A general coalition structure: some equivalence results

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://elea.unisa.it/xmlui/handle/10556/2119

Record completo di tutti i metadati

Campo DC	Valore	Lingua
dc.contributor.author	Bimonte, Giovanna	-
dc.date.accessioned	2016-07-13T12:31:32Z	-
dc.date.available	2016-07-13T12:31:32Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013	-
dc.identifier.citation	Bimonte, G. (2013). “A general coalition structure: some equivalence results”. DISES Working Paper 3.230, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche.	it_IT
dc.identifier.issn	1971-3029	it_IT
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10556/2119	-
dc.description.abstract	The formation of coalition may imply some theoretical difficulties, such as costs arising from forming a coalition or sharing information among agents. In this paper we will assume that only a subset S of the set of all possible coalitions in an economy is the set of admissible coalitions. We define the S-core concept, as in Hervs-Moreno. We will extend to a model with both uncertainty and asymmetric informations the results showed in Okuda and Shitovitz.	it_IT
dc.format.extent	12 p.	it_IT
dc.language.iso	en	it_IT
dc.relation.ispartof	Working Papers ; 3.230	it_IT
dc.source	UniSa. Sistema Bibliotecario di Ateneo	it_IT
dc.subject	Differential information economy	it_IT
dc.subject	Restriction on coalition for- mation	it_IT
dc.subject	Private core	it_IT
dc.title	A general coalition structure: some equivalence results	it_IT
dc.type	Working Paper	it_IT
È visualizzato nelle collezioni:	DiSES Working Papers

File in questo documento:

File	Descrizione	Dimensioni	Formato
3_230_G_Bimonte_A_General_Coalition_Structure_Some_Equivalence_Results.pdf	working paper	181,91 kB	Adobe PDF	Visualizza/apri

DSpace JSPUI