426-430).

Before this conflict began, as matters were getting worse the United States had to withdraw part of their war ships from the Mediterranean, leaving the American ships unprotected from the corsairs' attacks. During the conflict, the United States ships almost disappeared from the Mediterranean, the Congress declared war on Algiers, and President Madison sent two squadrons to the Mediterranean to impose a treaty to the Bey of Tunis and the Pasha of Tripoli (Wright & Macleod, 1945, pp. 202-206).

It should be noted that due to the waging war between the two major naval powers, France and England, from 1805 to 1814, ships flying the flags of the North African Regencies were considered neutral and were thus «allowed to navigate freely». However, especially after 1808, with the occupation of Spain by the Napoleonic armies, many of these war vessels were boarded and «their papers inspected by the English» (Panzac, 2005, p. 218).

In the early 19th century, the commercial fleets of Maghrebian countries grew rapidly, with the particularity that the ships used were built in Europe, the majority of their crew members, mainly serving as supervisors, were Christians, and that they also used European-based contractual methods. This was especially true of Tunisians, who competed directly with Christians in maritime shipping. After the French Revolution, the reorganization in the Mediterranean trade gave prominence to Europe in the Regencies' international trade. By signing and «setting up transactions and contracts», not only with Europeans, but also with their Muslim partners, they made an attempt to become integrated in the Western and international trade. As Daniel Panzac puts it, between 1806 and 1812 this policy «began to bear fruits», but by 1813 this procedure started to fail (Panzac, 2005, pp. 254-255).

As this reorganisation failed, the North Africans returned to their privateering activities, which they in fact had never abandoned, albeit reduced in the previous six years and reaching its peak in 1815. The situation had now become more dangerous for ships of all nationalities (Panzac, 2005, pp. 267-268).

With the end of this war, the Algerians decided to attack some American ships that sailed the Mediterranean. In February 1815, the Congress declared war on Algiers, only to discover that the Algerian ships were near the coast of Spain. The

Americans tracked them down and engaged in a fierce battle, which they won as their weapons were far superior to those of the Algerians. The Americans then landed in Algiers and forced the authorities to sign a treaty which abolished the payment of any tribute, and took measures for the exchange of prisoners (Panzac 270-271). Actually, the Dey signed a treaty at the end of 1816, nine months before being murdered, and the Algerian corsairs never again posed a threat to the United States ships and trade (Wright & Macleod, 1945, pp. 206). After this, the commander of this squadron, Commodore Decatur, travelled to Tunis and Tripoli to re-sume relations with these powers (Panzac, 2008, pp. 270-271).

Following all this activity, heightened by the anger at the increase in corsair activities, the Congress of Vienna condemned Barbary slavery (Panzac, 2008, pp. 272-273). After this decision, as Daniel Panzac (2008) wrote, «England, the only true naval power in the Mediterranean, should take the responsibility for applying that resolution». As a consequence thereof, the British fleet in the Mediterranean was given orders to visit Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli to notify these regencies of the Congress's decisions and to negotiate the release of the captives, but was not successful (p. 274). This resulted in an attack against the capital of Algiers by an Anglo-Dutch fleet in August 1816 that almost destroyed the city and its defences. Faced with no alternatives, the Algerians signed a treaty, released all the European captives without any ransom, abolished slavery, and even paid the British war reparations. At the same time, the Bey of Tunis and the Pasha of Tripoli were informed of this operation and summoned to release any captives still in their custody.

According to Daniel Panzac, this event marked the end of corsair activities and left bitter feelings in Algiers. Moreover, in 1818 the participants at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had discussed this issue and in this international meeting England and France were entrusted with the mission of informing all the three regencies «that they had to cease all corsair activities or face reprisals from a “European League” and assigned to punish them». There was another conflict with England in 1824, but this time the mission of the British vessels was unsuccessful (Panzac, 2008, pp. 275-291).

By the end of the 1820s, for a number of reasons the regencies depended economically and politically more and more on Europe. The Americans kept only a few vessels in the region for patrolling purposes until 1830, when France occupied Algiers (Wright & Macleod, 1945, pp. 202-206). In fact, the 1830s saw the signing of the first asymmetric treaties, which addressed the issue of European powers to be imposed in Africa and Asia over the next decades of the 19th century (Panzac, 2008, pp. 332, 334).

It is extraordinary, however, that as late as 1825 Portugal, Sweden, Denmark and Naples were still paying tribute to what we now know was a weakened Algiers (Allen, 1905, p. 12).

Conclusion

After the independence, the Americans were on their own in the Mediterranean. They could no longer count on the protection of the Royal Navy against the attacks of the North African corsairs and had to compete in terms of trade with the far more experienced European powers, who, in turn, were also very wary about the presence of another competitor's merchantmen in these waters. These were difficult times, as the corsair activity that had diminished soon increased again in part due to the war waging in Europe after 1793, and the negotiations with the Barbary Regencies were very tough.

We must bear in mind that in 1793 the beginning of war between France, Great-Britain and other European countries «upset the maritime equilibrium in the Mediterranean». It lasted a decade and involved a great number of “naval battles” and “sieges of ports”. With the conquest of Egypt by Napoleon, the two centuries and a half of good relations between France and the Ottoman Empire came to an end. This state of things made the Sultan force the North African powers to wage war against France, allowing them to capture French ships, as well as those belonging to the annexed countries or to France's allies. The corsair activity reached its peak in 1798, then decreased from 1806 to 1813 and was not able to ramp-up their campaigns between 1814-1815 and virtually came to an end in 1816. Sometimes, this “state of war” led to several armed conflicts. (Panzac, 2005, pp. 73-76, 152).

As a young nation, the United States did not have a strong navy, as for many American politicians this was not seen as a priority. At odds with this difficult situation, the US sometimes were able to count on the help of Europeans, as was the case of Portugal until 1807, when the country was invaded by Napoleon's armies. The United States officials eventually realised that a display of force was the best way to bring these acts of piracy to an end, so they began to build their own fleet, sent warships to the Mediterranean, and waged a war on Tripoli in 1801 and on Algiers in 1815. After 1816, the corsairs ceased to be a threat to US ships, and only a few ships were stationed in the area for patrolling purposes until 1830.

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Colonial Enclosures. Notes on War and Peace, Land and Modernity in the Italian Colonization of Libya

CATERINA MIELE

In 1925, Joan Rosita Forbes, an English traveller and writer, described the Abyssinians women as «hewers of wood and drawers of water» (Sorgoni, 1998, p. 32). Far from being contingent, during the early modern era, in the English-speaking countries that phrase described a new type of worker - proletarian, stateless, unskilled and racialized - produced by the rise of the global colonial space from the XVI century. Forced by hunger and violence, they carried out all the works necessary to the rise of capitalism, such as building ports and ships, deforestation, land reclamation, enclosures of common lands (Linebaugh & Rediker, 2013). The aim of this essay is to point out that the Italian colonial history is entirely inscribed in the global history of capitalism and that, within the Italian Empire, both indigenous peoples and white proletarians, although in a very different way, were part of a transnational subaltern multitude that made the transition to the capitalist modernity possible. In order not to reiterate that particular «foreclosure of the native informant» (Spivak, 1999) that characterizes the Italian historiography, I would like to pay attention to the colonial era in the Mediterranean basin as a space of permanent transition to global capitalism when processes of expropriation, separation of workers from their means of production, accumulation and production of subaltern subjectivities, exploitation of natural resources were continuously produced. It is important to start from the relationship between human beings, the environment and the territory within the colonial space. When John Locke in the *Two Treatises of Government* of 1698 argued that every man has the right to own as much land as he can cultivate and Emmerich de Vattel in *The Law of Nations* of 1747, spoke of a natural right to take possession of a land inhabited by nomadic tribes who cannot occupy the entire territory (Mattei & Nader, 2008), they were not thinking to a sort of imaginary no man's land, but of the New World. The colony actualized the fundamental principle of the European Public Law, what Carl Schmitt (2006) defined the *nomos of the earth*, as to say the political community

with all its rights and responsibilities consists of owning the land, cultivating it and building ties with the territory. In other words, «the fundamental right» emerges as «the right of the settler» (Tuit, 2004) and Frantz Fanon himself realized that both the settler and the native emerge as figures constructed from their relationship with the land (Fanon 2005; Tuit 2004). This is the reason why the colonial territory's occupation immediately leads to a racial order. The historian Moses Findley argued that colonialism should be looked at from the colony, rather than from the metropolis, starting from the relation between colonizers, colonized and the land (Findley in Elkins & Pedersen, 2005). The agrarian one was both a legal and a political question in the colonial context, above all an issue of mutual representations, where stereotypes about the laziness of the dominated peoples and the hopes to solve the problems of the motherland could flourish. As early as 1832, the Enlightenment jurist Romagnosi compared civilization to the «vegetative power of agriculture», capable of transforming the «native land», originally looking like «a great forest, with great deserts or undammed rivers». For Romagnosi, indigenous people could be assimilated «to plants, born, raised and propagated without art», whereas the human groups who gave themselves organization and traditions were «refined» people; only when those organizations became part of «permanent consortia», one could speak of «civilization» (Romagnosi in Puccini, 1991). These were, more or less, the very abstract guiding principles of the Italian colonialists when, less than a century later, they set out to conquer Libya.

Problems of translation: the land and the colonial power

In the early days of its colonial adventure, Italy meant to join the international geopolitical competition and to find a way out for the national rural labour surplus: the ideal colony would have been a fertile and depopulated land, «exactly the opposite of what they found in Libya» (Anderson, 1986: 186). In the same period, the British and French colonialists were migrating from the enthusiasm of the conquest to the «realism of colonial management» (Leclerc, 1972, pp. 33-34), both due to the harsh anti-colonial resistance and to a more careful consideration of local regimes of land property. The French officer and colonial ethnographer Maurice Delafosse, for example, studying the land systems in Sudan, could realize that there was «no inch of ground without an owner» and in that region the government used to be considered the owner of the territory only on in a symbolic sense: it was the population to retain real rights to the soil. As a consequence, for the indigenous justice, the French colonial authorities could not consider it as their own domain – or loan it to private companies – not even a «very small parcel of land» (Leclerc, 1972). This established fact often ignored by European settlers as it potentially invalidated treaties and agreements about the use of the territory established by the colonial order, was very common in the African colonial realities, including Libya.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Tripolitania was inhabited by artisans and merchants in the coastal cities and peasants, former slaves and semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes in the interior areas. The decline of the Trans-Saharan trade coincided with the beginning of British and then Italian economic penetration and with new opportunities for wage labour in factories, construction field, esparto crop, farms or in the nearby French Tunisia (Ahmida, 1994, pp. 48-61). In Cyrenaica, the urban areas of the narrow coastal lowland were inhabited by Arab traders from the West while the interior regions of the highland were populated by peoples who lived by transhumant breeding, cultivation of mountain lands and trade in hides, wool and butter with the coastal towns and with Egypt. In his monograph on *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, the British anthropologist Evans-Pritchard (1949) described the evolution of these Cyrenaic segmental societies into forms of centralized political power by analysing the historical processes that led them to structure a strategic alliance with the brotherhood of Senusi and to give life to one of the longest movements of anti-colonial struggle in North Africa. Despite criticism from various points of view (Cresti, 2011; Ahmida, 1994), Evans-Pritchard ethnography remains an important testimony about the way Cyrenaic populations adapted to a complex natural environment, including a tangled and fragile organization of wealth division, i.e. a flexible regime of land ownership, institutionalized forms of hospitality exchange on grazing areas, a more rigid ownership of water sources and a predominantly collective land tenure defined by tribal law. In pre-colonial Cyrenaica the Ottoman government recognized the territory of Derna and Benghazi as its direct ownership (*miri*), while the remaining territory, although it was formally state property, was assigned to the Bedouin tribes who lived there and who were granted the right of perpetual usufruct of the land. The *mulk*, the private ownership of the land on which individuals or families held absolute rights, was only widespread in the narrow coastal areas and in the Saharan oases where people practiced a sedentary agriculture. The absentee ownership had no reason to be, as the owners who did not cultivate their lands lost all rights on. Another common form of land property were the funds donated to religious organizations (*habs* or *waqf*), which were considered inalienable. Finally, there was the desert and the uncultivated land (*matruka*), formally Ottoman administration's property, inalienable, on which villages or tribes exercised a right of usufruct (Ahmida, 1994, pp. 35-38). Before the arrival of the Italians, therefore, individuals rarely could claim permanent rights to the land and the property was rarely a formal juridic title but it was rather based on uses and customs. On the contrary, the Italian colonists were united by the «faith in what they persistently defined as a virgin or empty land»: as for other kind of colonial rule, the indigenous land system was “understood” in a specific way aimed to allow the plunder of lands and the exploitation of the inhabitants (Elkins & Petersen, 2005), thanks to an epistemological violence that ranged from the total denial of the indigenous peoples existence to the refusal to acknowledge their right to the soil.

The same definition of indigenous as “nomads” meant to deny their rights on their own land while the Europeans brought notions of ownership with them

strongly in conflict with those of the “inassimilable” natives: the rhetoric of the mission of civilization, the colonial theses about the availability of dominated territories and the “title” of “native” itself represented complex claims which demonstrated that there was a clash not only between two different peoples, but also between «two different epistemologies» (Young, 2003, p. 63). The epistemological short circuit, in other cases, worked through the perversion of local law: Italians found the legitimation for Libya’s occupation in a code of Islamic law which claims that the land belongs to those who cultivate it.

Understanding the colony: colonial property and mapping of lands

In the century before the conquest, the Italians knew Libya only through the stories of poets and travellers who described it as a land of plenty. Until the last decades of the nineteenth century, only a few Europeans could travel the country because of local populations and Ottoman authorities’ hostility towards foreign travelers since they saw them as agents sent by Western governments to prepare for the occupation of the country. With predominantly literary knowledge of the Libya felix and very few eyewitness accounts of the country (Cresti, 2011, p. 42-46), Italians were preparing the occupation with an optimism due almost exclusively to the successes achieved by the French in the colonization of Algeria and to the strong certainty that European people were destined to settle permanently and definitively on the African shores of the Mediterranean. A first real knowledge on Libya dates back two years after the capture of Tripoli in 1913, when the senator Leopoldo Franchetti led one of the first expeditions to carry out a survey about the possibilities offered by the colonization of the region. Italian presence’s instability prevented him to make a land census of suitable land for human settlement, in order to avoid arousing suspicion among the population. However, the senator could see that in the Mediterranean region of Tripolitania the «land suitable for production» exceeded «by far the needs of indigenous people and the ability of their agricultural and pastoral production»; but he could also ascertain that there was no lands owned by the government. The land was there, but unavailable for a metropolitan. Then, they need to figure out if the natives would agree to cede their own lands to the «lowest price that corresponds to their present value» and to a sufficient extent for colonization (Franchetti, 1914, pp. 41-42). Instead, they seemed quite demanding, as «informed of the enthusiasm, sometimes exaggerated, manifested by public opinion in Italy around the agricultural future of Tripoli» as well as unaware «of the expenses needed to put their land into value». Indeed, as soon as the Italian authorities began to arrange the soil, a lot of people started to claim «rights over those areas that were, in fact, public ownership» or to «ask for money for the stones our officials gather in the riverbed to execute some works in the public interest»: these cases clarified, for Franchetti, the state of mind of the natives (Franchetti, 1914, p. 42). Impressed by Italian technology, they seemed to take the talks about the “ben-

efits” that the Italian rule would have brought literally, insofar as they thought they could use the situation to their exclusive advantage (Franchetti, 1914, pp. 42-3). Another problem was represented by the fact that it would have been improper for an Italian to rent land from local people, because in Tripolitania «the tenant is, in front of the owner, almost in a status of servile inferiority», so that the damage caused by a protracted time of colonization would have been «way lower than durable damage generated from this kind of relationship between colonizer and colonized» (Franchetti, 1914, p. 44). Therefore, there was an even more practical problem linked to a land unsuitable for agriculture: the colonization of Libya represented a «great battle with the earth», a battle to fight against a natural environment so different from the one known by Italians, «a tenacious enemy, that needs to be continuously monitored and bridled», against whom even the «stubborn and constant work might be not sufficient». Franchetti underlined that «the climate aridity and the nature of the soil those who have not learned how to fight them with different methods from enjoying the fruits of the land»; the “agricultural conquest” was a complex work «where the enemy has to be attacked on all sides. Nature must be conquered and enslaved everywhere it is not impregnable» (Franchetti, 1914, pp. 47-48). Three years after the military conquest, the profit that Italians could have made from the region was totally unknown and uncertain, while Franchetti’s doubts were confirmed: reports of other technical commissions sent by the government in Libya in the aftermath of the conquest suggested to postpone the settler colonization and to start with an experimental colonization (Cresti, 1996, p. XXIII). The colonization of Libya, the promise land for peasant-settlers masses from the mother country, had to be delayed for decades due to the morphological and climatic characteristics of the territory as well as to the anti-colonial resistance. Before the thirties, it was not even possible to determine how many lands and which ones were suitable for cultivation.

With the final conquest of the country, a new flux of technical and academic discourses on Libyan territory contributed to the definition of the demographic colonization objectives. The colonial sciences were part of a complex of discourses and practices of education and legitimation, such as the population census or land quantification: while serving as a practical logic, these practices and discourses were also part of the illusion of colonial bureaucratic power of being able to control the indigenous reality, making it conceptually «manageable» (Appadurai, 1996, p. 152). When Italian colonialists could devote themselves to the mapping of Libyan territory they were impatient to understand the colony and to shape it through colonization projects. The colonial conquest deprived the entire Libyan population of the right on their territory and distorted the local systems of resource exploitation. In Tripolitania, the governor Volpi solved the problem of the scarcity of land in an authoritarian way, conferring the property of empty lands to the colonial government and confiscating the funds of the rebels and of those who had supported the anti-colonial resistance. In Cyrenaica, when the “pacification” process was over, together with the phase of experimental colonization based on conferring large plots of land to a few metropolitan dealers (Cresti, 1996), the Governor Balbo

started, in 1937, the intensive demographic colonization program. On the eve of World War II, over ten thousand settlers arrived in Libya and about 900 thousand hectares of land were conferred to the government property, of which 374.670 hectares granted in concession (Del Boca, 1991, p. 266). As effect of the military actions and of the expropriations, for the first time the colonialists were forced to consider that the Empire was not depopulated as the explorers had described. The mass immigration of Italian peasants toward a region whose population was so hostile to the colonization also meant to reformulate the first beliefs about the role of the future settlers and their relationship with the natives.

If Italians still lacked the knowledge of the Empire's territories, the Fascist agronomist Mazzocchi Alemanni suggested to compensate the incompleteness of data with a correct interpretation of the environment, as an organic whole, in order to implement the colonial action (Mazzochi Alemanni, 1938). This would also mean to "discover" the presence of indigenous people in a territory that colonialists considered depopulated, perhaps due to some «particular ways of settlement that we might could define *mimetic* in relation to the country» and to some other elements that had misled scholars and administrators (Mazzochi Alemanni, 1938). Once recognized the presence of the native populations, the colonialists had to assess their value for the future of the Empire. First of all, it was necessary to understand the relationship between the indigenous people and the land and how to restrict their rights of property (Mazzochi Alemanni, 1938). In a few words, the local land systems (collective, flexible, founded on Islamic law and tribal traditions) were replaced with the absolute and direct property of the colonial government. Even before, in the Italian Eastern Africa the «labour policy (and its ethnic theory)» was circulating among «the three vertices of a triangle: slavery (that colonialists wanted to fight), forced labour (that they wanted to impose as a kind of forced education or as a punishment for certain types of crimes) and work as a new cultural value (which they tried to introduce)» (Solinas, 1988). Around the agrarian question and retaking old themes of the colonial discourse, Italians established a new regime of truth focused on the assumption that indigenous peoples were unable to use their own land and that the intervention of Italian labour was necessary (quasi-divine).

The education of the colonized

Demographic colonization, therefore, interlinked with an epistemological conflict about the land and the ways to inhabit it; that gives an idea of the multiple paths that connected pre-colonization imaginary geographies to the Imperial action, the successes and failures of the colonial rule to the anti-colonial resistance. It is worth to underline that this stage of the Italian dominion in Northern Africa was made possible only thanks to twenty years of bloody military campaigns carried out after the conquest of Tripoli in 1911 till the "pacification" of the entire country in 1932 (Ahmida, 1994; Del Boca, 1991; Salerno, 2005). The demographic coloni-

zation led by the governor Balbo would have begun in 1937 and end a few years later with the outbreak of war and the end of the Italian colonial rule in Africa. Despite its brevity, this experience is important if one consider it, as suggested by Nicholas Thomas, as a “colonial project”, an analytical category that defines the «socially transformative power that is localized, politicized and partial, yet even produced by historical developments» and the ways «these developments are narrated» (Thomas, 1994, pp. 105-106).

The project implied the mass migration of Italian peasant families to settle into the rural areas and villages built on this purpose. The colonial authorities managed emigration, providing lands and accommodation, while two para-state organizations organized the work of rural families. The programme – aimed to face overpopulation and unemployment in the Italian countryside, to develop agriculture within the colony and to strengthen the presence of metropolitan citizens – was based on a mix of political and technical discourses as well on the long experience of scholars and scientists who have investigated the chances of development of Libya for years. The colonial society was seen as a complex organism ready to operate through disciplinary mechanisms addressed both to Arab populations and to the settlers. The speech of the demographer and sociologist Filippo Virgili at the First Congress of Colonial Studies in 1931 demonstrates, for example, the biopolitical attitude of the fascist colonialism in Libya: he spoke of Libyans as «lost tribes» or «primitive peoples not yet touched by the wind of civilization», leading a poor existence through a poor pastoral economy. Even if he blamed this lack of progress, Virgili tried to figure out forms of cooperation with them, freeing them from “slavery” even if it had been at considerable expense. It was time to consider, beyond the objectivity of the natural elements, the great challenge represented by the “active element”, the man as a producer, whose work needed to be “educated” in order to reap the maximum profit from nature itself: «we can say without hesitation that Arabic is dominated by nature and he was not able to appreciate it; he served nature instead of exploiting it for his own benefit. The Italian worker has learned to defend themselves from the inconstancy of nature and will impose his will even to climatic irregularities and to the rough ground». What the colonial rule needed was, first of all, «care and training of indigenous labour» but also the «agricultural education of Italian immigrant» (Virgili, 1931).

“Civilizing” the ones, educating the others within an impoverished and abandoned natural environment: a dual register of intervention, on settlers and colonized, to turn them into docile, productive, racialized bodies. The indigenous policy for Balbo was not an anti-British geopolitical strategy, as his speeches demonstrated at the Volta Congress in 1938, when he declared his intention to include the coastal populations of Libya into the Italian territory and to allow Libyans the chance to acquire the Italian citizenship, a project never put into practice, because of its obvious inconsistency with the racist fascist program. Noteworthy, the innovative ideas of Balbo’s indigenous policy, including a set of social measures addressed to what he called Italians Muslims, were different to the previous brutal

policy of repression, but they went parallel to an unprecedented strengthen of racial segregation as well as to a clear ethnic separation between Arabs and Berbers of the coastal provinces, on one side, considered «capable of assimilating the spirit of our laws and to evolve themselves» and people of the Libyan Sahara, a «country of distinctly colonial character, populated by people of Negroid race», on the other side. (Balbo, 1938). By distinguishing between “colonial” and “non-colonial” peoples Balbo made racialization a concrete program of government, even contradicting the main assumption of the Manifesto of the Racist Scientists which declared that the race was «a purely biological concept» not dependent on historical processes. As Ann Stoler (1992) has observed, the colonial law elaborated in the mother country took on new meanings and forms within the colony. After all, Balbo never questioned the principle of racial segregation. What is critical in Balbo’s discourse is, rather, the governmental techniques of differential inclusion of Libyans, in particular the measures aimed to the protection and exploitation of the indigenous labour, both to pastoral activities and agricultural ones, including free allocation of state land to Libyans citizens, in order to link semi-nomadic people to the land. Before labour, Balbo tackled the education of Libyans (Tekeste, 2005; Jerari, 2003) with measures that reveal the inherent coherence of his program of social engineering. The government of Tripoli tried to spread school education among the Libyan people investing relevant financial resources in the construction of new school buildings and teacher training. Quranic schools were maintained but subjected to sanitary and hygienic supervision (Balbo, 1938); Italo-Arab primary schools were established even in the most remote villages with Italian teachers supported by the few Arab professors available. After the primary school, Arab pupils were directed to the so-called «Muslim schools of indigenous arts and crafts» with the purpose of turning them into workers to be employed in the most humble tasks of the Libyan economy. Girls’ schools of “Education and Work” were established throughout the country, what for Balbo would have represented «a significant step in the evolution of the Muslim Libyan women». These were boarding schools where girls were trained and could achieve the «qualification to the practice as care assistants, in order to spread the modern hygiene principles among Libyan families» (Balbo, 1938).

The segregationist character of indigenous policy reached its climax with the *Gioventù Araba del Littorio*, a fascist organization for the Libyan youth, parallel to the one provided for the Italian one, but strictly separated. Young people coming from the Libyan elite, finally, had the possibility to continue their education at the “Islamic Culture School”, founded in 1935 like the GAL, with the aim of offering a high education institution in Islamic law. In fact, through the school, the government had the monopoly of Islamic education and, together, the chance to train loyal and docile subjects to be employed as civil servants in the positions reserved to the natives (Muslim teachers in primary schools; employees or officials of public administration; alim, cadi or mufti in Sharia courts, the parallel judicial system for indigenous; teachers of the madrasa). Balbo was planning a parallel recruitment

system, with grades, assignments, promotions, for the Libyan positions in the colonial administration where the candidates had to «expose and illustrate one of the fundamental measures adopted by the government for the social and moral elevation of the Muslim populations» (Balbo, 1938).

The goal was to cancel the nomadic and mimetic element of indigenous labour and to frame it in corporative organizations controlled by the state; to separate and regulate the education and the training of young Libyans: the punitive and spectacular power of the first phase of pacification should have been replaced by the biopolitical regulation of colonized peoples. The Balbo government went, therefore, beyond the colonialist tradition, typical of Graziani's era, the one who could defeat the indomitable Bedouins of Cyrenaica, a population described by the chronicles of the time as «invisible» or «formless» or «mimetic» with the territory (Del Boca, 1991) only by imprisoning it. Balbo, on the contrary, thanks to a more stable political situation, an organic “understanding” of the territory and a coherent project, could move the colonized out of the shadow of his traditional social structures and inserted him/her in the modern bureaucratic colonial State. Rather than chaining indigenous forces and reduce them – as Graziani had done with the concentration camps aimed to reduce the energies of resistance, physically eliminating the protagonists – Balbo aimed at wanted to organize Libyan forces to multiply them. Most of the Balbo' governmental practices did not reach their goals; Libyans were never passive objects of his policy and all his plans were abruptly interrupted by the Second World War and the governor's death. Moreover, it is important to point out that the military campaign and the demographic colonization, i.e. Graziani's violence and Balbo's governmentality were two sides of the same coin, contiguous phases that can be distinguished only for the analytical purposes, since Balbo could not even imagine a social policy towards Libyans without the guarantee of their total submission; among the survivors, the memory of mass executions and internments was still alive and it likely worked as a strong deterrent to rebellion attempts. Nevertheless, our analysis of Balbo's discourses and practices is mainly meant to contribute to the decentralization of the Italian history, emphasizing the importance of the colonial space in the transition of the country to capitalist modernity. The set of indigenous policies was not a mere transfer in the colony of the labour regulation system carried out by fascism in the motherland, because colonial policies were intended not only to produce docile and useful bodies, or differentiated and organized productive forces, but also to hierarchize those forces. The census policies of colonized peoples, for example, had the effect of placing important indigenous practices along new directions, so applying, in this way, different criteria of value upon existing conceptions of group identity, physical distinctions and agricultural productivity (Appadurai, 1996, p. 52). Through institutions such as the GAL or the Italo-Arab schools, the Libyans were captured in the colonial system of classifications and hierarchies that was designed to transform the image they had of themselves in a negative sense: they had to learn to look at themselves through the colonialist' eyes, following the typical alienation process of the colonial situation.

This was the case of the Islamic judges who had to pass a process of recruitment where the evaluation criteria were established by the colonial government, in contrast with Islamic law; the case also of native women who were taught to adapt household management and care of children to the hygienic principles of the dominant culture; or the one of Libyan farmers, whose fertile lands had been stolen by the colonial government and substituted with other less fertile soils. The Islamic principle «the land belongs to those who cultivate it», whose purpose was preventing the formation of large private properties, was translated by the colonial power as a right to civilize (thus to dominate) a population unable to exploit its territory.

The rural infantry

Between 2 and 3 November 1938, 1,800 Italian families were conducted in Libya; other 11.000 settlers left the following year and similar expeditions were planned for the coming years with the aim of bringing about one million “rural” metropolitans to the Fourth Shore. The first expedition of 1938 (so-called Expedition of Twenty Thousand) was among the most spectacular demonstrations of strength and grandeur of the fascist regime and the singular example of a mass emigration organized by the State: the departure from the ports of Genoa and Naples was an event somewhere between a military parade and a celebration (Segré, 1978) – in fact men were asked to wear the military uniform – as well as a rite of passage that marked the beginning of a new life for the settlers. For the fascist ideologues, the settler was not an immigrant, but rather “an entrepreneur” who brought “his capital, his business, his culture and his order in a region of the Empire «to give life to the colony and develop it»; if the immigrant could be described as an “unemployed” that left his motherland, often alone, «with a sack on his back» to «offer his work» in those foreign countries that required it, on the contrary, the colonizers departed as a «team, with a safe guide and an accurate program», and they knew that they would have never lacked «support and assistance» or «the comforting vision of a family» (Virgili, 1931). The settlers were called homeland heroes, real soldiers mobilized «for a great battle fought for themselves and their children» (ECL, 1938), “rural infantry” who continued the war of conquest against the hostile nature of the colony (INFPS, 1939). The colonialist had no weapon, but was armed with his work and his arms, the settler could undermine the colonial order if he did not fit the role the regime choose for him. Many families settled in Libya before the demographic colonization had proved themselves “unsuitable” to for the role, because untrained, undisciplined, more likely to repatriate or to find wage work in the urban centres of the colony rather than to face the hard work of peasants, or too friendly with the indigenus. To ensure the success of the colonization and turn migrants in search of fortune into “agents of the Empire”, the government had to select larger families, of proven Fascist faith and with a strong agricultural culture. The colonial Government organized the expedition in detail, setting on “scientific

basis” quantity and quality of the metropolitan population to receive, with a fair proportion of women, in order to facilitate the normal and natural reproduction of the race and to avoid the risk of racial intermarriage (Livi, 1937). Women would have ensured the regeneration of the Italian race, in its broadest meaning, satisfying the sexual instincts of the man and supporting him in moments of despair, reproducing the national family in the overseas, favouring the stabilization of labour and giving birth to the «future army of workers» for colonization projects (INFPS, 1939): the presence of women in the colony was primarily a problem of defence of the race. Despite the rhetoric of the authorities, the settlers did not seem to feel either pioneers or Empire soldiers; totally heedless of the romantic aspect of their mission, they seemed attracted by the sole desire of a land to be possessed (Moore, 1940, p. 36). In fact, the bellicose rhetoric of land valorisation was the integral part of the fascist project of social engineering, in particular with the purpose to ensure public order, to prevent the risk of defections and to encourage a mentality of land owners and the affection to the land among the settlers (Cresti, 1996, p. 72). The most pervasive element of sanction/control/reward system within the demographic colonization was the colonic contract that the farmer had to sign with the colonial institutions. The final acquisition of the plot of land entrusted to the settler was subjected to certain requirements: he had to take care of the house and the barn, he could not rent them or allow their use to others, he could not change the consistency of the lot and allow the members of the family to leave; above all he had to follow any directive of the government technicians. Whether the farmer had given evidence of «inability or unwillingness to run the farm, or of indiscipline», the government (i.e. the institute of colonization) could have terminated the contract or issued a fine. For diligent settlers some small grants were provided, but the ultimate objective was the final possession of the land, so that the improvement of the settler’s condition and the colony’s development could be considered in a certain way equivalent. Within 25 or 30 years the farmer would have definitely paid off his debt to the government of the colony and received his property contract.

Demographic colonization was also a radical project of re-foundation of the colonized territory, where the space organization reflected the principles and the values of the colonial rule. The war and the expropriation of indigenous lands had liberated the fertile soils from the presence of native populations, while the building of the roads and of other infrastructures made the territory fit to live in. Then the territory was divided into fertile lands reserved to Italians and lands less suited to human settlement where the natives could continue to practice agriculture and sheep-breeding. The space reserved for the settlers was further divided into districts and farms, small production units made of a plot of land and a farmhouse to accommodate a family; at the centre of the area there was the rural village, with the church, the House of Fascism, the Offices of colonization and agrarian technicians, the food shop, the post office, a clinic, the school and the sports fields. The villages were designed to meet the material and spiritual needs of the settlers, to ensure a perfect organization of the work and the maximum productivity of the lots in the

context of a family life marked by sobriety and work. Social life should have been lived within the boundaries of the national community: Balbo wanted the settlers to have fun with games and dancing after work, without imposing a too rigid control over women, except in cases where the possibility of sentimental relationships with Muslims was suspected (Cresti, 1996). Despite Balbo had called for a progressive removal of the indigenous population from the colonization areas that had become «ethnic islands» (Cresti, 1996, p. 75), this condition was in fact not realizable, not only because the Italian population was a minority, but also because the coexistence of Italian and indigenous required that the latter were entrusted to the most humble and heavy work, to formally ensure the superiority of the first. Given the premise of separation, the work time remained a critical space in which the settlers could forget to be the superior race and treat the Arabs as the companions of the same level or on the contrary, abuse their privilege disrespecting them. With regard to the study of colonial Tripoli, Mia Fuller (2006) argued that the principle of ethnic segregation in Italian colonialism was not fully respected and that the plans differed radically from political practices. According to Fuller, the literature on fascist Italian colonialism was based on an “assumption of apartheid”, but more than “ethnic oasis” in Libya there were rather “ambiguity oases” where Italians and natives had many opportunities to meet and interact. However, the ambiguity of the racial segregation policy in Libya (in Tripoli as well as in the country) does not diminish its intrinsic discriminatory logic, nor its long-term effects: crossings the colour line was more apparent than real, since the principle of substantial difference between the two races, strongly incorporated by the Italians, was not diminished either by spatial proximity or by collaboration in certain fields of social life.

The segregation of races, therefore, worked both on a practical level and on a symbolic one. The colonial government was really concerned to make the segregation practices visible, turning the colonized space into the stage of civilization scene through narratives and discourses (Massaretti, 2002; 2003). The domestication of Libyan space was also achieved by drawing on it, through limits and distances, the colonial values of inclusion/exclusion, its categories, its principles of classification. For example, the relationship between the village, the farms and the territory outside the areas drew the hierarchical order among the colonial subjects, the government, the settlement agencies, the settlers and the natives. The demarcation of the areas emphasized, at the same time, the distinction between an interior “Italian” space and an indigenous outside area, on the one hand; between valuable and not valuable territories, on the other hand. The centre of rural villages, instead, represented the political, economic and technical power irradiating on the individual farms. The organization of space in the areas symbolized, more generally, the land valorisation as a progressive fight against wilderness: the districts were not closed universes, but networks of production units which, by the virtue of their relationship with the colonial power, extended their influence on the surrounding territory, continually transforming it. In this hybrid space, the farmhouse remained the core of racial segregation as the farmer was compelled to keep the indigenous «away

from home» (Giglio, 1939: 9-19). The relevance of the colonized space in the creation of the domestic self (Chambers, 2006), in other words, should be literally seen as the centrality of the land, the land of the colony, in the representation of the colonialist self.

Land reclamation as colonial enclosure

The Italian settlers in Libya, unlike the metropolitan ones, did not work for a landowner but for a colonial government who stole the lands to local populations by military force. Unlike their peers in the motherland the relationship that bound the first to the land was a concrete expression of the violence of the colonial system. The non-productivity of the lands they were called to colonize was alleged more than real: those territories were far away from being desert and unpopulated, they were instead inhabited and used by Libyan populations, who employed alternative methods compared with the ones established by the ruler. The colonial valorisation of the soil, therefore, did not concern the increase of the productivity or the economic performance, but was about the establishment of a new political and cultural system. The term valorisation itself, characteristic of the Italian colonial discourse, was used, as appropriate, to define the agricultural policy or the civilizing mission, as if the two things were equivalent. As the British journalist Martin Moore (1940) pointed out, the Fascist demographic colonization in Libya was the translation of the “integral land reclamation” (*bonifica integrale*) within the Empire. That term describes a series of radical transformation of the land (including the draining of wetlands, the introduction of new agricultural techniques to increase productivity and measures to limit the spread of endemic and epidemic diseases), undertaken since the first decade of XIX century by Italian liberal governments and then improved by Fascism that made it the core of its political culture. The integral land reclamation was for the fascists a kind of totalitarian occupation of the territory, which needed to be transformed in all its aspects, but also a process of rooting people to the land. The land reclamation assumed an equivalence between uncultivated lands and the risk of contagion, an equivalence that can be understood only if we consider the “contaminant” as a form of disorder that violates moral and social taxonomies, the elimination of which is more the effort to organize the environment than not a negative act (Douglas, 2002). The idea of a pervasive risk of contagion worked as an analogy «to express a general point of view on social order» (Douglas, 2002). So, in the colony the technical use of the term “land reclamation” implied a broader political and cultural sense aimed to introduce, in the colonial context, the radical fascist project of sanitization of the social body and national regeneration (Ben Ghiat, 2001). Within the Italian colonial context, then, new biopolitical mechanisms of populations’ government toward a “differential inclusion” of productive forces (Mezzadra, 2008) were implemented. To an extent far more extreme than that of the mother land, in the colony the colonization/land reclamation

represented a real process of enclosure, expropriation of commons, removal of the collective forms of land ownership, in parallel with the establishment of a racial order that crossed the bodies and the domestic space even before the public one. The land reclamation in the colonial territory represented a process of transition to the language of value as well as of transformation of colonists and colonized in productive subjects. From a decentralized and trans-Mediterranean perspective and starting from the history of the Italian demographic colonization of Libya, its policies of re-foundation of the country and its disciplinary power toward both Libyan colonized and Italian settlers, therefore, I tried to stress how the meaning of “war” changes within at the colonial context, where peace is represented both as the result and the continuation of the war. In the “pacified” Libyan colony, symbols and practices adopted by Italian colonizers in land reclamation and agricultural colonization were keeping the violence of the colonial war (against “barbarity”), even if the object was no longer the “colonized” but rather the “nature” of the colony. In this short but crucial phase of the colonial rule, the epistemological and material conflict between colonized and colonizers was played around the notions of land and labour, so contributing, in this way, to shape the final transition of the two countries to capitalist modernity but also to strengthen the imaginary boundary between the human being and its environment that characterizes the global present.

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Old Conflicts and new Borders: Chronicles from the Zones of the Anglo-American Landing of 9 September 1943

GIUSEPPE D'ANGELO

The armistice between the Anglo-American forces and the Kingdom of Italy breaks down the framework of the alliances during the World War II and sets a completely different scene of warfare. The ally of yesterday is the enemy of today; those depicted by the propaganda as “the evil” become allies, liberators, bearers of democracy.

Among both the soldiers and the civil population, the change of scene is lived with different and, sometimes, contrasting feelings. The hope that war may quickly finish survives, but a feeling of resigned disillusionment prevails in the souls of those who had much more wholeheartedly rejoiced after the fall of Mussolini on 25 July.

The article aims at reconstructing the events related with the announcement of the armistice and the Anglo-American landing of 9 September 1943, seen by a particular observatory, the city and the province of Salerno, where the military operation is carried out.

The hours of the abandonment

The day of the announcement of the armistice appears, to the rulers of the country, a day like any other. Raffaele Guariglia, minister of foreign affairs of the Badoglio government, shows an extraordinary tranquillity, sure that the contacts with the general Maxwell Taylor, commander of the 101a Airborne Division, and the diplomatic action of general Rossi can persuade the Allies to postpone the landing (Guariglia, 1950, pp. 703-704). Guariglia is wrong: Roosevelt will be intransigent and, indeed, the fleet which carries the soldiers of the landing has left Orano, Biserta and Tripoli between 3 and 7 September and has joined the ships departed Palermo and Termini Imerese on 8 September (Pesce, 1993, p. 21). At the moment of the announcement of the armistice they are off the coast of Capri.

The surprise of the Italian rulers is absolute. The minister Guariglia writes that he has been urgently summoned at the *Quirinale*, where the marshal Badoglio, with not very polite words, informs the presents about what is happening (Guariglia 1950, p. 704).

The armistice comes unexpected, as well as the German reaction (D'Angelo, 2007): Benedetto Croce himself registers the news with a laconic note in his diary: «Alle 18,30 tornavo a casa da una piccola passeggiata quando Adelina mi ha detto di aver udito alla radio che è stato concluso l'armistizio con gli anglo-americani» (p. 6). The tone is very different from that, full of hope and expectations, of 25 July (p. 1) and from that, more hushed, of a note of late August.

In Salerno the day of the armistice begins with an Allied recognizer which flies over the city, with a late air-alarm and with three cannon-shots, aimed at pushing away the enemy aircraft (A. Carucci, 1972, p. 21).

Fernando Dentoni Litta describes that day:

[...] fu una bella giornata calda e piena di sole, senza preallarmi o allarmi aerei. Nel tardo pomeriggio si diffuse la notizia che l'Italia aveva firmato l'armistizio con le Forze Alleate, appresa da "Radio Algeri" che aveva trasmesso un comunicato del generale Eisenhower. La notizia, nonostante non fosse confermata dalla radio italiana, suscitò grande attesa e non mancarono dimostrazioni di giubilo anche se forzatamente frenate, soprattutto da coloro che vestivano una divisa militare.

La conferma arrivò alle 19,45. [...]

Il proclama di Badoglio scatenò tanta gioia nella popolazione. Cortei di giubilo si ebbero per tutta la città e fu festa in tutti gli ambienti, compresi quelli militari, dove, però, ciascuno restò al suo posto in attesa di disposizioni (che non arrivarono mai e ben presto le forze armate furono allo sbando) (pp. 47-48).

The expectation of the Italian soldiers is vain; moreover, the commanders of the military units present in the area do not have many certainties and the headquarters located in Campania and Basilicata are unaware of what is happening. The testimonies of colonel Ugo Almici, chief of staff of the XIX army corps, and of general Mario Arisio, commander of the 7a Army, are particularly interesting.

The narrative of colonel Almici provides information related to the general conditions and to the difficulties of communication between the headquarter – stationed in Curti (province of Caserta) and in the process of moving in Casamarciano, near Nola (province of Naples) exactly in the morning of 8 September – and the units stationed further south. Almici tells the difficulties of Italian soldiers: the communication with 222a coast division (which controls the strip from Capo d'Orso to Castrocucco, on the border between Basilicata and Calabria) is interrupted for days because of the allied bombings; the coast brigade C is in the same conditions; radio links are practically inexistent and links are kept only by radiograms transmitted on the Navy wire. The moving of the headquarter should reduce the distance and ease the communication. That morning Almici asks the commandant, General Riccardo Pentimalli, if, on the basis of the *Memoria 44 OP*, the order of transfer should be cancelled; the commandant, unaware, confirms the order. In the late afternoon, when Almici reaches Casamarciano, the rumours of the armistice is already circulating and the generals

Ettore del Tetto, commandant of the territorial defence of Naples, and Ettore Marino, commandant of the defence of the harbour, confirm them. Almici asks information to the Bureau of Operations of the Staff, but after 19,00 – less than half an hour after the speech of Badoglio and the news provided by the Allied radios – he is driedly and repeatedly told: «Riceverete ordini»¹.

The announcement of the armistice surprises the leaders of the Italian armed forces, the same men who should react to attacks by «qualsiasi provenienza»: last and useless euphemism to say German attacks.

Seen from a particular observatory, such as the headquarter of the 222a coast division in Buccoli di Conforti, the 8 September is a singular day. We can reconstruct it through the testimonies collected by General Mario Soldarelli, territorial commandant of Naples, charged to write a report on the events related to the murder of General Ferrante Gonzaga del Vodice². One of Gonzaga's subordinates, in his testimony, describes the excitement of those hours:

L'8 settembre 1943, verso le ore 11 un messaggio cifrato proveniente dal XIX Corpo d'Armata ci avvertiva che la flotta anglo-americana era in rotta verso la nostra costa; fino alle ore 16 di quel giorno fu un susseguirsi di messaggi. Che io, quale sottufficiale di servizio, decifravo col cifrario "O. P.". L'ultimo radiogramma ci segnalava la flotta nemica al largo del golfo di Salerno e Napoli precisando specie il numero delle navi.

Gran fermento al Comando: accordi con le unità germaniche, ordini ai reggimenti dipendenti, disposizioni per l'imminente battaglia.

Il comandante della 16^a Divisione corazzata tedesca ci comunicò «Dalle ore 16.45 la 16^a Divisione "Panzer" è pronta per il combattimento».

Verso le ore 18 ci portammo ai ricoveri, tre grotte scavate nella collina immediatamente dietro la palazzina del Comando. [...]

Io portai con me la macchina da scrivere e la cassetta d'acciaio con i cifrari e i timbri del Comando.

Poco prima delle 20 iniziò il bombardamento aereo-navale, intensificatosi subito con un crescente impressionante.

Then, the turn of events:

Alle ore 20 apprendemmo dalla radio la notizia dell'armistizio: ne fu avvertito il Sig. Generale che venne subito nella nostra grotta e chiese conferma della notizia. La stazione radio gliela diede col testo integrale del messaggio del Maresciallo Badoglio³.

The surprise is absolute and arrives when they are preparing to contrast the Anglo-American landing and are looking for the necessary agreements with the German headquarter of the 16a Panzer Division, located in Eboli. Gonzaga has under-

¹ Archivio Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Esercito (AUSSME)", Fondo N 1 – 11 "Diari storici della seconda guerra mondiale", b. 2122/B "Settima armata". *Relazione sul comportamento all'atto e dopo l'armistizio compilata dal colonnello Almici Ugo*, pp. 22-23 (from now *Relazione Almici*).

² AUSSME, *Fascicolo personale 4084. Generale Gonzaga Principe don Ferrante*, "Relazione sulla morte del Generale GONZAGA Principe don Ferrante Comandante la 222^a Divisione costiera del generale SOLDARELLI Mario" (from now *Relazione Soldarelli*)

³ *Relazione Soldarelli*, annex 8 "Relazione sulla morte del Sig. generale Gonzaga del serg. magg. Gaetano Cipullo", (from now *Relazione Cipullo*).

stood for some time the possibility of a change of alliances and on 30 July he has written to his sister to be worried for an «attacco alle spalle da parte dei tedeschi». He also states to intend «spostare delle batterie in modo da dominare le strade e, se si muovono, apro il fuoco contro di loro», and to have blocked the roads placing some cannons. (Gonzaga, personal communication, 30 July 1943).

Uncertainty and confusion prevail, making even more evident the difference between the importance of the moment – with the surrender to the Anglo-Americans and the change of alliances – and the absolute inability of the military leaders to manage this sensitive transition, ensuring the continuity of the chain of command and the support of the peripheral units. The king, his family and part of the government escape to Brindisi; military leaders run away leaving units without orders and provoking their disbandment; the «si salvi chi può» prevails.

In these hours, Salerno is the front line of the military operations in Southern Europe, as well as the epicentre of a real revolution in Italy's war. Privileged observatory, also in consideration of the outcome of the event, is the headquarter of the 222^a coast division.

It is necessary to underline that the information on the evening of 8 September are not reported in univocal way and, therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct the framework of the different testimonies to deduce some certain elements.

Luciano Garibaldi (2006) states that the news of the armistice «venne appresa dal comando della 222^a divisione costiera [...] ascoltando il giornale radio trasmesso dall'EIAR alle 19,45» (p. 97). Major Luigi Pinna, opening the memorial which he delivers to the Staff of the Regio Esercito, states: «La notizia della firma dell'armistizio fra l'Italia e le Nazioni Unite, venne, dal Comando della 222^a Divisione costiera, appreso tramite una emissione dell'E.I.A.R. alle ore 20.30 del giorno 8 settembre»⁴. The testimony of captain Raffaello Tarquini – quoted by Garibaldi (2006, pp. 105-110 and published in a 1945 book (Fumarola, 1945, pp. 167-172) – generally speaks of 20,00 hours. Understanding the exact moment of the announcement is not an excess of zeal, because the time available to general Gonzaga is an essential element to evaluate his possibility to react. Pinna is not present during the following events, but he is certainly with Gonzaga when they listen by radio to the announcement of Badoglio. If the chronological reconstruction of the major is correct, they listen to a reply, 48 minutes after the first announcement by the EIAR and two hours after the announcement of Eisenhower by the microphones of Radio Algeri. In the meantime, German soldiers are already informed, so that major Udo Von Alvensleben, chief of staff of 16a Panzer Division, writes in his diary (8 September 1943, h. 6,30 p. m.) that Italy has signed the armistice with Anglo-Americans and has unconditionally surrendered (Von Alvensleben, 1971, p. 319). The former allies, therefore, know the decision of the Italian government be-

⁴ AUSSME, Fondo N 1 – 11 “Diari storici della seconda guerra mondiale”, b. 2122/B “Settima armata”, “Relazione Pinna”, p. 1 (from now *Relazione Pinna*). A copy of the *Relazione Pinna* is kept in the personal file of General Gonzaga, annexed to the report of general, (*Relazione Soladarelli*, annex 5 “Relazione del maggiore Luigi Pinna”).

fore Gonzaga; many others hear about it after a demonstration of joy of Italian citizens, who have listened to the broadcasting of the strictly forbidden Radio Londra.

The personal file of general Gonzaga allows to establish some certain elements. The medical captain Marco Petrosino, in a testimony released to general Mario Soldarelli, states:

Il giorno 8 settembre essendo stato dato l'allarme aereo-navale il comando tattico divisionale, come già predisposto, alle ore 20 si trasferì al ricovero sito ai GROTTINI di Buccoli di Conforti e precisamente nel Grottino ove era installato il Centralino telefonico. Il sottoscritto con altri ufficiali e con il suo aiutante di sanità raggiunse il ricovero alle ore 20.15. Alle ore 20.30 dalla stazione radio del Comando venne comunicato che dalle stazioni radio civili era stato trasmesso il bollettino annunziante l'avvenuto armistizio con l'esercito anglo-americano. Alle ore 20.45 circa ci raggiunse nel Grottino il Signor Generale Gonzaga, comandante della divisione, il quale si accertò attraverso gli ufficiali presenti, ognuno per la parte di propria competenza, che ogni servizio fosse in regolare efficienza. Dopo di che invitò gli ufficiali a raggiungere il proprio posto di servizio durante i bombardamenti, restando egli all'ingresso del Grottino⁵.

In spite of the delay and of the absolute vagueness of the radio message, Gonzaga issues precise orders, which he deduces, probably, from the *Memoria 44 OP*. Major Pinna summarises them:

- a) - abbandono della linea di spiaggia;
- b) - concentramento dei vari reparti in compagnie, battaglioni; successivamente, dietro ordine del comando di divisione, concentramento per reggimenti;
- c) - opporsi con le armi a qualunque tentativo tedesco di disarmo o di offesa alle armi italiane⁶.

Gonzaga has to face huge difficulties to communicate with his units stationed in Campania and Basilicata. It is again Pinna, who in that moment is together with the General, to narrate them:

Gli ordini [...], data la interruzione dei collegamenti causata dalle precedenti azioni aeree, furono recapitati al comando del 17° costiero, e al raggruppamento di artiglieria dal col. in s.p.e. MAESTRI del comando di divisione; non poterono essere trasmessi al comando del 18° reggimento costiero, sia per l'interruzione delle comunicazioni, sia perché l'ufficiale incaricato ne fu impedito dalla situazione creatasi in seguito.

Il colonnello MAESTRI poté raggiungere il colonnello del 17° reggimento costiero, e trasmettere gli ordini concretati dal comando di divisione. Questi poterono essere trasmessi [...] solo al 239° battaglione costiero in Salerno, ed al 162° battaglione costiero ad Agropoli. In base ad essi, due compagnie del 239° battaglione del comando di battaglione e il comando di difesa porto di Salerno, poterono opporsi al tentativo di disarmo iniziato dai tedeschi; del 162° battaglione una compagnia poté anche essa opporsi al tentativo di cui sopra⁷.

⁵ *Relazione Soldarelli*, allegato n. 4 "Dichiarazione sui fatti d'arme dell'8 settembre 1943 del Capitano medico cpl. PETROSINO Mario", p. 1 (from now *Relazione Pterosino*).

⁶ *Relazione Pinna*, p. 1.

⁷ *Ibidem*. Capitals in the original.

The 17° regiment takes over control the coastline between Capo d'Orso and Punta Licosa, with headquarter in Battipaglia; the 18° controls the territory from Punta Licosa to Castrocucco, on the border between Basilicata and Calabria, and has its headquarter in Sapri⁸.

Here again it is evident that the situation is clear to Gonzaga and he immediately tries to carry out what he had deduced by the rare instructions received and, mostly, by his instinct of soldier. Just one thing is surprising and can partly be justified only by the short time and the absolute necessity to warn and direct the headquarters of the regiments: it is very strange that a soldier like Gonzaga does not think, as is demonstrated by the following events, to organize more carefully the defence of his headquarter. Only the hurry to give the orders to the furthest units and an extraordinary trust that all soldiers would behave by the rules of military honour can have determined a situation that will prove to be dramatic.

For the defence of the headquarter Gonzaga places two machine guns Breda 37, one at Villa Conforti and one close to the caves⁹.

At this point, the testimony of Major Pinna ends. Pinna is sent to the headquarter of the 16a Panzer in Eboli, in order to «informare quel comando della cessata nostra collaborazione e per prendere accordi con quel capo di S.M., circa il comportamento della truppa italiana e tedesca»¹⁰.

The situation of Gonzaga and of the Italian soldiers will become dramatic and the destiny of the general is by now signed. Alvensleben (1971, p. 319) writes in his diary that he told the General Sickenius that his mission would certainly entail the death of the Prince, as he had never surrendered, and that therefore he proposed to go unarmed to him.

The certain element is this: in the evening of 8 September, a short time after 21,00 – one hour after the announcement of Badoglio – the German Major reaches Gonzaga and orders him to surrender; the Italian general falls to German bullets.

It is not clear the dynamic of the firefight in which Gonzaga is killed. The minister of the war himself believes that some aspects of the tragedy of Buccoli di Conforti must be clarified. In an autograph note sent the Colonel Luigi Bruni, chief of staff of the minister Alessandro Casati, representative of the liberal party in the two Badoglio governments, he writes: «S. E. dice: Segnalare a chi di ragione le questioni oscure perché se ne tenga memoria ed in caso si facciano indagini»¹¹. The testimonies on the matter are discordant and it seems that there is no eye-witnesses able to describe in a reliable and concrete way what happened.

The most complete testimony is provided by Captain Tarquini, who is not present at the event because he is captured by Germans at the headquarter of the division. The officer reports in details what he hears by Major Italo Panzi, present in

⁸ *Relazione Almici*, p. 2.

⁹ *Relazione Almici*, p. 2.

¹⁰ *Relazione Pinna*, p. 1.

¹¹ AUSSME, *Fascicolo personale 4084. Gonzaga Principe don Ferrante*, "Appunto autografo del col. Lombardi", 11 aprile 1945.

the caves of Buccoli (Fumarola, 1945, pp. 170-171). Luciano Garibaldi also quotes the testimony offered in 1949 to the Gonzaga family by Captain Michele Mastrocinque, who refers what is said by his colleagues.

The testimony of Von Alvensleben, who is certainly in the same place of Ferrante Gonzaga, could be useful. Von Alvensleben goes to Gonzaga in order to make him surrender and to put the Italian soldiers into protection. The major states that he is aware that the Italian general would never surrender and this behaviour would entail his death.

The words of the German major clarify the sense of the “Fall Achse”, the Operation Axis – code name elaborated by the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW) to face the eventual surrender of Italy, to neutralize the armed force deployed in the different theatres of the Mediterranean and to occupy the Peninsula: “Ernte einbringen”, secure harvest, bring harvest in the farmhouse. The “harvest” is the surrender of the Italian army, irrespective of the means to achieve it.

In the caves of Buccoli Alvensleben asks Gonzaga how he wants to behave after the announcement of the armistice; the Italian general replies that he will behave as an officer who obeys orders and does all the way his duty. The *Relazione Pinna* and the aims of the order of reaching the German headquarter, confirm that this is the will of Gonzaga. It is also certain that the German Major orders Gonzaga to turn over his weapons and the general spurs his soldiers to defend themselves, taking his gun and screaming «Alle armi».

From this point, however, the sources are discordant. Both the *Relazione Pinna*¹² and the testimony of Captain Tarquini (Fumarola, 1945, p. 170) speak of a shoot which hits Gonzaga on his head and any attempt of Italian reaction is stopped by a launch of hand grenades. Others highlight that the general tries to avoid that an officer obey the order to turn over his rifle, further alarming the Germans, and only later he goes back and tries to take his Beretta. According to this narrative, Gonzaga would collapse on the desk, hit on the thorn and on the forehead, and the German major would anyway disarm him. Partly, but significantly, different is the testimony of Captain Mastrocinque, according to whom the Major himself kills the Italian General (Garibaldi 2006, p. 108). The statement of the attorney general of Stuttgart, which after the war acquits von Alvensleben, also refers the testimony of the medical officer Mario Petrosino, who states to have seen the German with the gun in the hand, in front of the Italian general.

Marco Picone Chiodo (1990) adds some other “fantastic” elements. After describing the meeting between Gonzaga and von Alvensleben, tragically ended with the murder of the Italian general «abbattuto da un raffica» while trying to take his sidearm, Chiodo writes: «Il suo capo di Stato Maggiore, disperato per l’armistizio e per ciò che stava accadendo, si uccise e la 222a divisione costiera fu dispersa dalle cannonate tedesche» (p. 381). The chief of staff is the Major Luigi Pinna, who did not suicide in the wake of the facts of Buccoli, neither, to tell the truth, in the fol-

¹² *Relazione Pinna*, p. 2.

lowing years. From 30 November 1953 to 19 November 1954, with the rank of colonel, is the chief of the 132° armoured regiment “Ariete”; later, on 4 November 1968, he is in service in Aviano (province of Pordenone), as is written by the Lieutenant Maurizio Parri: «durante il discorso tenuto ai carristi in armi la “fiamma” passa dalle mie mani a quelle del Generale Pinna e da questi è consegnato al Comandante del nuovo X Btg. in armi» (M. Parri, n.d.). Clearly the then major had changed his mind.

Chiodo’s narrative is completely wrong also about the destiny of the Italian soldiers and it is false that they were disbanded with cannon fire. The Captain Petrosino, in his testimony, states that in the night they were moved at the headquarter in Villa Conforti and only at 13,00 of 9 September they were moved, under armed guard, to the place “Grotte di Giacobbe” in Eboli¹³.

Von Alvensleben (1971, pp. 319-321) trusts his narrative to his diary, published three years after the acquittal and almost thirty years after the events. He writes to have gone at the Italian headquarter with the intention to arrest Gonzaga, although for a short time, justifying the order that he had received with the difficult situation of the German troops. The refusal of the Italian general is clear, and expected; Gonzaga appears to go back, take his gun and give an order to his soldiers. Here von Alvensleben inserts the imponderable element: a cloud hides the moon, making impossible to see what happens in the caves of Buccoli. Noise of shooting, Italians who immediately escape with their hands up; then the cloud disappears. The face General Gonzaga, hit on the thorn, is bloody: «War er durch eigene Hand gefallen?», had Gonzaga committed suicide?

We can imagine that time has transformed the memory of Udo von Alvensleben, filling it with stereotypes about both the legendary cowardice of the Italians and the honour of a German soldier who, even reluctantly, obeys an order of which he realizes the nefarious consequences. Certainly, time has drawn a “romantic” veil, which inducts to narrate the events as a horror movie, with clouds which suddenly and motivelessly covers the scene, hiding the characters, allowing the most fantastic hypothesis, including the suicide, and then disappear. What is certain is that the narrative of the German major seems not reliable.

Once again the *Relazione Sardelli* helps us. The testimonies collected, mainly that of the Sergeant Cipullo, reconstruct with sufficient clearness the events. Cipullo writes of a short discussion in German between Gonzaga and a shadow close to him; of another brief discussion in German, of a step back of the general, of a «grido strozzato» followed by «un colpo secco di pistola», by the explosion of an hand grenade and by a machine gun fire. The explosion of the grenade raise a dust cloud which invades the caves; then the Germans repeat the order of surrender. When Cipullo, discovered by a German soldier who is searching the caves, is carried outside, the body of Gonzaga lies upon the ground; he notices the bloody and black face, understand that his commandant is instantly died because, he states,

¹³ *Relazione Petrosino*, p. 2.

«non avevamo udito un lamento»¹⁴.

It is useful to add that the *Relazione Sardelli* and two testimonies collected some months after the events – those of Captain Petrosino and of Cipullo – «fanno cenno, concordi, al comportamento del maggiore del genio Panzi che, dopo l'intimazione di resa ripetuta appena caduto il Generale, invitò gli italiani a non far fuoco e ad uscire all'aperto»¹⁵.

In Salerno, with the sacrifice of the General Ferrante Gonzaga del Vodice, is written the first page of the Italian war against Nazis. With his behaviour and with the quick warning of the still reachable regiments, Gonzaga prevents some Italian units to be disarmed without defend themselves. The General Gonzaga del Vodice has been granted by gold medal to the memory, because of his dignity and loyalty.

The hours of the landing and those immediately following are also outlined in a report of the *Carabinieri* about the behaviour of commanders and units. The report analyzes the reaction of the *Carabinieri*, highlighting some interesting elements. The first is the immediate and subsequent reactions of the soldiers. The drafters of the report write that, on the basis of prearranged plans, the Germans retaliate against the Italian armed forces. Soldiers are disarmed and forced to disband: «Vi fu panico generale nella popolazione civile e nei reparti di truppe e paesi, villaggi, caserme furono disertati». The drafters, anyway, underline that

la percentuale dei militari sbandati fu limitata, e solo pochi di essi non rientrarono ai rispettivi reparti subito dopo l'occupazione.

A mano a mano che il territorio fu occupato dalle truppe anglo-americane, i comandi dell'Arma presero con esse immediatamente contatto, collaborando al mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico e per agevolare con dati e notizie il proseguimento delle ostilità contro i tedeschi¹⁶.

The *Relazione*, moreover, narrate three events in which the *Carabinieri* are protagonists of an energetic reaction against the Germans. The first concerns the barracks of Salerno, immediately after the Anglo-American landing: «Si presentano i militari tedeschi per disarmare i militari, il comandante della compagnia, sostenuto dalla virile fermezza dei suoi dipendenti, poté evitare il disarmo e indurre gli avversari ad allontanarsi» (p. 12).

The mentioned officer is, very probably, Captain Umberto Jaconis, remained in Salerno at the end of August, when his unit had been moved. It is evident that the captain's reaction prevents that the situation of Gonzaga may repeat and, in this case, the Germans retreat.

The second event takes places in Tramonti, where the commander of the station and two of his men disarm a group of Germans, engaged in combats with the Anglo-Americans. The Germans are disarmed and consigned to the allied headquarter

¹⁴ *Relazione Cipullo*, pp. 1-2. Emphasis in the original.

¹⁵ *Relazione Soldarelli*, p. 4.

¹⁶ Archivio Storico Arma dei Carabinieri: Roma. (ASAC). Legione Territoriale dei Carabinieri Reali di Napoli: Ufficio Comando: *Relazione sul comportamento dei comandi e reparti dalla dichiarazione dell'armistizio in poi. 19 febbraio 1944*, p. 13.

of Maiori (p. 12).

The third event concerns Montecorvino Pugliano:

(...) Subito dopo lo sbarco delle truppe alleate, il comandante di quella stazione si pose a disposizione degli ufficiali anglo-americani, collaborando nella raccolta di notizie sulla forza e dislocazione dei reparti tedeschi e delle numerose postazioni di artiglierie. In base a tali notizie, le truppe da sbarco poterono attuare, con minor numero di perdite, il piano per la immediata cacciata dei germanici dalla frazione "Torella" e dalle contrade "S. Biagio", "Le Caterine" e "Rizzare" (pp. 12-13).

According to the report, the behaviour of the *Arma* was virtuous, but not without exceptions:

L'azione di comando di taluni ufficiali è stata ed è tuttora oggetto di esame e nei riguardi di alcuni sottufficiali e militari sono stati disposti trasferimenti per ragioni di opportunità, o adottati provvedimenti per responsabilità e deficienze singole (p. 13).

It is reported a fact concerning the commander of the company of Eboli, whose behaviour seems to be a serious misconduct and therefore «in attesa della punizione propostagli, è stato trasferito con tutto il personale della stazione di Eboli» (p. 13).

The report also speaks of the Salerno population. In a footnote it is written:

La popolazione già stanca dei soprusi e delle vessazioni della soldataglia tedesca, all'atto dello sbarco delle truppe Anglo-Americane in Salerno, dava libero sfogo al suo odio contro la Germania. Tutti rifiutavano di prestare la loro opera nell'interesse delle forze tedesche; moltissimi uomini validi si rifugiarono nei boschi per non essere deportati; i contadini e gli agricoltori nascondevano il loro bestiame e sotterravano il raccolto; altri commisero atti di sabotaggio sui fili telefonici colleganti i vari reparti tedeschi; altri infine coadiuvarono i comandi delle truppe di occupazione per la cattura di numerosi tedeschi e fornendo notizie d'interesse militare¹⁷.

The population seems to react without the enthusiasm of the hours followed to the fall of Mussolini, as if the preoccupation for the possible German retaliation obscure the announcement of the armistice with the Anglo-Americans.

War and daily life

Almost all Salerno people narrate a different reaction by the civil population. The hours of the armistice and the landing are narrated by a number of testimonies, which reconstruct the panorama of the province of Salerno, from the beaches of Agropoli to the plain of Eboli, from the hillsides (from Campagna to Acerno, to Giffoni, to San Cipriano Picentino) to Salerno and the valley of Irno, to the Amalfi coast, to the *Agro nocerino*, to the Neapolitan plain.

Carlo Carucci (1943) begins to write his diary in the evening of 8 September,

¹⁷ ASAC, Legione Territoriale dei Carabinieri Reali di Napoli: Ufficio Comando. *Relazione sul contributo apportato dalla popolazione*, s.d.

describing the joy and the hope, along with the awareness of the defeat, of the first hours after the armistice:

Gran festa oggi in queste borgate di Olevano, che sono sulla montagna e chiamate Salitto, di cui una, dov'è la mia casa, chiamata Valle. Alla radio inglese delle 5,30 ho inteso che l'Italia chiedeva all'Inghilterra l'armistizio. Certo ciò non deve rallegrare un italiano. Ma c'è da sperare di meglio? Sono subito uscito di casa per annunciare ai paesani la lieta novella, e tutti han ripetuto la frase, uscita senza troppa ponderazione dalla mia bocca: la guerra è finita; la pace è fatta. (pp. 11-12).

The same euphoria is found in the description of the hours of the armistice written by Michele Scozia (1984). Displaced in Baronissi, in the Irno valley, he writes that they are

colti da un vociare confuso proveniente di là della stradetta, un calpestio, un correre di gente dalla maseria e dai casolari, poi le voci si fecero più distinte, erano più grida che voci e canti ed evviva [...].

«È finita – gridavano – è finita la guerra, hanno firmato l'armistizio».

Poi alla naturale euforia del primo impatto con la notizia da tempo attesa subentrò un senso profondo di commozione (pp. 122-123).

The euphoria also affects barracks and soldiers. Fernando Dentoni Litta (1998), sailor in service in Salerno, remember that «cortei di giubilo si ebbero per tutta la città e fu festa in tutti gli ambienti, compresi quelli militari, dove, però, ciascuno resto al suo posto in attesa di disposizioni (che non arrivarono mai e ben presto le forze armate furono allo sbando)» (p. 47).

The joy is destined to last a short time, reconnecting the view of the people with that of the *Carabinieri*.

Dentoni Litta (1998) reports the first news of the operations of landing, which start around 20,30 of 8 September, and adds:

Nella stessa ora giunse al Comando Marina un cifrato del Compartimento Marittimo di Napoli, dove si annunciava che la zona militare del compartimento sarebbe stata oggetto di un possibile sbarco Alleato. Si aggiungeva, inoltre, di facilitare le operazioni di sbarco e di opporsi ad eventuali interventi tedeschi nei confronti degli italiani.

Verso le ore 21 cominciarono a giungere echi di cannoneggiamenti con grossi calibri, tanto che anche a Salerno provocarono tremolii di infissi e di muri, provenienti più dall'entroterra che dal mare (p. 51).

The start of operations is marked by along with the sinking of some vessels in the harbour the explosion and by the explosion of two warehouse, storing ammunitions and other goods, located in the harbour. Both Dentoni Litta (pp. 51-52) and Arturo Carucci (1972, p. 22) refers that the first civilians die, victims of the explosion. The testimonies, however, disagree on the time – as if they would like to validate the historians' distrust of eyewitnesses. Dentoni Litta tells that explosion happens at 22,30; Carucci at 21,00. It is certainly a detail, considering that both have privileged observatories: the headquarter of the navy in Salerno the first; the hospital – which is located on the top of the hill, with a view on the harbour – the sec-

ond. A confirmation of their narrative comes from Ezio Berti (1988), who refers that the plans of general Bessel provide, among the other things, «la distruzione dei magazzini del porto di Salerno, dei vecchi depositi di munizioni di tutta la zona», as well as of other infrastructures (p. 81).

Different, and terrifying, is the scene seen by Carlo Carucci (1943), which is displaced in a fraction of Olevano sul Tusciano, located in the hill above the gulf of Salerno. Carucci writes that at midnight of 9 September he is woken up by the noise of a cannon fire and immediately goes on the balcony:

Tutto l'orizzonte era illuminato a giorno; razzi di ogni colore, e abbaglianti, si levavano sul mare, in alto, soli, a catena, che cadevano o restavano a lungo fermi nell'aria. E poi uno sparo che rimbombava per il vasto orizzonte, e lo spostamento d'aria giungeva fino a noi. [...] E ora sbarcano; e la difesa anticostiera tedesca cerca evidentemente di resistere e impedire che lo sbarco si faccia (p. 13).

The scenario of the internal towns of the province is vividly narrated by Michele Scozia (1984), who describes what happens in those hours:

Al di là delle colline, in direzione di Salerno, era tutto un fiammeggiare, un alternarsi di bagliori e scoppi forti, laceranti, senza soste e mentre avanzava il solito massiccio ossessivo rombo degli aeroplani, il cielo si dipingeva di cento e cento colori. Io credo che mai più si vedrà, nel nitore tiepido di una notte di settembre, uno spettacolo più affascinante, una più travolgente fantasmagoria di luci e di colori, un incrociarsi di bengala luminosi bianchi gialli rossi azzurrognoli, un indagare di cento fotoletriche, un tambureggiare di calibri diversi da terra, dal mare e dalle colline (pp. 123-124).

The scene looks like the fireworks which, traditionally, conclude the feast of the patron saint of Salerno, Saint Matthew. However, they are not fireworks and light fixtures, but the continuation of dramatic hours.

A little time before Scozia has welcomed «con commozione con gioia la fine della sciagurata avventura» and now he is «nel bel mezzo di una delle più colossali operazioni militari della seconda guerra mondiale».

On the trunk road called “due principati” there is «continuo ininterrotto movimento di automezzi pesanti e leggeri, carri armati e artiglieria» (p. 125); the surroundings of Salerno are already occupied by Scotch soldiers (Dentoni Litta, 1988, pp. 52-53), avant-gardes of the Commandos landed in the middle of the Amalfi coast; the German troops, «nella notte tra l'8 e il 9 settembre lasciano inaspettatamente i centri abitati, forse per timore di insurrezioni popolari o in attesa di ordini» (A. Carucci, 1972, p. 26) and retreat on the hills.

Another witness, Domenico Sorrentino, tells us how the night of the armistice is lived by the people of Mercato San Severino – or Sanseverino Rota, as it is called at that time:

Cadono le prime ombre della sera, la gente fa crocicchio e non parla d'altro che dell'armistizio; si fanno le 22 circa, e si vedono i primi guizzi dei razzi lanciati lontano verso il cielo della martoriata Battipaglia; in breve il cielo costellato di stelle della limpida sera settembrina si popola di apparecchi dal rumore assordante, a cui ormai siamo assuefatti. Ci accorgiamo che sono apparecchi americani.

– Che cosa succede?

Bombardano! Ma è possibile? Se c'è stato l'armistizio vuol dire che le ostilità sono finite. Ma è forse falsa la notizia trasmessa dalla radio? Ma no! Essa è stata trasmessa da Radio Roma e da Radio Londra, anzi il Maresciallo Badoglio ha letto un proclama.

Sono queste le domande e le risposte che ci facciamo (Sorrentino, 1984, pp. 20-21).

Also for Sanseverino people, feelings and concerns about future overlap, in the dramatic hours of that 8 september.

The *Book of the baptisms* of the Church of the *Annunziata* in Salerno collects the notes written by the Prior, don Aniello Vicinanza, who wants to leave a testimony of those tragic events. The priest refers, in four different occasions from 21 June to 11 September, the most important events.

La notte tra l'8 e il 9 settembre 1943 la flotta Angloamericana tenta di fare lo sbarco a Salerno, ma contrastata dai reparti tedeschi effettua lo sbarco nella piana del Sele e a Farinia. I Tedeschi durante la notte fanno saltare per aria la Capitaneria e la banchina del porto. La sera del nove gli Anglo Americani entrano nella città abbandonata dai Tedeschi.

The priest mistakes the landing of the Commandos in Vietri and the arrival of the avant-gardes landed in Magazzeno for a general allied landing in the town.

Also in Pontecagnano – one of the place chosen by the Allies for the landing of a part of their armed forces – citizens look astonished at the events of the night. Ersilio, a 9 years old boy, tells to Marisa Pellizzari (1992), who interviews him:

Quella notte dello sbarco, volete sapere come mi sembrava il mare? Ecco, come un campo dove stanno tante vaccaresse o bufali... così stavano tutte le navi a mare. E vedevate che ogni nave di quelle sparavano, e il fuoco saliva così in alto, come si vede per televisione, alle volte, che si vede quando fanno, per esempio, una battaglia navale. Era notte, poi, ed era bello vedere perché lucevano, quando passavano proprio i proiettili e si vedevano proprio di fuoco nel buio e li sentivate. Io rimasi di fuori alla mia casa per un poco di tempo e guardavo (p. 241).

Vincenzo, remembering the effectiveness of the gunships, tells that it was like a landing of aliens (Pellizzari, 1992, p. 246). The 15 years old Matteo, for his part, remembers that he was astonished:

I mezzi da sbarco prendevano la velocità da mare e salivano di oltre venti metri sulla sabbia. Erano centinaia e centinaia. Gli inglesi avevano poi dei grandi mezzi come ruspe, come carri armati, e camion che andavano per mare e per terra. Costruivano subito le strade: coi motosega tagliavano tutte le piante, con le ruspe spianavano. Poi c'erano dei mezzi cingolati che portavano quei rolli di rete di metallo doppio con le bacchette di ferro dentro. E ancora c'erano dei mezzi che fissavano le reti a terra con delle zeppe di ferro. Costruirono subito due-tre strade: c'era un via vai di carri armati, di auto-colonne, di camion, eccetera. E noi guardavamo tutto questo movimento (p. 247).

Despite the mistakes of the Operation Avalanche, on 9 September the first English soldiers, coming from Vietri sul Mare, arrive in Salerno. Don Aniello Vicinanza is witness of their fight with the Germans, in the roads around the Church of the *Annunziata*. Furthermore, he is protagonist of an important fact, when the Germans capture a group of soldiers and civilians, after that two German men are

killed and five wounded in the fights in the western edge of the city, between Via Madonna del Monte, via Spinosa and the theatre Verdi. Don Aniello insists and persuades the Germans to release the civilians and hold the soldiers as prisoners of war (A. Carucci, 1972, pp. 28-29).

Pietro Laveglia (1978) meets twice Don Aniello Vicinanza and collects a “reticent” testimony of the priest, reluctant to speak of himself; Vicinanza, in any case, is a very interesting figure, whose we know very little (pp. 391-392 and 427-430).

The entry to Salerno is postponed of few hours and only in the morning of 10 September the first avant-gardes enter the city, evacuated by the German troops after an heavy Anglo-American naval bombing. After a short time the bulk of the troops arrives. Dentoni Litta (1998) writes:

Il mattino del 10 settembre enormi forze fecero il loro ingresso in città, tanto che dal Teatro Verdi sino al fiume Irno vi sostava una unica fila di mezzi militari di ogni specie; era una cosa da sbalordire chiunque tanta ricchezza di mezzi bellici e di perfetta efficienza militare. Tutti gli spazi esistenti lungo la strada vennero occupati da militari di ogni colore. I pubblici giardini erano pieni di mezzi e tende tese tra carro e carro, sotto le quali la truppa dormiva saporitamente [...].

Nonostante tanta gente e tanti materiali, tutto si muoveva in rapida logica e precisione, anche in virtù di precise segnalazioni stradali che reparti specializzati collocarono nei punti strategici dei percorsi (pp. 55-56).

It is even embarrassing the surprise of Dentoni Litta when he sees an huge deployment of staff and resources, unusual for a sailor accustomed to the tightness of the Italian resources, so that it appears “effective” to him. However the Allied headquarters are anything but effective, as the “Avalanche” is characterized by limits and mistakes of preparation and direction.

It is interesting, furthermore, to analyze how the landing and the following operations are described by the press: Salerno lacks local newspapers and only after some months it will be possible to find news about the city and the province; in Naples, on the contrary, newspapers survive and publish many news about the landing and the events in Salerno, but since 9 September they are taken under the control of the German military authority: on one side silence, on the other the echoes of the propaganda. The “Roma” of 10 September has the title *Le truppe americane a Salerno* and *Il normale aspetto della città - I servizi pubblici e le banche funzionano regolarmente*. It seems that nothing changed, neither the enemy nor the allied. An article of 20 September (*Le operazioni nel salernitano. Gravissime perdite inflitte alle truppe anglo-americane*), which refers an official statement of the German armed forces, is emblematic:

I combattimenti che durano da due settimane nella regione di Salerno non hanno dato alle truppe anglo-americane sbarcate l'atteso successo operativo, né sono valsi ad isolare le divisioni germaniche dislocate nell'Italia meridionale. Combattendo contro forze numericamente superiori le nostre truppe hanno annullato ogni tentativo dell'avversario di ampliare al sua testa di ponte. Si è riuscito, così, a effettuare il congiungimento con le forze presso Salerno, dove le nostre Divisioni sono giunte, dopo aver sistematicamente distrutti tutti gli impianti e attrezzature utili al nemico in Calabria e nelle Pu-

glie. Il piano operativo costruito dagli anglo-americani sul tradimento di Badoglio è in tal modo completamente fallito (p. 1).

Contrary to the news of the Neapolitan papers, Salerno appears abandoned. The Allied soldiers, indeed, do not find any representative of the political authority, as everybody has flown to the villages around the city. All are disappeared. It is don Aniello Vicinanza to meet colonel Lane, who enters the city with the Allied troops. Vicinanza tells him that the archbishop Nicola Monterisi – which will mark, with his work, the life of the city until 30 March 1944, when he dies at the age of 77 – is in Salerno. Monterisi is almost the sole authority which stays at his place in those days and tries to rule the territory during the absence of the civil authorities. The Church of Salerno, before the representatives of the State, becomes the most important point of reference not only the citizens, but also for the Allied military authorities.

Lo sbarco degli alleati provoca come è noto la dissoluzione non solo del regime ma dello Stato. Le classi dirigenti, compromesse col fascismo si rendono latitanti. È l'apparato della Chiesa l'unico punto di riferimento, di difesa, di rappresentanza delle popolazioni in quei mesi, e con l'apparato della Chiesa le organizzazioni di Azione Cattolica. Ed alla Chiesa gli Alleati danno immediatamente i più ampi riconoscimenti e intrattengono con essa i più stretti rapporti (Di Marino, 1975, p. 15).

Monterisi meets colonel Lane and captain Augustine Riola, of Italian descent. During the meeting he recommends: «Date ordini ben precisi perché siano rispettate le donne, le abitazioni private, gli edifici di culto e provvedete al più presto di viveri e di acqua la cittadinanza. Ricordate che siete i rappresentanti di nazioni civili presso una nazione civile» (Menna, 1993, p. 148).

The following day Lane takes over the city hall. Don Aniello Vicinanza writes in the *Book of baptisms*:

Oggi 11 settembre 1943 il colonnello Aloysius Thomas Lane U.S.A. ha fatto col suo stato maggiore l'ingresso in Salerno. Non essendovi sul posto nessuna delle Autorità ha voluto prendere possesso del Comune alla presenza di me Priore dell'Annunziata. Dinanzi al Comune stesso, alla presenza del popolo e dei suoi ufficiali, mi ha chiesto mettendosi in ginocchio la Santa Benedizione.

To tell the truth, also the prefectural commissioner, Giovanni Cuomo, is in the town and on 12 September is at his working place in the city hall, according to the testimony of one of the Italian exiles who work for the Allies, Massimo Salvadori, who adds: «data l'età avrebbe avuto più di qualsiasi altro il diritto di starsene a casa. Invece era lì facendo il possibile per mantenere un minimo di coesione e di ordine» (Salvadori, 1951, p. 224). Along with him, almost only priests remain to “garrison” the city.

Arturo Carucci, chaplain of the hospital of Salerno, in the morning of 27 September can meet the archbishop, who reminds him the sacrifice of the priests of Salerno. Monterisi states:

Sono contento che avete fatto il vostro dovere. Tutti i miei sacerdoti sono rimasti al loro posto. Don Vito De Nicola, Don Felice Ventura e il Can. Bonavoglia di Eboli sono periti sotto le macerie delle loro chiese, al loro posto. È con dolore che dico questo, ma ne sono orgoglioso (Carucci, 1972, p. 92).

In the afternoon Carucci finds out that also the father Giovanni Daelle, chaplain of the hospital “Villa Maria” of Mercato San Severino, has been killed and, with him, about twenty hospitalized people are victims of «hunger and bombs».

Also the father of Arturo Carucci, Carlo Carucci (1943), remembers the sacrifice of the priests of Salerno:

Fu sepolto colla madre e la sorella sotto le macerie della sua canonica a S. Severino, D. Vito de Nicola; anche a S. Severino, nel tubercolosario, perì Don Giovanni Daelli; Don Felice Ventura restò sotto le macerie della sua chiesa a Pastena; il canonico D. Pasquale Bonavoglia e ben sette monaci trovarono la morte a Eboli. L'arcivescovo di Salerno, D. Nicola Monterisi, restò nella città straziata, soffrendo anche la fame, quando mancò la luce, l'acqua e il pane, e portò la sua parola di conforto nei punti più sinistrati e nei momenti più pericolosi, e, pei gravi disagi, si preparò alla morte che dopo poco l'incolse (p. 8).

Since the late summer the city is affected first by the bombs and then by the presence of the occupation troops: the war is no longer a painful, but far, event; it represents the daily life of Salerno people.

Moreover, the armistice, on the contrary, and the change of alliances affect the consciences of the people. After 8 September the Italian story splits: the “Vento del nord” and the Kingdom of South represent the two side of a lacerated country, involved in a cruel civil war. In the North, however, the movement of resistance is being born; in the South the political parties will be quickly re-established and, in the last stage of the World War II, they will generate the first elements of democratic life of Italy.

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Giuseppe D'ANGELO – Jorge MARTINS RIBEIRO
Editors

Borders and Conflicts in the Mediterranean Basin is the product of the cooperation of historians coming from different countries.

The aim of the book is re-reading the history of the Mediterranean basin starting from a double interpretative key: sea and border. The book understands the Mediterranean as a “liquid border”, place both of violent confrontations –such as the building of empires and the assault to the goods of the others - and fruitful encounters among the peoples living on its shores – think to trade and cultural exchanges developed for centuries.

By overturning the view land/sea, the book aims at determining different perspectives and a different relation with the other, which is an indispensable operation, mainly under the cultural point of view.

The book is structured in three sections: *Mediterranean borders between pope Gregory the Great and Fernand Braudel*; *Borders and conflicts between culture and history*; *Conflicts on the sea*. The different topics analyzed by the historians find an unity in the ability of the Mediterranean peoples to rebuild an autonomous thought, starting from the peculiarities that fifty centuries of history have been entrenching in this area.

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