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http://elea.unisa.it/xmlui/handle/10556/2119
Title: | A general coalition structure: some equivalence results |
Authors: | Bimonte, Giovanna |
Keywords: | Differential information economy;Restriction on coalition for- mation;Private core |
Issue Date: | 2013 |
Citation: | Bimonte, G. (2013). “A general coalition structure: some equivalence results”. DISES Working Paper 3.230, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche. |
Abstract: | The formation of coalition may imply some theoretical difficulties, such as costs arising from forming a coalition or sharing information among agents. In this paper we will assume that only a subset S of the set of all possible coalitions in an economy is the set of admissible coalitions. We define the S-core concept, as in Hervs-Moreno. We will extend to a model with both uncertainty and asymmetric informations the results showed in Okuda and Shitovitz. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10556/2119 |
ISSN: | 1971-3029 |
Appears in Collections: | DiSES Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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3_230_G_Bimonte_A_General_Coalition_Structure_Some_Equivalence_Results.pdf | working paper | 181,91 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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