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Elaborating historical thinking on monuments

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Abstract

Public history culture recently is characterized by controversial debates on monuments, their replacement or alteration. History education which aims at enabling and empowering students to partake in such controversial public history culture needs to address these in terms of developing historical consciousness and competencies of historical thinking. For the latter, Stéphane Lévesque recently presented a framework, which this article interprets and evaluates, both elaborating it further for reflecting monuments' diversity and proposing an alternative to Lévesque's proposal of levels of the necessary competencies.

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1 Introduction

Monument debates have abounded within the last years. Especially recent criticism of European colonialism and colonial history, including imperialism and empire, relations between settler and indigenous communities, but also slavery and commemoration of war, have led to public debates on how to deal with monuments, especially in the public sphere, and also to actions of activists on both sides to topple statues as well as to secure them against such actions.[1] Not exactly a new phenomenon,[2] the recent surge in such debates has also evoked a discussion in the History Education community on the significance of these debates for history education.

In this article, I discuss the challenges monuments may hold for historical thinking in post-traditional, plural societies and what historical learning might (need to) look like in the light of these challenges. I refer specifically to a recent article by my colleague Stéphane Lévesque, in which he addresses the same question and suggests a "new approach" for addressing monuments from a history education perspective, based on an earlier conceptualization of historical thinking by Jörn Rüsen. My hypothesis on this is that Lévesque's approach has specific merits, which, however, will be even greater if some further differentiation is applied.

2 Monuments as media of Public History communication

Many (most?) monuments do not only 'occupy' public places visually with the intention to 'dominate' them as well as the 'public consciousness'[3] – they do this by offering identification and mostly also by telling stories. Contrary to popular opinion, however, they do not necessarily present a *singular* story, but can suggest quite different narratives meanings to different groups – at least in diverse societies. Memorials at former Concentration Camp sites, e.g., are signals of repenting for the 'perpetrator society', i.e. they admonish the German society not to repeat what 'they' have done in the Nazi era. To the victims (the descendants of those who were murdered, the survivors and their relatives, etc.), the same message 'nie wieder' ('never

1 Wall 2020; Sabbah 2020.

2 As for colonial history, the toppling of the statues of Hermann von Wissmann and Hans Dominik, German colonial officers in then "German East Africa" (today Tanzania) and Cameroon, which had been placed in front of the Colonial-Institute-originated Hamburg university (The Wissmann one after having been removed from Dar Es Salaam at the end of German colonial rule), by protesting Hamburg students in 1968, after a first effort in 1967, are just one example often referenced today; cf. Sabbah 2020, p. 418; Zimmermann 2020, p. 289.

3 Walden 1994, p. 14.

again') is not an admonishment but a promise – or rather a self-commitment of the German society, and for those victims, the 'nie wieder' may – next to the function of being places of mourning – again be a reminder – of staying vigilant and alert nonetheless. These different functions and meanings can coexist, but can also be intension to each other. Especially the interpretation of these memorials as political statements against right-wing positions, propagated by some left-wing organisations (among them antifascists) sometimes conflicts with survivors' interests in having these memorial places as their place of mourning. Still other interpretations will emerge if groups with different relations to that past and different traditions of memory culture come into play, e.g. immigrants to post-war Western- or unified Germany.

Later generations of recipients, then, will bring additional (and again diverse) perspectives, concepts and values into their perceptions of the monuments. They will attribute still different and diverse interpretations to what these monuments stand for – not fully detached from the "original" intentions of the authors and the perceptions and interpretations of the contemporary recipients, but not bound to it. These differences between intended and perceived meanings can in some cases amount to complete non-understanding, leaving the present with no meaningful interpretation whatsoever. Monuments might then be considered *dysfunctional.* This, will, however, be an exception. Even in most such cases, monuments will continue to convey a message, stand *for* something. Often, the "original' message(s) will still per recognizable, but there will be new layers added to it – up to new and in some cases even reversed evaluations of the presented manifest narrative. Monuments proudly commemorating the achievements of explorers such as Christopher Columbus, e.g., will often be correctly interpreted as such even 100 years after, but may (or will) be evaluated quite differently, or at least controversially in different form that of its erection. It can still be understood as a signal of pride in the exploration and 'discovery', but both the fact and the concept it is addressed by has been re-evaluated.[4] This will, however, be not unequivocal. Different evaluations from diverse perspectives will render the re-evaluation of both the events or persons commemorated and the commemoration itself controversial. While many Europeans, and maybe especially Spanish citizens, still may take pride these achievements – as e.g. visible in the monument "Legua Cerco" in Sanlucar de Barrameda and a 2010 tile-set commemorating the fist circumnavigation by Fernando Magellan and Juán Sebastian Elcano in the same town[5] – others, like visitors with pre-Columbian American ancestors, but also people taking criticalist, postcolonial perspectives onto the questioned past, will strongly disagree.

How, then, can monuments be 'read' – not only in the sense that the message intended by their creators can be determined from statements noting, categorizing, and evaluating the past and the appeals to the public associated with them, but also possibly further and dis-

4 Cf. e.g. Jones 2016.

5 Cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanlúcar_de_Barrameda_2019-2022 (visited 22.02.2021).

tinct narrative interpretations that can be traced back, among other things, to already contemporarily different social, cultural, political, and other perspectives of members of the general public (i.e., 'recipients') as well as in contexts of this kind that have changed between the time of erection and later observation?

For this, monuments can be regarded as unidirectional media for transmitting information from a sender to a recipient,[6] but not vice versa, since feedback about the information/communication provided, needs to take different routes and also is limited in that due to the longevity of monuments the sender may no longer be around when the message gets through to some sender: As quite a number of other media in the field of public history, monuments are a form of temporally stretched communication.

What is the (perceived) aim of the monumental communication? Is it to provide neutral information, to foster the affirmation of an attitude, e. g. grief or heroifying pride, is it to present role models, to admonition or to accuse – or maybe even a specific combination of these?

To what extend does such a monument (or institution) address the "own" group of its operators, to what extent are others addressed, or rather to what extent is a distinction made between different "target" or addressee groups? The significance of the latter can be well illustrated by the example of concentration camp memorial sites.

As institutions of the survivors and their relatives, they are first of all "intransitive" places of mourning. As institutions of the successor society to the perpetrators, they also address the "own group" in a quasi-intransitive form, namely by discussing the shame of the own people. In this particular sense, the AFD-politician Björn Höcke does hit the mark when calling the monument to the murdered Jews of Europe, which belongs in the same context, a "monument of shame" – but not in the meaning he wants to express: While he lamented and condemned it[7] – despite all later attempts to trivialize and reinterpret his comment –, this remembrance of "one's own" shame is to be judged as an essential achievement as a prerequisite for the simultaneous function of exhorting the responsibility arising from past deeds.

However, this "remembrance" unites the different modes of "remember" and "remind", but also of the retelling to those who joined the historical culture of a society later, i. e. later generations and migrants. These different modes may produce different narratives, be it that they presuppose knowledge of certain contexts, whereby certain information and contexts only need to be hinted at, vs. the need to speak explicitly, or be it that the addressees' belonging to a particular group can be presumed vs. argued.

The identification of abstracted singular "sender" and "recipient"-positions are, however, problematic with regard to communication via monuments. Often, monuments are initiated

6 On this also see Körber 2014a; Körber 2014c.

7 "Gemütszustand eines total besiegten Volkes" 2017.

and curated by a small but influential group within society, representing their interests and voicing their interpretation of history. Not only in cases where considerable portions of the society support such monument, e.g. by contributions via public collections, however, they purport to speak *for* the whole society, either explicitly so or implicitly via a neutral voice.

In most cases, these positions will be filled by different individual or collective actors, both as real and imagined – and there may (will) be differences between intended and "realized" positioning, because the perception and understanding will vary with the positions of who actually notices and analyses the monument. Consider the following scheme:



Graph 1: Communicative Structures in Monument Culture (A. Körber)

As for the "sender" position, there often is a difference between an explicit "speaking position" [S] referred to in a monument and the actual people who had influence onto what this "voice" says, whom it represents, etc. – its actual author(s) [AU]. Furthermore, specialists in monumental expression (poets for inscriptions, sculptors for visuals) will be participating. While the actual author(s) often will exert real influence, e.g. in deciding on drafts, etc., the speaker position taken, may be quite larger and is not necessarily covered by procedures of collective consensus-making. E.g. a small group – an administration or a club of influential people – may act as authors [AU] of a monument, pretending to speak for a larger group or a whole community – e.g. the citizens of a city of a country as 'speakers' of the monument.

Similarly, the intended group of recipients (addressees [A]) may, but need not be identical to the people actually viewing and being addressed by the monument (recipients, [R]), e.g. after significant change in a country's population, as is the case in the Hamburg Rathausmarkt (Town Hall Square) monument (Image 1 – Image 2, p. 46).[8] In a first (and possibly most widely accepted) reading, its inscription "FORTY THOUSAND SONS OF THE TOWN GAVE THEIR LIVES FOR YOU – 1914–1918" obviously addresses the mostly German Hamburg populace of Weimar Republic time, *reminding* them of their loss of fathers, sons and brothers. In conjunction with the relief on the back depicting a grieving pregnant mother with her daughter, this call to remember is given a special interpretation of the event: The fathers, sons and brothers are to be commemorated as heroes – but not (as insinuated only a few years later in the Third Reich by replacing the relief with that of a soaring eagle; Image 3; p. 46)[9] because their actions are to be taken as a model for future revenge, rather than as a tribute to a not militaristic but almost private sacrifice for one's own family and the inhabitants of one's own city.

But who is it that exhorts the people of Hamburg to such remembrance? Manifesto, the speaker's position remains empty, which is apt to emphasize the generality of the expressed interpretation and exhortation. Even though it was, of course, a concrete group of (social democratic) deputies who took up and pushed forward a first initiative for such a memorial, and finally the Hamburg Senate pursued the erection of the memorial [AU], the message is not necessarily to be understood as a transitive exhortation of the citizens (who, after all, witnessed it) by their government, but also contains at least parts of an intransitive self-remembrance ('let us remember'), and, with the increasing passage of time, also acquires the character of a continuation of this context and coherence.

However, this reading is already contemporary not the only possible one. On several occasions, for example, students who have visited the monument have expressed the suspicion that it could be meant (not least because of its location in front of the city hall) as a message to Hamburg's politicians. This does not so much change the interpretation of the event to be remembered and the nature of the sacrifice of the forty thousand, but it does change the message. Addressee would then be Bürgerschaft (Parliament) and Senat (Government), namely in the first and today's variant (with Barlach relief) with the request to pursue a policy that does justice to this sacrifice, probably in the sense that a repetition of such ultimately futile mass sacrifice is avoided or prevented, in the interim Nazi variant with the soaring eagle almost on the contrary for a militaristic policy that allows a connection and completion of these 'heroic deeds'. What is interesting in these readings, however, is that author and speaker positions as well as the addressee position diverge differently: In the speaker position, 'the (Hamburg)

8 Appel et al. 2014b.

9 The eagle as the Reich's heraldic animal was – according to the Hamburger Tageblatt of November 8th, 1939 – to be interpreted as a "gripping artistic expression for the resurrection of our Wehrmacht after the end of Versailles" (quoted in Walden 1994, p. 17).

population' would have to be identified, which addressed the politically responsible [A], but which nevertheless (as democratic representation) initiated the monument itself. The abstract, anonymous and impersonal speaker position thus functions as an assertion of broad, even general conviction of what is being said.

Bit what message can this monument have today, in a time in which the abstract Addressee of the first (and main) interpretation has considerably changed – not only due to the course of time, but also to immigration and other changes of society?

In a manifest sense then, the message of this monument is valid for a certain portion of Hamburg citizens, only – for those who really have direct familial connections to Hamburg in World War I. For other, who also are Hamburg citizens, but who or whose ancestors have immigrated much later, the function is not so much that of a *reminder*, but rather that of *informing* them of some (rather implicit) history and – via the '*you'* of the inscription – of a rather implicit *appeal to identify* with the former (and come contemporary) Hamburg citizens and their loss/mourning, etc.

In comparison, the inscription of the Retterstedet Monument at Åkershus Slot in Oslo, "DE KJEMPET DE FALT DE GAV OSS ALT" („They fought, they fell – they gave us everything"; see Image 6, p. 48),[10] invites the visitor into the 'we'-group's speaker position: "oss". It may be read as a statement of its actual authors, only, but in bowing your head in front of it or laying down flowers, the visitor accepts this invitation.

Similarly, the inscription of the monument at Neuengamme Concentration Camp memorial in Hamburg, erected in 1965, invites the visitor into its speaker position, addressing [A] the victims as protagonists [P] and ascribing them agency in the past: "*YOUR* SUFFERING, *YOUR* FIGHT AND *YOUR* DEATH SHALL NOT BE IN VAIN" (transl. and italics; A.K.; see Image 7, p. 48).

In Altona – formerly a Danish, then from 1864 to 1938 Prussian town, and since 1938 part of Hamburg –, a war monument of 1925 addresses its protagonists as well as the present and future generations of (possible) recipients directly, obligating them to its interpretation of the heroic deeds of the protagonists as an example for future emulation. An example of this can be found again in Hamburg. The War Memorial for the members of 31st Infantry Regiment in Altona, Inaugurated in front of Altona's Johannis Church in 1925 (Image 4, p.47)[11] presenting medieval-type but generic warriors both as heroes to be hailed and role-models to be emulated via its inscription "TO THE FALLEN IN GRATEFUL MEMORY / TO THE LIVING AS AN ADMONISHMENT / TO COMING GENERATIONS TO EMULATE".[12]

10 Cf. Körber 2014c, p. 87.
11 Posch 2016; for more images Appel et al. 2014a.
12 On the counter-monument there, see below, p. 30.

Finally, one of the best known and most controversial Hamburg monuments needs to be mentioned. At first glance, it again is – just like the example from Altona – a monument commemorating the soldiers of a Hamburg-based infantry regiment of WWI and its reserve regiment, here the 76th. In contrast to the Altona example, though, the most-known war memorial in Hamburg it was erected near Dammtor station in the centre of the town in 1938 only – and while the Altona example, in democratic times and the best years of the Weimar Republic, is not openly, but rather implicitly revanchist, in the Nazi era, this monument is openly so. Designed by well-known Hamburg sculptor Richard Khuöl, it depicts a long file of 88 armed German soldiers, wearing not WWI-, but Wehrmacht-style (!) helmets, marching around a big, rectangular block, under an inscription of "GERMANY MUST LIVE, EVEN IF WE HAVE TO DIE" (Image 5, p. 47).[13] It is surrounded by additional large monumental plates, referring to the locations of the regiment's WWI-battles with the slogan "Great deeds of the past are bridge pillars of the future. For reasons largely unknown, neither the British Military Government nor any later Hamburg Government forced its destruction (even though it had been ordered).[14] Instead, not only veterans of that regiment and right-winged political groups (Neo-Nazis among them), but also the post-war West-German armed forces of Bundeswehr (part of NATO) held commemorative services there until at least well into the 1980s.[15] Today, it is publicly referred to as "Kriegsklotz" ("War Block") – echoing some of the harsh lather criticism which led to the erection of several counter-monuments that – together with the criticism – seems to have contributed to a change in public attitude.[16]

So while each monument needs to be interpreted as to both the narrative and message intended by its original (and possibly subsequent) authors and to that effected towards possibly different actual recipients, a certain degree of systematisation can be achieved: When, e.g. the speakers' and addressees' position [S]=[A], are (interpreted as being) conflated, a monument's message can be interpreted as being *intransitive*, i.e. referencing to a story which is considered to be common for speakers and addressees: 'We remember our own story' – be it a story of our own heroic deeds or that of pain suffered by 'our own' group. Especially of the monument references the past (the protagonists, their actions or their suffering) in an abstract way, only, monuments may be very suggestive to their actual recipients to identify with these positions. The actual message does, however, also depend on the integration of the protagonists' position and agency.

If [S]=[A]=[P] in an active mode, the monument tells a story of the group's own actions, in most cases heroic ones (e.g. 'we remember our own victory'), but maybe also tragic one ('... our defeat').

13 See Appel et al. 2014c.
14 Appel et al. 2014c with lots of additional pictures and materials.
15 See Walden 1997, p. 33; Walden 1994, p. 18.
16 For this, see below p. 31.

Often, agency is distributed among [P] and [S]=[A], though, either with [P] being referenced as the agents, specifically when remembering a group's own loss and pain, as e.g. in war monuments accusing others and depicting the own group as victims, or in monuments hailing saviours.

The reversed configuration ([S]=[A] as agents vs. [P]) characterizes the quite recent development of monuments referencing 'negative' aspects of the group's own history of inflicting severe injustice on others, as e.g. in the Berlin monument for the "Monument for the Murdered Jews of Europe" in Berlin. The concept of 'monument' thus carries a spectrum of narrative and evaluative notions – from heroising and mourning to admonishing and even accusing messages.

In German, the latter are often referred to as 'Mahnmale', a term which takes up the conception of 'admonishing' (lat: admonere) which in English is already present in the term of 'monument', while the latter in German are often referred to as 'Denkmale' ('Think-Mark'). But even the differentiation between 'Denkmal' as positive and 'Mahnmal' as negative does not really suffice, for the latter can refer to monuments admonishing addressees to not *let* something happen again (either to them or in general) but also to some admonishing to refrain from some attitude and action themselves, e.g. by explicitly referencing a responsibility of 'their own' group.

But the identification or conflation of [S]=[A] is not a given. In some cases, the differentiation of the speakers' from the addressees' position is rather symbolic or rhetoric in that in fact the authors and addressee's position are closely connected, e.g. in the Hamburg Monument for the victims of Nazi persecution on Ohlsdorf cemetery of 1949, containing the inscription "INJUSTICE BROUGHT US DEATH — TO THE LIVING: RECOGNIZE YOUR OBLIGATION" (Image 9, Image 8, p.49).

The diversity of monument-based interpretation and communication of history is, however, not confined to the different configurations of the communicative structure and their interpretation and acceptance by all actors. It also includes the use and interpretation of symbols. Both the Ohlsdorf and the Neuengamme monuments mentioned above, e.g., feature downward-pointing triangles ('Winkel'), like those separating Concentrations Camps into classes, thus referring not necessarily to all victims of Nazi persecution, but to those imprisoned in concentration camps, just as the Neuengamme one highlights 'political' prisoners who had considerably more agency even in the camp than e.g. the 448 Soviet Prisoners of war who were gassed to death on two occasions.[17]

The perceived message of a monument can (or rather will) however, change depending of the actual relationship between addressees and recipients – even if they still belong to the 'same

17 See "Death Register"; https://www.kz-gedenkstaette-neuengamme.de/en/history/death-register/ (last accessed 15.9.2023).

group'. For intended recipients/addressees being contemporary at least to the erecting of the monument, it can function as a *reminder,* directed at securing the persistence of a specific interpretation, if not of a certain common experience, whereas for later generations it will rather function as a tool of introducing them to the given, conventional evaluation and obliging them to sharing it. As for recipients not initially intended, the message may oscillate between suggestion and irritation.

In other cases, the relation of speakers, protagonists and addressees (possible recipients) may be still different: To address the 'own pride and pain' of a society via monuments, explicitly directed towards the own group, may additionally serve to tell others (a third party) about this collective stance towards the past. The martial messages of the 1925 Altona war memorial and the 1938-1948 version of the Hamburg Rathausmarkt memorial[18] as well as many similar ones may, e.g. be directed primarily at uplifting the German society's belligerent 'morale'. On a second level, though, it may also be interpreted as documenting this readiness to fight a new war to others, e.g. the former (and possibly future) enemies. Similarly, the re-construction of the Barlach relief in 1948 may not only be interpreted as an effort to subdue bellicose sentiments within German society and to shift them towards a more peaceful and humble opinion, but also as signalling this to the outside world. The installation of the counter memorial to the Altona monument in 1992, therefore, can be interpreted as a combination of a) an expression of a changed stance towards nationalist policies and bellicose public history, b) an effort to further influence German society and public opinion in this direction, and finally c) as an attempt to document this change of mind to the world public.

The latter facets of public history and memory politics are especially valid for partaking in the recent controversial discussion on Germany's and its society's way of addressing their outrightly murderous past. It is highly significant whether the development of a ('negative') commemorating via Mahnmale is positively recognized from a victim (group) perspective,[19] or from a 'third' side, or claimed from within German society,[20] e.g. – as a gesture aimed more at soothing and unburdening one's own conscience and as a kind of self-exculpation.[21]

This context and all manifestations related to it, including monuments to murdered Jews, memorials, rituals such as wreath-laying ceremonies etc., defy binary interpretations and judgements. For partaking in (German) history culture, it is therefore necessary to not simply 'understand' monuments, but to be able to assess their multi-faceted functions and significance within a diverse society, and to have at one's disposal such different concepts as 'repentance', 'commitment to humanitarian values', 'exhortations to self-reflection', but also

18 See p. 6, 30.
19 E.g. Neiman 2020.
20 Assmann 2014.
21 Cf. e.g. Bodemann and Geis 1996; Salzborn 2020.

'self-exculpation', "memory theatre" (Y. Michal Bodemann) and the pitfalls of 'coming to terms with the past'.

3 Different narratives of commemorating war and soldiers' contributions

The examples of monuments relating to wars and human losses discussed so far already show a clear spectrum of different historical narratives with different explicit, but always readable, references to the present. In most cases, according to at least some readings, this consisted of an affirmative interpretation recommending the repetition of warlike actions ('deeds') portrayed positively, or of a reprise of negatively connoted experiences (grief over loss, even defeats) with a motif of revenge, ultimately a bellicose interpretation. However, the example of the monument at Hamburg's Rathausmarkt[22] has already shown that quite different interpretations are possible through the design of monuments. The loss of life through the 40,000 "sons of the city" mentioned there must not be interpreted as to referring to them actively sacrificing their lives, but rather to them being victims of an overpowering and process ('war'), here not ascribed to any perpetrator.

It is the dominance of the former interpretations that – especially after the experiences in and with the Third Reich – has helped a critically reappraising, i.e. both criticising the past and, in the best sense of the word, critically symbolising its positive integration into meaning-bearing narratives of condemnation, reappraisal and change in the culture of remembrance to develop, even if this shift is anything but complete. This critical reflection on affirmative war memorials and war memorials usually includes a negative evaluation of the war event itself. The extent to which it has subsequently been possible, or even possible at all, to loosen or even completely dissolve the obviously close connection between the value-laden memories of fallen soldiers and the context of their loss within the framework of memorial culture(s) is a question that will be examined in the following using three examples that come from a completely different context, namely the US-American culture of remembrance and memorialisation in the period after the Second World War. Within walking distance of each other, there are several monuments which – as will be argued in the following – through their design convey affirmative, positive images of people and their lives with very different retrospective interpretations of the complex of 'war' and thus give expression to very different narrative understandings of what constitutes a woman soldier's probation or soldierly sacrifice in it.

Above all, there are three (or most recently four) monuments prominently placed in Washington DC, dedicated not to individual war heroes (as in traditional monument culture), but to the US soldiers in general who served or died in a specific war, namely (in chronological or-

22 See p. 6, 30.

der of their erection) the one for the Korean War, the one for the Vietnam War and the one for World War II. The specific differences is less in the fact that or how these wars themselves or war in general were evaluated at their respective times, even if the contemporary very critical public discussion about the Vietnam War in particular did not change the concrete narrative of the war.

The renunciation of the traditional memorial culture of remembering individual (mostly leading) war heroes, which can be understood as a consequence of the modern form of wars involving entire societies, underlies the design of all three monuments. The departure from the traditional memorial culture of remembering individual (mostly leading) war heroes, which can be understood as an expression of the modern form of wars involving entire societies, underlies the design of all three monuments. The form in which this is reflected in the three monuments is, however, highly different and significant for the interpretation they suggest to their contemporary and subsequent societies. All three versions follow classical traditions of commemorating war and war memorial, but deviate characteristically from them. Central for a differential interpretation, is their (or their authors') way of shaping the relationship of the soldiers to be remembered to the context of their war.

In addition to a ceremonial area for laying wreaths, and a long, highly polished wall into which many scenes of military and related events have been carved, a distinguishing feature of the *Korean War Memorial* is a group of figures of soldiers in combat equipment who are on the one hand abstract and typified by a common white colouring, while on the other hand their live-size forms with detailed and varying features characterizes them as individuals, who, as in a snapshot, are lined up in a "firing line", peering into the thicket indicated by the bushes and holding themselves ready to defend themselves. Although the 19 white-painted soldiers of the Korea monument are representatives of the type 'unknown/anonymous soldier'. They are not referring to individual heroes and specific, decisive situations. They stand for all soldiers in that war. On the other hand, they purposefully lack the abstractness of most references to the unknown soldiers which (possibly in trying not to exclude any) avoid any concreteness. These 19 soldiers are depicted in a concrete combat situation, one of peril and activity – albeit not a decisive one, but one of everyday character, of a type most soldiers will or at least might have encountered – in a situation that is not defined by punctual individual heroism, but of mutual commitment and by standing in for each other. This is the decisive element of what is presented as worthy of remembrance.

A completely different design was chosen a little later for the Vietnam War Memorial. As the former one, it is not dedicated to individual soldier which are to be honoured selectively, but again to all those serving in the war. It does so, however, not by presenting realistic figures as examples for all, as is the case there, but by mentioning all of them by name. Similar to earlier memorials to the participation of soldiers in battles (for example, to the US Civil War in Gettysburg), here the soldiers are not commemorated in an abstract but exemplary man-

ner, but each individual is listed separately. In both cases, therefore, it is not a question of unknown but known soldiers. Unlike in tradition, however, the individual soldiers do not appear in the memorial itself with a reference to their military function (for example, their military rank) nor in the context of their units. Whereas, e.g. the Pennsylvania State Monument in Gettysburg lists entire units in formation (see Image 10), the names on the Vietnam War memorial appear only as designations of individuals, as for civilians. Here, soldiers are obviously commemorated, but not because of their status as soldiers and combatants, but as individuals. The memorial does not commemorate them for what they did, but for the fact that they died in this war. It is clearly not a memorial to honour the wartime deeds of heroes (neither in the abstract towards society, humanity or other abstract values, nor in the sense of mutual comradely probation described above), but rather in their capacity as victims of the war. Not even the connotation of 'sacrifice' (vs. 'victim'; cf. Hamburg Rathausmarkt)[23] appears here, which is still conceivable in the case of the Korean War memorial as an expression of mutual sacrifice.

This monument connotes all the more that these men [and women?] are commemorated because of their status as citizens of the USA and as human beings, but not in their specific function within the military and/or their specific role in the war. No specific roles in and contributions to the war are mentioned, no heroic deeds are hailed or even mentioned. This is underlined by the fact that the arrangement of the names not only does not follow any military order, but also no social one. All the men and women appear in the order of their known date of death. In doing so, it seems to stress an egalitarian point for which there is a pun in the German language ("Alle Menschen sind gleich, wenn sie verschieden sind"), playing with the double meaning of 'verschieden' – as both 'different' and 'deceased'.

With this design, the memorial is not only mainly, but constitutively an expression of mourning remembrance – of a public mourning which at a first glance seems totally decoupled from any further political evaluation. Is this, the memorial seems even apolitical – but it isn't. First, the sheer size and by that the length of the list of names not only makes the quantitative impact of the war and of the losses in this war onto it on the American society, it also has its basis in the sometimes hefty public discussion about the meaningfulness of the military engagement of the USA in that war and the 'blood toll'. The political dimension of the remembrance expressed in this monument, however, is an explicitly civil one, a non-military. It reminds the visitors (and most of all the citizens of the US among them) of the war, its impact, its meaning, and of the people who fought in it. But it does so from a specifically civil point of view.

The last – and latest – of the three monuments, referring, to the earliest of the three wars, World War 2, is completely different in the kind of heroism it anodises. The memorial refrains from any individualisation when honouring the American military victims and participants

23 See p. 6.

in that war. Neither are there all individual names nor are some them presented as examples for all. Individual soldiers exist here only as a few real individuals who are named on bronze reliefs and in quotations. Otherwise, the individual soldiers disappear into the anonymity of stars as symbols (for every 100 men killed in service). More concretely, however, places of battles or theatres of war are named. Here, too, it is a matter of 'heroism', but an abstract and anonymous heroism, the focus of which is presented just as abstractly using the symbolic language of the 19th and early 20th centuries (e.g. eagles with iron laurel wreaths) and by inscriptions naming highly abstract concepts ('freedom', 'honour'). Whereas the Korea memorial emphasises being a soldier, proving oneself in daily danger and in cooperation with concrete comrades as an individual experience, the suffering (the danger of the invisible enemy in the undergrowth) and action, and thus also as a constantly new individual decision, whose reward lies in experiencable mutual commitment and ultimately in survival, the WW2 memorial makes the individual soldiers (and especially their heterogeneity) disappear behind a visually narrated appropriation of the individual for an inexperienced and inexperiencable goal and by referring to secondary rewards such as 'heroism' and 'honour'. In this sense, the WW2 memorial represents a blatant 'relapse' into a totalitarian, even fascist doctrine and memory culture. Unlike that of the Korea Memorial, the symbolic language of this memorial does not differentiate between remembering the soldiers and remembering the wars as such. The individual soldier is only commemorated as an individual but only via his being part of an anonymous force.

The examples of these three Washington Monuments thus shed some light onto a further dimension of (proto-)narrative meaning making present in our modern (not only) Western monument-culture(s), which members of the respective societies need to learn and to recognize, but which often only become visible by comparison, not in a singular analysis. Moreover, comparing the last of these examples to other monuments even outside its geographically close counterparts, can highlight further dimensions, namely that in many cases monuments to war combine different dimensions of remembrance, namely of military honouring and even heroification, of public statements about the political context of a specific war and of public and private commemoration (often mourning) of personal losses (this latter mainly manifest in the naming of these individual person by their names) – but also that these cannot be separated, but that they cross-relate to each other. One example of this interconnection, again can be found in the small town Wentorf near Hamburg in Germany.[24]

There, in 1925 – i.e. in the democratic times of the Weimar Republic – in typical backward-looking imperialist, militaristic and defiant manner, although not in similar clarity revanchist aiming at repetition of the war course as that of Hamburg Altona, a memorial was erected, which listed by name the members of the community fallen in the First World War. After 1945, it was initially supplemented rather abstractly by a reference to "1939 – 1945". This is in itself

24 For the following see Appel et al. 2014d – with pictures. Also Körber 2009a; Körber 2009b.

a remarkable intervention in the politics of remembrance, which testifies to at least a far-reaching equation of both world wars and thus to a non-perception or rejection of the difference between the two wars and also of the regimes that fought them. At the same time, however, the decision not to list the names of the fallen of the Second World War in the same way can also be read as an indication that German post-war society – still deeply attached to the traditions of national heroic and uncritical war remembrance – has not found a positive concrete form of expression for the obviously sparsely germinating unease.

Precisely because of the very clear change in the culture of remembrance that has since taken place in Germany towards a critical reappraisal not only of the Nazi crimes, but also of the more far-reaching traditions in which the 'Third Reich' had partly located itself, but which it also transcended in an anti-democratic and inhuman form, the subsequent addition of these names in 2009 (!) on the initiative of a prominent citizen must come as a surprise. To interpret it only as a late attempt to provide private mourning with a public space and thus to close a gap, as the press did at the time, falls short. If this was the intention of the initiators, it means a blindness against the narrative construction that results from the insertion of the names among the imperial-(proto-)revanchist inscriptions and symbolism. Unlike in the case of the Washington Vietnam Memorial, it cannot be argued here on the basis of the symbolism that it is only and solely a matter of mourning for the soldiers as individual persons regardless of their participation in the war, about which one would no longer even need to ask. This is fully given by the fact that among the names added to this war there is also that of an SS-Untersturmführer consecrated by his parents in an obituary in the SS newspaper "Das schwarze Korps". The wording on the memorial since 1925, that the tribute is to the "living spirit of our dead", is thus also extended to the spirit in which the soldiers fought the Second World War. Here it becomes apparent that, although a distinction must be made between the times at which a monument is erected and the communicative positions at the time (who actually speaks in this monument, as who/for whom (in which capacity), addressed to whom about whom and about which contexts and how), it is precisely because of the cross-temporal extension of communication given by monumentalisation that the societies that add to, renew or even only maintain, restore or preserve a monument must at least partially enter into the speaker positions and allow themselves to be credited with the 'message'.

4 Theoretical Reflections

4.1 Rüsen's Typology of Narrating – and an Enhancement

In the late 1970s, Jörn Rüsen suggested a typology of four different "types of meaning-making" by narrating,[25] based on a theory of the development of historical knowledge in historiography by Ernst Bernheim,[26] and adding a special type, namely a critical form of knowledge. As already indicated, for Rüsen, it was not so much different forms of knowledge, but of "making meaning"-modes in light of experiences of change over time, from initially unstructured information about the past. His theory claims that the different types of narrating were developed through the course of intellectual history, driven by challenges to historical orientation by a development to ever more complex forms of change. Whereas, according to Rüsen, around ca. 500 BC (approx. Karl Jasper's "axis period"/"Achsenzeit"),[27] mankind experienced increased irritation by change which could not be met by just point to origins of conditions and claiming their (now explained) prolonged validity, but required more complex and abstract temporal reasoning. This led to the development of 'exemplary' narrating, which acknowledges the fact of demise and decay of this which had originated, and rather ventures to look 'behind' this surface, elaborating rules governing emergence and demise. In the time of enlightenment, then, change had become so prominent that even the search for time-spanning rules to be derived from history and advising present and future actions was questioned. A critical form was developed (the type specifically added by Rüsen to Bernheim's forms of knowledge), not (yet) providing a new explanation and guidance, but narrating history in a way which made both the futility of traditional search for origins and the elaboration of rules explicit that were supposed to guide life and practice across several hundred years. Only after this criticism, another, even more complex mode of narrating was developed which was based on the logic of identifying a long-time process of directed change, which could be identified by historical thinking and which made a future expectable which was different from past and present.

In his 2017 English version of the 2013 new version of his theory, Rüsen summarizes this in form of a table as follows:

25 In earlier English publications, Rüsen used the term "sense making", but seems to have switched to "meaning-making" for good now.

26 Bernheim 1920, pp. 5–14.

27 For an analysis of the history of the concept "Achsenzeit" cf. recently Assmann 2018.

Types of Forming Meaning	Reference to the Past	Concept for the Passing of Time	Time as Meaning
Traditional	Origins of universal order and ways of life	Continuity through change	Time is immortalized as meaning
Exemplary	Events and situations that demonstrate general rules of action	Timeless validity of rules of action that encompass temporally different ways of life	Time is spatialized as meaning
Genetic	Changes introduced into one's own way of life by others	Developments in which ways of life change in order to remain dynamic	Time is temporalized as meaning
Critical	Events that challenge the dominant historical orientation	Disruptions, discontinuity, contradictions	Time is assessable as meaning.

Tab. 4.1: The four types of forming of historical meaning (Rüsen 2017, p. 161), cutout.

Clearly, the critical type stands out in not providing a positive criterion for temporal meaning but just a negative one – it is the negation of both the traditional and exemplary type. In his new "Historik",[28] Rüsen integrated Bodo von Borries' early suggestion to place a 'critical' type between each of the 'positive' ones,[29] the basis from which I further differentiated the model to distinguish between two types of 'critical' thinking, one effective *within* a specific type of meaning making and delegitimizing not the respective type of temporal connection but only the individual one, asking for another one of the same logic, and the other type being the one which criticizes the narrative logic as such.[30] Von Borries also added two further types: one preceding the *traditional* one, characterizing the notion that some elements don't even have an origin but are constant across all time (and therefore can't even be addressed by any intention of change), and one transgressing the *genetic* type of thinking in terms of a directed change towards an even more abstract concept of more fundamental changes even in the lo-

28 Rüsen 2013, p. 259; Rüsen 2017, p. 161.

29 Borries 1988, p. 61.

30 And example might clarify this. If, e.g., a neo-liberal historian wrote about Alexander Graham Bell as a role-model for innovators' virtues, he could be criticized for naming the wrong inventor of the telephone, and be asked for better research of the same traditional logic, which he might, e.g., answer by writing another book on (e.g.) Antonio Meucci or Johann Philipp Reis. Someone else, however, could opine that it is not so much the names and personalities of inventors we need to think about, but some *unspecified* other aspect, if we want to learn from that development. Here, the traditional form of meaning-making itself would be criticized. The reaction could be a research into the social and economic structures favourable to great inventions in different times, which could be used in *exemplary* manner to ask for their equivalents today.

gic of such change ("evolutionary"),[31] while I suggested a "pluri-genetic" type which acknowledged not one but several directions of development.[32]



Figure 1: von Borries' advancement of Rüsen's types of narrating (Borries 1988, p. 61, transl. Körber 2015, p. 14).



Figure 2: Körber's advancement of the model of patterns of narrating (Körber 2013, p. 7; transl. Körber 2015, p. 15).

4.2 Lévesque's new approach

Canadian History and Social Studies educator Stéphane Lévesque proposes a "new approach" to addressing the question of monuments in memory culture from the perspective of

31 Recent discussions on "big history" and the outlooks to the future to be derived from it as well as from recent technical and societal developments, may indeed hint to limits of the genetic types of narrating for making meaningful connections from the past to a "changed" future, and therefore to the necessity of developing another pattern of temporal inter-connections which might be called "evolutionary". What the concrete logic of this "next step" of development might be, is, however, unclear so far. In this way, current thinking about the limits of genetic thinking might be classified as "genesis-critical" in von Borries' version (Figure 1) resp. 3B in mine (Figure 2). One example may be found in the opening chapter of Noah Yuval Harari's best-selling *Homo Deus,* containing predictions like "[...] once technology enables us to re-engineer human minds, Homo sapiens will disappear, human history will come to an end and a completely new kind of process will begin, which people like you and me cannot comprehend" – not by disruption, but in a slow process (Harari 2017, p. 46), which might be oriented by a new type of history. Cf. also Simon 2021.

32 Cf. Claude Lévi-Strauss's caveat that we tend to "regard as 'cumulative' any culture developing in a direction similar to our own" whereas others "would seem to us to be 'stationary', not necessarily because they are so in fact, but because the l*ine of their development* has no meaning for us, and cannot be measured in terms of the criteria we employ." Lévi-Strauss 1952, p. 24.

Historical Thinking, suggesting – in line with an approach to History Education of not being about teaching knowledge about the past (only or dominantly) but rather about enabling learners[33] to participate in such public by endowing them with the necessary competencies. In the concrete instance,[34] Lévesque combines a specific variant of the Canadian conceptualisation of 'Historical Thinking' (more *sensu* Seixas than Wineburg) with the typology of patterns of historical narrating embodying different patterns of sense- or meaning-making, suggested by Jörn Rüsen since 1982.[35] Using Rüsen's typology as a hierarchical taxonomy, Lévesque sketches a way of interpreting people's different stances towards monuments and their ideas of dealing with them as expressions of differently developed stances and conceptualisations. He thus offers History Education a path of developing people's historical understanding of monuments and their role in public history towards more reflective stances and concepts.

There are, however, two specific limitations to this approach, calling for its further elaboration. This paper shortly presents Lévesque's approach and explores its merits for identifying different conceptual stances towards monument culture. It offers an elaboration of Lévesque's typology for capturing the diversity both between monuments and within monuments in diverse societies, referring to a model of their role in a multi-faceted history communication. It takes up Lévesque's focus on history education addressing monument culture, rejecting, however Lévesque's usage of Rüsen's typology not only for differentiation societal forms of historical meaning-making but also individual levels of competencies, and presenting another concept for distinguishing such monument-related levels ('niveaus') of historical thinking competencies.

Elaborating on the recent decades' discussion on the purpose of history education not in learning a given history or in being initiated into a certain group's self-image by learning its specific interpretation of it, but rather in enabling learners to independently and critically perform historical thinking as a precondition for and part of partaking in today's societies' negotiations on the significance of past experiences, Lévesque suggest to explicitly and actively address such current debates and processes of orientation in history learning ventures namely, monument debates.

Didactic concepts which to not reduce such controversies and the positions and argumentations within them to simple questions of right or wrong, but accept them as necessary societal processes of negotiation and clarifying historical understandings, historical learning needs to be conceptualized not as helping students to shift from incorrect to correct positions, but rather from less to more elaborate conceptualisations and abilities to deal with the

33 The usage of 'learners' instead of 'students' is meant to include both adult education (e.g. in immigration courses) as non-institutionalized learning processes, where applicable.

34 Lévesque 2018b; Lévesque 2018c; based on Lévesque 2018a; cf. Lévesque and Clarke 2018.

35 Rüsen 1982; Rüsen 1990; cf. Körber 2013; Körber 2015, p. 11.

questions themselves in an open manner. What is needed then, is a differentiation of ways and forms of dealing with the past, which can be applied to learning processes.

As others before, relies on Rüsen's taxonomy of four different forms of making temporal "sense" or "meaning"[36] providing orientation of present identity and options present and future for acting in light of past experiences. The types it presents (traditionalist, exemplaric, criticalist, and geneticist)[37] are a) conceptualized as not simultaneously available from the beginning, but as having been developed successively from the least to the most complex, elaborate and powerful and therefore as being increasingly powerful in their ability to conceptualize and processing changes which are perceived with the course of past times, and b) are not held to merely substitute but rather complement each other, alas with the higher ones eventually taking dominance. According to Rüsen, this development characterized the history of Western historiography. The earliest and least developed form, then, conceives of the temporal course as being rather void of change. It metaphorically 'freezes time', or rather: overlooks substantive change. Historical education of this type, then, needs to focus on teaching/learning these origins of the current conditions in order to inform learners about how the world works. The second (exemplaric) concept, however, recognizes change and tries to identify patterns and rules governing this change, with history education needing to focus on making the timer-overarching rules discernible to students, enabling them to apply them in interpreting the world and acting in it. The most elaborate form of *geneticist* thinking, then, characterizes that specific form of historical sense-making which allows modern societies to identify *directions of change* in the past course of events and processes and to accordingly expect further developments (into the same direction) for the future. History Education then needs to endow learners either with a given (common) understanding of such directions of change from the past into the future (e.g. 'progression', 'modernisation') or to enable them to search for such developments themselves. The "criticalist" mode of historical thinking initially was placed between the exemplaric and the geneticist one, due to the according nature of early enlightenment historians' in de-legitimizing the earlier two logics in ancient and medieval historiograph by asserting their incapability for orienting expectations for a future in times where rather profound changes were perceived. Later on, Rüsen silently

36 English translation of Rüsen's terms may be misleading. His own English texts mostly use the term "sense-making" as translation of the German "Sinnbildung", directly taking up the concept of "sense", whereas other texts prefer "meaning" instead, focusing rather on the concept of German "Bedeutung".

37 Rüsen's term "traditional" does not imply that this mode of thinking has been handed down by way of tradition (which would be "traditionell" in German), but that it claims traditional validity of history. Differing from earlier English usage by Rüsen himself, Lévesque and also myself, I therefore use "traditionalist" here. Similarly, I refer to the second type as "exemplaric" by it not presenting an example, but claiming such status for rules as valid across time, "criticalist" for the third, which does denote criticism of the past but rather of other types of historical narrating, and "geneticist" for the fourth type.

took up a suggestion by Bodo von Borries and places criticalist types of sense-making between both traditionalist and exemplaric and between exemplaric and geneticist thinking.[38]

In his "new approach", Lévesque takes up the general idea of this conceptualisation. In line with Rüsen, he supposed that even while the geneticist form is the most advanced and characteristic of modern historical thinking, the others are neither overcome nor obsolete, but still present in the current configuration of public historical thinking. In his venture not to theoretically define patterns of sense-making, he transposes Rüsen's types to criteria for analysing educational stances to historical thinking resp. the type of abilities such stances explicitly or implicitly aim at developing within their students. This way, the typology of patterns of sense- or meaning-making is transformed into one of levels of aspired abilities of historical thinking for learners (Table 1). It thus allows to identify the underlying assumptions in different educational or curricular approaches.

		1	2	3	4
		Traditional	Exemplary	Critical	Genetic
A	Rüsen	Accepting and/or identifying past events/conditions as origins of valid conditions in the present and for the future.	Accepting and/or identifying unchanging rules discernible 'behind' events and processes and to apply them to the present and the future.	Questioning the validity of the traditional and exemplary approaches	Accepting and/or identifying directions of ongoing change discernible within the course of events/conditions and to apply them to one's own expectations of and planning for the future
B	Lévesque	Abilities to think historically are reduced to obligations to pre-given moral stances.	Abilities to think historically favour the application of a time-honoured analytical process that provides definitive rules and principles for actions.	Abilities to think historically reveal the contextual nature of our own self (positionality).	Abilities to think historically are based on concepts, rules and criteria. Context varies across time and place which limits our capacity to generalize from past events and impose our moral frameworks.

Table 1: The four modes of historical narrating (sense-making) after Rüsen (re-formulated by A.K.) and transformed to criteria for abilities by Lévesque (rephrased; AK)

In a further transformation, Lévesque identifies these different logics of narrating with levels of individual historical thinking competencies and even a direction of learning progression. Graph 2 suggests that the basic ("emergent") level is characterized by combining traditionalist and exemplaric type of narrating, whereas the intermediate ("composite") one shows all four (with just a little geneticist one), and the advanced level also combining al four types, with a dominance of the geneticist level.[39]

38 Rüsen 2013, p. 259; Rüsen 2017, p. 198; Borries 1988, p. 161; Körber 2013, p. 6; cf. Körber 2015, pp. 14–15.

39 Since the Graz conference and the general acceptance of this paper in 2021, Lévesque has further elaborated his conceptualisation in a major article, introducing a new terminology, namely "preservational", "analytical", hypercritical", and "reflexive" and thus clarifying some of the points addressed here, while other concerns, especially addressing the idea of progression, may still apply (Lévesque 2023, p. 8).

4.3 Narrative Patterns: Rüsen and Lévesque



Graph 2: Lévesque's model of competency-levels (Lévesque 2018c).

The message of Lévesque's cross-tabulation is clear: Each of the four different narrative types (positions of the central consciousness-wheel) is meant to underpin a specific form of the abilities (competencies) of historical thinking (in this case about monuments).[40] This is well argued – albeit it is not Rüsen's four narrative types which Lévesque describes, but an independent typology.

Where, e.g., Rüsen stresses that the *traditional* type is characterized by focusing on validating some current structure by searching for and/or pointing to its "origin", Lévesque merely points to the authoritatively known and given *history*, so that answers are "designed to provide straightforward, definite answers through common sense, life-practice", pointing to a true history which is considered a "window to the past". For Lévesque, the "traditional" nature is about history being considered a "window to the past" which is known, so that all inquiry can only be considered as asking the authorities. What is not defined, however in Lévesque's version, is the relation of this authoritatively known past to the present. It could well be considered quite different from the present. In Rüsen's model, however, the main characteristic of the traditional type is exactly the narrative concept of present elements of human nature and social life being valid because they can be traced to some valid origin, since which no real change is perceived: time is halted.[41] Even where Lévesque postulates "no distance between past and present", this seems to refer not to a *negation of change* and reassurance in the non-changing, but rather in the lack of perception of any change in the first place. Lévesque's narrative type is owed to an irritation by perceived change and a search for time-spanning stability, but a non-perception and an inability to independent thinking. It is only the characterisation of the special form of orientation which refers to eternity, but again, it seems to be more or less the presupposition rather than the sought-for result.

In the exemplary type, Lévesque's characterisation is nearest to that of Rüsen, e.g. in the reference to general rules and principles for orienting our present-day life" offered by "specific

40 Lévesque 2018c.

41 Cf.: "The dominant notion of the course of time in the *traditional narrative* is that of continuity through the ages. These traditional histories are mediated through a produced and continuously reproduced agreement about the validity of universal origins." (Rüsen 2017, p. 159; italics there).

concepts and cases" and the characterisation of the "dimensions of time" (past-present-future) being "interconnected through general rules for guiding our actions". This, indeed looks a lot like Rüsen's focus on "Regelkompetenz", the ability to recognize rules and patterns within the vast set of past events and circumstances which can guide present and future action. The same applies to Lévesque's characterisation of narratives as providing "useful lessons" in form of "historical generalisations". But again, there are some differences, especially in Lévesque wording that "Experiences from the past represent temporal changes, valuable lessons". To my understanding, Rüsen would caution that is not so much the changes, but the stable patterns *behind* empirical change which exemplary thinking searches for.[42]

It is mainly the critical and the genetic type, where Lévesque's descriptions differ from Rüsen's theory. As shown above, the *critical* stance is much more problematic in the original typology of Rüsen himself and has been re-located to provide a critical negation to each of the predecessing types (see above Tab. 4.1). In addition, it is often misunderstood as referring to critical evaluations of past events, actions or structure. That is only partly the case with Lévesque. Like Rüsen, his characterisation focuses on the validity and reliability of historical narratives for people's own orientation, e.g. where he states that the critical type of historical thinking delimits historical "significance, morality and continuity/ change" by "one's own interpretative framework". It therefore is (to a certain degree) *reflective* by nature. The additional characterisation that such critical thinking renders individuals free from 'obligation to predecessors' but rather establishes "value-laden principles to define their own course of actions" with "past, present, and future" being "distinct and only connected through a negative sense of rupture", however, transgresses Rüsen's concept of critical thinking being the de-legitimizing of a specific narrative interconnection of time and loads it with a general sense of critical distance to *any* pre-defined, offered orientation. In Lévesque's model, it is not so much a narrative type of criticizing other's narratives, but a kind of (self-)empowerment to address any given narrative in a critical way. This is one of the main reasons why Lévesque's characterisation is much more fitting to a level of competence than Rüsen's.

And, last but not least, the *genetic* type: In Rüsen's typology (see above) it is the understanding of the course of events across time following a specific course of directed change, leading from the past via the present into a future which thus becomes (up to a certain degree) discernible, even though we have learned that the present is all but similar to the past. In Lévesque's version, however, the genetic type is not so much genetic in the sense of thinking in temporal directions, but a specific degree of accepting the validity of historical orientation within *change and continuity* even after the level of freeing oneself of pre-given narratives

42 "Historical thinking approaches these events as a plethora of events or situations that, despite their spatial and temporal diversity, present concrete cases that demonstrate the *general rules of action with timeless validity*." (Rüsen 2017, p. 159; italics there).

has been reached. In a way, Lévesque's genetic type is the positive complement to the negative empowerment to criticism, representing the consequence from insights into the void of negativity: Once I have learned that other people's narrative suggestions are not obligatory but instead merit (and require) critical scrutiny, I still have a need for temporal orientation which can only be met by a narrative – but one which is recognized as "open to revision and scrutiny" and bound by a perspectivity which does not render them useless for my own orientation, but is part of the game. In this conception, the "genetic" type indeed represents a high (elaborated) level of having gained insight into the constructedness, perspectival nature and therefore relativity of all narratives *and* of not having surrendered into a cynic relativism, but rather to have gained a personal sovereignty, independence and responsibility which might be called "competence" in the full sense.

It therefore can be concluded that Lévesque's two-dimensional model is not so much a cross-tabulation of 'Rüsenian' patterns of meaning-making and his competencies, but rather an *independent and autonomous differentiation* of very important aspects of a conception of historical consciousness and historical thinking students can and need to acquire, a progression from a dependent way of thinking, looking for safety in prepared orientation and narratives, via critical insights into their limits towards a state of (in the positive sense) self-conscious sovereignty of thinking that is very much called for in modern societies ceaselessly quarrelling over history in political arenas and with political aims. To sum up: Critique does not so much aim at Lévesque's didactic model, but rather at his usage of Rüsen's (otherwise still indispensable) terminology of narrative types. Stéphane Lévesque's levels of competencies, therefore, should not be revised, but renamed e.g. to "dependent and a-historic" instead of "traditional", "rule- and knowledge-oriented for "exemplaric", "hyper-critical" for "critical" and "reflectedly sovereign" for "genetic".[43]

In a very recent article, now, Lévesque has further elaborated his conceptualisation in a major article, introducing a new terminology, namely "preservational", "analytical", "hypercritical", and "reflexive" and thus clarifying some of the points addressed here, while other concerns, especially addressing the idea of progression, may still apply.[44]

5 The power of Lévesque's typology for making sense of monument culture

Lévesque's subject being not historical thinking in general, but its specific application to monuments in public history culture, Lévesque also characterized the different levels of specific conceptualisations of monuments and their function in dependence from the different types of narrating/levels of competencies (Table 2, rows B and C).

43 Cf. also another model Borries 1988, p. 12; English in Körber 2015, p. 8.

44 Lévesque 2023, p. 8.

Table 2: Lévesque's "New Approach" (Selection); (Lévesque 2018a; Lévesque 2023)

	1	2	3	4
2018 2023	Traditional Preservational	Exemplary Analytical	Critical Hypercritical	Genetic Reflexive
	(keep monuments)	(explain monuments)	(replace monuments)	(change commemoration)
A	Abilities to think historically are reduced to obligations to pre-given moral stances.	Abilities to think historically favor the application of a time-honored analytical process that provides definitive rules and principles for actions.	Abilities to think historically reveal the contextual nature of our own self (positionality).	Abilities to think historically are based on concepts, rules and criteria. Context varies across time and place which limits our capacity to generalize from past events and impose our moral frameworks.
B	… monuments are represented as essential to define their own roots, traditions, and sense of self.	Monuments are explained in terms of their development and their differences. They serve as examples for a certain type of commemoration.	Monuments of another era are in rupture with today's moral values. There is a need to generate new ways of commemorating for orienting our own present-day life.	Commemoration is explained in terms of developments in a directed change, campaigning for specific forms of commemoration beyond monuments that promote insight and perspective-taking.
C	Monuments tell stories which ascertain the permanence of the group and provide guidance in establishing a traditional narrative vision for the future of Canada.	Narratives provide useful examples for orienting life in time and instructing [people] through lessons they can learn from.	Findings serve to generate new contextually situated narratives that are more appropriate for … present-day purposes and individuals' positionalities.	Forms of commemoration beyond monuments generate multiple-perspective narratives that integrate memorial change over time …

Lévesque's application of Rüsen's types of historical sense making provides some important perspectives on monument culture.

Consider again an example from Hamburg: The already mentioned Monument to the "FORTY THOUSAND SONS OF TOWN" who "GAVE THEIR LIVES" in WW I,[45] with the word "for you" having been added as a concession to the right wing 'Zeitgeist', originally (1932-1938) and its depiction a pair of mother and daughter, holding each other by Ernst Barlach on the verso, which in 1938 was exchanged for an eagle or 'phoenix' flying up, and changed back again in 1948 (Images 2, 3; p. 46). Applying Lévesque's Rüsen-based typology, we can identify some important features and functions of this monument:

- In a *traditionalist* pattern of meaning-making, it appeals (in its initial and current form) to its recipients to accept the deaths of 40.000 Hamburgians as the origin a continuous loss, still and perpetually to be mourned but to be accepted stoically.[46] It puts even today's recipients into a continuous line with Hamburgians of the late Weimar Republic and exerts an appeal to identify the lost Brothers, Fathers and „Sons of Town" as theirs.

45 See above p. 6; Plagemann 1986, 138-140;155. Appel et al. 2014b; invenies 2015, and Klingel 2006, 33,135.

46 On Barlach's intention cf. Klingel 2006, p. 62.

- Only the *exemplaric mode,* i.e. reference to general rules behind individual stories, allows us – in Lévesque's application – to interpret the two- and even three changes of the monument as being due to changing political circumstances and programmatics, and to identify its different narrative as no longer one of stoical mourning of victims of the war but one of pride and expectation of renewal of their (now 'heroic') sacrifice.
- It requires *criticalist* historical thinking, however, to question whether or to what degree these forms of public monument with the reference to "sons of town" having given their lives "*for you"* is still functional in 21st century's Hamburg with a diverse, often immigrant populace, but also, more generally, in how far such monumenting still addresses our current concerns with the past, e.g. about war being rather clear about 'us' vs. 'them'.

These three modes prove to have limited value only. While they help us to accept (traditionalist), explain (exemplaric) and to possibly reject monuments in their statements, they do not open up opportunities beyond the question of keeping monuments (and thus accepting their own power) vs. removing or toppling them (not providing different options). *Geneticist thinking*, being defined as identifying a directed line of development in the past whose recognition can help us envision what to expect from the future and to actively shape this development, might indeed help. Using it, we can ask for the place of the respective monument in a general history of monument culture: In how far can a certain monument be considered as marking a specific development ('milestone') in monument culture, and in how far must it be interpreted as being itself outdated and possibly obsolete. Geneticist thinking goes beyond the dichotomy of either/or, being not binary but complex. It does not only ask *whether* a monument (still) has a value and *whether* it needs to be set up / kept / taken down, but rather *what value* can (still) be seen in it. Monuments thus can become not only markers to a certain past in a narrative and evaluative form we have to accept or reject, but markers *of* their own time's and society's form of dealing with the past. It takes geneticist thinking not to merely ask whether a monument still expresses our own attitude or needs to be actualized, but to perceive and accept it as a signifier of past/overcome attitude, to which we as a society and as individuals have to relate and position ourselves and which we possibly have to comment on.

As a consequence, geneticist historical thinking on monuments may guide societies to develop monuments and monument cultures which go beyond just erecting monuments and considering them valid expressions of the present society's views of the past, its attitudes towards and evaluations of it, reinforced every now and then by affirmative rituals, such as wreath-laying ceremonies, etc., in the direction of more developing 1.) a more plural 'monument landscape', 2.) more inclusive ways of constructing monuments, 3.) a development of modern, more abstract and reflexive forms of monuments and monumental design, as e.g. visible in many concepts by Jochen Gerz,[47] the Berlin *Monument for the Murdered Jews of*

47 Gerz 1993.

Europe by Peter Eisenman, and lots of others, and 4.) ways of dealing with monuments which are not merely affirmative, but also reflexive and criticalist, e.g. by encouraging the erection of counter-monuments,[48] the creation of monumental palimpsests through providing space for later commenting, and by encouraging and even organizing explicit discussions on evolving existing monuments.[49]

Lévesque's application of Rüsen's typology of historical narrating and thinking can thus be interpreted as a taxonomy of increasingly complex and potent patterns of historical thinking – of levels of historical competence (Table 3).

It can inform our sense- and meaning-making on monuments in public history culture. It does, however, require to interpret monuments in a rather conventional, uni-dimensional way. The form of meaning-making described in Lévesque's typology is rather one of developing our stance *towards* classical monuments, but neglects the diversity of references to the past already given both within individual and in the spectrum of monuments in our (post-)modern public history. Lévesque's new approach therefore can and should be adapted for allowing to analysing monument culture's diversity.

48 Tomberger 2007; Wijsenbeek 2010.

49 The metaphorics of the term 'palimpsest' requires exploration. Originally, palimpsests are texts written on top of erased other ones, without a necessary interconnection between the texts. In literary theory, the term has been used to combine different forms of inter-texual, e.g. para-, hypo- and hypertextual relations, which presuppose a relationship. Here, I refer to still another usage, namely the possibility of 'superscribing' new monumental displays and narratives across monuments which do not erase or render them invisible not just replace them with an alternative, but rather integrates them into their new narratives as visible components.

			1	2	3	4
		Monument-Type / Structure	**Traditional**	**Exemplary**	**Critical**	**Genetic**
A	**a**	**Concrete persons**	individual heroes as important members of the own group and facets of the own history	Typical, abstract heroes of human experience in general	Devaluing, criticising the presentation of persons as concrete and abstract heroes	Assessing affirmative presentations as testimonies of specific ways of dealing with the past
	b	**Abstract groups ("unknown soldier")**				
B		**Individual events**	… as concrete parts of the own history	Monuments reflect a society's specific views of history	Criticising the presentation of any affirmative past	
C		**Logic of Historical Narrative**	"our own pride and pain" (Joke van der Leeuw)	"pride and pain" in general, virtues, suffering	Criticising affirmative traditions	Looking for developments in monument culture
D		**Stance towards Monuments**	Accepting the embracement into the monument's "we-group"	Looking for abstract insights, consequences, Abstracting von concrete embracement	Calling for breaking the imposing gesture Calling for toppling affirmative presentations Criticising embracement	Looking for commemorative forms beyond monuments

Table 3: Lévesque's conception applied to traditionalist monuments

6 The narrative complexity of monuments

The development of new types of commemorating of geneticist type (Lévesque) via monuments started a century ago. In our context of competencies of historical thinking on monuments, the case of the Hamburg monument highlights the narrative complexity and even polyvalence of monuments. Table 4 suggest some different intersections of possible individual abilities of sense-making (columns 1-4) related to different societal forms of addressing the past (e.g. via monuments and monument -related actions).

				1	2	3	4
				People's / Learners' Stances towards monuments as …			
				Traditional	Exemplary	Critical	Genetic
				… necessary / expedient, presenting a specific past person/ event with a specific affirmative message ("own pride and pain")	Memorials as presenting generalized and generalizable experiences (persons performing exemplaric deeds; events)	Questioning / delegitimizing monuments' messages	Overcome monuments towards other forms of commemorating
A	Narrative mode of commemoration	traditional	…specifically affirmative ("own pride and pain")	• Persons as heroes • Events as part of one's "own" story • Accepting the embracement	• Heroes as examples for generalized virtues • Events as generalized experiences	• Criticizing affirmative presentation of "pride and pain"	• "Heroic affirmative" presentations as part of a long overcome form of commemorating
B		exemplaric	… generalized affirmative (examples for typical experiences)	• Exemplaric heroes as individual heroes • Abstract groups as individuals to be hailed ("unknown soldier")	• persons and events as examples for generalized insights and opportunities for reflection • Abstract groups ("unknown soldier") as exemplaric for general experiences (Hamburg WWI)	• Criticizing affirmative presentations of generalized insights • Suggesting presentation of generalized critique (memorials; anti-war monuments)	• Exemplaric presentations as a step towards more autonomous commemorating
C		critical	… normatively invalid;	• Replacing monuments as "destroying the past"	• Replacements as typical for shifts in dominant interpretation ("each time builds their own monuments and topples those of before") • keep up monuments (only) if the underlying patterns of conduct are supportable regardless of the specific case	• Replacements and counter-memorials as instruments of emancipation from problematic attitudes to history	• Counter-monuments as proof of emancipation of historical thinking
D		genetic	… the past as lost /overcome	• incomprehension?		• Diverse and inclusive commemorating as indecisive, arbitrary	• Searching for Inclusive, controversial and reflective commemorating

Table 4: Two-dimensional elaboration of intersections between monuments' and people's different levels of sense- and meaning-making; AK

It helps to distinguish different understandings of and stances towards different of dealing with the past, e.g. criticalist ones (Row C). It thus can help to explain that a monument can be interpreted and evaluated quite differently. Two examples may suffice:

The distinction of types of individual conceptualisation (1-4) can highlight that while heroic monuments presenting individual persons can be cherished both in a traditionalist form as presenting these persons as deserving members of one's own group, their actions and achievements being (presented as) important not in their general but concrete significance

for an in-group's history. By this logic, Northeners in the US might support statues General Ulysses S. Grant as guarantee of their freedom and safety, or Afro-American visitors might remember him as the 'liberator' of US slaves (A/1), whereas Southerners could support those of Generals like Lee as still representing the values of their cause which may have been lost, but which they still hold true, which the former need to oppose. Such calls for toppling such statues on the ground that they represent values no longer valid, do not represent criticalist thinking *sensu* Rüsen's and Lévesque's typology, but follow the same traditionalist understanding as in negative form. From an exemplaric stance, (A/2), however, such heroic displays can be recognized and cherished regardless of whether the concrete cause of the hero displayed and his attainments are considered still valid – it is the more generalized pattern, the example of heroism itself, exceptional skill or dedication, etc., which such a monument is considered pointing at.

In another sense, the Hamburg Rathausmarkt Monument mentioned avove,[50] commemorating the fallen soldiers of WWI (and today implicitly also WWII) can also be regarded as having different messages of exemplaric type. While on the main layer, it expresses loss of husbands, brothers and sons in the county's and town's defeat in WWI, and even though the notion of these soldiers' being victims of the overwhelming war is present, this loss is not merely referred to as the origin of the current situation, but as the result of an exemplary action of heroism by these soldiers: They are referred to as having done, what men are presented to have to do in such situations. And the abstractness of Barlach's relief of mother and daughter also adds to this understanding that this is no new, but rather a typical feature of war-experience: Soldiers die in not individually but collectively heroic service, and their families suffer. Hamburg women: you are not alone in this. Others have endured it, too. The replacement of the relief by that of the uprising eagle, then changes the political value, not the narrative logic: These soldiers are still examples, but no longer by being implicit in their families' suffering, but as concrete roll models for a new national uprising, the reference to families and relatives being wiped out altogether. And the current version with the restorated Barlach relief again takes up the former, exemplaric stance: The honouring commemoration of the specific soldiers of WWI ("gave their lives") might fades in time but is still there, but the exemplaric meaning of war being the cause for suffering, prevails.

A criticalist stance *sensu* Rüsen/Lévesque (A/3) is hard to see in that monument. It would be given if regardless of the specific virtues for one's own party or in general the logic of presenting individual persons as heroes or role models was objected to, e.g. by adding other parts which do not merely present alternative alternative readings of the past referred to, but actively de-legitimize the traditionalist and/or exemplaric presentation. An example of this can be found again in Hamburg. The already mentioned War Memorial for the members of 31st In-

50 See p. 6.

fantry Regiment in Altona,[51] was commented on in the 1990s by a counter-monument commissioned by the Johannis Church's congregation and realized by Rainer Tiedje with his university class in 1992. The combination of the old monument and the recent additions does not so much constitute a mere "successful contrast", as one Website comments,[52] but it encapsulates it into a new and longer narrative on the consequences of the belligerent norms and statements of the old monument. This is made possible by the new counter-monument transparently marking its temporal position as post-WW2 via the open display of its materials (metal frames and acrylic glass) and featuring an iconography not merely referring to abstract horrors of war but concretely alluding to the Second World War and the Holocaust in confronting each 1925 warrior with a "dark, emaciated, fearful creature[.]"[53] which to a certain degree resembling extermination camp prisoners ("musulmans").

In doing so, the counter memorial does not only effectively (I hope) de-legitimize the traditionalist and exemplaric presentation of history (criticalist sense-making) but also relegates it to the place of an overcome stance in a directed development towards more criticalist thinking. It thus represents one contribution to the efforts to find "other forms of commemorating" (Lévesque's geneticist stance; column 4) which do not only replace older ones but enclose them into a new narrative.

The 'Kriegsklotz' near Hamburg Dammtor station, also introduced above,[54] also has been added to with counter monument and the emerging ensemble could be called the most prominent example for Hamburg's memory policy's struggle, but not an outrightly "successful" one. After a series of public protests and subversive attacks against Khuöl's 1938 monument – including an attempted blasting – which in turn were met by partly successful efforts from the right-wing side of society to clean, save and even illuminate it,[55] a large counter-monument by artist Alfred Hrdlicka was commissioned in the 1980s, of which only two parts were realized, and more recently a third monument, commemorating not obedient soldiers, but to the contrary such who deserted the aggressive and criminal war and became victims of Nazi German military "justice" was presented.[56] All of this has not ended by the erection of the named counter memorials – which may be a good sign in itself. Instead, it seems, that the protesting overpaintings have become both themselves more meaning-making examples of grass-roots counter-monumenting, and the Hamburg state's reactions seem to have become more acceptive of them. Whereas decades ago, the monument has been cleaned quite soon after such attacks, at present an at least four years old re-painting is still visible, which blackens part of

51 See above, p. 7.
52 Kriegerdenkmal an der St. Johanniskirche 2012, transl. A.K.
53 Kriegerdenkmal an der St. Johanniskirche 2012, transl. A.K.
54 See above, p. 8.
55 On this, see Walden 1994, 18f.
56 For images and more material see Appel et al. 2014c.

the inscription, resulting in: "GERMANY MUST ~~LIVE, EVEN IF WE HAVE TO~~ DIE"[57] – a remarkable change and possibly an indicator of a changed public sentiment, too.

Similarly, criticalist displays and actions in monument culture, such as removals of monuments and/or their confrontation by counter monuments (row C in 4) can also vary. Individuals with a traditionalist understanding would only welcome them if monuments of the wrong party or an outdated affiliation are affected and otherwise interpret such criticalist forms as an effort to destruct the one / their own history (C/1), whereas people showing exemplaric thinking may either shrug off such efforts of removing monuments as part of the normal course of public history and history politics ('each time erects their own monuments and takes down that of the predecessors – so what?') or – if having to take a decision – ask not whether the person or event displayed is part of a still valid group, but could still be displayed as exemplifying generalizable attitudes, postures, etc. (C/2). Only people with a criticalist attitude to such displays of history would fully support such removals and/or the erection of counter-monuments as efforts to neutralize the older monuments' messages (C/3), whereas individuals having a geneticist understanding would rather try to find ways to have counter monuments not just replace but encapsulate the old messages into a new narrative – as I have shown before.

Thus, historical thinking abilities concern both a differential reading ("de-construction") of monuments' narratives and messages and the individual orientation within such a monument culture. The two-dimensional tabulation given in 4 therefore may serve as an extended version of Lévesque's proposal. Monuments do, however, not just present a single or a set of given messages regardless of the actual context in which they are displayed and perceived. Both these messages and their significance also vary with the recipients' social, cultural and temporal diversity. Not all ('national') history cultures, e.g., are characterized by a presence of colossal monuments so typical for the 'Second' German Empire; as the Bismarck monument in Hamburg, the Hermannsdenkmal in the 'Teutoburger Wald', the Niederwalddenkmal and others. Iconographic, architectural and linguistic codes on monuments are in themselves subject to tradition as they are influenced by other logics, such as intentional breach of tradition, notions of progression, etc. The typology does, however, still apply, in that it does not refer to the specific tradition in content or form, but to the narrative mode the monument presents.

57 See with an image of 2020 (Image 5, p. 47): Klotz am Dammtor: „Deutschland muss sterben" – umstrittenes Denkmal beschmiert 2020. The red underlinings there have faded or been cleaned, the black "erasions" are still visible today. The inscription is a quote from a 1914 poem "Soldiers' goodbye" ("Soldatenabschied") by Heinrich Lersch; cf. Walden 1994, 16f.

7 Societal and individual development of Historical Thinking competencies

Lévesque's "new approach" therefore needs more elaboration not only with regard to the explicit narrative diversity of monuments (as suggested above), but also with regard to the diversity of history communication via monuments within diverse societies. Members of contemporary societies, especially those in which a variety of different traditions are simultaneously available and (at least partially) considered valid ("post-traditionalist societies"),[58] must therefore have at their disposal a spectrum of concepts and terms for analysing and evaluating historical communication. Competencies of historical thinking and their respective levels therefore are not sufficiently characterized by different stances towards memorial culture, but by the specific forms of mastery of concepts and insights.

While it seems perfectly reasonable to view the development of public understanding of and public attitudes toward monuments in society as a whole as an increase in their abilities to deal with the past, applying the same logic to the development of historical thinking competencies in individuals – especially in the formative years – is rather implausible. While the individual patterns – according to Rüsen – developed one after the other in the course of the history of historiography and thus were only partially available to the members of earlier societies in each case, members of today's (especially diverse) societies encounter (public) historical narratives of quite different logics already at a young age, can perceive them, and must relate to them.

Rüsen's claim that the different patterns of meaning-making also form levels of individual competencies of historical thinking[59] is, however, implausible. It is based on a similar claim of a parallelism between the sequence of development of patterns for narrative sense- or meaning-making in the phylogenetic development of humanity or cultural history on the one hand and the ontogenetic development of the individual on the other hand. This theory implies that in ancient times even adult people had only simple patterns for processing time at their disposal, as they are accessible for children today. This may be plausible under the premise that they did not need higher forms due to little temporal change, the requirement for developing higher (exemplaric and geneticist) ones having occurred later, only, so that children in their individual learning trajectories only had access to these simple patterns. That under modern conditions in which ample historical change has led to ubiquitous presence of a complex set of patterns of sense making in everyday life, children should acquire them only successively in exact this order, is much harder to support.

It is much more plausible to assume that under modern conditions of complex patterns simultaneously available in society, the individual development of historical thinking and the

58 Girmes 1997.

59 Rüsen 2013, p. 259; engl. in Rüsen 2017, p. 198; Hasberg 2012, p. 142; similar Norden 2014, pp. 190–206.

necessary competencies is rather, "transversal" development of increasingly differentiated and conscious, as well as critical and reflexive mastering of all cultural patterns.

	ability to …	
Elaborate	Apply and reflect logic and implications of interpretive patterns	reflectively take part in discussing / developing memory culture
Intermediate	Ability to us patterns / interpretations	Reflect and choose different types of monumenting
Basic	(inconsistent / superficial application of facets of all patterns)	inconsistent positioning; incomprehension of implications

Table 5: Levels of Competencies according to the FUER-model (Körber 2007; 2012)

This would correspond to the differentiation of different levels ("graduation") in the FUER model of historical competencies,[60] according to which the lowest ("basic") level is characterized by the fact that thinking about the past and (in our case of memory culture and monuments) public forms of remembering can be seen as characterized by largely situational, inconsistent and unstable use of a spectrum of different forms, which just do not (yet) correspond to social conventions, but are either individual developments or consist of unprocessed, misunderstood use more of the terms than of the concepts underlying them.

To exemplify: If people can understand and use the terms 'monument', 'statue', 'memorial', or, in German 'Denkmal' and 'Mahnmal', 'Gedenkstätte', etc. (having heard these terms already), but do so indifferently and inconsistently – referring to the same marker by any of these terms without an intent to highlight different aspects of it, this might indicate a *basic level*. The same might be the case if, e.g. people referred to on such markers were named indifferently as 'heroes'. So much for the competency-facet of conceptual understanding. As for the procedural dimensions, a basic level might be signified by only being able to ask for what 'event' of the past a monument etc. 'stands for', for what it does 'mean' – without any qualification of the query as to its terminology and the concepts used (see above), but indiscriminately as to whom the question is posed to, etc., (inquiry competence), by only looking at its manifest message as a method of reading it (methodical competence) and by merely being able to accept vs. reject that message for oneself.

An *intermediate level*, then, would be signalled by the mastery of a differentiating spectrum of concepts (and related terminology) in inquiring, reading and narrating and evaluation. If, e.g. someone is able to ask *whether* a marker is meant as honouring or admonishing, if the concepts of 'victim' and 'sacrifice' can be used for asking or discussing the message of a monument, this level is given – even if the concrete message may be misinterpreted due to unfamiliarity with a specific symbol or term. Competencies are not identical with knowledge, but are the abilities to address new and unfamiliar instances. So if a person should wonder about the presence of 'Mahnmale' pointing not to German pride and pain but to pain inflicted onto others by Germans in German public history, being able to express this perception cor-

60 Körber et al. 2007, 35ff.

rectly, she/he would signal at least this level of competencies, whereas if someone simply perceived those monuments as indiscriminately heroic, this might be called into question.

The *elaborate level,* then, is marked by the additional ability to reflect on the intension, extension and therefore also on the limits of such concepts. It might even be possible on the intermediate level to realize that people can have been both sacrifices and victims or even perpetrators and victims (either in different circumstances or, e.g. as 'Kapo' in a concentration camp). To be able to reflect, though, on whether to remember in their capacity of having been victims might also reproduce the categories of their torturers, might reduce them to this state of victimhood, requires an additional level of competence. Similarly, to be able to discuss whether the erection of a 'Mahnmal', addressing the 'own group's' crimes might be both, a necessary addition to a memory culture which other wise would remain centred to one's own 'pride and pain', *and* a possible tool for trying to overcome this past, or of mere 'virtue signalling', might indicate the highest, the reflective level. It might characterize contributions to public history discourses in monument-debates which go beyond mere 'keeping vs. removing', positions which perceive and accept not only positional and perspectival diversity, but also ambiguity and continuous necessity for discourse, in spite of and even because of the presence of monuments.

8 History Education on monuments

What then is the purpose of addressing monuments and monument culture in History Education? To foster homogeneity or even unison of students' positions and expressions (both among them and within the societal history culture) cannot be a guideline – neither with these debates not in learning about and for them. Rather, members of (modern) diverse societies must be able not only to make up and revise their own minds about the past and its public representation every now and then (not to say: constantly), but also must be able to relate to their fellow-members' perceptions and interpretations, the knowledge, interpretation and association both topics and ways of representing possibly trigger in them, the meanings they may assign to the respective past and the ways they relate to it. In order to participate in their society's (and societies') memory culture(s), citizens need to be able to analyse the narrative logic of the references to the past which are visible (as in monuments and memorials) as well as constantly being made and refreshed (as in celebrations, guided tours but also rituals, speeches and teaching) in their society. It therefore should be one of the main tasks of History Education to enable students to analytically reflect their society's (or societies'?) memory culture, rather than invest them with 'the best story' told about it.

From this point of view, analysing monuments (and other media of memory culture and public history) should count among the main activities of School History.

Such analysis should, however, not merely aim at conveying to learners the "objective" meaning of monuments, offering them information about the story referred to, the context of their installation, the authors or artist, etc. It should go beyond prompting them to ask for 'factual' information first and to interpret afterwards. It should rather help students to (1) recognize both their own perceptions and interpretations of monuments, to (2) to make them aware of the memory culture as part of their cultural environment, (3) to help them perceive and appreciate the diversity of perspectives, interpretations and evaluations, (4) to help them gain insight into the limitations to this diversity in that interpretations can be discussed and evaluated and not 'anything goes', (5) to encourage, empower, and enable them to research information both on the past presented and the interpretations encountered, (6) to help them keep and open mind towards newly emerging perspective, problems, and discussions, and (7) to foster their developing competencies of historical thinking on their own and together with others.[61]

To "read" and understand monuments, therefore, requires a complex set of analytical operations. Tab. 8.1 has been elaborated in an international project for this purpose.[62] It suggests a set of questions and indicators useful for understanding the historical meaning of monuments. In most settings of today's (post-)modern, post-traditional societies, the task of addressing these questions does require more than mere recognition of obvious statements.

As has been elaborated upon above, places of historical culture do not necessarily tell one individual story in an auctorial way with certain factual and value judgments. They do however, in and with their respective design and institutionalization promote a certain selection from the quasi unlimited spectrum of possible perspectives, information, interpretations and valuations, while they exclude others or distinguish themselves from them. In spite of their own institutional "self-understanding", they often stand in a field of tension of different perspectives on this past, of the ways of dealing with it and of the "use" of these places. To what extent can and should "remembrance" take place, for example, at "perpetrator sites", or to what extent can a place, which primarily portrays the suffering of Germans in the Second World War, also work with the "commemorate" mode? Or is it not an "admonish" mode that is more appropriate because of the German responsibility for the Second World War? This is not only a question of terminology, but also of the modes of concrete presentation.[63] After all,

61 Cf. e.g. Körber 2015.

62 Bjerg et al. 2014.

63 For example, pupils of two school classes from a Hamburg grammar school, whom I accompanied alongside university students to the Neuengamme concentration camp memorial site in 2007, apparently perceived aspects of *hero worship*, despite the clearly commemorative and admonishing character. This was quite probably due to the inscription on the onsite monument from 1965. "These people died to make us feel better," a student from the former Soviet Republic told me. Similarly, in a recent project, students accompanying a guided tour through the "Mahnmal St. Nikolai" in Hamburg, an authentic place of destruction, overly clearly perceived the suffering of the people of Hamburg, but did not take notice of the necessary and actually presented contextu-

our present is equipped with a multitude of different forms of cultural and institutional references to the past and its meaning, as well as a whole spectrum of terms and concepts about them, which – again depending on perspective – are sometimes sharply separated, then again used with some overlaps. Monuments, memorials, places of remembrance, museums, documentation centers etc. are only some of the terms, just as "perpetrator" and "victim".

Precisely for this reason, however, it is necessary to inspire among the potential addressees of the monuments or rather the members of the respective historical culture an awareness of the specifics of different places as well as of the possibilities they offer for one's own orientation and for individual historical thinking, and to promote their competences for a future independent, yet compatible, perception and comprehension of these diverse places. It is thus helpful to prepare individuals for the challenges of discovering the remnants and representations of the past as which places and institutions of historical culture initially present themselves.[64]

alizations with the earlier bombardments of Coventry and Warsaw. The explicitly so-called admonishing monument effortlessly became a memorial to them.

64 Heuer 2011.

1. Communicative Explicitness:
   In how far does the monument (seem to) …
   - … present or suggest a specific person or group in a speaker position?
   - … address a specific person/group or suggests to be directed towards a specific group?
   - … address a third-party as some kind of witness as to the fact of remembering?
   - … refer to some third party as involved in the past narrated?
2. Narrative Explicitness:
   In how far does the monument (seem to) …
   - … presuppose that the recipient/addressee has sufficient knowledge about the context referred to?
   - … explicitly construct a specific context (tell a specific story),
   - … rely on a certain amount of common knowledge of *speaker and* addressee?
   - … introduce actors, contexts and events?
   - Other ?
3. Transitive/Intransitive communication:
   In how far does the monument (seem to) …
   - … embrace the *recipient/addressee* as a member of the same group ("we") as the (purported) *speaker*?
   - … address the *recipient/addressee* as a member of a different group ("you") as the (purported) *speaker*?
4. "Mono-" or "Heteroglossic" communication:[65]
   In how far does the monument (seem to) …
   - … embrace the recipient/addressee as undoubtedly having the same perspective/sharing the evaluation ("monoglossic")?
   - … address the recipient/addressee as not necessarily sharing the same perspective and evaluation ("heteroglossic")?
5. Communicative Intent:
   What is the relation of authors'/addressee(s)/third-party's role in the (proto-)narrated story?, e.g.
   1. Generic
      "‹…› want(s) ‹…› to ‹know/remember/acknowledge/accept/judge› ‹a group/a person/an event/ …› as ‹…›"
   2. Specific:
   - "'We' ‹…› want 'you' ‹…› (and others) to know what 'we' ‹…› have achieved!" (as e.g. in "Stranger, tell the Spartans …")
   - "'We' ‹…›want 'us' ‹…› to not forget what 'we' ‹…› have achieved!" (as e.g. in Monuments to Unification)
   - "'We' ‹…› want 'us' ‹…› to not forget what 'we' ‹…› have caused!" (as e.g. in German Concentration Camp Memorials)
   - "'We' ‹…› want 'you' ‹…› to know that 'we' ‹…› submit ourselves to not forgetting/remembering!"
   - "'We' ‹…› want 'us' ‹…› to not forget what 'they' ‹…› have done to 'us' ‹…›!"
   - "'We' ‹…› want 'you' ‹…› to know that 'we' ‹…› acknowledge what 'you' ‹…› have done to 'us' ‹…›!"
6. In how far does one (or several) of the following forms describe the communicative intention of the monument?
   - to *inform,* e.g. if it introduces and details the past incidents, contexts etc.;
   - to *confirm,* e.g. if it almost tacitly – without giving details – refers to a past context which both author and addressee share knowledge about; intending to secure acknowledgement of factuality;
   - to *commemorate,* e.g. if it almost tacitly – without giving details – refers to a past context which both author and addressee share knowledge about, intending to express a certain evaluation;
   - to *mourn,* e.g. if it refers to a past context which both author and addressee share knowledge about, intending to express a feeling of loss of someone/something valued);
   - to *remind,* e.g. if it refers to a past context which both author and addressee *should* share knowledge about, intending to
     - prevent forgetting;

65 In Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), the terms mono- and heteroglossic characterize forms of "engagement" of texts with possible other perspectives and sources of information (Martin and White 2005). While monuments seldom seem to be heteroglossic in that they refer to others perspectives as sources of the information and interpretation they present, I suggest that they may differ in how they address the public. Do they simply embrace the addressee into their narrative (monoglossic), or do they address them explicitly for reminding, admonishing or even hailing a common 'we' (heteroglossic).

- ○ secure a certain evaluation which is supposed to have been shared before?
- ○ to appeal, e.g. if it asks (invites?/requests?/summons?) the recipient/addressee to feel/identify/act in a certain way, e.g. by
  - ▫ referring to (a) person(s) as responsible for something, admonishing the addressee to evaluate this/these persons in a certain way, but *not to follow her/his example*, either
  - ▫ heroizing: presenting (a) person(s) as responsible for a special achievement and therefore to be revered;
  - ▫ giving thanks: presenting (a) person(s) as responsible for a special achievement and expressing gratitude;
  - ▫ condemning: presenting (a) person(s) as responsible for a special achievement and therefore to be condemned;
  - ▫ to present examples / role models, e.g. if it by presents (a) person(s) as responsible for something and addresses the recipient/addressee as possibly being in a similar position and having similar capacities, urging her/him either
    - – to follow the example (e.g. of taking action, of resisting);
    - – to *not* follow the example (e.g. of going along …);
  - ▫ to express gratitude, e.g. if it presents *the addressee and/or his group* as responsible for something good, expressing gratitude;
  - ▫ to accuse, e.g. if it presents *the addressee and/or his group* as responsible for something bad, expressing contempt;
- other (specify) …

Tab. 8.1: Questions and Options for Analysing Monuments. Based on (Körber 2014a), modified.

Visitors therefore do not have to learn so much about the past, or at least not only learn about the past, "by means" of the places which refer to it. They have at least just as much be enabled to develop the categorical and interpretive instruments of concepts and terms.[66] It should also be kept in mind that hardly anyone comes into contact with aspects of historical and memory culture exclusively or for the first time in school lessons. Many of the relevant concepts and interpretations are so present in the public debate that even the announcement of an excursion to a place of historical culture will awaken connotations and expectations, which, moreover, will probably be quite different among the individuals for social, cultural and individual reasons. Historical (learning) places not only include the "historical sites" to be visited by school classes on their own or under the direction of a teacher, but also those institutions of historical culture which, in addition to their activity in researching the past and history and documenting it in exhibitions and events, have a promotional function for the general public – in this capacity they are also again frequented by school classes. It is not unusual for these institutions – be they state, civic, or private – to have their own pedagogical departments or staff and a programmatic and didactic setup which are often elaborated and documented to different degrees of specificity and detail.[67] This can be an enrichment especially for historical learning in schools, as it opens up further relevant perspectives for learners (and teachers). Nevertheless, it can also lead to tension and dissatisfaction or even confusion among learners if such differences remain unrecognized or unspoken and are not addressed.

66 See e.g. Körber and Lenz 2006; Körber 2014a; Körber 2014b; Körber 2014c.

67 In addition, there is the common practice of having guided tours conducted by free guides with groups of all kinds (therefore including school classes), which are often provided centrally for several such locations but are neither integrated into the respective processes of developing exhibitions and tours nor into the school processes.

Despite the diversity of places and institutions of historical culture, a number of comparable challenges arise for their reflected use, be it within the framework of an individual, group or school visit. One of the more general challenges might be a misperception of the history portrayed and addressed, which can be based on the different perceptions of the "nature" of these places on the part of their "operators" and the pedagogical staff on the one hand and the visitors on the other. In the same way, however, the cause might also lie in the differences in cultural, social, or political perspectives between visitors. Meanwhile, none of this suggests the fiction of a given and simply perceivable or adoptable "correct" interpretation. On the contrary, it is even a constitutive element of contemporary historical culture and the self-understanding of most of its spatial representations that they are open to different perspectives and interpretations, even to discussions about necessary conclusions, and want to invite to such an open debate.[68] Being open to multi-perspectivity and controversy in this way however not only has limits in the respect of human rights and mutual respect as well as the demands of truth and objectivity, but also presupposes a minimum of understanding about the character and self-understanding of the respective places.

Furthermore, especially when it pertains to a school visit, there may be different pedagogical and didactic principles between the systems of memory culture and pedagogy on the one hand and school on the other – particularly where the places and institutions have an own pedagogical offer. In German memorial pedagogy, for example, any orientation towards direct learning assessments of a school nature is regarded as problematic, even if the aim is not initially or solely to obtain mere declarative knowledge, but rather the independent reflection and comprehension of what happened and possibly, how a society deals with that. Such a way of grasping a place is considered a form of learning which cannot be subject to direct control and is at the same time hampered by all forms of control as well as performance pressure. Such tensions between pedagogical forms, principles and routines will occur in many ways, not only in the (memorial) sites that focus on the perception, acceptance and reflection of social shame and responsibility in the face of a criminal past.[69] They cannot be completely dissolved in favour of one side or the other. The school must neither colonize the historical and memorial cultural sites for its own purposes nor can or must it completely surrender responsibility for learning processes. Rather, the "double pedagogical framing"[70] must be reflected upon and can even represent a valuable opportunity for historical learning in itself. Thus it is not only important for the staff involved in visits to sites of historical culture to note the expectations, preconceptions an eventual impressions of the places on the part of the (prospective) participants as well as on the part of the "pedagogical counterparts". This information itself can (in processed and possibly anonymized form) be the basis for a multi-

68 Kößler 2009.

69 See e.g. Knigge 2002; Thimm et al. 2015.

70 On this concept see Haug 2015.

perspective learning, oriented towards mutual perception and exchange of subjective and social meanings.

A mere "factual" analysis of a monument of a memorial place therefore will not suffice. Rather, educational settings should start with collecting the spectrum of perceptions of a monument, of questions it raises in different members of a group, of different ideas of what stories it tells, not so much aiming at a quick common solution, but rather as a basis for fruitful discussions of possibly diverse "readings" and evaluations. If possible, this should be done anonymously within the group, so as not to pre-emptively focus the participants towards finding a supposed "correct" information and interpretation. Furthermore, perspectives and hypotheses by other visitors as well as more official ones by authors and/or staff of possibly educational institutions should be likewise recorded and enhance the spectrum. The work-sheets in Materials 1a and 1b are meant to facilitate such a collections of interpretive ideas. In a T-P-S-format setting, therefore,[71] participants, teachers and responsible personnel can first individually note down and formulate *their own* respective expectations and observations, as well as their perceptions of the attitudes and concepts of the other participants (T). In following group work phases (P), it is not so much a question of whether the respective perceptions were *correctly* assessed, but rather of entering into an exchange about them. It is precisely these divergences and differences that should come to light and get discussed in this way, without getting linked to valuations. It will be advisable to work less with plenary presentations and more with mutual reading and questioning. Further questions for an overall discussion (S) can then be formulated on the basis of the insights gained, i. e. the similarities as well as the differences. It might be advisable to keep multiple copies of the instruments on hand, in order to note down additions, corrections, refinements and further questions during the discursive phases.

Tab. 8.2: Worksheet 1 for collecting different perspectives, interpretations etc.

			Own perception	Perspective of the institution (responsible persons)	Perspective of the visit management or teachers	(other) participants	Remarks/ Comments
Place of History Culture:							
Task: 1. Write down your own impressions, insights and, if necessary, questions about the historical-cultural (learning) place in the column "own perception"! 2. Complete the other columns by means of observations, interviews if necessary, surveys! (It does not depend on the complete processing of all individual fields, but on the elaboration of essential commonalities and differences in perception as a basis for (joint) further reflection and interpretation! 3. Evaluate in a comparative way and formulate insights and further questions! 4. Communicate and discuss your results a) with other participants*, colleagues* and b) with representatives of other perspectives.							

71 T-P-S stands for Think – Pair – Share. It represents a method of cooperative learning in which the learners first deal with a question individually, then look at it in pairs or in small groups under a new question (not simply a "right or wrong" one). Only this result is then shared in the plenum and reflected further. See among others Brüning and Saum 2007.

			Own perception	Perspective of the institution (responsible persons)	Perspective of the visit management or teachers	(other) participants	Remarks/ Comments
Category	Auxiliary Questions	Examples					
Task	Why does this place exist? What was it set up for? Who initiated it?						
Historical and Cultural Classification	What parts of (overall) social historical culture does the location address? Which and whose history(s) are addressed? To what extent is this of general interest?						
Form of historical communication	Which of these characterizations apply to this location (several are possible)	informing corroborating reminding mourning admonishing heroizing arraigning appealing to thanking					
Institutionalisation	What does this mean for its function as a place of learning?						
Educational intentions	What is the interest in the use as a historical-cultural (learning) place?						
Aims	What specific concepts and goals of historical thought and learning does the place open up?						
Principles	Are there specific principles of work there?						
Formate	Formats						

			Own perception	Perspective of the institution (responsible persons)	Perspective of the visit management or teachers	(other) participants	Remarks/ Comments
Methods	Which specific methods are used?						
Reflexivity	To what extent does the experience and pedagogy of this place itself become a theme?						
Role(s) of employee	How is the role of the local employees understood?						
Role(s) of pupils/recipients	How is the role of the recipients understood?						

Tab. 8.3: Worksheet 2

In how far do you (a) recognise an interest in or expectation of (a) the institutionally responsible persons at the place of learning, (b) the group of recipients*, (c) the manager/teacher (and (d) yourself)?					
	Own perception I expect (hope? / fear?)	Perspective of the institution (responsible persons) The location/programme aims to …	Perspective of the visit management or teachers* inside The visit aims at …	(other) participants The participants expect (hope? fear?) …	Remarks/ Comments
Transfer of fixed knowledge about the past ("basic knowledge")					
Transfer of fixed interpretations and interpretations					
Empathy with past circumstances					
Creation of community by conveying a common image of history (chronological; monoperspectival)					
Promotion of a critical attitude towards society; questioning of community ideas					
"Historical Consciousness": insight into one's own historicity and into the effects of the past on the					

In how far do you (a) recognise an interest in or expectation of (a) the institutionally responsible persons at the place of learning, (b) the group of recipients*, (c) the manager/teacher (and (d) yourself)?					
	Own perception I expect (hope? / fear?)	Perspective of the institution (responsible persons) The location/programme aims to …	Perspective of the visit management or teachers* inside The visit aims at …	(other) participants The participants expect (hope? fear?) …	Remarks/ Comments
present					
Identity reflection: clarification of individual references to past(s) and history					
Promotion of a critical attitude towards society;					
Ideology critique / deconstruction: thematization and problematization of popular and other ideas of history					
Ability to think historically					
Method training: Ability to deal with history in one's own way					

9 Learning progression

The acquisition of a higher (intermediate) level of competence then does not consist in the discarding of the traditionalist pattern and the acquisition of the exemplaric one (as suggested by Rüsen and Hasberg) or in the development of a specific combination of them (as in Lévesque's concept; cf. Graph 2, p. 22), but in their increasingly conscious differentiation and separation, the ability of their alternative (and, if necessary, combined) application both to the formulation of one's own and to the analysis of others' references to the past. Thus, the individual elaboration of competence(s) is not so much about changing narrative logics, but about increasingly recognizing their respective forms, implications, performances, and – toward the elaborated level – their limits (5 and Graph 3).



Graph 3: Differentiation and Elaboration of Concepts on Monuments Culture and Monuments as Facets of Competencies (A.Körber)

10 Images

Image 1: Inscription on the Hamburg Rathausmarkt memorial (1932). Photo: http://denkmalhamburg.de/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/gefallene-weltkriege-4.jpg (CC-BY-NC 3.0; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/deed.de).

Image 2: Ernst Barlach: Relief (1931; Re-Construction of 1948) on Hamburg Rathausmarkt Monument. Photo from Wikimedia Commons (public domain): https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Hamburg_Mahnmal_01_KMJ-adj.jpg

Image 3: Hans-Martin Ruwoldt (1938): Phoenix on Hamburg Rathausmarkt Monument. Photo: https://www.denk-mal-gegen-krieg.de/kriegerdenkmaeler/hamburg-lo-os/.

Image 4: Monument and Counter-Monument next to at St. Johannis-Church in Hamburg-Altona (Photo: 1970gemini in German Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=19523318).

Image 5: The War Memorial of 1938 ("War Block") near Hamburg Dammtor station with graffiti. Photo: Patrick Sun/Hamburger Morgenpost; https://www.mopo.de/hamburg/klotz-am-dammtor-deutschland-muss-sterben-umstrittenes-denkmal-beschmiert-36678982.

Image 6: Retterstedet Monument at Åkershus Slot, Oslo, Norwaym near the Hjemmefront Museum; 2012; Photo: A. Körber

Image 7: Stele of the 1965 International Monument at (Hamburg-)Neuengamme Concentration Camp Memorial; Photo (c): A.Körber

Image 8: First Hamburg Monument for the victims of National Socialism of 11/1945 in Hamburg Ohlsdorf; Detail. State of 25.3.2010; Photo (c) Andreas Körber

Image 9: First Hamburg Monument for the victims of National Socialism of 11/1945 in Hamburg Ohlsdorf. Photo: NordNordWest/Wikipedia. Licence: CC-BY-SA 3.0; (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/legalcode); Original: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mahnmal_Opfer_der_NS-Verfolgung_Ohlsdorf.jpg



Image 10: Plate for a Military Unit on the Pennsylvania State Monument in Gettysburg, PA, US; Photo Bryandgeer (CC-BY-SA 3.0 unported; https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PA_105th_Wildcat_Regiment_Plaque_on_the_Pennsylvania_Monument_in_Gettysburg,_PA.jpg)

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