

Mediterranean, Knowledge, Culture and Heritage 1

Mohamed BENGUERNA - Emiliana MANGONE
Editors

BEYOND THE BORDERS
THE MEDITERRANEAN BETWEEN CULTURES,
MIGRATIONS AND LIFE-WORLD



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Mediterranean, Knowledge, Culture and Heritage 1

Book Series edited by

Giuseppe D'Angelo and Emiliana Mangone

The Book Series, published in electronic open access, shall be a permanent platform of discussion and comparison, experimentation and dissemination, promoting the achievement of methodological action-research goals, in order to enforce the development of the territories and of the local and European identities, starting from the cultural heritage and from the Mediterranean Area. All the research work revolves around three key topics:

Mediterranean: The knowledge and cultural values of southern Europe and the Mediterranean Area may represent the strategic elements to overcome the current crisis in Europe, to the point of becoming a stimulus for the review of policies.

Knowledge: Language, history, tradition and art have always conveyed dialogic relations and interpersonal relationships within societies, founding on otherness the peculiarities understood as knowledge development, processes, sedimentation and transformation. What becomes peculiar is the "knowledge" as the achievement of an advantage derived from the possession of unique and inimitable knowledge.

Culture and Heritage: Culture, understood as its cultural heritage, is proposed as one of the privileged areas of the "new economy". In fact, the encounter between culture and territory represents one of the most valuable opportunities for development.

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Preface by the Series Editors

What Perspective for the Mediterranean?

This book inaugurates the new ICSR Mediterranean Knowledge book series on *Mediterranean, Knowledge, Culture and Heritage*. As the firstborn, this text has to accomplish the difficult task of tracing the coordinates for our intellectual journey.

The aim of the series is to publish innovative studies in the field of socio-economic sciences and humanities, about the broad subject of the Mediterranean. About the most recent events, think to some phenomena – the Arab spring, the migration from Africa and Middle East toward Europe, the economic crisis of the Eurozone, which affects mostly the Southern Europe – which, although developing on the Mediterranean, have a global impact and, therefore, raise the interest of scholars living in the whole world.

This book, resulted from a rich collaboration between sociologists of different nationalities, is, in a certain sense, a programmatic volume focusing on some aspects of these phenomena within societies. In it the authors reflect on the Mediterranean as a strategic element to overcome the current crisis in Europe, becoming a stimulus for the review of European policies and providing a solid foundation for the growth of a true European cultural heritage and knowledge (Mangone, 2015).

This book represents an attempt to rethink the “boundaries” and rethinking the boundaries means rethinking the current idea of Mediterranean between cultures, migrations and life-world (the concepts compared with the Mediterranean in the three parts of the book). Because the Mediterranean legacy is a complex *ensemble* of ideas, im-

ages and feelings which have been cultivated for centuries and are still cultivated in this “sea amidst the lands”; which was called *mare nostrum* by the ancient Romans and to which the same name could be attributed again if, as Franco Cassano argued (Cassano & Zolo, 2007), we understand the word *nostrum* as referring to each and every one of us, as human beings.

Knowledge and cultural values of the Mediterranean can be the driving force to overcome the *impasse* of which Europe cannot free itself.

This book brings the focus on the borders in the sociological perspective and we expect this reflection to produce a refreshing outlook on the Mediterranean.

Fisciano, Italy
April 2016

Giuseppe D’Angelo

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Mohamed BENGUERNA - Emiliana MANGONE

Editors

BEYOND THE BORDERS
The Mediterranean between
Cultures, Migrations and Life-world



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Introduction

What Challenges for the Future?

MOHAMED BENGUERNA and EMILIANA MANGONE

From Knowledge to the “Life-world”

The development of humanity must be rethought by shifting the focus from the traditional elements of competitive advantage to new knowledge-based elements. What matters now is the so-called “knowledge resource” (Liebowitz, 1999), because the achievement of a benefit comes from the possession of knowledge.

Indeed, to know means: a) to participate in the construction of meanings of social and cultural reality in order to transform it in symbolic representation (by activating knowledge structures); b) to attribute “sense” and “meaning” to events, objects or persons on the basis of knowledge, expectations and assumptions; c) to develop in a complex and dynamic way the information that people can gather and turn them into knowledge.

Every interaction with objects or with humans, every act of communication, implies a transmission of skills and knowledge: an exchange that becomes a process of integration of the differences – understood as collective wealth in which everyone is recognized – without limitations in the learning paths of each person or prejudices on “expert” and “profane” knowledge.

Knowledge is the future and we have to invest on it because it remains the main strategic development factor not only industry-wise, but also from a social and cultural perspective. The process of knowledge-based human development is facilitated by constant “knowledge creation” aimed at “continuous innovation” in the industrial, social, and cultural field. The new challenge in order to keep up with the process of globalization is to be able to learn more quickly in order to better anticipate changes, and to do that we need to be able to activate mechanisms of acquisition, creation, diffusion, and incorporation of the “key” resource: knowledge. In that, the inability to gain access to the tools and forms of knowledge dissemination, will make even more stagnant those backward situations that are already crossing the decency limit. Moreover, it will further hinder the acquisition of those entitlements (Sen, 1981; Daherendorf, 1988), that a protection system should guarantee its citizens in order to enable them, on the one hand, to express their own needs and, on the other hand, to fulfil them, namely the possession of those titles that allow someone to enjoy the civil and social rights.

However the investment in the knowledge vector requires implication and engagement tools such as educative system and structures that have a direct or indirect connection with the formation.

In light of this, the very role of researchers is to generate “knowledge” through which society can observe the phenomena it produces and continuously improve as in its daily unfolding. As Bourdieu had said in his acceptance speech for the CNRS Gold Medal, the task of sociology is “the critical unhinging of the manoeuvring and manipulation of citizens and of consumers that rely on perverse usages of science” (Bourdieu, 2013, p. 12) going beyond the questions posed by common sense or by the media as they are often induced and not real.

The work of researchers and the resulting knowledge produced are to be intended, as Bourdieu stated over twenty years ago, in a dual manner: on the one hand, they allow for an “institutional support” (public service) that does not mean meeting all the needs of society, but giving scientific answers to actual problems, not with the “solution”, but by suggesting possible routes for the improvement of

the need concerned. On the other hand, they allow the development of a “critical and active citizen” very close to the ideal type of Schütz’s “well-informed citizen” (Schütz, 1946) which, revised according to the present society (Mangone, 2014), appears to be advocating the establishment of a modern citizenship amounting not merely to rights but also to duties. For this newly forged citizenship, the establishment of a socially approved knowledge based on the principle of responsibility (Jonas, 1979) becomes a priority, revealed through social reflexivity (Donati, 2011), an aspect of individual reflexivity that is neither subjective nor structural but related to the reality of social relations.

From the above stems the problem related to the relationship between knowledge and society, both in terms of equal access to knowledge and in terms of use of the knowledge resource. Globalization, whose effects impacted on the economic and socio-cultural aspects of society, increased instead of reducing interdependence relationships as well as conditionings in social relations. This is particularly true for what concerns financial relations between richer countries, while it does not hold for “imbalanced” relations between rich and poor countries.

At this point it would be useful and beneficial to mobilize all vectors (novel, theater, cinema, etc.) that promote and spread in depth these tolerance values of respect and listening.

As it is highlighted within this book, it is necessary to trigger a reciprocal logic to equal exchanges and shares in cooperation processes in order to achieve mutual benefits. However, this political objective presupposes look at the countries of the South with a new look through the application of innovative theoretical and ideological foundations.

In pursuing this logic, the Mediterranean Knowledge acquires a fundamental importance in promoting pluralism, diversity, and freedom. If Europe and the Europeans want to build their future, they will have to review their relationship with the Mediterranean together with the other political and cultural actors bordering on the Mediterranean, starting with the Arab peoples.

This sea, unfamiliar with juxtapositions like North / South, East / West, Islam / Christianity, and which saw the flourishing of cultures, arts, religions, philosophies, today is no longer a „hotbed“ of dialogue, but has become a battlefield for a war fought not with weapons but with “ideologies” and where opponents are identified in Us and Them: We, the civilized (Europeans), the modern ones, those who live in prosperity; Them, foreigners (non- Europeans), refugees, those who have been deprived of the opportunity to choose to remain in their country of origin because of conflicts, famine, and epidemics.

Echoing Dahrendorf (1988) we can say that life chances, understood as the possibility to choose between alternatives, are never equally distributed: there is no society in which all people have the same entitlements and enjoy the same provisions (set of choices and tangible assets). However, if choosing between possibilities is itself seen as a major element in leading of a decent life, then it is our duty (the above mentioned *We* of the clash) to offer a set of choices by basing policies not only on the principle of responsibility, but also on the principles of fairness and freedom.

This sea, that was once “dialogue and freedom” has now become “closure and death”: today there are tens of thousands dead drowned in the Mediterranean, due to the increase of migration flows from Africa and the Middle East to the shores of Europe (UNHCR 2015) - as very well expressed in the Part II of the book. This *mare nostrum* – where the “our” is related to humans (Cassano & Zolo, 2007) – once a meeting place for knowledge as the meeting place of strangers, has now become a “border insurmountable” for many desperate.

Humanity as a whole – especially Atlantic Europeans – seems to have forgotten that knowledge is produced by comparison with the *xenos*.

It is desirable, therefore, for the “Mediterranean knowledge” (both tangible and intangible) to become a thoughtful knowledge promoting relationship building both between subjects and within their living environment, facilitating an encounter with the Other with the awareness that only dialogue can make society open to the re-composition of cultural differences and the specific features of

every culture. As stated in the contribution of Donati – in this book – it requires a “relational semantics” to the needs of multicultural citizenship.

If otherness is a dimension that cannot be ignored, being, now as then, fundamental for the processes of identification and recognition, we must ponder the fact that the other (the difference) is not only a place of conflict and recrimination, but also a foundation on which to build a culture of tolerance and respect – an issue currently much debated. Said culture should instil, particularly into younger generations, the desire to know each other, to open up towards the other as a person from whom to learn not only new customs, habits, and new ways of being, but also as a way to re-discover ourselves, to reconsider ourselves, our values and behaviours. The cultural dimension becomes therefore crucial, as it can provide the basis on which to establish a society not merely focused on respecting “otherness”, but which also allows to explore the mechanisms created at different levels (individual, social, and cultural ones) whenever we relate to the “other” (Mangone & Masullo, 2015). We can thus affirm that musing on the Mediterranean implies, on the one hand, the comparison with otherness as a matter leading to the real encounter between *Us* and *Them*, the social and psychological mechanisms involved in preparing people positively or, on the contrary, negatively towards the other (Mangone & Marsico, 2011). On the other hand, it implies a reflection on the policies, that is, on the forms of recognition and protection of every person as equal and to whom equal opportunity of expression and self-realization, self-fulfilment should therefore be guaranteed.

The thoughts expressed within the debate on interculturalism and multiculturalism are based on cultural and identity issues: the great challenge faced with difficulty by society and social systems (among which we can find the European Union), is whether they should be seen as closed systems (non-welcoming) or as open systems (welcoming) towards “other cultures”; what Baumann (1999) called “the multicultural enigma”.

Laying the foundations for the construction of a real and effective multicultural identity that crosses Europe – that part of the West de-

fining itself as the “cradle of democracy”, in contrast to Sen’s statements (2003) – cannot be separated from what happened in the past, to what is happening and what will happen even in the Mediterranean.

The weight of the Mediterranean component is impressive in several respects throughout southern Europe resulting in great differences in comparison with the rest of Europe: European society is crossed by deep interwoven cleavages, in some cases overlapping and adding up, transforming difference into conflict (Catholics and Protestants, church and state, North and South, etc.). European identity, therefore, and its geographic map, correspond not only to the institutional divisions, but also to these complex differences (as religion, economy, politics, literacy, draw another Europe than the official one) that constitute true lines of separation, often even within the borders of the nation state (Eder & Giesen, 2001). Due to the interplay of a number of factors, a common destiny connects the entire Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to the Golden Horn, causing the perception of a clear civil inferiority to form / stir in the collective consciousness.

The social role of territories has changed. Not only can people move and travel in much easier and more inexpensive ways, but a growing number of persons can build their identities with multiple senses of belonging: travel and at the same time long for their homeland. The word “geo” has returned, and geo-politics has regained its importance, as well as geo-culture and geo-communication. All these changes have paved the way to new opportunities for multi-polarities and provide new possibilities for territories that have been condemned to marginality, as might be the case of the Mediterranean towards Europe.

The Mediterranean legacy is a complex *ensemble* of ideas, images and feelings which have been cultivated for centuries and are still cultivated in this “*sea* (not ocean) amidst the lands”; which was called *mare nostrum* by the ancient Romans and which the same name could be attributed again if, as Franco Cassano argued (Cassano & Zolo, 2007), we understand the word *nostrum* as referring to each and every one of us, as human beings.

A new concept of territoriality can be built with the help of an approach that goes beyond the classical oppositions Europe/ Mediterranean, North/South, East/West, etc., which can set up a new dimension of social space that as a “container” is transformed into an “arena” where people carry out their everyday lives and construct a social reality and own “life-world”.

Beyond the Borders

This book resulted from a rich collaboration between sociologists of different nationalities and reflects on Mediterranean as a strategic element to overcome the current crisis in Europe, becoming stimuli for the review of European policies and providing a solid foundation for the growth of a true European cultural heritage and knowledge, then passing it on to future generations. This book represent an attempt to rethinking the “boundaries” and rethinking the boundaries means rethinking the current idea of Europe and the Mediterranean. Only from such a rethinking can the foundations for the construction of a real and different European identity be laid. The knowledge and cultural values of the Mediterranean can be the driving force to overcome the *impasse* of which Europe cannot free itself.

So, while some chapters strive to formulate more general categories, others deal with the concrete situated reality. We expect this reflection to produce a refreshing outlook on Mediterranean.

The book is organized into three parts, which dialogue with each other. However, the first chapter, “Adult Age of Cooperation: Elements for a Debate”, written by Mohamed Benguerna, has not been included here because it addresses an issue of general policy on cooperation between the northern and southern countries. Based on the professional experience of the author, it reflects on cooperation in the field of scientific research, particularly between Algeria and the European countries and specifically with France. The chapter emphasizes the application of a logic of reciprocity, since the Southern countries (including Algeria) have accumulated scientific training and sufficient and substantial technique that allows them to claim

and be part of this logic of reciprocity. This policy objective, however, requires the emergence of a new look on the South, and this can happen only if it is supported by an innovative effort in terms of theoretical and ideological assumptions.

The first part, “Mediterranean and Cultures”, is composed of three chapters. The first chapter “The Us/Them Encounter. The Mediterranean between Land and Sea Borders”, written by Emiliana Mangone, reflects on the theme of “otherness” to explore the mechanisms created at different levels (individual, social, and cultural ones) whenever we relate to the “other”, stretching from feelings of openness and curiosity – underpinning reception and integration policies – to evident feelings of intolerance, urging, even manifestly, to discriminate against the other, perceived as different, or as one who belongs to what is “unfamiliar” and this within the land e sea borders of the Mediterranean.

The idea that the political inclusion of minorities into a common citizenship needs a new cultural approach in order to avoid the fallacies of what has been understood and practiced as “multiculturalism” so far is proposed by Pierpaolo Donati. In this chapter titled “Multicultural Citizenship Needs a Relational Semantics of Borders”, Donati argues that there are three semantics theorized as possible solutions to manage cultural borders: dialectical, binary and relational. It depends on the choice among these semantics what kind of ideal model is followed in order to include people into a common citizenship. To put it bluntly, the latter can be configured as a *culturally neutral* public sphere (based upon the neutralization of cultural borders) or as a *morally qualified* public sphere, which defines the borders of citizenship as mutual relations between different cultures so to avoid any form of exclusion, discrimination or segregation.

In the next chapter, written by Andrea A.S. Barbieri, titled “The Mediterranean Legacy for the Future of Europe” argues on building of a new idea about what can be called “The Mediterranean approach” or the “Mediterranean mind”. In order to move in the this direction, understanding what it could mean, the author reflects around 3 main ideas: a) *the open concept of Mediterranean* that has been cultivated by prominent intellectuals of the past (for exemple,

Albert Camus); b) the “long durée” approach to the history of *humana civilitas*: putting apart ideas like western and eastern; and rethinking the ideas of modernity and secularization; c) the new concept of *territoriality* that can be built with the help of the geo-sociological approach to most recent changes in geo-politics and international relations.

This book represents a renewed effort to discuss the migration flows crossing the Mediterranean trying to go beyond the numerical dimension. For this reason the second part of the book is entitled “Mediterranean and Migrations”: Cortinovis’ chapter focuses on recent developments in the so-called external dimension of migration policy, which includes a number of initiatives adopted by the EU to ensure cooperation with countries of origin and transit of migrants. Because, the management of migration flows across the Mediterranean represents a crucial testing ground for the European Union (EU) migration and asylum policy.

The chapter written by Folco Cimagalli, “Mediterranean, Migrations and Communities. What Challenges for Social Policies?”, focuses on the key role that communities can play today in new policies, more efficient and effective. The community, both the ethnic and the host, in this light, is a lever to build far-reaching policies, in which the center of gravity of the interventions is not the primary time of acceptance, but one of integration, in a development perspective. In this sense, a relationship with the community and among the communities becomes unavoidable challenge for integration policies to be really innovative.

The third part of this book, “Mediterranean and Life-world”, is composed of three chapters that offer several reflections on aspects of social reality and life-world: the gender, the public space and education. Giuseppe Masullo in his chapter (“Boundaries among Genders in the Mediterranean Area: Between Reality and Imagination”), highlights how Western countries help in drawing the outlines of the debate on gender differences in the Mediterranean area, through a perspective that often reveals a certain degree of ethnocentrism, given its failure to take into account alternative models that emerge in other Mediterranean contexts – particularly those with an Islamic

tradition – often branded as backward with regard to women’s rights and the plight of LGBT individuals.

“Museum Displays and their Contemporary Sociological Resonance” is the title of the chapter written by Carmel Borg and Peter Mayo. This chapter focuses on the Museum as a public space and a reinterpretation of a selection of its holdings in light of contemporary preoccupation and issues. The authors propose a non-conventional approach to reading and appreciating artefacts in a museum, one that allows for a less hierarchical reading, and valorises communal, social class, religious identity and environmental perspectives. It represents an attempt at enabling works to “speak” to contemporary concerns without giving these works any false sense of “universality”.

The last chapter of the book, “Tactics or Strategies? The Governance of Early School Leaving in Naples and Albacete”, written by Anna Milione, offers a reflection on early school leaving. In this chapter the author contrasts two ways of dealing with early school leaving: a *tactical approach* aiming at “harm reduction” and a *strategic approach* that assumes a holistic view on transforming the school and the ecology of education practice. To describe these practices author will move “in the middle of things” to illustrate two ways of tackling with early school leaving emerging in a program funded by Comenius Regio Project “A care for every child”, aimed at reducing high risk school leaving children living in highly deprived socioeconomic territories of Spain (Albacete) and Italy (Naples).

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Adult Age of the Cooperation: Elements for a Debate

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One thing that disturbs me and even despair me: It is the radical inability of the Christians to speak of another place of history and the historicity and the Christ's irreducible truth. I don't say that this attitude is false, therefore to reject ; I only ask the Christian to make the only charity worthy in my opinion: to accept every time that it is about a knowledge act to speak of a neutral place, that is to comment every time collects it, instead indefinitely to comment again according to the data of the tradition...

Letter from Mohamed Arkoun to Maurice Borrmans
Paris, 5 April 1971

Introduction

The aim of our contribution is to have a debate, a series of reflections around the experiences of cooperation between the countries of the North and those of the South. It is more especially about an illustration in Algeria and the European countries and, in particular,

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France.

The case that I discuss concerns the experiences of cooperation in the domain of the scientific research. From my professional experience, I interrogate the scientific cooperation convention model. It will be about knowing why and how this type of unilateral collaboration subsists after several years of exchanges.

Let us look on these three (3) notions of which is the title of our text.

Three Notions (Age, Adult, Cooperation): Why?

The notion of age backs to the question of the periodization of this cooperation experience between Algeria and France in the domain of the scientific research. We can distinguish, outline, three big phases. The first begin with the independence of Algeria and its enormous needs of formation of the managers and more especially the higher teachers. France occupied and always occupied a very important role to this level.

However, from the years 1980, with the substantial development of the Algerian academic structures, an offensive politics is started by the political authorities of the country in order to strengthen and to enrich the management of the universities and centers of research.

This new orientation of the scientific cooperation is going to be of a certain contribution for the funding of the Algerian academic system especially as a massive return of teachers is recorded after a formation in various and multiple geographical areas.

Finally, with the years 1990, it is the third phase that reveals an action in depth in terms of production and reproduction of the academic system whose ambition is to want to offer itself to the international. It is this trajectory and its political context that justify our title “Aged and adult” in a context of cooperation.

Of what Places, I Intervene?

My questioning is the fruit of the teachings, fruit of a series of experiences that stakes out my professional course.

First, my double experience of teaching and research with different practice of collaboration with colleagues and foreign partners.

Then, the one of the coordination and the scientific animation of research projects; finally, the manipulation and the involvement to assessments and scientific appraisal.

At the time of all these places of intervention, I was very attentive to the reflections of my foreign colleagues; I was very attentive to the reflections of my foreign colleagues about various themes landed in the collaborations.

The protocols of agreement and the conventions constitute some examples rich in teachings to seize and to understand the logics, and the theoretical and ideological foundations.

As such, we will present, in manner of illustration, two (02) articles extracted of a convention draft between two (02) organisms of Algerian and French research and that we will submit to a commentary.

Illustration: A Convention and the Questionings

Article 1: The present contract has for objective to define the modes of collaboration between and In view of the realization in common of research on the thematic.

Article 4₁: Obligation of the parts

The organism (X) (France) gets involved to:

- To mobilize the expertise of its managements, make them available and send in mission, according to the possibilities, the scientific staff required by the program of research.
- To contribute to the acquirement of the necessary facilities for the land activities planned for the program of the survey.

- To achieve on time, except in case of force majeure and in conformity with the curriculum, the tasks of which his collaborators are responsible.
- To contribute to provide seminars of methods or continuous training registered to the program.

Article 4₂: The Algerian organism gets involved to:

- To provide, according to the possibilities, the infrastructures necessary to the optimal realization of the curriculum.
- To facilitate the relations of collaboration with the other public or private Algerian organisms.
- To achieve on time, except in case of force majeure and in conformity with the curriculum, the tasks of which his collaborators are responsible.

Therefore, we can make three comments of these two (02) articles:

First, the distribution of the tasks and the roles of every part are clearly defined and denote scientific stakes of this convention project.

Secondly, these two (02) articles characterize the part producer bearer of the knowledge and the expertise. As they delimit the statute of support, of accompaniment of the beneficiary part of this convention.

Thirdly, the mission of appraisal is clearly localized and devolved to the convention part.

Such a comment brings me to interrogate myself on this notion of “cooperation” to examine what are the nature and the content of this expertise mission to the profit of a partner of the convention.

These articles represent the existence of a certain conception of cooperation that finds its anchorage in the historic course of these two countries and more particularly the trajectory of the scientific cooperation. Our worry is not to cast doubt on this capacity of expertise and its possessors but it is about the conditions of its mobiliza-

tion of the politics, cultural and economic contexts of the two societies and, in this case, the Algerian society.

It is around this observation that I am going to tempt to deliver some elements or indications, in perspective of more deepened approach.

North / South. South / North: Foundations of a Scientific Hierarchy

It will be difficult, within the context of this contribution, to depth examination of the foundations of such an equation that requires a more intensive mobilization of the historic and statistical data.

In this context, we submit to the discussion points that seem revealing to us of this hierarchy. First, we found this practice, that lasts and persists, to make societies of the South, and in our case Algeria, of the objects and study opportunities.

It is a rich observation in teachings that we can raise on several domains of this scientific cooperation. For example, a historic research on the objects and the topics of the Algerian doctorants that stay in France, indicate us that, in the big majority, the Algerian society remained their study opportunities. In the same sense, we note that a very reduced number of Algerian doctorants intends to think on the objects of lands of the residence society. It is why an investigating and an exploitation of the files of the theses presented in France would be necessary to reinforce and to clarify such a report.

The same for most foreign doctorants and, in particular the French, that do scientific residences in Algeria, invest the thematic historic and cultural of this country.

Very often, the comparative perspective is absent of these doctorants research. We can reduce the domains of cooperation intervention in order to refine this type of observation.

The approaches, the theoretical basis and these specific objects of the South as well as the instruments of investigating are going to come from the societies of the North and thus French.

To this level, we are in presence of an equation bearer of a producer of theoretical and methodological (the North) instruments and

a pole consumer as object and land of application and analysis (the South).

It is this questioning that is submitted, today, to the new contingencies politico-cultural and economic of the societies of the South that require an innovative exam.

By way of conclusion of this contribution, we propose some data and questionings able to contribute to renewal of a cooperation strategy beyond the borders.

Conclusion: Elements for Exchanges Reciprocity without Borders

Several authors (Sahli, 1965; Shayegan, 1988; Le Pichon, 1991; Benguerna, 1992; Kadri & Benguerna, 2014) tempted to think on this problematic of cooperation in order to seize and to understand the stakes and the foundations. So, it would be useful to examine with a historic perspective the historic and cultural anchorages of the trajectory of these cooperation experiences.

In fact, an orientation of the investigating will be able to argue our following thesis that a successful cooperation process, require its insertion in a logic of the reciprocity.

It seems that the societies of the south, in particular, Algeria accumulated a sufficient and substantial scientific and technical training allowing them to claim and to enroll in this logic of the reciprocity. But such objective depends on a political will of sharing, exchange and equity in the processes of collaboration.

To listen, to recognize and to accept the other is inescapable levers to cooperate in serenity and the mutual profit. Such a political objective supposes the emergence of a new look on the countries of the South. This look will not be able only if it is sustained accompanied by an innovative effort of theoretical and ideological assumptions. It is a movement in depth that is required and that is going to upset the attitudes, the behaviors, the analyses carried by a historic accumulation, forged by cultural practices and a repetitive reducing perception of the actors of the South. Such a vision does not take account of the evolutions and the progressions of the countries of the South. They

are always considered in the statute of losers. Also, the task is immense but beneficial if we want to come out of this equation of one-way cooperation.

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Part I

Mediterranean and Cultures

*The Us/Them Encounter:
The Mediterranean between Land and Sea Borders*

EMILIANA MANGONE*

The Discovery of Otherness

Networks characterizing contemporary society are based on communicative events that constitute *communicative relations* (Gili & Colombo, 2012) or as a *communicative dimension of social relations*, even if social relations can not be reduced only to their communicative dimension as this is only one of the dimensions constituting the social relation.

Showing aspects of ambiguity, any form of relation fluctuates between the exchange of information and symbolic action on the other: implemented and fulfilled relations are, therefore, problematic actions that most often does not allow reciprocity between the subjects. For this reason cultures and identities are forced to get moving, to get in touch with *the other* and with each other, so that

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the challenge is to be able to be themselves without closing oneself to others and to be open to others without denying oneself. The person building her life plan recognizes herself and also the other as different from oneself, but when this process does not reach the end point of mutual recognition, it can produce conditions so as to cause discomfort or conflict situations.

This is because the attitudes and actions of people are influenced by many multidimensional factors among which stand out, on the one hand, the culture, and, on the other, the indissoluble bond with the very biography of the person herself. In this way the transition was made from an approach to the study of social phenomena oriented towards the search for the cause (causality) to an approach focusing on the overall interaction between the individual, social, and environmental variables (relationality).

In the relational perspective (Donati, 2011a; Donati & Archer, 2015), indeed, social relations are not seen as a constraint for the individual, but rather as the element promoting her self-determination on the ground of reflexivity (Donati, 2011b). In other words, the people, through a relational reflexivity, must orient themselves towards the reality emerging from the interactions and falling back on the subjects themselves, as it is beyond the powers of individuals and groups.

If social relations connect *Ego* and *Alter*, it is precisely through the relation that the discovery of the Other originates. The idea of otherness, which usually leads to the concept of “unfamiliar” or “foreign”, depends on the recognition or not of the other within the cognitive order established by society or reference groups (Gutmann, 1992; Mangone & Masullo, 2015): the “other” as a “foreigner”, in Bauman’s (1995) reading of contemporary society, is defined by the *distance*, perceived as an element of “strangeness” in the other, separating what we need to know and what we know, or we think we know, about the potential or actual attitudes that others assume.

The idea of otherness is almost always therefore reduced to that of alienation and thus to the stranger, but it should be noted that every society has its own “foreigners”: indeed, if we consider Simmel’s work on the stranger (1908) we find that this category is

characterized by dichotomies (near / far, same / different, inside / outside the community) that today no longer apply only to the category of the “foreigner” *per se* – understood as someone coming from far away and with her specific symbolic dimension – but also to the one (other) that is among us and that creates ambiguity or undermines the degree of certainty as she can not be easily ascribed to a precise category. In this way the *Ego / Alter* relationship is no longer based on inequality issues – in what – but on differentiating aspects – for whom. The focus should be placed on *Ego*’s attitudes that perceives herself as similar to / different from *Alter* in a given symbolic sphere, as well as on *Alter*’s answers within a relational framework built on expectations that may influence the determination of closeness / distance and openness / closure.

The *Ego / Alter* relationship is embodied in the construction of identity, as this is based on the process of recognition (of the self and the other). Identity is, therefore, a system of representations on which each individual establishes: a) its existence as a person; b) the recognition and acceptance of others, of the group and their culture. It follows that identity is “in motion”: the construction of identity takes place over time through processes of differentiation and integration, which makes it subject to changes precisely because of the relational situations that the person experiences in her everyday life.

The person building her own identity, as it is a matter of social construction, recognizes herself, but she also recognizes the other as different from herself and recognizes herself as an-other; the existing differences, however, should not represent a limit to the action; on the contrary, they should be an incentive towards the integration of skills and everyday experiences. The individual as a subject is located in the social system and is in turn socially identified – through the categorization process – and this is true not only for the individual, but also for groups: indeed, each group has an identity corresponding to its definition and allowing it to place itself into the social whole. Identity is both inclusion and exclusion: it identifies the group and distinguishes it from other groups (Cuche, 1996); in this

perspective, identity appears as a way for categorising the us / them distinction based on cultural difference.

Contemporary society is lacking a linear path of development for people's life course, due to the increase in uncertainties, no longer allowing the allocation and consequently the clear belonging of individuals to a single social circle (Bauman, 2001) within which to hold a well-defined position. In other words the identity under construction arises as the intersection of multiple social circles with the simultaneous presence of several *provinces of meaning* (Schütz, 1932), and then the simultaneous presence of different definitions of the same reality. The multiplication of life worlds puts the person in contact with poorly integrated systems of meaning, often in contrast between them (Festinger, 1962) and this results in an increase in the complexity of the recognition process, and thus of the *Ego / Alter* relationship.

The attitudes and actions toward others depend on the idea we build of ourselves from the interpretations of our past and present actions, and the predictions of what we will do in the future (Berger & Luckmann, 1969). It can be argued therefore that attitudes (defined as positive or negative orientation) are oriented towards someone from the perception that one has of them through the assignment of a judgement (Hewstone, 1983): indeed, the social reality of individuals derives not only from the social significance but also from the products of their subjective world. Individuals build their action schemes on the basis of the significance they attribute to their daily existence, they find a world of meanings and events that become real for them just because they are conscious and perceiving social beings. These representations, which are social representations (Farr & Moscovici, 1984), can be considered a set of cognitive matrices aimed at coordinating words, ideas, images, and perceptions that are related to and are shared by a large mutually identifying category of people. Social representations are considered as actual interpretation systems for our social environment: in short, social representations constitute social reality because they determine the meaning and significance of actions and events, as well as define the experience of reality by identifying the limits, meanings, and

types of interactions by reducing the information ambiguity (turning the unfamiliar into familiar) make meanings of actions unequivocal.

Social representations, therefore, are a descriptive tool for understanding the processes and functioning and construction mechanisms of the “other” category: indeed, when a person or group attaches a value judgement (positively or negatively oriented) to another person or group, they build shared social representations that in case of negative orientation lead to the allocation of responsibilities that may go as far as the establishment of prejudice and exclusion of these individuals since they are often considered “enemies” (Mangone & Marsico, 2011); this is often the case in particular with immigrants.

If we try to further analyse this process on the basis of representations as cognitive-descriptive processes leading to the construction of the “foreigner” construct, we find that people do not attribute strangeness to the “Other” only to foreigners as immigrants, but rather the strangeness they build and consequently the recognition of otherness refers to a broader and more complex categorization process leading to the visibility of the Us-Other link (foundation of social identification) and making apparent at the same time the close-far dimension. Basically, the Us strengthens and unfolds positively thus negatively defining the Other; this process is particularly significant when the person is already aimed at “defending her own world”. The risk arisen by the strengthening of this process, therefore, is to witness the reproduction of a cultural bias – that in its exasperation becomes racial prejudice – which is in fact “defence of one’s own world” and “competitive approach” to the “Other”. Indeed, prejudice is nothing but a form of categorization bestowing social implications on its victims (Allport, 1954), but it is quite a normal cognitive process for those who produce it: is not negative in itself, but in its effects. In everyday life prejudice is a preconceived opinion, socially learned, shared by the in-group, and assuming a negative value towards the prejudiced category (the “Other”), thus directing attitudes (Taguieff, 1999). As already recognized by many, prejudice defines a certain kind of orientation towards comprehensive categories of people rather than towards

individuals considered not as single units, but as members of a category. On the basis of this definition we can say that people create prejudices against the “Other” not for being different, but rather because it is classified in the broader category of “immigrant”, “homosexual”, “differently able” “foreigner”, etc.

Towards an Inclusive or an Exclusive Society?

In the history of mankind, pluralism – and especially ethno-cultural pluralism (Savidan, 2009) – is not new, and it is precisely on cultural aspects that reflections about the processes of identification and recognition first involved in the integration of “Others” are focused. In particular, it is paramount the debate on multiculturalism (Taylor, 1992; Baumann, 1999) as a new way of thinking about culture and its dynamics, even though multiculturalism, in many countries, has generated negative effects such as the further fragmentation of society (see Donati, 2013) and a cultural relativism leading to further separation between different cultures.

The discussion, still ongoing, is thus based on the search for a new way of living able to ensure justice and equality for all groups (differentiated by race, sex, religion, etc.) even if some of them may be defined, according to common sense, as belonging to a “different culture” than where they live. Multiculturalism is not the concept of culture multiplied by the number of these groups, rather it is a new way of understanding the cultural dynamics that should not be applied only to “Others”, but also to oneself. Indeed, culture is the set of elements allowing us to enhance the sense of belonging to the group and the identity, but identity is not possible without “recognition” (Mangone, 2015). When we invoke the concept of “recognition”, however, we do not mean the “politics of recognition” as proposed by Taylor (1992) – in agreement with Baumann (1999) – because, if we were to analyse this conceptualization, its limit would unequivocally stand out. Indeed, multiculturalism, from which interculturality then follows, can not be based on the attribution of equal dignity and value only to “selected” cultures which have been

recognized for a long time (as Taylor says), but such dignity and value should be attributed to all cultures, otherwise we would be guilty, anyway, of forms of ethnocentrism, with the distinction of them being more refined and intellectualized, but not really differing in their substance from violent forms of ethnocentrism. Such dissent is justified by the fact that the recognition of oneself as an object (self-recognition) is obtained only by participating in the experiences of others and thus in the experiences shared with others in a social context with its cultural peculiarities. This may be derived only from knowledge and signification processes that create the necessary conditions so that everyone can have an equal chance to choose *life chances* (Dahrendorf, 1988) for their own life plan. In other words, we return to Sen's concepts of "functioning" and "capabilities" (Sen, 1982; 1987): the former are "states of being and doing" allowing for the achievement of welfare, while the latter permit to acquire "relevant functionings" (well-being) enabling one to choose between different options.

Starting from these assumptions and Simmel's idea (Simmel, 1908) that social action involves interaction and can not be understood except as a transaction between those who act and those who classify such action¹, we can outline "openness" or "closure" attitudes, often assigning marginalized positions to those who are considered "different" from Us, meaning the "Other". Of course, there are various forms of disapproval: they represent the factors influencing the growth or decline of "diversity"; in other words, disapproval is the aspect / form that diversity will take. In Lemert's labelling theory (1951) this is very clear: for example, the social reaction to the "madman" can be expressed as a function through the concept of *tolerance quotient*, intended as the ratio between the objective behaviour and the community's willingness to tolerate it. The *tolerance quotient* is well illustrated and explained in Jodelet's study on madness (1989): the citizens' reactions, in the case study, are tolerant because they perceive the benefit deriving from the acceptance of mental patients, since these are still confined within a

¹ Specific status positions, stigmatized and negatively valued, are assigned to acts by the reactions they cause, rather than determined by the acts themselves.

part of the community (and this is true not only metaphorically but also physically). In the specific case of the mentally ill, they are not *strangers* to the community (Simmel, 1908) but rather *foreigners* (Schütz, 1932) because despite having interacted with the group, they live with it only a temporary relationship, and thus destined to end. Similarly, this cognitive processing can be carried out for all those categories that we consider “other than us”; however this kind of signification process also leads to another concept that in everyday interaction becomes a kind of “defence” of one’s self, and it is an attitude of closure or of increasing the distance then leading to the exclusion of the “Other”.

This processes reiterate once again that the self assumes a key role in the Me/Us-Other/s relationship; and by referring to Goffman (1968) we may further clarify two aspects of this identity component: the *actor*, who represents the free and independent component of the subject, and the *character*, who represents instead the set of characteristics needed each and every time we relate to the “Other” in the world of life. The Self is the result of a situation, a frame (Goffman, 1987) that is born and experienced emanating precisely from the meaning attributed to the situation around which the relationship is organized on the basis of a kind of negotiation. In practice people adapt to situations and try to adapt them to their needs, they build their own behaviour on the basis of role expectations given by the outside world and, in this way, try to control and guide their actions on the basis of the idea that others have of them. These are the dynamics usually found in the construction and strengthening of identity and the Self. Goffman has clearly defined these processes by stating that everyone needs their own *identity kit*, divided into *personal identity* and *social identity*. The latter, in turn, must be divided into *virtual*, attributed to the person on the basis of her appearance, that is, of what others imagine and according to which it is possible to get just an approximate and presumed categorization, and *actual*, *i.e.* real since it enables us to pinpoint with a large degree of certainty the category the person belongs to. When someone is in front of us we may have the evidence that she possesses an attribute marking her as different from

the others, from the members of the category of which she should presumably belong to, a less desirable attribute. So that we can, at best, get to judge her as a bad person, or dangerous, or weak. In our mind, she is thus downgraded from complete person, to which we are commonly used, to a marked, discredited person. This attribute is a stigma especially when it produces deep disrepute (Goffman, 1963). The constant oscillation of social identity between virtual and actual, due to continuous change of situations, compels the subject to redefine her social identity when undergoing a process of stigmatization. The stigma is a personal attribute (whether physical or cultural) such as mental illness, homosexuality, skin colour, disability, or religion, the examination of which gives rise in other people to a strong doubt about the identity of the subject, thus determining the predominance of the virtual component on the actual component. For its part, the stigmatized person always tries to control the difference between the two components of her identity, or she tends to hide the characteristics liable to produce the stigma, thus stopping any action which may provoke social disapproval.

The identity of a subject is then redefined through the interaction systems and techniques carried out within the society. Indeed, in contemporary society, it happens that the “marginal man” (Park, 1950) – who lives in two worlds in each of which he is more or less foreign (double absence) – is no longer the subject able to observe in a detached manner and to look with a broader horizon at his own cultural context, because the “other”, but also “We Others” implement all the strategies in order to preserve our identity and social status (social order), as well as to maintain links with the surrounding world to which we actually have to be accountable for our own attitudes (structuring of roles). In practice, it is the real barrier “We” erect against “Others” that unbalances the identity and forces the person to redefine it. This situation causes a progressive deconstruction of the Self, since raising the barrier forgoes the possibility of using the strategies with which the person usually tries to escape the dynamics of exclusion.

In the light of this description, implementing support and knowledge actions around the “Other”, means *educating* and *training*

citizens to adopt a new role within the society and not to build barriers, but rather to tear them down in order to reduce deviations between *virtual social identity* and *actual social identity*. The hope is that they do not build ideological bridges, but rather – given the dramatic nature of what is happening in the Mediterranean with migration flows – humanitarian corridors able to promote welcome in terms of public and social security by reducing the state of emergency and discomfort of populations already severely battered by various social disasters (wars, famines, epidemics, etc.).

The Us/Them Encounter: The Mediterranean between Land and Sea Borders

The championing of pluralism, diversity, and basic liberties can be found in the history of many societies. The long traditions of encouraging and protecting public debates on political, social, and cultural matters in, say, India, China, Japan, Korea, Iran, Turkey, the Arab world, and many parts of Africa, demand much fuller recognition in the history of democratic ideas. This global heritage is ground enough to question the frequently reiterated view that democracy is just a Western idea, and that democracy is therefore just a form of Westernization. The recognition of this history has direct relevance in contemporary politics in pointing to the global legacy of protecting and promoting social deliberation and pluralist interactions, which cannot be any less important today than they were in the past when they were championed (Sen, 2003, pp. 29-30).

This passage by Sen seems to be the most sensible starting point to try and explain why the “Mediterranean” acquires a fundamental importance in promoting pluralism, diversity, and freedom. If Europe and the Europeans want to build their future, they will have to review their relationship with the Mediterranean together with the other political and cultural actors bordering on the Mediterranean, starting with the Arab peoples.

Before getting to the heart of the argument, however, a clarification is needed: knowledge is related to the social worlds in which people live and objectified knowledge is nothing more than the translation of this into political and social action. What turns a group of people into a society is what they think, the way they think

and their wealth of knowledge (what they know); indeed, knowing means relating with things and facts, but also with rules, laws, and programs by “taking possession” of them. And through this “appropriation of knowledge” this sea

that has often been set ablaze, but has also always been able to put out its fires, turning the clash into an encounter, the war-front into comparison and discussion, the *pólemos* in *diálogos*, to see, at the height of the tensest conflict, the invisible and powerful harmony that, at the bottom of each contrast, holds back the contenders (Resta, 2012, p. 17),

can find an answer to the crisis of the European identity.

The Mediterranean Sea was called *Mare Nostrum* by the Romans, because the land washed by this sea – or the sea that bathed this land – was indeed almost entirely part of the Empire. Nevertheless, the Mediterranean area witnessed the development and diffusion not only of the Roman civilization, but also of the greatest civilizations, religions, and arts that stretch far beyond the fall of the Roman Empire and long before its birth.

This sea, unfamiliar with juxtapositions like North / South, East / West, Islam / Christianity, and which saw the flourishing of cultures, arts, religions, philosophies, today is no longer a „hotbed“ of dialogue, but has become a battlefield for a war fought not with weapons but with „ideologies“ and where opponents are identified in Us and Them: We, the civilized, the modern ones, those who live in prosperity; Them, foreigners, refugees, those who have been deprived of the opportunity to choose to remain in their country of origin because of conflicts, famine, and epidemics. Echoing Dahrendorf (1988) we can say that life chances, understood as the possibility to choose between alternatives, are never equally distributed: there is no society in which all people have the same entitlements (access to – and legitimate control on – things) and enjoy the same provisions (set of choices and tangible assets). However, if choosing between possibilities is itself seen as a major element in leading of a decent life, then it is our duty (the above mentioned *We* of the clash) to offer a set of choices by basing

policies not only on the principle of responsibility, but also on the principles of fairness and freedom.

This sea, that was once “dialogue and freedom” has now become “closure and death”: today there are tens of thousands dead drowned in the Mediterranean, became an “open-air graveyard”. This *mare nostrum* – where the “our” is related to humans (Cassano & Zolo, 2007) – once a meeting place for knowledge as the meeting place of strangers, has now become a border demarcating good from evil: in the mind of migrants, the Mediterranean is the quest for freedom and a safe harbour (good), but from salvation that sea turned into a death-trap (evil).

Humanity as a whole – especially Atlantic Europeans – seems to have forgotten that knowledge is produced

by comparison with the *xenos*, the stranger. In this sense, the coasts lapped by the Mediterranean and the Aegean were the perfect cradle of the so-called civilization, areas of encounter / clash between „xeni“; whose vitality in thinking was also awakened to the realization that any attempt of self-consideration and identity building was dynamically stimulated by an external reality that did not fit perfectly (Calabrò, 2015, p. 81).

It is desirable, therefore, for the “Mediterranean knowledge” (both tangible and intangible) to become a thoughtful knowledge promoting relationship building both between subjects and within their living environment, facilitating an encounter with the Other with the awareness that only dialogue can make society open to the re-composition of cultural differences and the specific features of every culture. Difference is the result of a social process (differentiation) rather than a given reality; therefore it is a rather normal feature of complex societies. Thus the problem is not the difference itself, that cannot be eliminated, but lies in the meanings associated to it in a particular social context, in the risk to make the dangerous equation difference = social inequality come true.

If otherness is a dimension that cannot be ignored, being, now as then, fundamental for the processes of identification and recognition, we must ponder the fact that the other (the difference) is not only a place of conflict and recrimination, but also a foundation on which to build a culture of tolerance and respect – an issue currently much

debated. Said culture should instil, particularly into younger generations, the desire to know each other, to open up towards the other as a person from whom to learn not only new customs, habits, and new ways of being, but also as a way to re-discover ourselves, to reconsider ourselves, our values and behaviours. The cultural dimension becomes therefore crucial, as it can provide the basis on which to establish a society not merely focused on respecting “otherness”, but which also allows to explore the mechanisms created at different levels (individual, social, and cultural ones) whenever we relate to the “other”, stretching from feelings of openness and curiosity – underpinning reception and integration policies – to evident feelings of intolerance, urging, even manifestly, to discriminate against the other, perceived as different, or as one who belongs to what is “unfamiliar” (Farr & Moscovici, 1984).

Researchers have the task of holding together the reflections by means of an intellectual action going beyond “ideological” points of view, through a perspective focused not only on macro-social phenomena (concerning social systems and their organization forms), but includes also micro-social phenomena (concerning the relationship between individual and society and social actions) and meso-social ones (concerning the relationship between social system and life-world, the latter understood as the set of meanings and representations of culture). In this perspective, we will have to criticize the representations of society, not only those built by the media, but also those scientifically developed, especially by economics and political science.

We can thus affirm that musing on the Mediterranean implies, on the one hand, the comparison with otherness as a matter leading to the real encounter between *Us* and *Them*, the social and psychological mechanisms involved in preparing people positively or, on the contrary, negatively towards the other (Mangone & Marsico, 2011) [with]in the meso- or intersubjective dimension. On the other hand, it implies a reflection on the policies, that is, on the forms of recognition and protection of every person as equal and to whom equal opportunity of expression and self-realization, self-fulfilment should therefore be guaranteed.

It is necessary to activate processes transforming the individual's cognitive system, so that everyone's experience is actualized as synthetic-reinterpretative participation in various, different cultures. Indeed, the co-presence of different cultures encourages the construction of new, multivalent, trans-ethnic cultural identities. Similarly, intercultural communication (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988) – in the context we have outlined – is a multidimensional process of interaction between people of different cultural identities, who, through the encounter of cultures, live a deep and complex conflict/reception experience as a valuable opportunity for personal growth for everyone, in order to change everything representing an obstacle to the construction of a new civil society. The thoughts expressed within the debate on interculturalism and multiculturalism are based on cultural and identity issues: the great challenge faced with difficulty by society and social systems (among which we can find the European Union), is whether they should be seen as closed systems (non-welcoming) or as open systems (welcoming) towards “other cultures”; what Baumann (1999) called “the multicultural enigma”. Culture is not an absolute and the same goes for identity; both are dynamic: the benefits derived from culture depend on its very process of reconstruction, and the dominant discourse of culture as an immutable inheritance is just a subcomponent (often a conservative one) of a process. It follows that multiculturalism is a new way of understanding cultural dynamics: multiculturalism does not mean the concept of culture multiplied by the number of “other cultures” in a given area, but rather a new approach for managing the cultural diversity (simultaneous presence of various cultures) introduced in everyday life by individuals coming from different areas (Hannerz, 1996).

Laying the foundations for the construction of a real and effective multicultural identity that crosses Europe – that part of the West defining itself as the “cradle of democracy”, in contrast to Sen's statements (2003) – cannot be separated from knowledge and its circulation in the Mediterranean countries (be it born within this area or of a later date of arrival). Indeed, this knowledge plays a key role in providing a precise and distinct sense of belonging to Europe, as

well as a sense of European citizenship which must include the Mediterranean instead of considering it as a “border”. In recent years, with the process of Europeanization touching the economic sphere, many grievances have been raised against Southern Europe, often hastily identified with the Mediterranean area, even though debt problems and ruinous economic situations do not concern only the Mediterranean countries (such as the Greek crisis, or that of Italy and Spain).

The weight of the Mediterranean component is impressive in several respects throughout southern Europe resulting in great differences in comparison with the rest of Europe: European society is crossed by deep interwoven cleavages, in some cases overlapping and adding up, transforming difference into conflict (Catholics and Protestants, church and state, North and South, etc.). European identity, therefore, and its geographic map, correspond not only to the institutional divisions, but also to these complex differences (as religion, economy, politics, literacy, draw another Europe than the official one) that constitute true lines of separation, often even within the borders of the nation state (Eder & Giesen, 2001). Due to the interplay of a number of factors, a common destiny connects the entire Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to the Golden Horn, causing the perception of a clear civil inferiority to form / stir in the collective consciousness.

The problem of a cosmopolitan Europe (Beck & Grande, 2004) is not the Mediterranean – not least because in this area the most significant civilizations, religions, and philosophies, legal codes and political regiments were born, including democracy and even the sciences. All these different kinds of knowledge and cultural values born in the Mediterranean basin (southern Europe, North Africa and East) can represent strategic elements to overcome the current crisis in Europe, becoming a stimulus for the review of policies and providing a solid foundation for the growth of a genuine common euro-Mediterranean cultural heritage and knowledge, then passing it on to future generations.

In a society that is constantly changing and where even national borders are easily overcome, development must be rethought by

shifting the focus from the traditional elements of competitive advantage to the new ones are based on objectified knowledge – as mentioned above. What becomes peculiar is the “knowledge” and in this case the “Mediterranean knowledge” produced within in the past centuries and that still find fertile ground (or, better, fertile sea!) for further developing knowledge and circulating it within the basin and out of it – history teaches us that cultures, arts, philosophies and many ideas in it developed have influenced the history of all humanity, and in many cases still do.

Every interaction with objects or with human beings (the meeting and / or confrontation with the *xenos*) implies a transmission of skills and knowledge, thus an exchange that becomes an integration process for the differences – understood as collective wealth in which everyone is recognized and recognizes – without limitations in learning paths for each person or prejudices concerning “expert” and “profane” knowledge.

In this society that differentiates among development processes and where the advent of new information technologies has enabled to remotely manage highly complex processes, competitive advantage is basically in the defence and growth of knowledge. The future is in knowledge that remains the main strategic factor of development not only for what concerns industry, but also for humanity in its multiple dimensions (personal, social and cultural). Knowledge in the form of culture and heritage is also one of the privileged areas of the “new economy”, the meeting place between culture and territory is one of the most valuable opportunities for human and economic development.

The social space is constantly changing and it shows increasing complexity, thus raising the need to start thinking about modernizing innovation forms with the ability to provide social responses to the real needs of citizens and that are moreover capable of combining all the resources. The key word is therefore *innovation*, which goes after experimentation and is opposed to *conservation*; the latter, however, should not be understood as a process for maintaining knowledge, but rather for maintaining the *status quo*. However, in order to trigger innovation processes rather than conservation ones, we need

experimentation, that is the unit of measure of actions, projects, and interventions. The best chance of achieving the goals of the said actions, projects, and interventions is given by their flexibility and adaptability. However, their ultimate success will be mainly a result of their sharing and their encompassing of all social actors. This kind of process allows the birth of new knowledge from the one already established (and from this point of view the Mediterranean is like a safe full of treasures!), directing action towards *social innovation*, which in turn enables the establishment of a civil society not intended as a mere right but also as a duty, for the establishment of a shared knowledge founded on socially approved forms of responsible freedom oriented towards common welfare becomes a priority.

From the starting point of the ancient knowledge of the Mediterranean, through different forms of “reflexivity” (at once personal, social and cultural), we obtain a new and specific knowledge that direct actions towards innovating the relationship between man and land, no longer considered as only a right but also as a duty, founded every action on the principle of responsibility (Jonas, 1979). This knowledge is constructed through learning and activation processes (construction of reference models and experimentation) orienting actions towards social innovation (Murray, Caulier-Grice & Mulgan, 2010), that is, towards new ideas (products, services, and models) that meet social needs (more effectively than their alternatives) and at the same time create new social relationships or new collaborations.

Social innovation does not mean innovation *per se*, but rather consists of innovation processes triggered by the replacement of mechanisms or processes to achieve the same goal, so that people are encouraged to organize themselves in order to fulfil old and new needs and ensure not only an improving the of quality of life but also the protection of the common goods. Social innovation responds to certain needs of the citizens, and at the same time it also offers new decision and action processes by bringing together the “formal” with the “informal” (networking,) supporting and promoting all those solidarity community networks (Zoll, 2000) and reciprocity that are spontaneously created.

The higher the level of inclusivity of the process involving all members of society, the more innovative practices have a positive outcome on the social context. There are indeed no actors and sectors more suitable of these for developing social innovation practices. Social innovation has a collective and social character: it does not result from the imagination of an individual but from activities within *communities of practice* (Manville, 1996) – groups of individuals characterized by spontaneous aggregation, both social and professional, integrated into learning processes and dealing with shared issues with the same requirements (communities are the active subject promoting the exchange of experiences and encourages actions) – or learning cooperatives (Sharan, 1994) given that the need to share information and research projects, to coordinate efforts and debate different viewpoints in order to go on is quite clear.

Innovation starts from the “Mediterranean knowledge”, and develops until it becomes common practice. These new ideas (products, services, and models) make it then possible to meet social needs (more effectively than their alternatives) and at the same time create new social relationships or new collaborations. Moreover, they enable us to rethink the current idea of Europe and the Mediterranean. Such reconsideration is the only possible starting point on which to lay the foundations for the construction of a real and different European identity. The knowledge and cultural values of the Mediterranean “must” provide the driving force to overcome the impasse impeding the whole of Europe. They can become the fruitful stimulus for reviewing European policies (in particular integration ones) and provide a solid foundation for the protection and promotion of effective cultural heritage and knowledge matching up with our times, able to bring out a new future by the legacy of the different cultures.

Only Europe able to recognize the Mediterranean its cradle and to return to its forgotten suburbs could really its „natural“ (in geo-historical terms) centre of gravity, that sea in which to gaze only with nostalgic regret for the lost centrality in world history, but with the proud knowledge to be a „great space“ able to exercise its role of neutralizing conflicts avoiding the danger of a clash of civilizations (Resta, 2012: 104).

Conclusions

However, given that the social actions leading to the exclusion of the “Others” can not be eliminated (and this applies to any class of subject: foreigners, homosexuals, the disabled, etc.) for both relational and socio-cultural factors and without prejudice to the need to reduce the effects of exclusion from society, in concluding this contribution we must clarify some aspects.

The relation with “Them”, opposing de-personalization and de-individualization, allows for the redefinition of information by generating a new assessment of the person outside of the membership category causing prejudice (Allport, 1954). This does not mean that the categories are eliminated, but simply that with the onset of a new, less stereotyped categorization process, we overcome the rigidity with which we judge (positively or negatively) someone.

From what said above, it is clear that cultural diversity (Hannerz, 1996), permeate all social processes and not only because, in different contexts, we make contact with people from other countries, but more generally on the grounds that the act of the relationship, which is a communicative relationship, must take into account different roles and cultural levels, and, so communication becomes intercultural communication (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988), understood as the negotiation of meanings between “Us” and “Them”.

Today one can not but think of *intercultural communication* (*politically correct*, to say the least) because it is the only alternative to conflict, as it is a dialogic interaction designed to add value to all the instances in play and to achieve equilibrium points they are recognized by the parties involved – “Us” and “Them”. Interculturalism does not happen in society, nor it happens at school or in textbooks, but the transformation of the cognitive system of the subject can be started by educational processes, so that her reality is fulfilled as a synthetic-reinterpretative experience of differences.

It is a multidimensional process of interaction between subjects with different identities, that through their meeting live a deep and complex experience, of conflict / hospitality, as a valuable

opportunity for the growth of their personal culture, with a view to change all that is obstacle to the construction of a new civil society and an open society.

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Multicultural Citizenship Needs a Relational Semantics of Borders

PIERPAOLO DONATI*

We Need a 'Relational Reason' to Make Different Cultures Meet and Build a Common Civic Sphere

1.1. Since being adopted as official policy in several countries, the political doctrine of multiculturalism has generated more negative than positive effects (social fragmentation, separateness of minority groups, and cultural relativism in the public sphere). Today, in its place, we speak of *inter-culturalism*. But this expression too seems more or less vague and uncertain. We need to debate the possible alternatives to multiculturalism. Interculturalism today is subject to many deficiencies because it lacks a proper reflexivity within each culture so that it is unable to see and manage the relations between cultures. In short, it lacks a relational interface between cultures (between the subjects that are bearers of different cultures). To get beyond multiculturalism's shortcomings and the

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fragilities of interculturalism, a secular approach to the question of coexistence between cultures is needed – one that is capable of restoring life to reason through a new semantics of inter-human difference/diversity. Making reason more relational could be the best way to imagine a new configuration of society that will be able to humanize the processes of globalization and the growing migrations.

1.2. How can we approach the growing cultural differences and diversity that can be seen in society as a result of globalization? In other words: how can we treat those people who are bearers of relevant cultural differences or diversity?

The doctrine of multiculturalism is the answer that has gained the biggest foothold in the West, albeit in a variety of forms, for the simple fact that it seems to be the most consistent with the liberal premises of western democracies. The doctrine of multiculturalism was, in fact, born to favor respect, tolerance, and the defense of different (minority) cultures. It later morphed into an imaginary collective, under which we would be “all different, all equal,” in the sense that our differences/diversity are all placed on the same level and treated under rules which render them in-different – that is, in such a way as to maintain that the meaning and relevance of those differences make no difference. From this viewpoint, the doctrine of multiculturalism is a coherent consequence of pure neofunctionalism – as alleged „scientific approach“ – when applied to cultural dynamics. Differently from classic functionalism (e.g. Durkheim conceived of culture as a „moral fact“), neofunctionalism (e.g. Luhmann, 1990) legitimizes cultural anomie in a systemic way (it claims that „everything that is possible is allowed“; in other words, ethics and morality are wholly relativized).

This multiculturalism produces a society characterized by a growing pluralization of all cultures, generated not only by migrations, but also by the internal dynamics of individual native cultures (national, regional or local). In particular, multiculturalism erodes the very modern western culture that gave rise to it, which loses the rational bases that assured it a certain homogeneity for many centuries. Indeed, multicultural ideology justifies new, so-

called post-modern cultures and lifestyles. The multiplication (systematic production) of cultural differences nourishes a social order in which the individuals individualize themselves by means of the search for an identity that refers to particular social circles that privatize the public sphere.

Since being adopted as official policy in several countries, the ideology of multiculturalism has generated more negative than positive effects (social fragmentation, separateness of minority groups, and cultural relativism in the public sphere). As a political doctrine it seems ever more difficult to put into practice. Today, in its place, we speak of *inter-culturalism*. But this expression too seems more or less vague and uncertain. In this chapter I will discuss the possible alternatives to multiculturalism. We hear speak of interculturalism, but interculturalism today is subject to insurmountable deficiencies because it presents an insufficient internal reflectiveness to individual cultures and it lacks a relational interface between cultures (between the subjects that are bearers of culture).

To get beyond multiculturalism's shortcomings and the fragilities of interculturalism, a secular approach to the question of coexistence between cultures is needed – one that is capable of restoring life to reason through a new semantics of inter-human difference/diversity. Making reason more relational could be the best way to imagine a new configuration of society that will be able to humanize the processes of globalization and the growing migrations.

1.3. Multiculturalism is a theory that is reductive of encounter and recognition (Gutmann, 1992). At the root of its reasoning, multiculturalism expresses the need to find new avenues for the recognition of the dignity of the human person when we meet each other and perceive the differences/diversity that exist between us. In this, multiculturalism reflects what is surely a good thing. The assertion that we must recognize the value and the dignity of all citizens, independent of their race, ethnicity, language, or religion recalls us to the Christian view of secularism in the early days of Christianity: that is, the original dignity of every person, prior to and apart from every ethnic and cultural belonging, including the fact

that the Christian is a citizen like the others. However, even if it is true that multiculturalism represents a motive to rethink the character, quality, and characteristics of recognition of what is truly human, on the other hand it does not provide a sufficient answer to these questions. The multicultural solution is lacking because it does not succeed in filling the gap between *citoyen* (citizen) and *homme* (person). To assert that the citizen achieves self-fulfillment in the public sphere by means of the policy of human dignity and the corresponding legal rights (the policy of universalism), while the person achieves fulfillment in his or her own cultural community (the policy of difference), leaves empty what exists *between* these two spheres.

Multiculturalism is ambiguous and ambivalent because, if on the one hand it underlines the uniqueness of the human person, on the other it renders the person incommunicable from the cultural point of view. Certainly its insistence on the *radical otherness* of the Other, which pushes toward a better understanding of what about recognition between human beings is different from the recognition that a human can give to a non-human entity. The point, however, is that multiculturalism promises a recognition that cannot be realized because it has a reduced and restricted conception of encounter and recognition. Multicultural recognition, in fact, is conceived as the unilateral act of a collective mentality that attributes an identity on the basis of an self-certification or an identity claim that satisfies neither a veritative criterion nor a criterion of recognition (appreciation). In social practices, on the other hand, we see that recognizing the Other (as an individual, but also as of another culture), is a human act if, and only if, it is an act of validation (that sees the truth of the Other) inscribed in a circuit of symbolic exchanges (gifts).

Multiculturalism fails to satisfy either of these two requirements. In multiculturalism, the act of recognition of an identity does not seek out the reasons that legitimate the difference, and does not establish that circuit of reciprocal gifts that is necessary to produce human civilization. To take this step, multiculturalism must adopt the reflectiveness necessary to the processes of recognition. To go

beyond the limits of multiculturalism requires the development of a reflexive reasoning that is not the technical or scientific reasoning that we have inherited from modernity. After deifying reason, the Enlightenment ran aground on the shoals of anti-humanism, in which reason appears mutilated and twisted. There are two alternatives: either we abandon reason as a veritative criterion (of recognition), or we make an effort to „widen the range of reason“. I propose that we follow this second course.

Widening the Range of Reason in Order to Understand and Manage the Borders

2.1. We need to expand the range of reason with (what I call) „relational reason“, as an alternative to multiculturalism and as a way of achieving a new common world.

Which reason should be used to address differences/diversity?
The search for a new rationality appropriate to encounter and recognition between different/diverse people/groups requires semantics adequate to understanding and dealing with what makes difference and diversity. It is a fact that difference/diversity is, in general a mix of faith and reason, of motives of faith and rational motives, woven together. In ancient societies, which continue to be the benchmark for what is called „classic culture“, this interweaving had a solidity, which materialized in a common *ethos* (and from here the natural law, and the doctrine of a common ethic, which was dispelled by the modern public ethic, which is no longer based on a shared *ethos*). Joseph Ratzinger (2003) wrote that: “the original relational unity between reason and faith – although never unchallenged - has been torn [...] Farewell to truth can never be definitive [...].” In this expression is contained – in my view – the keystone of the issue. Nevertheless it must be noted that we are still very far from having understood what it means. I cannot pause here to discuss whether the laceration was produced (before or after, more or less) on the part of reason or on the part of faith. The question on which I focus my inquiry is this: what is meant by relational unity

between faith and reason, and also between religion and culture? Certainly it is the unity of a difference. But how do we understand difference?

I suggest to distinguish three semantics of difference: *dialectical*, *binary and relational* (see table 1). We must come up with a new theory of difference (in personal and social identity) which allows us to understand and handle it in a relational way. Since the distinction is a reflexive operation, we are directed back to the ways in which reflexivity removes and judges differences. I will make three fundamental distinctions: dialogical reflexivity, binary reflexivity, and relational (triangular) reflexivity.

(I) The *dialectic* and *dialogical semantics*: conceives of difference as a margin, a distance, as a point of continuous conflict and negotiation, which can find an agreement or not. The cultural encounter between Ego and Alter is represented as a relationship at the border of their identities where they meet, discuss and try to accommodate their differences. The border is a real space, where negotiations can take place between Ego and Alter (differently from a binary semantics in which the border is conceived as a sharp separation, without any chance of successful communication). What is „in between“ the people who meet is a sort of externality for one another. At the point of conflict, Ego and Alter remain estranged one from the other. The border is polemogenous by definition (i.e. it is susceptible to generate war, or, if not war, at least moral strife), because it is the object of the will to appropriate it by one or the other, the field where one tries to assimilate the other. It has to do with seeing which of the two can take possession of it, or, alternatively, in what way they can share it or at least turn it into a place of exchanges that are the outputs and inputs of one to the other. Between Ego and Alter there is no real mutual exchange; rather, there is assertion of two identities that stand each facing the other. The two may dialogue, but the agreement they may reach is entirely fleeting (in sociological terms, it is highly contingent, which means that it depends on many variables and can be always possible otherwise, i.e. possible in many different ways, including not to be). Here, reciprocity does not require the recognition of a common

identity. A clear example of this semantics is given by Habermas (2002), according to which the common border is defined („constituted“) by civic values and a dialogue around them (what he calls „constitutional patriotism“).


I (<i>dialectical semantics</i>)	II (<i>binary semantics</i>)	III (<i>relational semantics</i>)
<p>Difference as a border between Ego and Alter, in which there is at the same time a clash and a sharing of/on the border (the unity of the difference is the border itself, in which the terms of the relationship recognize themselves as strangers in dialogue between them) (Habermas)</p>	<p>Difference as a slash between Ego and Alter (autopoiesis of both and their non communicability) (the unity of the difference lies in the common problematization of the world) (Luhmann)</p>	<p>Difference as dissimilar way to live a relation which is constitutive both of Ego's and Alter's identities (the unity of the difference between Ego and Alter is the relationship which at the same time joins and distinguishes them) (Donati)</p>
<p>Ego  Alter</p>	<p>Ego  Alter</p>	<p>Ego  Alter</p>

Table 1 - Three semantics of the difference/distinction between Ego and Alter (or different cultures)

(II) The *binary semantics*: conceives of difference as discrimination and incommunicability. The border between Ego and Alter is a sharp distinction (division), is a separation, an irreconcilability, an impossibility of exchanging reciprocal inputs and outputs. This semantics stems from the theory of autopoietic and autoreferential systems, of mechanical, functional, and automatic character (Luhmann, 1995). According to it, culture is a mere by-product of the communication among people, which consists of messages which are disturbances (noise) the one for the other. There is no possibility for a common world. What is common is the pure and simple common problematization of the world (to love one another simply means to recognize that the problems of ego are also the problems of alter, and vice versa), seeking to confront the paradoxes generated by the functional rationality of the system (in

which Ego and Alter act without any chance to influence its operating structures). Society here is a paradox because becoming fellow (*socius*) does not mean to share something, but, on the contrary, it means to draw binary distinctions that divide some people (the in-group) *from* and *against* other people (the out-group).

(III) The *relational semantics*: understands difference (the distance that separates Ego from Alter) as a social relationship (neither a simple border, nor a slash). The relationship is never just any, generic relationship, but is always qualified in some way (Donati, 2011). It is not a free interaction in the void. Nor is it a mere communication. It emerges from a context, and it has a structure whose shape is based upon the terms of the relationship, and can only come from it. Always under determinate conditions. The relationship is constitutive of *Ego* and *Alter's identities*, in the sense that the identity of Ego is formed through the relationship with Alter, and the identity of Alter is formed through the relationship with Ego. The border is an area of conflict, struggle, negotiation, but also of a reciprocal belonging, which is constitutive of them both. The unity of the difference is a relational unity, that is, it is the unity of a real differentiation that exists because of reciprocal reference to a common belonging with respect to which Ego and Alter differentiate their own Selves. From here begins the recognition of a *real otherness* (and not - as many scholars claim – the recognition of an Alter-Ego, which is in fact an Alter as imagined, represented, depicted by Ego).

The recognition of authentic otherness does not coincide with total strangeness toward the other, because relationship bespeaks *distance*, and even separation in some respects, but at the same time bespeaks *sharing*. The sharing is not between two mirror images, but between two distinct, unique entities. These entities, while they maintain their impenetrability without synthesis, reveal themselves by reference to a reality that joins them, their humanity, for example. The otherness is not irreconcilable contradiction, in the degree to which the Other is perceived as another Self and “Oneself (is perceived) as Another” (Ricoeur, 1992). But this other Self is not the same (*idem*); rather it is unique (*ipse*). If Ego and Alter coincided and

could be assimilated one with the other (*idem*), the relationship would vanish. If, on the other hand, the relationship was entirely external to Ego and Alter, the result would fall into the two prior cases (semantics I and II). Cultural confrontation must therefore look at the relationship that is constitutive of Ego and Alter, though differently for each. The cultural difference can and must be seen as a different way to understand and configure this relationship, without being able to conceive of it as destined to a dialectical synthesis after the manner of Hegel.

2.2. Sociology has still to understand the emergence of a relational semantics in the complex of citizenship (Donati, 2016). western culture has, until today, used the first two semantics (dialectical and binary), oscillating between the two. My conviction is that, in the climate of globalization, and in the wake of the flawed experience of multiculturalism, the third semantics is emerging. The third semantics, that of relational difference, interprets and understands cultural differences insofar as they are generated in reference to a common world (that which includes both Ego and Alter). The common world differentiates itself and is re-generated (re-differentiated) through forms of „relational differentiation,“ that is, of differences that are generated by different ways of articulating the founding relationships shared by the people involved in a context (not the functions, the roles – that which is institutionally prescribed, as a specialization of actors and performances).

Secularism is the motive that justifies cultural pluralism, when it springs from the social relationships amongst human beings. Properly speaking, the secularity of the state does not consist in the fact that the state authorizes religious freedom, let alone rules based on political principles, like that of the juridical equality of religious denominations (this is entirely different from the equality of persons under the law, which is a fundamental principle). The state can be called secular in so far as it limits itself to recognizing the original liberty of persons in professing their faith, and it claims for its own those values and rules that emerge in a shared way from the public debated between the religions on the basis of rational argument. To

go deeper into this point it is necessary to recall the relational semantics that allows us to see the unexplored aspects of human rationality: *relational reason*. What does it consist of?

Relational Reason: Expanding Reason through Social Relationships

Relational rationality is the faculty by which the human person sees the reasons (the good motives) inherent to inter-human social relationships (not to individuals as individuals, nor to social or cultural systems). Certainly the being-together of different cultures stimulates the deepening of rational (axiological) individual choices, within individual reflexivity. But this does not suffice to configure the „*inter*“ (what lies in between different cultures) as a social relationship. To turn the *inter* into a common world, the public sphere requires a rationality that takes into account the differentiation between cultures as a *relational differentiation* (Donati, 2011). In other words, cultural identities are different for the different ways in which they interpret and live their relationship to values that are common to the human beings. The way refers to the instrumental and normative dimensions of reason, as well as concrete aims, while the values refer to the axiological (or teleological) dimensions of reason. The so-called policies of equality of differences, that neutralize relationships or render them indifferent, can only generate new differences, which find no rational solution, but only new forms of dialectic or separation.

The example of the inter-ethnic relationship speaks very well to this. If ethnicity is considered from the perspective of equality of individual opportunities, cultural identities are rendered indifferent, because their relationship has no reasons of its own to affirm and foster. It no longer makes sense to speak of different ethnic cultures, because their relationship has been cancelled out. From the relational perspective, on the other hand, only if we assert rights to differences (of relationships!) can we find human values (and rights).

To make social relationships indifferent, canceling out the discrete reasons that inhere in the identity of each specific kind of

relationship, is to annihilate the value of relationships as *sui generis* reality. It is to nullify the principle of appreciation that the relationship contains.

Relationship is what – at the same time – joins, differentiates, and diversifies. For example, the relationship of friendship joins two persons in a circle of symbolic exchanges, while it differentiates them with respect to what they can reciprocally give themselves to, and it diversifies them with regard to the quality of the friendship.

The reasons that are inherent to human relationships correspond to the dignity of the human person. They are latent and have morphogenetic potential. To sustain an interculturalism capable of creating consensus on fundamental human values it is necessary to adopt a relational paradigm able to see and *articulate the reasons* that give shape to the inter-human, to that which is „between“ individuals. The right to life, the right of a child to a family, the right to an education worthy of a human being, the right to work, to a healthy environment, and so on, are all *relational rights*, because they are rights to relationships (rather than to things or performances). Relationships have their own reasons, which the individuals involved may not even be explicitly (linguistically, conversationally) aware of, but which they comprehend to the extent of the type and degree of reflexivity they have; that is, to the extent to which they manage to see the reasons behind the relationships that human realities imply.

The cultural mediation which is often talked about can only overcome the obstacles of prejudice and intolerance if people succeed in reasonably bringing values together, and giving them relational rationales.

Relational reason validates, rather than hides, differences. Precisely in this way it is capable of moving beyond the ancient configurations of relations between cultures (that is, the segmented differentiation in primitive societies, the stratified differentiation of cultures in premodern societies, and the functional differentiation of early modernity), which are all forms of differentiation incapable of arriving at shared public reason in a globalized society.

Relational reason gives us an alternative to relational differentiation, which in application signifies the creation of a public

sphere that is religiously qualified, in that religions have a role in defining public reason, because they orient people toward a reflexive understanding of their cultural elaborations in their life-worlds.

This reflexive understanding supports and nourishes an expansion of reason. It is a way to get beyond modern western rationality, which stopped at the threshold of the distinction between instrumental and substantial reasoning. According to this distinction, the relationship to value (*Wertbeziehung* in Max Weber's theory) is non-rational, because values themselves are non-rational (from the Weberian viewpoint). Relational reason tells us the opposite. It indicates the different ways in which it is possible for Ego to relate to values, as it relates to the Other, not on the basis of purely subjective factors (sentiments, mood, emotions, irrational preferences) or acquired habits, but on that of reasons that are neither *things*, nor rules of exchange, but are goods (*values*) connected to the quality of present and future relationships. These are what I call „relational goods“ (Donati, 2015). I propose that we take a new and radical look at the theory of rationality proposed by Max Weber, which profoundly (and negatively) conditioned the social thought of the twentieth century.

Rationality cannot be reduced to the two modalities put forward by Max Weber – that is means-end, or instrumental rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) and value/belief-oriented rationality (*Wertrationalität*). To reduce human rationality to these two concepts is an operation dense with ambiguity and can be a source of great confusion. *Zweckrationalität* deals with the calculation of means to achieve an end, but ends can also become means, until it is no longer possible to distinguish what is a means and what is an end. The concept is unusable. *Wertrationalität* refers to a value subjectively understood by the social actor, but that value may be a good in itself, or a personal taste/preference. The reformulation of the Weberian distinction between instrumental and value-oriented rationality undertaken by various authors - for example Parsons (1951) and Alexander (1995) which translated them respectively as *instrumental* and *normative* rationality -, has been unsatisfying and insufficient.

I propose a redefinition of rationality as a faculty of human

behavior that has four components or modalities.

(I) First, instrumental rationality deals with efficiency, and involves the means, therefore the adaptive dimension of thinking and acting (rationality of efficiency); its analytic counterpart is the economic sphere, and its empirical, macrostructural counterpart is the market.

(II) Second, goal-oriented rationality refers to situated objectives, and regards the achievement of defined goals and goal-attainment (rationality of efficacy); its analytic counterpart is the sphere of power, and its empirical, macrostructural counterpart is the political system (the state).

(III) Third, the properly values-oriented dimension of reason, which corresponds to the distinction-guideline that points toward what is good in itself, what is an end in itself, what has worth in itself (that which lies at the depths of the *ultimate concerns* of the actor, which some call *ultimate values* in the sense of *ultimate realities*). That is, the rationality of value as good in itself; the rationality of that which has a dignity that is neither instrumental nor goal-oriented (*value rationality* or *axiological rationality*, or *W.r derationalität*, or the rationality of dignity). It is important here to understand clearly that, in what I call *value-oriented rationality*, the value is not a situated goal that has a price, but is a good without price, that no money can buy. Value-oriented rationality is not dependent upon the situation. It is inherent to the dignity of all which deserves respect and recognition, because it is distinctively human (as opposed to the non-human or in-human). Therefore, it regards in the first place the human person as such (and not because an individual behaves in a particular way). As an analytic counterpart it has the sphere of good in itself or for itself, the symbolic reference – and what is non-negotiable – to that which characterizes the good or a person and distinguishes that person from all the others. The empirical, macrostructural correlate of value-oriented rationality is the religious system – religion understood as a cultural fact distinct from faith (which transcends culture).

(IV) Fourth, the integrative dimension of reason, which integrates among themselves the other dimensions of rationality (value, goal-attainment, and means) through ethical and moral normativity, and

assures the autonomy of rationality against other kinds of actions and social relationships; I call this *relational rationality* (or *Beziehungsrationalität*), or *nomie rationality* (what is rational in the *nomos*, that is) in the norms of division and distribution, which at the same time divide and connect the parts in relation. Social relationships have reasons that belong neither to individuals nor to social systems. Reasons which the individuals and the systems may not know about, and in fact do not possess. As an analytic correlate, this dimension takes the sphere of social bonds, and as an empirical, macrostructural correlate, civil society inasmuch as it is an associational world.

The four dimensions of reason (instrumental, goal-oriented, values-oriented, and relational) make up a *complex of reason*, or human reason as a complex faculty. From this angle, every component is essential so that human reason emerges in its fullness, be it as a theoretical faculty or a practical one. The actions of recognizing, understanding, explaining and seeking what is rational are all needs of the complex faculty of human reason, as seen from the relational perspective.

From the sociological perspective, reason is a faculty that exists as an emerging social phenomenon. There is no such thing as a purely individual rationality, in the sense of a faculty cut off from social relationships. Reason is a faculty that emerges from the workings of its constitutive elements, each of which has its own characteristics. The faculty which we call human reason is generated as an emergent effect of the togetherness, interaction, and interchange between the four fundamental dimensions that comprise it. Encounter and recognition are relational goods not because, as some believe, they carry with them a particular human warmth, or a feeling of good will, or a special *pathos* (elements that in any event have their own weight and importance), but because they realize a relationship upon which depend the goods of those who participate in the relationship. And this dependence is rational, or at least reasonable.

Rethinking the Issue of a Multicultural Citizenship in a Relational Framework

4.1. The contemporary challenge of multiculturalism is different from the past and therefore must be thought of in a different context and under different historical circumstances. The context is marked by the systemic processes of globalization. Conditions are marked by the problematization of every civilization.

In this scenario, also migrations are assuming a cultural meaning different from the past. Migrations do not mean any more the transfer of individuals and social groups from a relatively stable culture to another culture endowed with a stable identity. Generally speaking, just the opposite is true. Migration is more and more a risky process which spreads from the uprooting in the place of departure and the uprooting in the place of arrival.

If one wants to produce a meaningful multicultural society, one should be well aware that cultures do not share the same capabilities in producing an inter-cultural dialogue. We should at least distinguish between two forms:

- a) traditional pre-modern cultures, which are *unable - or have scarce resources - to confront themselves with other cultures*; it can be a matter of cultures which consider themselves as unique and/or superior, or cultures which have no idea of cultures others than themselves; here the concept of ethnicity prevails over that of race, which is in fact a later construction.
- b) modernizing cultures, which *do have in themselves a principle of distinction from other cultures* (and in general among cultures); since they rely upon such a distinction, they elaborate a particular dialectic universalism/particularism or cosmopolitanism/localism; this is precisely the case of cultures stemming from Jewish and Christian roots; but, even in these cultures, today the concept of ethnicity meets an increasing erosion and is replaced by other concepts, like social category (instead of race), which are used in a rational and strategic manner in order to produce further distinctions.

4.2. Western culture is nowadays characterized by not by a proc-

ess of rationalization, as Max Weber has suggested, but by the fact that it brings the dialectic of cultural differences to the maximum of paroxysm. The entrance into after(or trans)-modernity is marked by the following traits: (i) the crisis of the universalism typical of western modernity, and (ii) the emphasis on new distinctions which are used to re-elaborate (i.e. manipulate) cultural differences, irrespective of their traditional meanings.

It is at this point that we ask ourselves: is modernity only an unfinished project or is it an utopian project which cannot be accomplished? In the latter case what will take on the project of modernity?

Since the XVIII century (Montesquieu, Kant, Rousseau) the attempts to reconcile the tears generated by the process of modernization have heavily relied on citizenship. These efforts have been based upon two kinds of operations: 1. the opening of a public sphere, and at the same time 2. the attempt to free the human subject by using the distinction *citoyen/homme* so to permit a wide range of subjective choices (the human subject has been put into fluctuation while the citizen has been more and more restrained).

Today we are still witnessing the same trend. Mainstream political ideas try to solve the issues of a multicultural society by means of state citizenship, i.e. through processes of progressive inclusion in the system of social guarantees geared by the state. This happens at the very moment in which such practices show increasing failures.

In order to look for a new universalism, perhaps it could be more convenient to recall the problem of the relationship between *homme* and *citoyen*.

Is it plausible that this distinction - and the relations it contains - can be brought again on to the historical scene?

Certainly the kind of universalism we are looking for can be neither naïve nor idealistic, as it has been in the past. It can be supposed to spring neither as a natural drift nor as a spontaneous generation of value patterns (*eigen-values*). There is no alternative to a cultural elaboration of what is and should be universal in social life of human beings. For this purpose, it can be helpful to think that, contrary to the major strand of modernity, „the universal“ can be differentiated, i.e. we can produce new distinctions within and between the same

universal symbols, such as citizenship, family, human identity, or whatever. But, in order to do that, we need a relational approach which can be able to avoid both the separation and the conflation between and within the different forms of „the universal“. In particular, such an approach is needed when we must cope with the issue of relating the citizen and the human person to each other.

4.3. All the forms of universalism which we know up today show serious shortcomings in contributing to the solution of multicultural issues:

- what we call substantive or comprehensive universalism runs the risk of imposing a particularistic (i.e. western) version of human rights;
- universalism practiced as a mere convention or contract is not a solution, for those who adopt it end up with forms of cultural regression;
- functional universalism is more and more revealing itself as a technology, not as a cultural solution, since it finds itself lacking a value *pattern* which shall give meaning and legitimation to the social system;
- deliberative universalism appears to be dependent upon conditions and stipulations which presuppose value patterns.

We need to pursue a new road to a possible human universalism. Personally I would call this road *relational universalism*, which is characterized by the fact that it puts its directive distinction neither in the individual as such (with the request of some change in the „self“), nor in the social structure as such (with the formulation of some project of social engineering), but in the management of social relations as such. The assumption is that social relationships constitute human persons as well as social institutions. It is in the social relationship - with its human requisites - that we can look for, and find out, „the universal“.

Such an universalism must be conceived of as an adequate management of cultural differences understood as memberships which, contrary to modern citizenship, are meaningful and relevant to the new complex of societal (not nation-state) citizenship. Instead of re-

lying upon the habitus of coining labels (as P. Bourdieu does), it must look at the capabilities of people to act reflexively upon each other through the activation of a discourse on what is human (Archer, 2000). It must delegitimize the concept of race as a representation useful to and meaningful for the handling of social relations, i.e. for the recognition of what is human.

Relational universalism is not a form of syncretism. It is neither a bridge, nor a mixture. It requires to put oneself on such a level of discourse as to produce a different observation: how to find the universal not in the abstract, but in the particular (a place, a single person) and *vice versa*, so not to reduce anything to something else. It is precisely the opposite of reduction and colonization.

Now, the challenge of the postmodern age is that, differently from the modern, it includes the possibility to differentiate the universal: human beings can be similar by being different. At the political level, this perspective is not far from the idea of „complex equality“ (or complex citizenship) put forward by Walzer (1983). At the cultural level, the idea of relational universalism emphasizes the detachment from what has been called the neutral power of modernity, i.e. the tendency to neutralize „coloured“ identities.

Relational universalism is not very far from the idea of a multiple citizenship, as a political arrangement which can recognize multiple loyalties. It can be a substitute for an abstract idea of citizenship („universal“ in so far as it is thought of as worldwide or supranational) as it is envisaged in the Kantian ethics and in many contemporary authors (such as Eder, 1993; Habermas, 2002 and others): *the universality (and solidity) of the ‘universal’ can and must be exercised in the multiplicity of the loyalties which define a situation (unitas multiplex).*

We need a complex of citizenship which can be able to produce a high degree of social differentiation and integration both in the internal and external relationships of each human person.

4.4. The idea that citizenship (or a political order) can solve the problems of cultural conflicts - and in particular racist attitudes and behaviours - through the inclusion of people into the welfare state

can stand or collapse. It depends on the chances that citizenship has to get a cultural elaboration able to produce empathic forms of cultural differentiation, having in mind what is properly human in social relations.

Only if our society will succeed in putting its cultural focus on inter-human relations, neither on individuals nor social structures as such, we can hope to avoid the dramatic clashes of civilizations which are brought about by false universalisms.

Today the search for a new citizenship is more and more pursued through the request of a new „politics of difference“. This request emphasizes the process of differentiation, but puts in danger the integrative forces of society. It can become useful only to the extent that it can be managed in a relational way (this means for instance that a quota system should be excluded, since it leads to segmentation and segregation).

As an example we can look at educational policies in Sweden in the area of minorities and immigrants, by referring both to formal decisions and their implementation. Swedish educational policies have met three distinctive periods. The first period (roughly in between the early 30's and the late 60's) was characterized by the assumption that school mainly serves state interest and therefore loyalty to the state should be imposed on citizens irrespective of their ethnic membership. In the second period (1970-1989), school policy was assumed to serve individual rights within the context of state regulation and participatory democratic procedures; this has involved conflicts both between state and local school authorities and between these authorities and immigrant groups. Cultural and linguistic diversity were still conceived as possible only within a general context of individual solidarity to state citizenship. In the third period, beginning with the 90's, a new approach has been adopted, which is characterized by free choice within a context of group initiative and market mechanisms under democratic rule (in what is expected to become later on an ethnic democracy) (Peled, 1993). This approach allows a greater recognition of minorities and ethnic diversity, particularly in schools (for instance the teaching of many languages instead of one language - the home language -). Within and through this new

approach, which is also a politics of recognition, the citizenship of multiple loyalties become a possible alternative pattern in many areas of social life..

To Conclude

The inclusion of ethnic minorities into the complex of state citizenship, even when policies of affirmative discrimination are considered, has come to its limits. Ethnic groups need a model of mobilisation which must go well beyond the ideology of „participation“. New forms of ethnic mobilisation are an essential requirement for a multicultural society. They can be addressed towards many different goals and can adopt many different styles of social, economic and cultural policies, including forms of class mobilisation and/or forms of lobbyism or poly-corporatism. All these forms have their own rationale as to what it means to strive for a „possible universalism“.

To me, there is another chance, which I would like to call *the mobilisation for a relational society*. It implies peculiar association styles among individuals and social groups within and between ethnic identities, under the heading of what I call relational universalism. The latter is based upon what connects (relates) the citizen and the human being, as well as the public and the private sphere, in a complex of societal citizenship where intermediary social networks are developed as sources of a new societal community, producing a normative pluralism together with relational goods. The rationale for such a perspective basically consists in the opening of new chances able to avoid all kinds of hegemonic universalism as well as all kinds of relativism. It can help us to learn what it is like - in poet Emily Dickinson's words - “to dwell in possibility”, i.e. the possibility to have migrations without all the human hardship stemming from nationalism and particularistic ethnic relations.

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The Mediterranean Legacy for the Future of Europe

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Il Mediterraneo non è solo geografia. I suoi confini non sono definiti né nello spazio né nel tempo. Non sappiamo come fare a determinarli e in che modo: sono irriducibili alla sovranità o alla storia, non sono né statali né nazionali: somigliano al cerchio di gesso che continua ad essere descritto e cancellato, che le onde e i venti, le imprese e le ispirazioni allargano o restringono. Lungo le coste di questo mare passava la via della seta, s'incrociavano le vie del sale e delle spezie, degli olii e dei profumi, dell'ambra e degli ornamenti, degli attrezzi e delle armi, della sapienza e della conoscenza, dell'arte e della scienza. Gli empori ellenici erano a un tempo mercati e ambasciate. Lungo le strade romane si diffondevano il potere e la civiltà. Dal territorio asiatico sono giunti i profeti e le religioni. Sul Mediterraneo è stata concepita l'Europa (Matvejevic, 2007, p. 18).

Se gli europei vorranno costruire il proprio futuro, dovranno cessare di pensarsi come il fianco orientale dell'impero atlantico. Ma per fare questo essi devono rivedere il proprio rapporto con il Mediterraneo. Devono farlo in modo del tutto nuovo, pensando non da soli, ma insieme a tutti gli altri

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soggetti politici e culturali che si affacciano sulle rive di questo mare, a cominciare dai popoli arabi (Cassano, 2007a, p. 31).

Un'analisi che colloca il Mediterraneo di nuovo al centro di una civiltà che, via via ramificandosi, assorbe i contributi di altre civiltà e restituisce all'umanità le ragioni di un nuovo equilibrio internazionale. Il Mediterraneo non più bacino secondario, superato e messo in disparte dall'evoluzione del mondo o dal declino dei popoli rivieraschi, bensì ancora snodo determinante di una nuova civilizzazione fondata sugli scambi globali e sull'integrazione fra Occidente e Oriente (Folli, 2008, p. VII).

In ordinary times as well, institutional thinking holds great value on a variety of fronts. It injects a concern for something more than the claims of personal power and temporary advantage. With at least some people around you who are thinking institutionally, there is a greater chance of being told what you need to hear rather than simply what you want to hear. Institutional thinking also helps protect against the willful ignorance called presentism – the arrogant privileging of one's own little moment in time. Institutional thinking transforms the past into memory, which is a way of keeping alive what is meaningful in the qualitative significance of our experiences. Because it is attentive to rule-following rather than personal strategies to achieve personal ends, thinking institutionally enhances predictability in conduct. Predictability in turn can enhance trust, which can enhance reciprocating loyalty, which can facilitate bargaining, compromise, and fiduciary relationships. All this is a chain of relationships that amounts to a civilized way for people to live together (Hecló, 2008, p. 188).

Nous pensons... que, par sa place dans l'histoire de la philosophie et par les focalisations qui sont les siennes, Strauss offre des perspectives étonnement nouvelles pour penser la crise de notre temps (Pelluchon, 2005, p. 9)

Il faut reconnaître que Strauss est plus originel et plus intempestif que ne le disent à la fois ses détracteurs et ceux qui se réclament de lui pour justifier une politique qui prétend imposer le meilleur régime. Loin d'aboutir à la condamnation des Lumières, sa critique de la modernité conduit à d'autres Lumières. Mais pour voir en quel sens Strauss est un philosophe éclairé et comprendre son invitation à réactualiser la pensée classique, il convient de mettre l'accent sur la véritable ligne de démarcation entre les Anciennes et les Modernes et de considérer les ruptures qui ont eu lieu à un certain moment de l'histoire d'Occident. Cette radicalité du questionnement philosophique fait défaut aux successeurs de Strauss et à la plupart de ses contemporains... il s'agit de revenir au coeur du problème, au rationalisme (Pelluchon 2005, p. 277).

Premise

When I was a student of the Faculty to Political Sciences in the late Sixties of last Century I have been, for some years, a militant of the European Federalist Movement created by Altiero Spinelli. In those days we were quarelling with others who were more radical: they were followers of Albertini (the editor of a journal called “il Federalista [the Federalist]). Both those groups were in favour of a new Europe to be build beyond the National States: a Political Union of a new kind (Spinelli) or a Federal State modelled on the U.S.A. (Albertini).

Que reste-t-il of those ideas and projects? I must admit: practically nothing!

In the last 20 years I have been very active in promoting various forms of scientific cooperation: european ones and, as well, international ones. While young researcher are, generally, very pleased to participate to those projects (specially at the beginning of their career, in the first years, when the best researcher were active in asking to participate), scientists are less interested and most of them tend to think that the best countries where to go, for spending some time for research or teaching activities, are the U.S. and Canada.

Working hard, as we have done in the last five years – in the context of the Erasmus Mundus programme – to foster the Bologna and the Lesbon processes of universities’ reform and change I must admit that it is not easy to convince Colleagues in activating the “good practices” which are needed. Why?

Laziness, could be one answer. National proud another answer, for some. But in most cases real reasons are others: burocratic rigidity, which nowadays it is called “governance of the system” is an important one. Another is the spreading at large – not only in Europe but, as well, all over the world - of what could be called the *new culture for higher education studies*. This *new culture* – which has its origin during the Sixties in the U.S., see the Allan Bloom’s book, *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987) – has three interconnected “gods”: the economy and finance, the technology and new media, the customer.

Students are becoming – more and more – customers and as such are treated (and kept at a distance!); they are not anymore learning young people; that’s why dormitories are beginning to be more important than classrooms.

In this context *there is a small place for European-ness*. There is a small place for thinking and working on new ideas, new institutional process to go beyond national stereotypes, to create something new which could be not only European Union but a Federal Europe. Stereotypes between North and South, West and East are still very strong and rooted: they do not come out openly because political correctness is becoming stronger and stronger.

So, from my “observatory” much southern and much Mediterranean, I can say that nowadays not only they have practically disappeared those small but influential political groups or movements who were actively working for the Unification of Europe. Conceiving a new and original political model: a federal democracy able to overcome the imperial conceptions which had been cultivated and practiced not only by the U.S. but also by European Countries like England and France, Belgium and the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, Denmark and Sweden (and, at last, also by Germany and Italy).

Not only there are no more those avantgardes, but there is little left of what it has been, for quite a long time at least in countries like Italy, of that pro-Europe sentiment which, in a sense, has been the premise for thinking a new innovative role of Europe in the international arena: as a pole for better intercultural communication policies or for the convergence of cultures, the hybridization of ethnic groups, the integration of migrants.

The Mediterranean Legacy

The Mediterranean legacy is a complex *ensemble* of ideas, images, feelings which have been cultivated for centuries and are still cultivated in this “*sea* (not ocean) in between the earths”; which has been called by the ancient Romans *mare nostrum* and which could be

called again in that way if – as Franco Cassano (Cassano, 2007a; 2007b) has argued – we understand *nostrum* with a totally different meaning: as referred to us, the humans.

Evoking and thinking of the Mediterranean legacy means beginning to think alternatives to the actual state of the things of the world and of Europe.

Going back to the disasters produced in the XIX century, by giacobinism and colonialism, by the ideologies of science and progress; and, in the XX century the disasters produced by the European *civil war* (1914-1945) and by the “cold war” (1948-1989), by the ideologies of the “end of history” and the “clash of civilizations”.

And beginning to think at the “historical existence” of humans in a totally different way. Reinventing new categories in the place of the dominant ones: like the given for granted dualism between *open and closed* societies, *simple and complex* societies, or *antiques and modern* times; or *North and South* or *East and West* civilizations.

In order to do this kind of work – this new way of thinking the world – we can use the researches and the intellectual work made by prominent scholars which are quoted in my bibliography: like Gino Germani (1991), Jack Goody (2006), Remi Brague (1999; 2005) and Franco Cassano (2007b). They are my starting points.

ANNEX 1 - Applied Knowledge and the Social Relevance of Sociology in the Mediterranean

THE OPENING OF MEDITERRANEAN MINDS

Towards a geo-sociological approach for Mediterranean Studies

“My argument, then, is the product of an anthropologist’s (or comparative sociologist’s) reaction to „modern“ history [...] . But what is required is more careful comparison, not a crude contrast of East and West, which always finally turns in favour of the latter” (Goody, 2006, pp. 3-4).

Time has come, for us as comparative sociologists, to start think-

ing “The Mediterranean Mind” as a more comprehensive way of conceiving and understanding Modernity and Post-Modernity. An alternative to the dominant way of thinking globalization and the so-called “information society”: the once called European and now called western, but, in reality: anglo-saxons in the XIX century and nowadays North-American and North-European.

The Mediterranean Mind is a new idea with ancient, long and large, roots. An idea which connects, or could connect persons and peoples who have in common places and cultures which have been called western or eastern, northern or southern but are components, notwithstanding their differences, of one civilization which has been called, many, many years before the modern times, *humana civilitas*.

Since the end of the so-called second world war many things have changed and as humans we are not yet totally aware of consequences for our future.

The social role of territories has changed dramatically. Not only people can move and travel in much easiest and unexpensive ways, but a growing number of persons can build their identities with multiple sens of belonging: travelling and, at the same time, longing to a homeland. The word “geo” came back, and geo-politics is important again, and geo-culture or geo-communication as well. All these changes have open the road to new opportunities for multipolarity and gives again chances to territories which have been condemned to marginality.

It is in a general context of unexpected consequences coming from epocal changes that the Mediterranean *gaze* is back with us and the opening of new Mediterranean minds becomes possible.

Thinking to Mediterranean minds means opening eyes and ears to many directions across space and time: from ancient and southern cultures and peoples who arrived in the Mediterranean 3.000 years ago to the 5 or 6 main linguistic and geo-cultural groups that created that way of looking around and thinking things of the world that most of us, as comparative sociologists, are able to identify as “mediterranean”. And, then, we should think to those people and cultures who, more recently, by travelling and migrating, found them-

selves in many other countries of the world: not only in Brazil and Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela (and in all other countries in Latin America) but also in Asia and Africa, in Australia and Canada, in the United States and Northern Europe.

In a certain sense all the world is implicated and interested in the possible meanings connected with the *Mediterranean gaze*. (Like Italian sociologists who are doing research around the world trying to understand ways of living and thinking of Italian origin persons – the so-called Italics – have learned in recent years.) The kernel is obviously in the geo-space which includes Southern Europe, the Balkans, and the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) Countries.

A. Premises

1. Since the end of the so-called “Second World War” many became aware of the possibility of extinction for human life in the world. Not only because of the “invention” of nuclear, chemical and other mass destroying weapons but also for what it looks to some of us the increasing inability of humans to rule themselves (starting from prominent sociologist Norbert Elias).
2. After the end of the so-called “Cold War” and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union misleading “theories”, and misleading readings of them, began to circulate in the world creating a lot of confusion: from the Fukuyama’s (1992) optimistic “end of history” theory to Huntington’s (1993) pessimistic “clash of civilizations” theory.
3. Others suggested recently the need for strong reaction (Girard 2008) to what has been called (Delpech 2005) the risk of the western world going back to the old “barbarian” way of thinking (before the invention of culture and communication): looking the other way and pretending not to understand what is going on: closing eyes and ears. Others suggested for Europe “the Roman way” (Brague 1999; 2005) while others are quarreling dividing themselves (unilateralists vs multilateralists, neoconservatives vs neorealists...) on the way to fight the so-called “war on terrorism” which has been considered by some

the “IV world war” and by others not even a war being “the terrorist” a new incarnation of “the partisan” (Schmitt, 1963).

B. Ipotesis for Discussion

1. The starting point is the building of a new idea about what can be called “The Mediterranean approach” or the “Mediterranean mind”. Sociology could be the starting point of the process needed; the kind of sociology that Pierre Bourdieu (2006; 2008) had in mind in the last period of his life: not only “a sport de combat” but also a “new unified science”, apt to keep together - with a strong epistemological break, a kind of “conversion du regard” - not only the social sciences and the humanities but also the physical and biological sciences. A “new science” which has something to share with the ideas of the Neapolitan XVIII century philosopher Giambattista Vico when he postulated, in opposition to Cartesio, a “scienza nova”.

2. In order to move in the above sketched direction, understanding what it could mean, it is important to start thinking around 3 main ideas:

2.1. *the open concept of Mediterranean* that has been cultivated by prominent people of the past, one of them has been Albert Camus (Judt, 2008);

2.2. the “long durée” approach to the history of *humana civilitas*: putting apart ideas like western and eastern; and re-thinking the ideas of modernity and secularization;

2.3. the new concept of *territoriality* that can be built with the help of the geo-sociological approach to most recent changes in geo-politics and international relations.

3. Going through the above lines of thinking. I reach these 3 main conclusions:

3.1. The Mediterranean world has not been the cradle of western civilization but a place where – for more than 2000 years – people coming from different places of the world (who did not call themselves neither “nations” neither “races”) met and hybridized. Building a human civilization in ways that although were different in some

aspects in relations to other human civilizations located in central and eastern Asia or in Southern Africa were not opposed to them. Nor the unified aspects of the so-called “Roman Empire” or “Hellenistic Age” or, latter on, the “Christian World” nor the conflicts or wars that existed (even for long periods of time) were able to cancel cultural specificities of different towns and places, traditions and religions. For centuries and centuries wars had nothing to do with the kind of wars which aroused after the XVI century.

3.2. The concept of the West as opposed to the East is quite new in history and is mainly connected with the two main historical changes that occurred in human history: two turning points which are well known but need to be understand in the light of the third turning point which occurred in recent years (of which we are not yet well awarded). The first two turning points to which I am referring to are related: first) to the CONQUEST of the Ocean and the birth of a certain number of sea empires: Portugal, mainly England and Spain, Holland but also Sweden and Denmark... (XV and XVI centuries) and second) to the birth of the United States of America (1776), who became, after the Monroe doctrine (1823) “The dangerous nation” (Kagan, 2006), and the consolidation of the larger sea empire of the world: the English who defeated Napoleon. The conquest of the seas is connected to:

- the conquest of the New World of the Americas (“The Eldorado”)
- the introduction of new war technologies of gun’s powder which totally changed the way of making war (like it become evident with the invasion of Italy in 1494 by the powerful army of Charles the VIII – see M. Boot 2006)
- the strategic decisions of both eastern countries: China (destroying the huge fleet of boats), Japan (forbidding the use of guns)
- the Protestant Reform
- the consolidation of international commerce
- the cradle for the new modernity, the new capitalism and industrial revolution.

It is during this span of five centuries (XVI-XX centuries) that a new and strong ideology has been created (with the contributions of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza) which broke dramatically with

previous times, with the so called old, traditional, antique time. A new, brave new, world was invented and erected. It was called modernity. The West as the cradle of new times began to exist, the war changed its nature: it become war between religious and ideologies. Passions and sentiments become more important than before. In the name of science, reason and truth, people were killed and burned like witches, heretics and traitors. The National State began to exist as the new institution, creator of law and justice (*cuius Regio eius Religio*). The Communities of people with their links with ancestor and descendants, the Gods who made the divine and were connected with nature (the same land and territory, the same sky) all ancient traditions connecting religions to peoples were considered against modernity and the State. The triumph of modernity came during the XIX century: the National State, Colonialism, Science and Progress, Positivism, the West are the central key words of the new era of uninterrupted progress and secularization. No more wars. Nobody wanted to hear from the very few who were aware of what was going to happen during the XX century. The “wars of extermination” in the colonial lands and the “wars of religions” in Europe (XVI-XVII centuries), which had transformed themselves into what they looked at first (after Westfalia) regulated and limited form of wars become, in the Americas (with the “Indian” troops recruited both by the French and the English in Canada and the USA) and in Europe (with the new forms of guerrilla war in Spain and in Russia and of “civil war” in Paris and all over France), during the French Revolution and Napoleon campaigns, the most cruel form of wars: the ideological and nationalistic kind of wars.

The conquest of the “New World” of Americas, the birth of the western empires of the sea, the closing of the Asiatic empires of China and Japan, the opening to the West of Russia: all these geopolitical events contribute strongly to reduce the strategic, economical and political, cultural and religious roles of the *Mediterranean World of Cities* (like Genoa and Venice, Rome and Barcelona) and *Empires* (like the Islamic and the Turkish).

But nothing of what happened during most of the XX century had ever happened before: civil wars everywhere. Also if the name “civil wars” has been rarely used.

A “European civil war” has been the “great war”, the so-called “first world war” (1914-1918).

A “Russian civil war” has been the so-called “Russian revolution” (1917-1922). Those two civil wars contributed to: the semi-legal ascent to power of Fascism in Italy (1922) and of National-Socialism in Germany (1933), the “civil war” in Spain (1936-1939) and the Sino-Japanese war (1937-38). Which brought Europe and the World to the so-called Second World War (1939-1945) which has been either a continuation (and an ending) of the “European civil war” and, at the same time, a war between the two major empires of the sea the USA and Japan.

In the after war begins the process which brings to the third turning point of the world history.

3.3. Apparently only two superpowers were left at the end of the war with the economical, technological and political resources to play a strategic imperial role in the world: the USA and URSS.

The USA was left as the only empire of the sea; the Japan had been defeated in the war; the British and what it was left of the others European empires: the French, the Dutch, the Belgium and the Portuguese were exhausted and the end of colonialism will put them out.

The Soviet Union was left as the most important continental empire with no rivals.

Both empires, at the end of the war, were more strong, rich and united they had been before the war. They were ready to become the leading champions of two new coalitions having at their disposal two new kinds of weapons: the nuclear bombs and *two different kinds of propaganda weapons* they had both used during the twenties and thirties: for nowadays, for present times “here and now”, the mass media and the Hollywood fabric of dreams on one side; and the communist utopia of the socialist society as sort of paradise an earth to be build for the next generations with the contribution of everybody and the leading and convincing talks and images about peace

coming from thousands of European and Third World antifascism artists and intellectuals.

The point is that what it has been called the “cold war” was mainly a social construction of opposed propaganda hiding the fact that the cold war was in reality the continuation of a civil war. What is terrible with civil wars (in their different possible declination as “religious” or “ideological”) is that participants to this kind of wars do not consider themselves as enemies who are enemies because they are fighting for something they do not have (e.g territory) that the enemy has. The fighters of a civil war they each think of themselves they are “good” while the others are “bad” (“reason”, “science”, “god”, “civilization” is with us and not with the others who are “barbarians”, “criminals” “bad guys” and so on). The aim of a civil war is not only to win the enemy but to “eliminate” – physically or morally – the enemy, to destroying him, to convince him that he is wrong and so on. In other words civil wars as “total wars”.

Thus, what happened during the “cold war” (1948-1989) remained till now relatively not openly spoken; with the consequence, for example, that many people have drawn from those years many wrong or negative ideas that are still with us. One of those ideas, is the concept of western civilization which has been reinforced during all those years with ideological and cultural contents who come from the quite long span of time which goes from the XVI century to nowadays. We can say today that this concept is mainly “american” (“northamerican”), it was built on the basis of a previous concept which has been mainly “Anglo-Saxons”. In the concept of western civilization there is not much of what has been European or Mediterranean before the XVI century; or of what has been European in the thinking of the founding fathers of the unification of Europe before, during and right after the Europeans civil wars.

But, there is much more to consider. Because of the many new facts and processes that came into being in those years a turning point has arrived. The invention of new weapons, the technological revolution connected to informatics (the computers, the internet...), the building of new kinds of aircrafts (the big and fast jet) totally changed the relations between territories and between the earth and

the sea with a totally new place in our human world of the sky. Globalization is a poor and misleading concept for describing and conceptualizing what has happened. We are facing a new phase, a new stage in the historical existence of humans. The sea has lost the huge, central importance it has had from the XVI century to the Second World War. As a consequence the only empire of the sea, the USA, is less powerful than it used to be till few years ago.

Air conditioning and water new treatment are other important inventions that have totally changed the place in the world of desert territories located in to hot sites. People and things are moving from place to place much more and more quickly and less expensively that used to be. All these technological and economical inventions are powerfully contributing to change the social role of territories. *Territoriality is back with us* and can give new senses of belonging to more people. And this is one important reason that gives strategic relevance to once marginal and poor territories. Last but not least other territories become suddenly important and rich because of gas and petrol that give energy to the multiple assets of modern world.

What is at stake with this yet not well perceived turning point is that, to the contrary of what has been said in the last few years, we are not facing a world where only one superpower (or few others) have the possibility to lead the world. Nor is possible to conceive the collapse of soviet Communism (1989-91) like a victory of the West and the end of history.

What can be said, instead, is that we are facing a process that's taking the world to an increasing multipolarity. What it lacks is the awareness of this kind of process and the energy to take the lead of new story to play.

C. The Possible Role of the Mediterranean World

I am totally aware that what I am trying to discover analyzing, from a geo-sociological point of view, the state of the world may be perceived as a sort of utopian thinking. Maybe somebody can see in the steps I am taking a sort of wishful thinking. It is not the case. I

am aware that to get in new places one has to cultivate a vision, but I also think that the vision I am cultivating, although furnished with generosity and hope, is or could be well grounded in thoughtful analysis. So when I began thinking about this idea of “the opening of the Mediterranean mind” I knew that I was not talking of something that is already with us but of something that could come if we begin to call attention to those facts or process which could be the pre-conditions for possibilities of the kind I am thinking to come into existence and grow.

ANNEX 2 - Open Societies and Southern Europe

BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM. TOWARDS INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Learning how to perceive and understand the Mediterranean Ancient Worlds as Open Societies. The contribution of Etruscans, Italics and Romans to the building of modernity

“I love those historians who support the idea – against everything and everyone – that Rome has not disappeared during the V century under the attack of the barbarians” (Braudel, 1985, p. 105).

“L’histoire de la première internationale où le socialisme allemand lutte sans arrêt contre la pensée libertaire des Français, des Espagnols et des Italiens, est l’histoire des luttes entre l’idéologie allemande et l’esprit méditerranéen” (Camus, 1951, p. 373)

A. My Thesis

The *first modernity* has its roots and beginnings in two places: 1) the Mediterranean Rome of Cicero; 2) the Asiatic China of Sun Tzu.

In both cases it was clear to people of those ancient times (that I call the *first modernity*), that the meanings of the things of the world were strictly connected to contexts: without knowledge of the context it is not possible to understand, to capture meanings.

The first modernity is still with us in some parts of the worlds and among some cultures, but it is not called modernity.

The second modernity was born much later in the northern regions of Europe and is connected to German and Scandinavian cultures and traditions, and to the Reformation, the culture of the book and the culture of the individual.

B. Three Starting Points

1) *Damnatio Memoriae*. History is always (in most cases) written by the winners. That means that the holders of hard power tend to use their soft power....

2) *Collective memory* is not built by historians and intellectuals but by inter-generational communication through ways of living, ways of doing things, ways of telling stories...It goes beyond centuries, in the very long duration, in the long lasting span of time...In the long processes of time things can change their names, while keeping their meanings.

3) As a consequence of 1) and 2) it may happen that *public ideas* or *public knowledge* about the past are manipulated, biased by ideology, ignorance, stereotypes, political correctness...and one of the consequences is that many people think that “past is past”, “no use looking at the past”, “too much thinking about the past is an obstacle for the building of the future”.

Therefore, instead of living with real knowledge (it is worth mentioning in this connection that the contemporary society is called “knowledge society”), we live with stereotypes and we accept wishful thinking. The idea of multiculturalism is the consequence of this very common way of thinking.

The same goes with other ideas connected with globalization, capitalism, democracy, modernity and modernization, western cultures and eastern cultures, clash of civilization...

My ipohthesis is that we have to learn how to *re-brand ourselves* and look with different eyes at our historical existence; by *our*, I mean what belongs to us as humans, going in the direction of what K.A. Appiah (2006) understands as cosmopolitanism.

My research has started a few years ago from the idea that we should look at the past using what I have called the *communicative gaze*, understanding the past with the sensibility of the humans who were living there (like the new archeology tries to do). And with the awareness of the present time (feeding the need, that we can all share, to build a peaceful future); selecting from past times what we need in order to understand and meet the Other.

C. The Concept of Italicity and the Idea of two Modernities and two Modernization Processes

Migrations and hybridizations have been, and still are, the two main driving forces for the historical existence of humans in those places of the world where things began to move in the direction of creating civilization (in the Braudel's conception): ancient China and the Mediterranean (3/4 thousands years ago). And those ancient societies were, since the beginning "open societies". And when agriculture was invented and cities began to grow, and with them writing and division of labour, complex societies came into being. And when Rome, with the contributions of Etruscans and Greeks and of many other peoples coming from East and South – began to be the center of a new world (around the second and third century B.C.) in the middle of the mediterranean sea, modernity began to exist. And afterwards, in different ways, Athens, Jerusalem, and Rome, became, in the midst of the Ellenistic flavour, the cradle of a new modernity which grew in different directions with Second Rome (Costantinopolis) and Third Rome (Russia), with the Italian Cities, with German Sacred Empire, with Portugal and Spain Empires... But, the word

modernity was not invented and was not used to describe what the historical existence of human had built in about two thousands years. My idea – which is not only mine – is that we should give the name of First Modernity to this long period of time during which humans invented most of the things which are still important parts of our life.

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Part II

Mediterranean and Migrations

The Challenge of Migration in the Mediterranean and the European Union's Response

ROBERTO CORTINOVIS*

Dynamics of Migration flows in the Mediterranean

Migration across the Mediterranean Sea is not a recent phenomenon. Italy, for example, experienced massive arrivals of Albanian migrants during the 90s as a consequence of the collapse of the communist regime in that country. In the same period, the Spanish government introduced visa requirements in order to halt migration from North African countries, a phenomenon dating back to the 1960s (Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014). A recent study collecting the statistical data provided by the European countries overlooking the Mediterranean Sea estimates a yearly average of about 44.000 landings on European southern shores from 1998 to 2013 (Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014). The situation unfolding during 2014 and 2015 represents, however, an unprecedented increase of trans-Mediterranean flows: 216.000 landings occurred in 2014 according to the UN High Com-

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missioner for Refugees. That is a number three times higher than the previous peak recorded in 2011 in conjunction with the Arab Spring events (UNHCR, 2015a). The data regarding 2015 show a further steep increase in sea arrivals, which reached the impressive figure of more than one million at the end of the year (Ibid).

When focusing on the evolution of migratory routes across the Mediterranean during the past two years, we can observe the strong pressure experienced along the Central Mediterranean route, which originates in Libya and ends on the Italian shores, and the East Mediterranean route, which starts from Turkey and reaches the Greek islands in the Aegean.

The Central Mediterranean route, in particular, was the main channel used by migrants to reach Europe in 2014, with over 170.000 arrivals on Italian shores recorded during the year. In 2015, some 153.000 migrants landed on the Italian coast, mainly nationals of Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan. The Central Mediterranean route proved to be also the most tragic in terms of number of people who perished at sea, with 2.892 deaths in 2015 (against 806 deaths recorded on the Eastern Mediterranean route) (IOM, 2015).

At the same time, the Eastern Mediterranean route gained increased relevance over 2015. While during 2014 about 44.000 migrants landed in Greece via sea from Turkey, over 850.000 arrivals were recorded in 2015. These figures highlight the centrality acquired by this route as a privileged access to Europe for migrants that come from the Middle East and Central Asia, mainly Syrians, Afghan, Pakistani, and Iraqis (UNHCR, 2015a).

Political and Socio-economic Variables

According to Monzini (2007, p. 180), there are three interdependent variables that play a key role in determining migration dynamics in the Mediterranean: the migration pressure originating in the countries of origin of migrants; the management and control policies adopted by transit and destination countries; and the strategies operated by

organisations involved in migrant smuggling (which are, in turn, influenced by the effects produced by the first two variables).

Regarding the first variable, the perpetuation and worsening of the conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, such as those unfolding in Somalia and Nigeria, have caused a massive increase of “forced” migration towards Europe. In fact, the increase of flows across the Mediterranean has been accompanied by a parallel increase in asylum applications in the European Union: in 2014, 626.960 asylum requests were lodged in the EU Member States, a 43% increase compared to 2013, when 431.090 demands were presented. In 2015, the surge in asylum demands continued unabated: at the time of writing, provisional data from Eurostat report a total number well beyond one million applications (Eurostat, 2015). Looking at the nationality of asylum seekers in the EU, the nexus with Mediterranean flows becomes clear: Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans, and Eritreans are prevalent among asylum applicants in the EU as well as among migrants smuggled on the Italian and Greek coasts (Eurostat, 2015; UNHCR, 2015a).

The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, can be singled out as the event that produced the most relevant impact on the dynamics of migration flows across the Mediterranean. According to the UNHCR, the number of people who need humanitarian aid because of the conflict reached 12,2 million in 2015, out of which 7.6 million are internally displaced within Syria and more than 4 million are refugees hosted in the neighbouring countries, mainly Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Compared to the magnitude of the phenomenon, it is important to remember that EU States have welcomed so far only a limited quota of Syrian refugees: about 532.000 by November 2015 according to official data (UNHCR, 2015b).

The Central Mediterranean route was one of the main channels chosen by Syrians in 2014, when 42.000 arrivals were recorded. However, in the last part of 2014 and during 2015, increasing insecurity experienced by migrants in Libya, along with visa restrictions adopted by neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Algeria, forced an increasing number of Syrians to shift to the Eastern Mediterranean

route, where they became by far the most represented nationality among smuggled migrants (UNHCR, 2015a)¹.

The case of Libya mentioned above draws attention to the second variable taken into consideration to understand the dynamics of flows, which is the role of policies implemented by transit and destination States in order to prevent migration. Because of the military and political disorder that occurred in Libya after the fall of the Gaddafi's regime in 2011 and the consequent absence of an effective state authority able to control the borders, Libya became a main hub for migrants coming from the Middle East and the sub-Saharan Africa who want to reach Europe (Toaldo, 2015).

Although the instability that arose in the post-revolutionary phase created the conditions for a further increase in migration flows from and towards the country, the centrality of Libya as a hub for African flows grounds its roots in a set of factors that predated the fall of the Gaddafi regime. The „open door“ policy that Libya adopted towards migrants in the 90s, together with the work opportunities created by the oil economy, determined a constant flow of migrants into the country, in particular coming from sub-Saharan Africa. The activity of smuggling networks into Libya, sustained by long-standing demographic and socio-economic factors in neighbouring countries, was not stopped even when the Libyan regime, under increasing pressure from European States and in particular Italy, shifted to restrictive migration policies from 2007 onwards (Toaldo, 2015, p. 8). When observing in detail the geography of migration in the African continent, it is possible to observe the consolidation of some centres, such as Agadez and Dirkou in Niger, Tamanrasset in Algeria, Omdurman in Sudan, Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, and Sabha and Kufra in Libya, which acquired new relevance after the end of the regime. These „hubs“ connect the „African“ migrant routes to Libya: the western

¹ The trends relative to 2015 indicate that most of the migrants that arrive in Greece from Turkey continue their journey along the „western Balkan „ route, through Macedonia and Serbia, and then re-enter the EU via the Hungarian border. The following data show the entity of the phenomenon: about 760.000 migrants transited along this route in 2015, many of whom of Syrian and Afghan nationality (Frontex, 2015). In the majority of cases, the final destination of those migrants was a Northern European country, especially Germany and Sweden.

route, used by migrants coming from Mali, Gambia and Senegal; the Central route, used by Nigerians and Ghanaians; and last, the Eastern route, used by migrants coming from Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan (Altai Consulting, 2013, p. 31).

The evolution of African routes used by immigrants is strictly connected to the third variable mentioned above, which points to the activity of the smuggling organisations that operate along these routes². This aspect acquired central relevance in the agenda of the European leaders in 2015, as testified by the launch of the military operation „Eunavfor Med“, whose objective is to disrupt the „business model“ connected to the human smuggling and trafficking in the South Mediterranean Sea (Mananashvili, 2015). However, empirical evidence gathered so far demonstrates that the organisations that favour irregular immigration are part of a complex social and economic phenomenon that requires a deeper understanding of the causes that lie behind it. In particular, studies that have explored in depth the business model operated by the traffickers have shown that smuggling organisations are fluid and hierarchically unstructured and rely on informal and flexible networks that are embedded in the local economies of countries involved (Monzini, Pastore, & Abdel Aziz, 2015, p. 34). Within these organisations, there are actors that play different roles: *passeurs*, who handle the transportation of migrants; „organisers“ who deal with logistic issues (for example taking-people from one collection point to another); intermediaries in the countries of origin of the potential migrants whose job is to establish a first contact between offer and demand of smuggling services (Altai Consulting, 2013, p. 53)³. In some cases, smuggling organisations evolve

² The present paper explores the dynamics related to migrants „ smuggling, without taking into consideration human trafficking, a much more serious crime which implies transporting migrants with the use of force and for the purpose of exploitation. It is however important to remember that, in many real situations, these two forms of illegality are connected and not easy to distinguish (Monzini, Pastore, & Abdel Aziz, 2015: 11).

³ In a news story on human trafficking in Libya, the British Newspaper *The Guardian* reports the following account recorded in the city of Zuwara: „No one has the name „smuggler „ written on their chest. Anyone here who has no money can sell their apartment, buy a boat, and organise a smuggling trip. By the time of the next

into “service providers” agencies similar to tour operators, able to offer clients a „package“ that covers all different phases of their journey from the country of origin to that of destination (Achilli, 2015).

Although the extensive use of violence and other forms of typically criminal actions such as human trafficking and kidnapping for ransom is becoming widespread, especially in the current Libyan scenario (Monzini, Pastore, & Abdel Aziz, 2015), the pervasive character of smuggling activities challenges the validity of a mere military approach to the problem, embodied by the „Eunavfor Med“ operation launched by the EU in 2015. On the contrary, as many contributors have already highlighted, it would be beneficial to tackle the root causes of migration in partnership with third countries and, at the same time, to envisage legal channels for entering the EU territory, especially for migrants in need of international protection (de Haas, 2015).

Cooperation with Third Countries: the External Dimension of EU Migration Policy

In light of the dynamics outlined in the previous part, it appears clear that the management of migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea is related to the further development and coordination of various interconnected policy areas. Necessary components of a comprehensive approach to the challenges posed by migration flows include efficient asylum and reception systems, admission policies that can maximise immigration benefits for both countries of origin and destination, and policies to contrast illegal immigration that, at the same time, can guarantee the respect of human rights of migrants. While EU action currently covers all the above-mentioned areas, the following section aims to explore a specific component of EU migration governance in the Mediterranean, the so-called „external dimension“ of migration policies. The external dimension includes those EU initiatives aiming to expand the scope of migration policies outside EU

trip you „d already have regained half the cost of the apartment. It „s a very easy formula. „ (Kinsley, 2015).

borders by ensuring the cooperation of countries of origin and transit of migration flows.

The external dimension of migration policies is often associated with the concept of „externalisation“, that is the attempt to export migration control instruments to third countries (Boswell, 2003). This theoretical approach was formulated following a set of policies adopted by the EU from the early 90s onward, which were characterised by a strong focus on migration control, such as restrictive visa policies, carrier sanctions, readmission agreements and joint management of external borders in cooperation with third countries (even if in this latter case, bilateral activities of Member States continued to play a central role, as testified by cooperation between Spain and Morocco and between Italy and Libya established during the last decade) (Lavenex, 2006).

In recent years, the EU has committed to expanding the reach of its external dimension, following the so-called „root causes approach“, namely a strategic approach aiming at tackling the push factors of migration flows. In particular, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), firstly adopted in 2005 and then revised in 2011, lays down a comprehensive strategy for the development of the external dimension of EU migration policy (European Commission, 2011). The main goal of the GAMM is to face all relevant aspects of migration in a balanced and comprehensive way, in partnership with third countries⁴. This comprehensive approach is also at the basis of the European Agenda on Migration adopted by the European Commission in May 2015, which aims to define the main lines of action in the field of migration to be adopted by the EU in the coming years. The Agenda, which is strongly influenced by migration crisis unfolding in the Mediterranean Sea, emphasises that:

To try to halt human misery created by those who exploit migrants, we need to use the EU’s global role and wide range of tools to address the root causes of migration (European Commission, 2015, p. 2).

⁴ The GAMM is structured on four pillars: legal migration and mobility, irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, international protection and asylum policy, and maximising the development impact of migration and mobility (European Commission, 2011).

In the last part of 2014 and during 2015, some important initiatives were launched in order to strengthen cooperation with the main countries of origin and transit of migrants. As described below, while the EU focus was initially centred primarily on Africa, due to the relevance of migration routes through that continent in 2014, the shift of migration flows to the Eastern Mediterranean in 2015 imposed the launch of a high-level dialogue on migration with Turkey, from which the majority of migrants were now coming. As a result of that process, the EU and Turkey finalised in October 2015 a Joint action plan, together with a € 3 billion facility to implement the strategy therein envisaged. In particular, the Action Plan foresees a range of actions to assist Turkey in supporting the more than two million refugees hosted on its territory and to prevent irregular migration to and from the country.

While the relevance of the EU-Turkey deal cannot be underestimated, both in terms of its possible impact on the large refugee population involved and for the political issues it raises, the following part of this contribution provides a description of cooperation pursued by the EU with African partners. Indeed, even beyond the current asylum crisis, it is extremely likely that migration from Africa will continue to be a major challenge for the EU in the following decades, due to not only widespread instability and conflict across the continent, but also to economic and demographic characteristics of many African countries, especially in the Sub-Saharan region (Blangiardo, 2015).

The Rabat and Khartoum Processes

The effort to strengthen dialogue with African countries on migration issues was pursued through the Rabat and Khartoum Processes, under the impulse of the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the EU (from July to December 2014). More recently, in the context of the Valletta Summit on Migration held on 12-13 November 2015, the EU and African leaders stressed their commitment to use

the Rabat and Khartoum Processes as instruments to pursue the joint initiatives foreseen in the Action Plan that was adopted in the context of the Summit⁵.

The Rabat Process, launched in 2006, includes the 28 member states of the European Union, the countries of Northern, Central and Western Africa, the European Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The goal of the Rabat Process is to promote a coordinated and balanced approach to migration among the partners and in particular to strengthen the synergies between migration and development. The Rome Declaration, adopted on 27 November 2014 in the context of the 4th EU-African Ministerial Conference, had the aim of providing new impulse to the Rabat Process. The Declaration is structured on four pillars: 1) organising mobility and migration; 2) improving border management and combatting irregular immigration; 3) strengthening the synergies between migration and development; 4) promoting international protection⁶.

In the context of the same EU-Africa Ministerial Conference, a new platform for regional dialogue, the *EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative*, also called the Khartoum Process, was created. The Khartoum Process gathers the EU member States and the governments of Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tunisia. The Joint Declaration launching the initiative focuses on combatting irregular immigration and human trafficking through an increased cooperation and exchange of expertise between police and border control authorities in the countries of origin and transit⁷.

The Khartoum Process was criticised due to its „asymmetry“: in other words, for not addressing evenly the GAMM pillars, in favour

⁵ See: Valletta summit on migration, 11-12 November 2015. Political Declaration. Online: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/>

⁶ See: Rabat Process, Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, Rome Declaration, 27 November 2014, online: http://processuserabat.net/web/uploads/cms/EN-Rome_Declaration_&_Programme.pdf.

⁷ See: Khartoum Process, EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, Rome Declaration, 28 November 2014, online: <http://italia2014.eu/media/3785/declaration-of-the-ministerial-conference-of-the-khartoum-process.pdf>.

of a predominant focus on combatting illegal immigration. Criticism was also raised on the choice of having countries like Eritrea and Sudan, responsible for systematic violations of human rights and democratic principles, involved in the dialogue. These circumstances led some analysts to interpret the Khartoum Process as an attempt to revive the logic of externalisation of migration policies by shifting its scope of action further south in the African continent. More specifically, this move would be made necessary by the collapse of the North African regimes on which the EU Member States had previously relied for controlling migration flows, as a consequence of the Arab Spring (Morone, 2015)⁸. Without entering into the merit of that reading, it is nevertheless possible to conclude that, compared to the broader platform for cooperation envisaged in the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process is still far from laying down a balanced and comprehensive approach for managing migration in the East African region.

Mobility Partnerships and Regional Protection Programmes

Besides an analysis of the programmatic declarations of the Rabat and Khartoum Processes, it is necessary to consider the so-called „operationalization“ of the two processes, which means the specific available tools, resources, and the actors responsible for their implementation. To this regard, the Rabat Process emphasises that the cooperation framework developed at the regional level is functional to creating specific tools aimed at increasing bilateral and multilateral cooperation⁹. The next section will illustrate two of the tools implemented by the EU to this end: Mobility Partnerships and, with specific reference to asylum, Regional Protection Programmes.

⁸ Bunyan (2015) advances a similar reading of the outcome of the Valletta Summit.

⁹ See the internet website of the Rabat Process at the following link: <http://www.processusderabat.net/web/index.php/support-projects-activities/infographic-mobility-partnerships-and-common-agendas-on-migration-and-mobility-in-the-rabat-process-region>.

According to the Commission, Mobility Partnerships (MPs) represent one of the privileged tools to translate the GAMM into practice (European Commission, 2009). The goal of MPs is to establish partnerships with the countries of origin and transit of migration flows through concrete initiatives that range from legal immigration to migration and development, and to combatting illegal immigration. MPs have been signed so far with three African countries: Cape Verde, Morocco and Tunisia¹⁰.

The mobility partnerships are concluded as non-legally binding political declarations subscribed by the European Commission, the concerned third country and those EU Member States that have voluntarily agreed to take part. Besides the Joint declaration, the partnerships include an „Annex“ that lists the concrete projects that the parties commit themselves to carrying out in the different areas of cooperation.

MPs have been criticised because, in spite of what their name would suggest, include only limited initiatives aimed at increasing mobility in the EU, in particular through the creation of new labour migration channels. On the other hand, the partnerships require the third country concerned to commit itself to fighting illegal immigration, primarily by stipulating a readmission agreement with the EU, usually in exchange for visa facilitation to the benefit of its citizens (Lavenex & Stucky, 2011).

Regarding asylum, in 2005 the EU launched the Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs), which are conceived as flexible and multi-dimensional frameworks of cooperation with the main regions that host refugees (European Commission, 2005). In the framework of RPPs, a series of projects have been implemented with a view to strengthen the asylum systems of target countries, in particular by creating new infrastructure and training public officials and NGOs personnel dealing with refugees. In the following years, RPPs were launched in North Africa (Egypt, Libya and Tunisia), the Great

¹⁰ See the internet website of the European Commission at the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/mobility-partnerships-visa-facilitation-and-readmission-agreements/index_en.htm

Lakes region (Tanzania), and in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Yemen and Djibouti) (Papadopoulou, 2015).

In 2013, moreover, a Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) was launched in the Middle East, targeting Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, with the objective of supporting those countries in managing the high number of Syrian refugees they host. This last programme is different from the former programmes because of its focus on development: in particular, the initiatives therein envisaged aim to favour socio-economic integration of refugees by providing them with livelihood opportunities. This new approach is an answer to the issues that were identified in previous RPPs, in particular the lack of coordination between development and asylum policies and, more fundamentally, the lack of a specific strategic vision behind the various initiatives included in the programmes (Cortinovis, 2015, p. 10). The European Agenda on Migration mentioned above includes, among its objectives, the establishment of the Regional Protection and Development Programmes also in North Africa and in the Horn of Africa and supplies to this end 30 million euros for the years 2015 and 2016 (European Commission, 2015, p. 5).

While the focus on the link between asylum and development of the new programmes implies a significant expansion in the range of activities they cover, in order to evolve into fully-fledged partnerships with the main countries of „first asylum“, the RDPPs must be supported by further investments, both politically and economically (European Commission, 2013, p.12). In particular, a first main challenge to be addressed in the future will be to ensure ownership of partner countries in the implementation of the programmes. To reach such a goal, however, it is fundamental to strengthen political dialogue with third countries“ authorities and to give a substantive demonstration of solidarity towards those countries, in particular by resettling a bigger quota of refugees in the EU.

A second central challenge will be to avoid overlapping between the initiatives pursued in the context of RDPPs and those financed through other financial sources, such as the new Trust Fund for Africa, launched in September 2015 and endowed with €1.8 billion. The rationale for the creation of this financial instrument is that of

gathering resources from both the EU budget and Member States' donations and setting in place comprehensive strategies aimed at addressing the root causes of forced displacement, primarily through a targeted use of development assistance (D'Alfonso & Immenkamp, 2015). In order to achieve that aim, EU policy-makers will have to succeed in ensuring coordination between the RDPPs and the Trust Funds and, on a larger scale, between the expanding funding in the field of asylum and the development funding addressed to African countries (Collett, 2016).

Conclusion: is the EU Approach Truly Global?

The first section of this contribution described some of the main geopolitical and socio-economic dynamics that characterise the migration scenario in the Mediterranean Sea: in particular, the effects of Libyan and of the Syrian wars were taken into consideration. Besides, it was shown that human smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea is managed by a complex network of actors that is rooted in the economies of the countries of origin and transit, a circumstance that challenges the effectiveness of a purely restrictive and control-oriented approach to the problem. This feature, together with the "mixed" character of migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea, draws attention to the plurality of the causes that shape the dynamics and composition of the flows, highlighting the necessity of creating appropriate governance instruments in order to face this complexity (Van Hear, 2011).

In this respect, the EU has committed itself to developing a Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, which aims to create long-term partnerships with the countries of origin and transit of migrants. When looking at the details of this approach, with a specific reference to the African continent, a basic asymmetry is evident. In fact, EU policy-makers have so far accorded priority to initiatives aiming to limit migration and combat irregular migration, while less action has been taken to create new channels of legal access to the EU, for both asylum seekers and other categories of migrants, and to

maximise the impact of migration on the development of third countries. However, a long-term strategy to manage migration in the Mediterranean requires balancing this asymmetry: first, through a more structured cooperation between the Member States at the EU level, and second, by adequately covering all the dimensions involved in the governance of migration.

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Mediterranean, Migrations and Communities: What Are the Challenges for Social Policies?

FOLCO CIMAGALLI*

City and Integration Process

Speaking about the Mediterranean these days, it makes us think about the boats that pass through it: the dangers of the journey and the weariness upon arrival.

In this paper, I will focus on the difficulties of acceptance and integration. Particularly, on the very fruitful construct in the social sciences, the community; a concept that is rarely used in terms of integration policies.

We will further discuss on the integration policies which are implemented in the place of the second landing which is the city (Bagnasco, 2003), and the role that communities play in this regard.

It is clear that the challenge will unravel the condition of everyday life of immigrants. Not so much on dangerous places, the arrival, the recognition, but on the laborious path of everyday life.

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The integration operates where migrants are called to interact with a social context that has a certain stability and routine; it is characterized by the presence of the immigrants and poses a challenge. The city is the subject of this context.

However, it must be clarified. Ambrosini (2005) stressed that the integration of migrants is a complex process and should not be considered as the mechanical result of the policies. The integration moves along heterogeneous channels, passes through informal networks. Integration is a complex, multi-dimensional concept extending on the cultural terrain as well as in the economic, trade and dwelling. Policies operate in an environment full of experiences, conceptions of reality, and objectives (Barry, 1997).

However, we cannot ignore the role that policies have or may have in fostering the processes of social inclusion. Indeed, this multidimensional issue, along with the number of factors involved and the heterogeneity of real models of integration creates new and essential factor to social policy. The spontaneous processes of adaptation (often not a real integration) are unpredictable and unattended. Sometimes, it provides dark paths, and illegality. Occasionally, it is momentary and produces contradictory effects¹.

In this paper, I would like to think about all these matter and identify some areas in which you can engage a fruitful work.

Here are two premises before entering into reflection.

First, in terms of integration, a considerable part of the literature has focused in describing the different models applied in the western world (Ambrosini, 2003; 2005). There are four main models considered, with the first, being a “temporary” one, associated with the German context. It requires the presence of migrants as functional to the needs of the economic and productive system. The acceptance for entering the country is thus limited to this condition and if it would cease the migrant has no reason to stay.

¹ In the case of Rome, which we studied in the course of recent research (Cimagalli & Saggioni, 2010) we noted for example that there are simultaneously different mechanisms that promote processes of inclusion. The problem is that these mechanisms do not appear to be adequately coordinated so as to engender situations of irrationality and waste of resources.

The second model is “assimilative” and it is based on the French scenario: in this case the integration takes place in the direction of the entry of migrants within the host culture. A condition considered non-negotiable for the reception is the acceptance of the democratic principles and cultural traits by the foreigners.

The third model is the “multicultural”, which is partially applied in countries such as the United States or countries from Northern Europe, namely, Sweden and the Netherlands, where in this case, at least in the main intentions, it is to devise new forms of rapprochement between different cultures and the creation of common traits. Also well-known as multiculturalism in the experience of many countries, it has not achieved the assumed promises but instead has created an unobtainable multicultural fact. Several authors have sketched outlines of a more realistic “salad bowl”, where you create a harmonious coexistence between social groups whose cultural traits are unchanged (Cesareo, 2000).

Lastly, the Italian case, according to this reading, was marked by an “implicit” pattern of immigration because this has not been explicitly recognized that long as a phenomenon to be addressed by specific policies. Also, because of the “complex of poverty”, immigration has not been encouraged nor discouraged that very long but has only been included recently in a comprehensive policy vision.

The Italian case, therefore, draws a highly uncertain integration model which assimilates different orientations and sometimes opens contradictions.

Obviously, the current integration actually appears different in various contexts and in part can only be similar to one of the types described above. Moreover, it should be noted that the actual integration processes are many and do not appear consistent with the model that would characterize a country as a whole all the time. The integration is real fluid, multidimensional, and it operates around the borders; it overcomes them and redefines them.

Next, we go over to the second element of the premise. The context of integration policies, for many reasons has moved from central to the local. The change of center of gravity of social policies,

described by many authors (Bifulco, 2015; Kazepov, 2010), leads to identify the local level for the development of inclusion policies. Mediterranean cities are the new arena of inclusion processes.

Within the city is where the real integration happens. In this context, multiple factors operate such as individuals, social groups, local and national institutions which intersect with public and private dimensions; cultural and economic dynamic traits. The urban context appears vital, and able to generate adaptation paths, and is often self-directed by the migrants themselves or guided by the reception policies. The importance of the local context there suggests expanding reflection of a particular fertile concept in the social sciences: the community.

The Concept of Community

In this context, it seems useful to re-discuss the concept of community. “Community” is a category used by classical sociology. Authors such as Durkheim and Toennies or Weber used it to describe a particular form of social interaction. Obviously, this is not a unique and convergent definition. Hillery (1955), in the fifties, has already made more or less ninety different definitions of this concept, and emphasizes on how they are united by three common characteristics: (1) there is a dense network of social interactions, (2) a common geographical location and (3) the people who make up the familiar relationships particular, the direct type.

Unlike the combinations of societarian type, face to face relationship, knowing each other, and sharing a collective “we” prevails in a community. The community is able to trace what Rosenberg calls “a warm circle” around us: it engages identity and belongingness in the community (Bauman, 2001).

Pesenti (2002) identifies four main guidelines in the definition of community. The first definition refers to the writings of Toennies (1887) and an important part of classical sociology: the community as an integrated symbolic place, where a culture of reciprocity prevails and in which individual differences are blurred in the

significance of the collective dimension.

The second definition narrows the field of interpretation and mainly focuses on the territorial-geographical dimension and thus binds the community to the dynamic neighborhood, (Park, 1936) or, more recently, founded on the concept of civicness (Putnam, 1993).

The third definition is more extensive and focuses on the symbolic aspects where the community has to do with the production of meaning and belongingness. In this sense, freedom and individual voluntarism are not confused with collective membership: it is the emerging theory in the so-called neo-communitarianism of American matrix (Etzioni, 1993).

Finally, the term is taken up by various authors (Maffesoli, 1988; Bauman, 2001) in the post-modern setting and marks the search for new allegiances that transcend almost completely symbolic size. The community becomes thin, fragmented, and imaginary.

The concept of community has evolved and changed some elements, but has not disappeared. Although many commentators emphasize how modernity has radically transformed the community balance and use a dichotomous perspective to interpret this change, and in spite how-authors like Rawls (1971) have traced the lines of a progressive liberation of the individual from the community bonds that resist only as instrumental ties following the definition of individual identity, this does not cease to exist, and to take on new forms.

In particular, we can point out here the line of reflections drawn from the American neo-communitarianism (Etzioni, 1993; Bellah, 1985) which operates an overcoming of the purely local dimension of the community by moving to mainly symbolic considerations. The community, according to this reading, is a constituent in the formation and allows you to locate a common good shared.

Moreover, the new debate for central reading in post-modern concept of modernity is linked to many of the macro-processes that characterize the present. The crack of the traditional explanations of the world (Lyotard, 1979), the progressive weakening of the outer containers, the rapid turn of the mechanisms of the industrial economy and the growing sense of uncertainty about the future (De

Vita, 1993), have fueled what Bauman (2001) calls as a new desire of community.

The processes of globalization and disorientation—generated by this fuel the sense of uncertainty and in this framework, the community has once again become a key concept that can explain contradictory processes. So for example, some authors, in outlining the features of globalization, emphasized that instead of simply initiating approval processes and disembeddedness (Giddens, 1990) from local realities it has produced new forms of association and new connections to the local dimension. The concept of “glocalization” (Robertson, 1995) was fulfilled precisely in the joint training of community ties and global type of memberships.

In this sense, albeit in an entirely new way, the community still seems to be a valid key in interpreting the processes in place.

Community and Social Policies: A Resource or Limit?

The community does not belong to the traditional lexicon of social policies. Only in recent times, while it is obvious the crisis of the Fordist welfare state, the community emerges in the language and practices of the “new” social policies.

In the traditional welfare, community does not appear as a resource. Understood as a set of primary networks, it can provide immediate support to the needs of fragile subject, but the support it can give appears short and not always effective.

Furthermore, social policies have fostered a sense of distrust in the community because it feeds the boundaries. Bauman (2001) writes: “Community means sameness which in turn implies the exclusion of others especially those who are considered different”. Therefore, social policies have emphasized autonomy of the individual and freedom from the bonds of community.

Traditional social policies place the individual at the center of the interventions (Donati, 2011): the individual is called to be rescued and placed in a position that emerges from the state of need. An individual conceived passively, as a receptor of aid from the welfare

system, or actively developed as a subject with capability for the activation of the necessary implementation of strategies of empowerment.

In this context, there are few spaces for the community.

Even policies that focus on promoting the integration of migrants are affected by this setting. Policies for migrants adapt to this approach even more than other areas. The migrant is regarded as an individual with resources and a protagonist of their migratory path. Policies, despite their varieties, range from a conception of an “I” absolute, free to move between the opportunities that a territory has, or that of an “I” standard, flattened into a categorical definition. In both cases, it is an invention.

Yet, both theoretically and at the level of empirical research, it is evident that the community has not disappeared.

For several years the studies on migrant integration processes have focused on the role played by the community (Berti, 2005). It is increasingly evident that the community plays a significant role in the integration of migration processes (Ambrosini, 2003). This is true in two different directions.

First, the community can represent a break on integration processes: retain, bind, and build impassable identity boundaries.

In the course of research that deals with the mechanisms of adaptation and integration of refugees and asylum seekers in Rome, some respondents have confirmed this view.

In some interviews that we place in a recent research (Cimagalli, 2010), some Eritrean women said: “There is a kind of self-destruction. They just do not go out of their environment and they do not have contact with the host society. They always speak their language”. And another: “Collatina be forgotten, in some ways I have to free myself. For me it is like a ghetto, as if I were still in Eritra. There, the community is unique. It is close compared here that is isolated, I cannot change the situation”.

The community as a closed and impenetrable set does not help establish real and lasting interaction with the host environment.

The quote shows how long has been observed in terms of the relationship between the community and integration. The

communities not only play a role of facilitators inside, but also as barriers to the outside. The ethnic community is impervious from the outside, and its members are protected and excluded. This is the concrete experience of many multicultural realities that in fact, have created a number of “separate enclave”: in this sense, multiculturalism becomes multicomunitarism (Touraine, 1997).

But the question in our view is not so simple.

The community can also be a resource. It is also true, that many studies demonstrate how migrant communities can be a key node to start real integration processes. They allow you to equip the individual to a wealth of social capital that they can operate with a minimum of security in social exchanges circuit. Along this direction, the closure of migrant communities is often a sign that something is not working on how a given environment is organized. It often happens, for example, that the importance of community is the result of misguided and ineffective policies, producing processes of ethnic segregation. Paradoxically, the importance of the community of the ethnic type is fed by the inefficiency of the political administration of the city, with the effect of amplifying the relations of a “bonding” and often makes them resistant. Thus, in many cases, it is clear that they represent a protection for the individual and at the same time a barrier to real processes of social incorporation.

The community becomes a real presence, cumbersome and difficult to handle.

What we want to emphasize here is that the community can become an indispensable ground work for integration policy.

Etzioni, in *Spirit of Community*, reminds us that there is also a geographical community. Communities can share not only ethnic belongingness, but also culture, values, and perception of a common goal. It is clear that the growing complexity of social processes have intensified the creation of a new type of community ties. This is not a residual phenomenon confined to the segregation of ethnic type. Communities across our cities, made vital, full of ties and sense.

I previously stated that being ingrained in the community tends to mark the boundaries: it is true, however, the new urban communities

have developed new ways in which you are freed from forced memberships and show greater plasticity. The community contributes to the formation of identity, and also builds genuine ties. The community, when it is not structured in terms of defense, creates trust, and feeds relationship. So, if she is open, it is flexible, accessible and can be a great source for the paths of integration.

Therefore, reception policies should welcome the challenge and look at the city in a new way. Integration policies now, need to be rethought in terms of their relationships with the communities and networks. A real process of integration is only possible if local policies are concentrated around the community, conceived as a unit characterized by its own culture, values, symbols and relational links that are sufficiently stable and coherent, and at the same time with certain flexibility. Within this flexibility, the plasticity of the community bonds in particular can be used to facilitate concrete processes of integration.

There is no question of excluding the communities, as it is sometimes demanded to make social policies, focusing solely on the individual and believing that these are the only places of the closure which prevents any communication route. Even if all the works are left to the communities, an infrastructure for communication and exchange can up as a defensive adaptation tools because of the absence of a breathable atmosphere. Small strongholds are unable to communicate and to look out. Otherwise, a new work with the community (Allegri, 2015) is able to actually produce effective results.

It must be considered that there are not only migrant communities. The community integration work is also done with the host community population.

Moreover, it must also be considered that the community work oriented to the integration of migrants is not only focused on the communities “of” migrants. There are other important communities like those of the host groups, whose location in the physical and social space follows community routes. According to this perspective, the integration, does not happen much “between” communities conceived as solids, but “with” communities designed

as plastic, penetrable, absorbent.

An approach of this type can operate with effectiveness and efficiency. Working with the community requires getting inside the real dynamics to understand the structure of networks and get in touch with the significant nodes. The social intervention is not abstract and infertile, but binds to the concrete real situations.

At the same time, an approach of this type allows the best use of resources. In working with communities, often it is not about buying external resources, but to use those that exist. The action aims to create bonds, not to the acquisition of external elements.

Certainly, the approach mentioned above is not traditional for the reception and integration policies.

First of all, it should be emphasized that it is not the same immediate identification of migrant communities. Too often, we only automatically tend to believe that forming community contexts only because of the same geographical origin (Berti, 2005). Often, the “ethnic communities” are imaginary categories made by administrators to simply lighten a complicated field. Do not just say “Moroccan community”, “Senegalese community”, “the Bengali community”. There is an automatic overlap between country of origin and community placement.

Conclusions

The work with the community requires a lot of patience in reviewing all the conceptual and operational tools usually used in migration policies.

Therefore, this approach involves three consequences from the point of view of the management of the interventions:

1. A shift of the time axis. Most of the current efforts aimed at the integration of immigrants are concentrated around the time of entry. The aim of local policies in many cities is the expansion of the reception, in terms of seats. With the result that such efforts widen the “mouth of the funnel” (Saggion, 2010): the number of people entering the care system. But, continuing with the metaphor of the

funnel, if it widens the output space, there will be people who overflow outside, i.e. in informal systems integration: little-known and little controlled.

The exclusive attention to places of first asylum and non-consideration of the integration of real flows is one of the causes in strengthening the closed type of community processes. The migrant is pressed behind the flow of newcomers and does not find the opportunity to the realization of every possible project. The community serves as a container of such discomfort, but does not offer an answer. Otherwise, the work with the community rather results in a shift of the axis of the policies. The acceptance (first level) and integration (second level) shift the time axis forward.

2. With the work of a community type, the approach has to change from categorical. That is ordered around-type chains on the basis of pre-defined needs and attributed to specific categories of migrants (men only, women with children, unaccompanied minors, etc.) toward the person-oriented approach (Rizza, 2007). The communities are not abstract places, nor static. They need the actual knowledge of the dynamics of communication networks, the relationship of forces, and the symbolic heritage (Cimagalli 2013). Working with the community involves a patient personalization of interventions, which may not be restricted to operate within static categories. The community work is a difficult work to standardize, because it works with the complexity (Folgheraiter, 2012).

3. Similarly, the intervention cannot be concentrated within the specific enclosure of “immigration policies”. Work with the community, even in this case, requires a new overall approach.

The community is a mix of sizes: culture, home, work, school, food, and so on. Working with communities requires adopting non-segmental policies, but able to communicate different systems (Bifulco, 2015).

4. The spaces increase. Community is plural. Work with communities to step outside concentration, but use the city in broad terms to understand the specificities of the neighborhoods, the needs of the area and interact with them. The community is not simply contained in a territory, she implies ties, networks, a not always

predictable work with space.

Following the teaching of Granovetter (1973), social policies must use the *strength of weak ties* to connect different groups. These weak ties are the links that connect different groups and communities.

Too often, migration policies have used theoretical perspectives that limit the field of action to established paths.

Now, the task of social policy is to work around the links more than on the individual. Only in this way we can meet the challenges and opportunities of the new complex societies.

The borders of the community can be crossed. The community can help you cross borders.

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Part III

Mediterranean and “Life-world”

Boundaries among Genders in the Mediterranean Area: Between Reality and Imagination

GIUSEPPE MASULLO*

Introduction

The present work is a reflection on the collective imagination built around the ideas of “masculine” and “feminine” within the cultures of the countries bordering the Mediterranean, on the assumption that the concept of “gender” has recently become one of the symbols that best expresses what is now conceived by many as a clash of civilizations, or between Western and Muslim countries. Recent news events – as the case of the women assaulted in Cologne¹ – highlight that the way of thinking about women, and gender issues in general, are emblematic of the cultural traits of a country and thus constitute some of the elements allowing for the construction of the

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¹ We refer to an event which had great prominence in the media, namely the aggression and harassment suffered by around 90 women near the Cologne train station during the 2016 New Year's Eve by a group of foreigners of Arab origin.

dividing lines between cultures, arbitrarily distinguishing between “evolved” and “backward” ones, thus aiming to establish lines of demarcation between “Us” and the “Other”.

This paper aims to analyse the ways in which Western countries help outline the debate on gender differences in the Mediterranean area. This debate often reveals the persistence of a certain degree of ethnocentrism and the inability of Western countries to take account of alternative models emerging in other Mediterranean contexts – particularly those of Islamic tradition – often considered culturally and morally “backwards” with regard to women’s rights and the plight of LGBT individuals.

As we will see below, with regard to both the status of women and homosexuality, in a symbolically interconnected reality – also because of the new media – characterized by movements of people due to the intensification of migration from the Southern to the Western countries, we can no longer apply a compartmentalized approach to the study of culture, as cross-cultural research does (Shweder & Bourne, 1984; Triandis, 1989; Lonner & Adamopoulos, 1997), but rather we should analyse the nodes or convergences between different perspectives (Mantovani, 2004)². In doing so it is first necessary to overcome some approximations, namely the ones determined within the rhetoric of a clash between civilizations, between universes that may appear culturally monolithic, but are in reality, as said above, for better or for worse, in communication. Therefore, this work will aim to explore these approximations, through the collective imagination constructed by the West around the figure of Islamic women and the place they occupy in their society of origin, and – given the ongoing migration processes – in the society of immigration, taking into account their traditions, but also their need for affirmation. The same goes for the issue of homosexuality, whose debate’s outlines within the Islamic world in the West are little known, often represented through stereotypes, and therefore

² Mantovani (2004, p. 34) carries out a review of this literature that «suggests simplistic and rather implausible dichotomies between a monolithic “West” and an equally monolithic “Rest of the World”, or between an homogeneous “West” and an equally homogeneous “East”».

approximate. To do this we must adopt, on the one hand, a cross-cultural perspective that captures commonalities between cultures in the various areas of the world, and, on the other, an intersectional perspective, which considers the interplay of factors such as those of gender, race, class, in order to counter homogenizing readings of the Islamic world and to capture the movements for the protection of women's and LGBT people's rights now emerging within both the societies of origin and those of immigration. Indeed, the risk is to strengthen an emerging neo-colonial rhetoric that resorts too easily to an essentialized concept of culture, thus not avoiding the naturalization of power relations, and causing inequality and discrimination to be invariably presented as the effect of natural inferiority, of a shortcoming, of a limit, of a defect in those who suffered them. Naturalization is established, as Corradi accurately states «as an ideological need, especially when neocolonial imperialist aggression appears in a context influenced by the egalitarian instances characterising the 1789 Revolution and the labour movement. And it is also a response to the movements that, since the end of the 18th century, call for *égalité* (equality) for women» (2009, p. 33).

The social construction of gender in the Mediterranean: between "Occidentalism" and new practices of domination

Since the beginning of the 90s, and even more extent after September 11, the discourse on women and Islam is paramount in both Muslim and Western countries' policies³. International cooperation plans, as well as armed interventions, find their justification in their defence of human rights, and of women's rights in particular. In fact, neither the focus on women nor the rhetoric of "liberation" are new

³ The US war in Afghanistan had the initial aim to capture Bin Laden. However, it then found its reason in the Taliban regime, and particularly in the condition experienced by women. Christine Delphy (2008, p. 111) describes this shift as follows: «After a month of bombing, the Alliance troops entered Kabul. Westerners claimed victory and enjoyed the feeling of having done something nice and good. Newspapers publish the picture [...] of a woman's smile and the war thus finds its fourth reason: women's liberation».

(or recent), and we can find their traces in many events marking the modern and contemporary history of Western countries and of their ways of relating to other countries with the aim to dominate and enslave them. The colonial past and the policies underlying world domination projects have always showed a particular concern for women in colonized countries, considered as backwards on this issue. Between the 19th and the 20th century, European perceptions and imagination divided the world into a dichotomy: on one side we find the West, progress, modernity, the development of science, on the other the wild, “primitive” world of the territories colonized by European nations that in 1930, according to Loomba (1998) constituted 80% of the surface of the Earth. As Siebert (2014) explains, colonial imagery had a strong sexist component. Not surprisingly, the “civilizing mission” of the colonial administrators and Christian missionaries largely based its discursive rhetoric on the sexual habits and family traditions of Muslims. Women – represented as recluses by several walls and veils – was seen as the practical embodiment of the oppressive and barbaric Islamic traditions which the East had to completely abandon if it wanted to reach the level of development acquired by the European civilization (Delphy, 2008). The settlers’ attitude towards women was “predatory” and based on the preconception of them being “loose”, as practices of concubinage and prostitution were very widespread in the colonies (Perilli, 2008)⁴.

Today we are still to overcome this discourse, as it still represents the way in which the West looks at the foreigner, the immigrant, which in this case is no longer outside of our world, but lives in our

⁴ For example, in the liberal era in Eritrea it was common practice for Italian colonists to take local women as companions (*madamato*), using the local institute called *demoz*, a form of fixed-term marriage contract that ultimately justified violent practices of domination and abuse of women (in the double sense of gender and race). The *demoz* (different from concubinage, which also existed) set on the spouses a binding reciprocity of obligations and duties, which were nevertheless not actually applied by the Italian colonizers, who saw in the *madamato* merely a convenient form of coexistence that assured access to domestic and sexual performances but left them substantially free from the constraints and responsibilities towards both the women and the mixed blood children eventually born in the relationship (Perilli, 2008).

midst, in our society. Indeed, Siebert states that «The ambivalent attraction of the indigenous – often black – female body, evoked in publications of the era and in the colonial postcards, finds today its continuity in the relationships that white European men establish with immigrant prostitutes» (Perilli, 2008, p. 295).

According to Beneduce (2008, p. 511) «Immigrants do not reveal, in their blank stare, only the complex political and human dimensions of their situation, but also the density of an unspeakable repressed collective past that is still waiting to be redeemed»⁵. Indeed, a strong ethnocentrism – with xenophobic tendencies – is still rooted in European culture, erecting an “Us” opposed to a “Non-Us”. Our culture is ultimately built «as a fundamental normative term crowning the whole of humanity’s historical evolutionary process and against which every other culture is to be considered only as a pre-culture, a lack of culture or, so to speak, an abusive culture» (Ferrarotti, 1988, p. 36). As we said above, since the Twin Towers attack on September 11 and up to the most recent upheavals affecting the North African continent with the Arab spring and the formation of the reactionary Islamic State ISIS, this reading is presented as a clash of civilization and, in Italy as elsewhere, it goes hand in hand with a growing diffusion of Islamophobia. As recent researches show, this makes it difficult to distinguish between issues related to immigration *per se* and those concerning Muslim populations in particular: «The greater visibility in the public space of the latter, either through outward symbols of religious affiliation, or by explicit request for recognition, such as, for example, the construction of places of worship, triggers ideological and cognitive mechanisms that tend to coalesce around the whole anti-immigration speech» (Alietti et al., 2014,

⁵ The past, called upon also by Siebert (2014), requires us to reconsider not only the events leading to nazi-fascism, but also our colonialist period, in order to understand the close connections existing between past events and current migrations (and their characteristics). The scholar claims that occurred a *colonial fracture*, a tendency to forget on the part of some European countries that dealt only partially with their colonial past: «The widespread lack of a sense of guilt or shame over the crimes committed in the past in the name of a supposed racial superiority is a fertile ground for discrimination policies and racist measures in the present» (Siebert, 2012, p. 257).

p. 9). The heated debate that followed the ban on wearing the veil in France in 2005, and the recent events in Cologne are examples that allow us to grasp the workings and persistence of this logic – ethnocentric and neocolonialist at the same time – where gender is once again a symbol to distinguish the civilizations bordering the Mediterranean – between the “advanced” ones and those less so – in order to dominate and subject them.

Intersectional and postcolonial perspectives in gender studies: Towards an Islamic feminism?

With the intensification of migration from the Southern Mediterranean countries to Europe, interest in the intertwining of gender and race issues has found new impetus. Foreign nationals from countries with different cultural and religious traditions introduce practices regarding gender identity that pose many dilemmas for the European countries. Theorists of universal rights and of cultural relativism argue over what should be the rights guaranteed to Muslim women. The former accuse the latter of sacrificing women to patriarchal subjugation in the name of the defence of cultural traditions and the plurality of cultures. Defenders of cultural relativism respond to criticism by arguing that the concept of equality by which women’s issues has generally been addressed is the result of an idea of rights built around a subject which is far from being sexless, neutral, with neither colour nor social membership. Within this confrontation emerges a racism no longer referring to skin colour, but rather to the supposed incompatibility between Islamic and Western culture. We can therefore understand why the concepts of “gender” and “gender relations” constitute important aspects in order to grasp the state of maturity of the ongoing integration processes. In the name of human rights, equality, the principle of “equal opportunities”, the West represents itself and stands as a place of freedom, unlike the Islamic world – of which very little is actually known – identified as a place of oppression for both women and other kinds of minorities, such as LGBT individuals.

Within feminist theory, new arising currents of research are introducing the tools offered by postcolonial studies, analysing the situation experienced by foreigners, in particular the questions raised by gender identity and sexual orientation as aspects through which new forms of power and subjection can be expressed in the host countries (Masullo, 2015a). These studies point out how migrants' gender and sexuality highlight the persistence of a domination and alteration model typical of the colonial era, emphasizing the social identity allocation mechanisms used by Western societies, that follow essentialist visions of the ethnic and sexual identities of migrants, that is of a social status considered as inferior and undesirable (Roy, 2012).

This research trend highlights the persistence of a "colonialist" rhetoric referring not only to the most obvious economic and political order inequalities between developing and industrialized countries, but also to the discursive practices on the Other, that is, to the persistence of a structural domination and the discursive or political suppression of heterogeneity and subjectivity (Roy, 2012). The latter aspects are particularly clear in the French debate following the *affaire du foulard*⁶, which can be considered to this day one of the most emblematic episodes of the way Western countries have met the demands of Muslim women.

The veil which, in its many forms⁷, is seen in the eyes of Western women as the symbol of oppression of Muslim ones, takes on quite another meaning for those scholars who identify themselves with post-colonial criticism.

⁶ In January 2004 the French Government announced for the following month the implementation of a law adopted by the Parliament by an overwhelming majority, whose first article reads: «In primary, secondary, and high schools, signs and clothes ostentatiously manifesting the religious affiliation of students are forbidden» (Mangtovani, 2004, p. 141). The law was intended to resolve a long-standing dispute, resulting in the expulsion of some students that despite contrary indications from the of the teachers had worn the veil, in defiance of the institution's rules.

⁷ They range from the Iranian *chador* or the Turkish *carsaf*, which cover the woman from head to toe, to the Afghan *burqa*, which also covers the face leaving only a dense lattice allowing the woman to look without being looked at, to the *niquab* which leaves free only the nose, to the *hijab*, a kind of foulard covering a woman's hair and shoulders.

Mohanty (2009) considers the analytical categories used by Western feminists to read the experiences of Muslim women to be based on assumptions of privilege and on an ethnocentric universalism. These are not secondary aspects because, as the scholar herself says: «research is never merely some simple “objective” knowledge, but it is also a discursive practice that has a political impact» (Mohanty, 2009, p. 150). The difficulty lies in considering “sex-based differences” on the basis of an idea of patriarchy and male domination as a constant and monolithic characteristic, whatever the considered cultures. This vision tends to homogenizing and overlooking the variety of contexts, so that patriarchy and male chauvinism oppresses all women from the countries in this area of the world. And when this “difference from the Third World” arises, Western feminists seize and colonize the constitutive complexity of women’s lives in these countries. Muslim women are systematically imagined as victims (of men’s violence, of the colonization, of the Arab family system, of economic development), and their image as created by these contexts hinders the formation of a coalition between Western feminists and those who struggle in other parts of the world (Mohanty, 2009).

Post-colonial theory, by contrast, suggests an analysis of cultural practices within the social contexts in which they originate. Indeed, on the issue of the veil, it refers to the various meanings that this practice can take for a Muslim woman: «The veil can be imposed on a woman by her family or her clan, or it can be independently chosen by woman as a marker of identity. It can be felt as a religious obligation, or it can be adopted as a symbol of belonging to a group. It can be experienced as a form of decent appearance in public spaces or as a defence of women’s modesty (...) female combinations and behaviours in Western societies sometimes appear disturbing or confusing to the extent that Muslim women may feel the need to differentiate themselves from them» (Mantovani, 2004, pp. 141-142).

These voices, belonging to non-Western cultures, blame Western feminists for overlaying their point of view to that of Muslim women and despising the meaning they give to their lives. Thus is born an

Islamic feminism⁸, opposed to considerations – such as Susan Okin's (1999) – highlighting that religion is largely responsible for the bad status of women in traditional cultures, as it controls and represses women through its founding myths and cultural practices⁹. By contrast, scholars of Islamic feminism reject the opposition between multiculturalism and women's rights, as this conception stems from both a reified vision of cultures and a strong prejudice against foreign ones: «if some of them do not share the feminist perspective, it would be wrong to say that they are victims of a culturally generated false consciousness and that they need to be freed by well-intentioned foreigners. This would be an arrogant and offensive attitude, denying them the very equality that we claim to bring» (Parekh, 1999, p. 72).

The aim is thus to reconcile Islamic values and feminist demands, arguing that the emancipation of women should not necessarily be achieved by abandoning their culture in favour of Western values and a given universal idea of women's rights: some institutions or roles that appear to be forms of oppression or discrimination, such as wearing the *hijab*, could instead be identity forms and practices able to increase women power in their communities or families.

Thus we can witness, on the one hand, an attempt at disassociation from Western feminism and the “oppression rhetoric”, and on the other a process of cultural renewal carried out by Muslim feminists with regard to those religious laws and rules not granting

⁸ Those who are called Islamic feminists, not always accept this label, given that the concept of feminism is a distinctive product of Western history. Others reject it because they claim to be part of the battles of the universal feminist movement, and do not believe it necessary to refer to Islam, even if they are practicing Muslims (Pepicelli, 2009).

⁹ According to Susan Okin (1999), multiculturalism is harmful to women, as the attention to the rights of cultural minorities «in order to be compatible with the foundations of liberalism, should aim at the welfare of the members of these groups, there are no excuses to accept that their self-appointed leaders – who are invariably older males – represent the interests of all members. Unless women – and more specifically young women (as older women often cooperate with the strengthening of gender inequalities) – are fully represented in negotiations on the groups' rights. Women's interests may be more damaged than promoted by granting these rights» (Susan Okin, 1999, p. 24).

women equal rights. As Valentine Moghadam explained, this is «a Koran-centred reform movement by Muslim women with the linguistic and theological knowledge to challenge patriarchal interpretations and offer alternative readings in pursuit of women’s advancement and in refutation of Western stereotypes and Islamist orthodoxy alike» (2004, p. 14). This is a global movement, it is not rooted in one country or the other, it has spread around the world, in the East and West alike. As Salih (2007) points out, the borders between Muslim women’s activist groups are porous and many women move in between different types of rhetoric and strategies, highlighting the complex and even contradictory nature of this issue.

The exploration of these areas of study is critical, as the identified strategies highlight the somewhat reductionist view used by western feminist theory to look at these women’s reality and their ability to take their destiny into their own hands.

The contemporary debate juxtaposes, on the one hand, “secular” feminists, aware of a certain oppression affecting women, and, on the other, Muslim feminists – which may or may not be defined as feminists – whose core aim is to achieve gender equality in society, that they not only see not as valid within Islamic realities, but even as called for by the very Islamic religion (Salih, 2007). Islamic feminists believe that women’s problems can be attributed in part to their attempt to match the men, while they suggest “complementarity” rather than equality between the sexes. For these militants the realization of the Islamic society as a whole will benefit women. Secular feminists, on their part, argue that Islamic feminism is an oxymoron. They quote international conventions and women rights as human rights, and they affirm that religion should be confined to the private sphere (Ali, 2012). While many secular feminists think that family codes should be based on international agreements, for Muslim and Islamists feminists the tools for their reform already exist in some principles of Islamic jurisprudence. According to Islamic feminists, like Iranian Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2006), Islam recognizes all rights to women and supports gender equality, but over the centuries exclusive male elites have imposed tight distorted interpretations of sacred texts and supported patriarchy in the name of the Koran. Islamic

feminists argue that today, in order to affirm women's rights, it is necessary to fight Islamic orthodoxy and return to the original message of Islam which guarantees gender equality.

Summarizing, secular feminists emphasize how in Europe a widespread multiculturalist rhetoric has led to the progressive marginalization of secular and progressive voices in the Islamic world (and in Europe as well). According to Salih (2007), in some cases, the need to produce counter-discourses counterbalancing Orientalist representations stemming from a growing and dangerous Islamophobia, has ultimately led to committing to completely uncritical visions, even with regard to deplorable aspects of Muslim societies and regimes.

Homosexuality and neocolonialism: from International Gay to homonationalism

What said above on Muslim women can also be extended to include homosexuality, which is punished by law in some countries and has become emblematic of the closure of the Islamic world towards gender diversity. Intersectionality – an analytical tool developed under black feminism to give voice to subjectivities other than white and middle class ones (Masullo, 2015a) is very useful to show how the representation of homophobic discrimination tends to overlook the experiences of LGBT migrants from overseas territories not only as gay and/or lesbian, but also because of their skin colour (Daveness, 2015).

In his recent book, *Global Gay*, Martel (2014) reviews the situation concerning the criminalization of homosexuality in Africa, showing that «Africa is a continent where homophobia is too often the norm: almost forty countries have laws prohibiting homosexual intercourse between consenting adults in twenty of these abuses on homosexuals are frequent. In about twenty of them abuses on homosexuals are recurring. Finally, in four African Muslim countries, homosexuality is still punishable by death (Mauritania, Northern Sudan, northern Nigeria, and some parts of Somalia)» (Martel, 2004, p. 177). Currently, according to the French scholar, we are witnessing a

tightening the laws against homosexuals, parallel to the decriminalization movement supported by UN Member.

In these contexts homosexuality is generally described as a phenomenon introduced by the West and tied to its immoral and dissolute lifestyle, which the Arab world had known as a result of the colonization process, and recently as a result of media globalization (Coppola, 2014).

According to the data of the report “Fleeing Homophobia”, every year in Europe 10.000 LGBT foreigners apply for international protection for sexual orientation and gender identity, but the situation differs greatly between the countries of Northern Europe and the European countries bordering the Mediterranean (Jansen & Spijkerboer, 2011). Within the LGBT movement, many associations deal with welcoming foreigners applying for asylum; however, it is precisely this issue that, as a recent study points out, often highlights the persistence of some stereotypes about LGBT individuals from Islamic countries (Masullo, 2015b). Migrants sharing this ethnic, national, and religious belonging are often seen as carriers of homophobic conservatism, which shows, for example, in their difficulty to freely “experience” themselves as locals do. This is because often some of their difficulties are not recognized, such as those experienced in a society where foreigners can undergo multiple forms of discrimination, related not only to sexual orientation, but also to ethnicity and class. The very process implemented to ensure the recognition of asylum rights to the foreigner, for example, is based on the imposition of a moral contract that leads to accept the “common values” and at the same time on the implied rejection of the foreigner’s culture, considered as emblematic of gender oppression (Roy, 2012). Although even in Western countries homosexuals do not enjoy the same citizenship rights as heterosexuals, and there are many situations in which sexual orientation leads to discrimination, the *gay milieu* reproduces negative and homogenizing representations of the migrant’s culture. A recent research by Davennes (2015) highlights the difficulties in holding together in the same political gesture – especially within LGBTQIA associations’ federations – the dual identities of gay and lesbian victims of racism because they are blacks or

mixed-race individuals, constantly ascribed to the exoticism of their extra-continental origin or to the issue of immigration. According to Prearo (2015, p. 14) «*Raceblindness*, the blindness to wards “race” of dominant activists thus results in a form of marginalization that, within LGBTQIA militancy, states a more general logic of reproduction of racist domain models, affecting also sexual minorities».

Precisely as a reaction to this blindness and to this tendency towards giving a rather monolithic reading of Islamic culture and religion, are born alternative points of view (and movements) within the moderate Islamic world. These movements, by proposing more rights and equality for homosexuals, are trying to overcome the supposed incompatibility between Islam and homosexuality existing in both Western and Eastern collective consciousness. Khaled El-Rouayheb (2005) , in his book *Before Homosexuality*, tracing the reasons for the supposed incompatibility between homosexuality and the Arab-Muslim world, describes through a re-reading of history the tolerance and openness of the Arab-Muslim world towards pre-modern gender diversity and non-normative sexual orientation, which has been lost as a result of colonial domination policies.

Also Joseph Massad (2007), in his book *Desiring Arabs*, develops a systematic analysis over the centuries, not of spiritual traditions, but of literature and poetry in the Arab-Muslim world, the novels and medicine treatises. Massad’s analysis of the evolution of sexual and political identities in the Arab-Muslim world criticises what he calls “the international gay lobby”¹⁰. According to this author, since the 80s, but particularly during the 90s, the *international gay*, echoing American neo-colonialist policies, implemented «an incitement to the discourse on sexuality» (it is not by chance that Massad used this expression, coined by Foucault (2013) in his book *The History of Sexuality*) in order to categorize and distinguish sexual identities, which until then had been quite blurred within Arab countries. As a reaction to this “mission” of “liberation” and “modernization”, the policies and ideologies opposed to sexuality and “deviant” sexual

¹⁰ This expression designates the various associations for the advocacy of LGBT rights, NGOs for the defence of human rights, and Western scientific societies engaged in supporting these causes.

practices – such as sodomy – have become more repressive. According to this scholar, the current repression against homosexuals in these countries is seen as the reproduction on a global scale of the cause of “Western” homosexuals¹¹.

Scott Siraj Al-Haqq Kugle (2013) is instead less critical in his book *Homosexuality in Islam*, where he highlights the movements that, within the Islamic and Western societies, through a re-reading of sacred texts – the Koran and the *hadith* (prophetic traditions) in particular – demonstrate that Islam, as opposed to common thinking, recognizes and supports gender equality. The author reiterates that over the centuries a small male elite imposed distorted interpretations of sacred texts and sustained patriarchy in the name the Koran.

As Coppola (2014, p. 29) points out «Today more than ever to reflect critically on issues concerning Islam is very difficult. Usually we tend to reduce the complexity of this religion into clichés and stereotyped categories of thought; we tend to order the varied Muslim world according to improper codes and language; we judge Islam through western culture guidelines, forgetting that the paths and the historical evolution of the West, on the one hand, and of the (Middle) East, on the other, have been quite different». This aspect is not only one way – from the Western world towards the East – but also bi-directional, as, in response to Orientalism, Occidentalism is establishing itself – in Campanini’s (2007) words, a kind of Reverse Orientalism¹². Just as Orientalism did, this Reverse Orientalism aims at highlighting the diversity of the Western world from the Arabic and Muslim world. According to Coppola (2014, p. 185) «Reverse Orientalism emphasizes the diversity of the Western world by using experiences, attitudes, lifestyles, as well as political, economic and social peculiarities of the West».

¹¹ For a more detailed analysis of the texts, see Rebutini (2014).

¹² The term Orientalism appeared for the first time in France, in the first half of the nineteenth century, and since then it has taken on different meanings. On the one hand, «it denoted the Western invention of the East, with particular reference to the Muslim world, while on the other it encased, in a much wider sense, the various attitudes of the West towards other East and South Asian cultures, religions, and societies» (Coppola, 2014: 185).

More recently, in his 2007 book *Terrorist Assemblages*, Jasbir Puar develops the concept of “homonationalism” in order to understand how the mainstream lesbian and gay movement not only stifled the radically anti-neoliberal LGBT movements, but also how it became an effective tool for the advancement of US imperialism. According to Kouri-Towe (2012), homonationalism talks about the ways in which Western powers put into circulation certain kinds of ideas about other cultures (such as the Arab or Islamic ones), in order to produce an image of the West as culturally, morally, and politically advanced and superior. Homonationalism focuses in particular on the ways in which the rhetoric on gender and sexual rights acquire a central role in contemporary forms of Western hegemony.

Following this lead, Hilary King (2014) recently highlighted the instrumental use of the rhetoric on sexual rights by the US, who built an image of themselves as a progressive country, morally superior to the states with different laws and legislations regarding LGBT individuals. As an example of this rhetoric, the researcher examines the speech given on 22 March 2014 by the US vice president, Joe Biden, at the gala opening of the Human Rights Campaign in Los Angeles. According to King, reaffirming the commitment of American foreign policy on LGBT rights, Biden claims to be a promoter of human rights, denouncing how hatred towards LGBT individuals can no longer be justified under the pretext of cultural norms. But his speech showed a short-sighted use of the expression “cultural norms”, not considering those cultures which have been hampered, deprived or transformed by imperialism and colonial power¹³. Moreover, his speech does not mention the “cultural norms” of the United States, the discrimination still suffered by many gays and lesbians in this country, whose heteronormative culture is still very strong. Far more serious, in King’s opinion, is the fact that Biden, when considering the LGBT identity, does not take into account the intersections be-

¹³ For example, he harshly criticizes (and rightly so) Uganda for its laws punishing people for “aggravated homosexuality”, but he does not say that they were passed with the help of American evangelical Christian groups, that worked extensively with Ugandan political and religious leaders precisely to this end (Martel, 2014).

tween race, gender, class, and ethnicity, reducing everything to a pure question of “sexual preference”.

Conclusions

The Islamophobic climate currently characterising all European countries is likely to increase, also due to the pressure caused by the high number of refugees coming from those Mediterranean countries now at war – such as Syria. In addition, we must consider the recent bombings at the heart of Europe, first in Paris and then in Brussels, in the name of ISIS. Under the pressure of these events, every element can be exploited in the geopolitical (and mass media) rhetoric of the clash of civilizations. As the above analysis points out, the gender dimension called upon by this rhetoric shows new colonialist and imperialist purposes.

The Cologne attacks carried out by a group of immigrants, and particularly the following debate in both politics and the mass media, highlight once again the subordination of women, considered as stakes in the global civil war tactics game, or as victims that Western males have to defend from the attacks of those coming from the countries where women are subject to a systemic sexism. And yet, as Natalia Aspesi (2016) points out: «Western women are not safe anywhere, in the squares they are assaulted by immigrants, but the gang is often made up of locals, and they must be careful even in their own home». Therefore, neither the status of women, nor that of foreign homosexuals can be considered as tools for distinguishing between cultures, between the more and less developed ones. This happens for purposes of mere ideological opportunism, in order to support anti-migration policies so widely discussed today in almost all European countries.

This logic, which uses gender issues as a key to demarcate boundaries between cultures, can lead to dangerous abuses if brought to its extreme. Recently there was a heated discussion following the publication of a sex manual for migrants (*Zanzu*) by the German Ministry of Health, with the aim of helping health workers and for-

eigners to interact on the topic¹⁴. However, beyond good intentions, there were critics who linked this sudden “interest” for the sex lives of migrants to the events in Cologne. In short, the risk is to reproduce a stereotypical view of the Other and its culture using the same argumentative strategies of the colonial past (Siebert, 2014).

The above analysis allowed us to describe how the outlines of the gender debate in the Mediterranean are often based on meanings that do not do justice to the cultures of the countries surrounding it, especially those belonging to the Arab Muslim world, where gender and gender relations take on different configurations, which can not be simplified through monolithic representations of Islam. It is no longer acceptable to marginalize – depicting them as extremist and fundamentalist – the vast amount of existing subjectivities and the extremely diverse movements within them, that, in their practices as well as in their speeches, state full compatibility between their culture and religion and the principles of gender equality.

On the contrary these configurations need to be recognized so as not to incur again in “raceblindness” and racist domination models, now once more widespread through Europe, and more generally in the West, which continues to represent itself as the home of human rights and social equality.

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¹⁴ “Zanzu” is an initiative of the *Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung*, a department of the German Ministry of Health in charge of education on issues concerning sexuality. Before, it was implemented in Belgium. Zanzu is a website designed for migrants and for the health personnel advising them on sexual issues. The site analyses situations related to prevention, sexual intercourse, and homosexuality, using explicit drawings and explaining everything in 13 languages. The reasons that led to this manual are based on the idea that migrants arriving in Europe often do not have access to a real sex education, a subject often considered a taboo in some countries of origin.

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Museum Displays and their Contemporary Sociological Resonance

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In the context of Malta's Valletta 2018¹ commitment to maximise, popularise and 'Europeanise' its cultural spaces, the chapter examines the role of national museum spaces in the contemporary era of cultural hybridisation, liquidity (Bauman, 2000) and mobility. Devoting attention to the proposed MUŻA (Mużew ta' l-Arti – Art Museum) and its artefacts, as well as other museums and displays, the paper examines how museums can become truly democratic spaces. By democratic spaces we mean places with which people can identify and which allow them to contribute to their narratives and cultural production, besides critically engaging with curatorial choices. In this regard, we are suggesting a non-conventional approach to reading and appreciating artefacts in a museum, one that allows for a less hierarchical reading, and valorises communal, social

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¹ Valletta is Malta's capital city built in the 16th century, by the Knights of the Order of St John. It will become European Cultural Capital in 2018.

class, religious identity and environmental perspectives. Ours is an attempt at enabling works to ‘speak’ to contemporary concerns. We, however, recognise the need to avoid giving these works any false sense of ‘universality’.

The predominance of knowledge as a critical factor in economic growth raises one politically-loaded and ethically-challenging issue: what and whose knowledge is being recognised, valorised and officially affirmed and who is providing the arbitrary decisions regarding the selection of cultures and knowledges?

Literature questioning whose knowledge counts posits the need for a knowledge democracy involving curatorial intermediaries, well prepared to engage in authentic dialogues with their publics. Writing in 2006, Boaventura de Sousa Santos goes one step further by making a case for ‘ecologies of knowledge’, emphasising the need to embrace excluded knowledges from ‘the other side of the line’.

In 2003, Borg, Cauchi and Mayo foregrounded colonial appropriation and exoticisation of ‘other’ knowledges when analysing institutions such as the National Maritime Museum and St John’s Co-Cathedral. They argued, in this regard, that, while local museums have become more pedagogically appealing, there is a need for the democratisation of Maltese curatorial experiences. Decisions need to be more community responsive, genuinely democratic and reciprocal. This democratic vision is urgent in view of Valletta 2018’s commitment towards community participation and in view of the recurring critiques of various editions of European Capitals of Culture (EcoC). Writing in 2013, Garcia and Cox noted that, in general, while cities are interested in popularising participation, the strategy used in the process is often patronising, centralised and tokenising in its approach. It is to the potential for ‘authentic voices from the margins’ that we now turn. We focus on one site, the National Museum of Fine Arts, which is currently in its initial stages of conversion to MUŻA.

A perceptive essay by Columbia University Professor, Mark C. Taylor tackles our modern day obsession with ‘speed’. This obsession has its social ramifications, not least road accidents such as the fatal one we both witnessed in 2002, on one of Los Angeles free-

ways, that was symptomatic of living in a place where everyone needs to be somewhere else in five minutes time to survive on the Capitalist fast lane (Mayo, 2006). Taylor declares that “the cult of speed is a modern phenomenon” and cites Filippo Marinetti, author of the *Futurist Manifesto*, who declared: “We say that the world’s magnificence has been enriched by the beauty of speed” (cited in Taylor, 2014, p. 36).



Fig. 1 - Antonio Sciortino (1879-1947), *Speed* – National Museum of Fine Arts, Malta

Futurists, Marinetti and Speed! This immediately brought to mind a collection of sculptures in the Valletta Fine Arts collection which will most likely be transferred to the new MUZA premises. It is very difficult not to think, in this context, of the gradual intensification of movement in Antonio Sciortino’s (1879-1947) sculptures starting with the ballet and tennis court rhythms and culminating in the ultimate ‘turbo-like’ speed of horses. In full flight, these horses capture the adrenalin rush of fierce competition. The Sciortino sculptures can provide the focus of a contemporary discussion around the modernist or postmodernist obsession with speed (Fig. 1).

Prodded by imaginative prompts or what Freire would call ‘hinge themes’, by whoever is conducting the discussion, the reflections can easily lead to a consideration of how art and the artistic styles, to which wilfully committed artists or ‘unsuspecting’ ones were attracted, reflected a change in values occurring on a wide scale. These

values continued to be reinforced, not least following “the transition from mechanical to electronic technologies” which made speed increase significantly. In Mark C. Taylor’s view, these values might have allowed capitalism to thrive but now threaten its future and the future of the planet itself. The earth is made to operate on rhythms it cannot sustain, to its own detriment and that of those who directly make it function thus (e.g. those who employ the means to make it operate in this unsustainable manner e.g. use of chemicals) (Ibid.). ‘Things of beauty’ can still provoke a whole series of disturbing questions. In a genuinely democratic public environment, these type of questions would be allowed to emerge as the work of art becomes an object of investigation, conjuring up ideas which can be regarded as forms of resistance to the dominant narratives.

Similarly worthy of investigation, in this manner, are the many landscapes and *vedute* of bygone Malta, some hearkening back to the 18th-early 19th century. Among the latter are landscapes of the Neapolitan Gerolamo Gianni (1837-1895). A typical example would be Gianni’s depiction of ‘Tarxien (*Tarscien*) House’ (Fig. 2) viewed from a distance. Mental juxtapositions involving Gianni’s bygone landscape and images of contemporary sites can easily raise issues concerning the vanishing rural spaces of the Maltese islands.

Clear demarcations between town/village and countryside are no longer existent, the most tangible outcome of a construction-driven economy. This Maltese way of ravaging planet earth is symptomatic of a ‘mind set’ through which the environment is seen not as something in which one is rooted and with which one lives in harmony but as an object of manipulation. *Extraction* and *control* are the key words. Stimulating debates about the ravaging of planet earth becomes all the more urgent in an age when public spaces are globally being subjected to commodification and speculative encroachment. A potential debate along these lines, stimulated by Gianni’s painting, can underline art’s potential as a vehicle for resistance to Capitalism’s extended reach into one time public spaces or ‘commons’.



Fig. 2 - Gerolamo Gianni (1837-1895), *Tarxien (Tarscien) House* – National Museum of Fine Arts, Malta

Paintings such as the earlier one by Gianni also connect with contemporary reality through juxtaposition between past and present. So do the ‘bourgeois’ depictions of the ‘quaint’ *kampanjol* (peasant) (see Bartolo, 1993), by Edward Caruana Dingli (1876-1950), especially when juxtaposed against the more dignified rendering, in the same collection, by Antonio Barrera (1889-1970), of fishers at work, once again in the context of primary production.

The latter can raise issues concerning the dignity of work, the eventual organisation of the working class and the present losses of this social class’s hard-earned gains, as its members and their representatives are forced to adapt to ‘Capitalist realism’ (there is no alternative) (Fisher, 2009), and precarious living. ‘Social Realist’ paintings of the nineteenth century, and their neo-‘social realist’ versions of the twentieth, with their clear depiction of basic living, provide stark reminders of the vulnerability which has been the staple of labouring class life. This condition reappears in the precarious nature of job availability in the present day economic scenario which is primarily services-oriented. Then there is the illusion of some *de-classé* members of the former middle class: they still cling to the

conviction, reflected in their consumption tastes, that they share their family's original class location, when the hard hitting reality is that they probably possess more formal education than their parents but cannot hope to enjoy the latter's standard of living. This failure to understand one's class location militates against any form of 'class-consciousness'. It is the 'class-consciousness' to which the 'social realist' painters of France, including communards such as Gustave Courbet (1819-1877), appealed. This appeal might have been echoed by Barrera, in the same Valletta collection, a century later.



Fig. 3 – Valentine de Boulogne (1591-1632), *Judith and Holofernes* – National Museum of Fine Arts, Malta

The same museum collection offers fine opportunities for contemporary discussions in its sections representing earlier artistic periods. A conversation by one of us with the current Curator of Fine Arts, Sandro Debono, focused on what has traditionally been regarded as the Museum's finest gathering of paintings and sculpture – the Counter-Reformation driven seventeenth-century collection of

bloody, violent depictions, with the emphasis on martyrdom, stoicism and heroic acts. Prominent is the mythical figure of Judith, first shown decapitating Holofernes (Fig. 3), in the gory depiction by Moise Le Valentin or Valentin de Boulogne (1591-1632). This was an overworked theme during the period, the most prominent examples being Caravaggio's rendering of the subject and Artemisia Gentileschi's version at the Capodimonte Museum in Naples. There is also Judith's triumphant display of the severed head in another painting (Fig. 4), this time by Mattia Preti (1613-1699)².



Fig. 4 – Mattia Preti (1613-1632), *Triumph of Judith* – National Museum of Fine Arts, Malta

“Isn’t that Jihad?” the Curator quipped. Acknowledging that different Muslims would dispute the proper meaning of *Jihad*, we feel that the Curator touches on an important point as far as relevance to contemporary communities is concerned. We are exposed to media representations and possibly falsifications of the meaning of ‘Jihad’.

² The Museum houses his largest collection anywhere with no less than 16 works on view.

Discussions around this theme foreground the notions of suffering and violence as recurring features of religious extremism. References can be made to periods when the new Protestant Reformation rationally called into question the Vatican's authority, with its perceived deceptions (e.g. plenary indulgences) and corruption at its core, and to the present day when political vacuums (Iraq, Syria and Libya), perceived widespread Arab and Muslim humiliation (Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib), and value disorientations lead to different forms of militant religious commitments. The latter include resorting to religious fanaticism and militarism in the form of Isis, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and Shabab. The latter also include actions of lone 'gung-ho' Neo-Nazis and selfdeclared 'Christians' such as Anders Behring Breivik³ with his massacre of 77 people, many of them children, in Norway. How do these images of fanatic faith affirmation, as manifest through seventeenth-century art, including theatre (with their fill of gory 'Senecan' elements), and throughout the 'body politic' itself (see Lyons, 2015), connect with present day sensitivities? Of course, we must emphasise the importance of aesthetic discussions - elegant cold colouring as in Le Valentin, powerful design, superb sense of composition, *tenebroso* effects, over-all 'bravura' and, in many, Caravaggist, or Dutch-Caravaggist paintings, artificial shafts of light (Matthias Stom, c 1600-after 1652). All these heighten the dramatic intensity of the scenes. (Mayo, 1997, p. 18) We would argue that, if steered carefully, the discussions can also enhance the paintings' contemporary relevance, striking a chord with visitors and their social and individual preoccupations.

Needless to say, twentieth-century paintings, including those falling under the rubric of 'Sacred Art,' strike even more sonorous chords. Giuseppe Schembri Bonaci (2008) leads us in this direction with his study on twentieth-century artists Willie Apap (1918-1970) and Emvin Cremona (1919-1987). We would explore here how paintings affirming Catholic religious faith preyed on the sensibility

³ He is reported to have blamed, on internet postings, Europe's left-wing parties for destroying the continent's Christian heritage by allowing mass immigration of Muslims. CBS News February 18, 2013 <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-look-back-at-the-norway-massacre/>. Retrieved 11 April 2015.

of not only contemporary but later artists in a country where 'Sacred Art' in a traditional figurative idiom continued to hold sway well into the twentieth century.

The museum at the core of the MUŻA project is just one type of museum among the many different types of museums available or likely to be set up on the island. It raises a number of issues which render it relevant to our times and enable it to resonate with a particular 'structure of feeling' (Williams, 1961, pp. 64-88) emerging from the society in which we live. We feel, however, that the one type of museum which needs to emerge in the various localities of Malta and Gozo, that can be truly representative of different cultures existing within their surrounding communities, and to which national museums such as MUŻA can contribute, would be the community museum. We would argue that the country needs museums of this sort, although we do come across the occasional display of, say, the Birgu War Museum that connects with people's daily lives⁴. A museum about the city of Valletta is being developed at the refurbished Fort St Elmo. One hopes that it will eventually begin to reflect the lives of ordinary citizens (a People's Museum) and not simply those who ruled the islands from their position of privilege - colonial, ecclesiastical or otherwise. The display and its activities would hopefully reflect life in the different quarters throughout the city and be complemented by similar museums in other localities throughout Malta and Gozo. These museums can be exemplars of 'history from below', enjoying wide communal ownership. Local councils should play an important role in setting up their community museum. We would recommend budgetary provisions for such a cultural development which would be part and parcel of the same council's development of community cultural and education projects. We would suggest that extra funding is provided for the latter programmes. It is these museums which would hold out the promise for becoming truly popular sites of cultural resistance, contestation and renewal. There is, of course, a constant battle to be fought against monopolization (by a select few), ossification and exclusionary 'social capital' that

⁴ We thank Vicky Ann Cremona for bringing the Birgu War Museum to mind and highlighting its connections with the lives of ordinary people.

might well foreground the interests of some and marginalise the interests of many others. Community organisations and local councils are not to be romanticised. A community museum, on the lines just suggested, strikes us as being overdue. If rendered dynamic and genuinely inclusive, it would serve as an antithesis to the dominant narratives in the traditional and still surviving Maltese museum milieu.

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Tactics or Strategies? The Governance of Early School Leaving in Naples and Albacete

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Introduction

Early school leaving is considered a notable obstacle for the economic development and the social inclusion all over Europe. In that respect, there is a joint effort of European countries to develop policies of remediation and prevention that may reduce the negative impact of early school leaving for supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.

Sociological literature on early school leaving is quite extensive. It relates early school leaving to socio-economic status, social class, school effects as well as individual agency (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Coleman, 1966; Lamb et al., 2011; NESSE, 2010). Accordingly, early school leaving is considered as a measurable effect of many social, educational, individual variables. By drawing

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on mobile sociologies of education (Landri & Neumann, 2014) in this paper I would like to contrast two ways of dealing with early school leaving: a *tactical approach* aiming at „harm reduction“ and a *strategic approach* that assumes a holistic view on transforming the school and the ecology of education practice (De Certeau, 1990). I will describe the practice of tackling early schooling as an assemblage of knowledge, people and educational technologies that enacts „early school leaving“, responds, and modifies it in different ways. To describe these practices in detail I will illustrate two ways of tackling early school leaving emerging in a program funded by Comenius Regio Project “A care for every child”, in 2012-2014, aimed at reducing early school leaving high risk for children living in some highly deprived socioeconomic territories of Albacete in Spain and Naples in Italy.

The project focuses on irregular attendance in compulsory school, here considered a „warning signal“ for early school leaving. „Irregular attendance“ raises several questions: What are the causes of intermittent school attendance? To what extent, does it relate to early school leaving? In which ways may the school and the ecology of education practice be mobilized to combat the intermittent attendance? How are discourses, policies and practices associated to address the intermittent school attendance? How do they relate to early school leaving? To give some replies to these questions the paper introduce and discuss a case study on school attendance in the first cycle of education that has been produced by comparing the reality of two schools located in two particularly disadvantaged remote areas: “Virgilio 4” school in the Scampia district of Naples and “La Paz” school in the district of La Milagrosa, the most degraded suburb of Albacete in Castilla - La Mancha.

The paper draws methodologically on “practice-based studies” (Bruni & Gherardi, 2007; Landri, 2007; Gherardi, 2008) and take the context and the interactives between the actors (human and non-human) who “live” as fundamental under investigation. The data collection occurred through: a) literature review; b) analysis of “intermittet” attendance rates; c) the critical review of institutional documents (regulations, guidelines etc.); d) direct research through: a

focus group with head teacher and teachers; depth interviews with the head teacher, teachers, parents, students, actors of no-profit associations. Elsewhere, the analysis of these sets of data explicitly draws on the methodology of grounded theory (Cardano, 2003). Working hypothesis was: the decrease or the increase of the intermittent school attendance depends on complex action nets that develop among students, families, schools, social services, and the work of no-profit associations in a specific geographical area.

The case study conducted here is not aimed at defining the conditions of reproducibility and generalization of the empirical results, but at the dialogic debate between the different experiences and at the identification of ideas and actions that impact schooling paths positively or, on the contrary, negatively. Therefore, the goal of the research is not the definition of an intervention model, but the search for processes, trajectories and innovative measures in educational paths that promote school attendance.

School Attendance in the Perspective of Practice-based Studies

The analysis focuses on *intermittent school attendance* as *non-canonical situated practice*, that “deviates” from the paths defined regular since the early segments of education, then a potential field of risk.

Like any other social phenomenon school attendance is not configurable as intimate action, the result of individual choices and actions, but rather as a situated sociocultural practice, emerging from the dynamic of the interactions that develop between the social and institutional actors, who are both involved in the construction of the local education system.

It follows that school attendance is formed as an effect of a network of actions-interactions rooted in the practices and in carrying them out (Gherardi, 2008, p. 22) of the local education system. In the perspective of the Actor-network theory (Latour, 1998) it can be said that it is closely interconnected and it interacts with other everyday life practices (it is intertwined with family practices, informal educa-

tion practices, non-formal education practices, leisure practices, practices of peer group socialization, etc.)

Generative Practices of Irregular School Attendance at Scampia

The field research on the generative conditions of irregular attendance showed a web of closely interrelated practices that relate to the structural context in which the school is situated, to the family background, to the institutional conditions concerning the operation of the school organization and the actions of the other institutional actors. The strong persistent degradation prevailing in the local context is recognized as the cornerstone onto which all others graft.

Among the factors that relate more specifically to the practices inherent in the family background the conditions of economic poverty and social exclusion faced by the marginal underproletariat acquire a prominent position. These are the *drop out* families, numerous cores compared to the city average in which different conditions of discomfort often rooted in the family history accumulate: parents who lack education, family and youth unemployment, overuse of mothers' family chores, early pregnancies and consequent conditions of psychological distress of the mother, fathers in prison. They all provide a growth environment strongly deprived from the economic, cultural and relational-affective aspect.

Organizational practices relating to domestic activities, activities of material subsistence and family care, the rhythms of the sleep-wake cycle, visiting fathers in prison, interrupt school attendance in a more or less repeated measure. Often in these contexts children are involved in domestic and family care activities, how to do the housework, look after younger siblings or help fathers work outside the home.

From a symbolic cultural perspective, strong distrust in institutions and the lack of recognition of the value of education in the local culture assume great significance.

Other generative practices of intermittent attendance concern more specifically the courses of action and the devices within the

school system (austerity policies and progressive reduction of financial and human resources, the system of relationships, rules, institutional practices, curricula, etc.).

In the lower secondary school there is a strong disconnection between the educational needs of children and the ability of the school to attract and keep them involved. In particular, there was little continuity and ability to forge links between the different segments of education, deficit of continuity and orientation in the transition from primary school to lower secondary school.

In particular, the focus is on the lack of ability of the educational institution to produce innovation in educational practices. Students do not feel involved in the teaching practices, often distant and separate from the experiences in other contexts of everyday life (Lipari, 2012). Languages, technology and *artifacts* through which the teaching is realized do not have relevance and significance. The school offers a standard of education (school curricula, contents, languages and standardized assessment procedures) in which the focus on results - in the spotlight of the evaluation system - demeans the essential attention to the learning process and the difficulties that arise during schooling, to the gaps of communication, to the critical events that occur in the history of each individual student.

The Enforcement Actions: a Dissipative Educational System

The field research focuses on the contextual factors that relate to the role and actions of the other institutions of the territory and the weak integration capability in the construction of the system of local interventions. In particular, the various stakeholders interviewed stressed the Social Services' lack of intervention and taking-over capacity.

“Virgilio 4” school triggered dynamics of collaboration with different actors of no-profit associations. However, several constraints affect the structuring ability of sedimented widened action networks: firstly, insufficient enhancement and integration of such bodies in the system of local social policies. Mostly the

relationships between the various institutional and social services involved appear contingent to project activities that are developed through the European Structural Funds, confined in a space/time bound to the availability of financial resources that do not affect the school routine. The associations are fighting for the material subsistence of the employed structures and operators. This latter factor in particular, is a focal point that generates conflicting competitive dynamics, in which elements of unfair competition sometimes prevail. Secondly, the absence of a pedagogical matrix and a methodology that frames a strategy of intervention and common goals. Associations' educational activity does not affect school activities. It follows a marked fragmentation and a weak capacity to build networks of permanent preventive actions which reveals the institutional arrangements for monitoring and mere containment of discomfort, as well as avoidance of serious social problems.

Containment Devices of Irregular School Attendance

As for the devices that promote school attendance, the field research showed actions of discomfort containment which are configured as tactics of incremental adaptation which are not integrated into an overall strategic action.

Among these devices, first compulsory education which generally acts as a coercive factor and then school transport as a facilitating factor for disadvantaged pupils who live far from the school.

The didactic laboratory and the extension of school time are the most effective devices in terms of attractiveness and educational success. During the period 2009-2012 the stabilization of the teaching staff, the testing of new didactic tools and methodologies have produced positive results in primary school attendance. In particular, in the fifth grade 7 pupils who had been failed several times for occasional absences finally passed.

In addition to these factors, then, informal practices of non repressive-punitive containment supporting the class group in

conflict situations, which are unbearable by the individual teacher. The headmaster's office serves as the "place of decompression" of the tensions, through the intervention of the headmaster who exercises containment action.

Another important device is the involvement of families in school life that is delivered through the birth of an association, created by a small group of parents, which aims to provide support to school activities and to promote school-family meetings. However, the action capacity of the association compared to the amplitude of the issues and to the social complexity that characterizes the educational background appears very limited.

"La Paz" School: the School at the Center of an Experience of Social Life Regeneration

"La Paz" school is located in a district called La Milagrosa that even with a lower population density presents social problems which appear very similar to those of Scampia: very high rates of youth population, high concentration of disadvantaged population, mainly of Gypsies and immigrants, high levels of illiteracy and unemployment, concentration of low-profile business activities. "La Paz" public school is smaller than "Virgilio 4" school (about 300 students); it includes mainly students in conditions of economic disadvantage, with an immigrant gypsy origin, which is a reflection of the social multiethnic reality of La Milagrosa.

Similarly to what was observed in Scampia, the analysis on the absenteeism causes conducted by the Spanish partnership highlights the significance of the situations that relate to the district background. The states of family poverty and illiteracy were recognized as the first generative factors of irregular attendance in primary school. In the growth and education path these conditions interact with the personal characteristics and practices that relate to the operation of the school and in general to the relationship that the student develops with the school environment.

Based on these empirical acquisitions during the school year 2005-2006 the educational project of “Learning Communities” has been implemented. It has profoundly transformed the old school CP “San Juan”, today “La Paz” school, innovating the organizational structure and educational practices. In 2010, “La Paz” has become an *integrated educational centre* which includes the different orders of compulsory education (early childhood, primary and secondary) plus adult education which is not mandatory. A unique experiment in the Spanish region that has made it possible to triple enrollment rates and reduce school absences by 10%.

The “Learning Community”: Rebuilding Social Fragmentation Starting from Education

Unlike “Virgilio 4” school, “La Paz” school is part of an urban regeneration project aimed at overcoming the socio-economic inequality and promoting the mediation of social conflicts that characterize the Milagrosa district. It is a holistic strategy that has a scientific matrix, studies and research by CREA, an academic institution in Barcelona, which has generated many international experiences.

The theory behind the practice of the educational and organizational practice of the Learning Community descends from the active pedagogy of Paulo Freire who developed the dialogic perspective in education.

In this perspective, the school is not a fixed structure, but an open material body under construction. It is conceived as a public space in which you learn to live together. Each individual institutional social actor becomes the protagonist of the construction of the local education system. Cooperation between different actors constitutes the essential factor of cultural innovation and development of educational practices (Elboj Valls & Fort, 2014).

In this theoretical perspective a strategic partnership has been built in the La Milagrosa district; it promotes the meeting of the different players and different expertise, and integrates forms of

intervention, the educational ones and those concerning social services.

So it has been developed a complex web of policy involving the different actors in the system of local governance, the institutions of the municipality of Albacete, associations, parents and relatives of the children who attend the school. In this context, the school has become the public space, the engine of the change and cultural development of the communities residing in the district.

A model of learning community has been implemented; it is characterized by symmetrical relations between the different actors involved. The dialogic perspective transforms the traditional vertical organizational structure of the school in a horizontal configuration in which government bodies can not be reduced to the leadership and to the school board, but converge in a management body involving all educational stakeholders, "the joint committees". A key feature of this organizational structure is the managerial autonomy: the recruitment of teachers and the executive is through the presentation of a project and verification of consistency with the organization's mission.

Education as a Process of Awareness and Social Cohesion

Through the holistic approach of the learning community strategies to cope with the difficulties of integration and social conflicts are concerted. In particular, in the strategies to combat school absenteeism the involvement and participation of the family is a crucial factor to promote the recognition of education as a value, the interest and the need to build relationships, the need to work together to encourage education investment and children's educational success.

Unlike what has been observed in the case of Naples, the methodology of the "learning community" applies new educational practices that emphasize active learning, cooperation and solidarity, taking into account the needs, motivations and the reality of the learner, emphasizing the logic and knowledge of the learner,

enhancing dialogue as a strategy for the construction of horizontal relationships among teachers, children, parents, social workers, emphasizing teamwork, research and collective production.

In this perspective actions of rapprochement, understanding and cooperation with families have been developed, including “family meetings”, “literary dialogic meetings”, “interactive groups” to encourage school attendance and the reflection on the experience of ?learning?. Participation is understood as a practice of empowerment, or as a cultural and political practice that is activated in an idea of school as a public space for exchange, dialogue and shared action in building an educational space for children, but also social and political culture for the La Milagrosa district and the city of Albacete (Arendt, 1994). They are therefore devices that generate practices of social and cultural transformation of the local context.

In particular, participation in meetings opens to new forms of social and collective interaction aimed at improving the social relations outside the school. These are meetings where you activate a process of discussion, investigation and analysis of everyday situations involving teachers, pupils, parents and social workers, a process of reflection on the problems and the individual and community facts, of the social economic cultural environment, not only to understand more the reality of the district, but to deal with situations, to act and transform reality in a Community perspective.

In this perspective, the families do not configure only as carriers of questions but also as co-builders together with the other actors of the educational institutions from the knowledge and expertise of each.

Conclusion

The analysis of the empirical documentation showed that school attendance can be related to a variety of variables that characterize the local system of education and create an ecology of educational practices that can be more or less attractive and inclusive. A complex web of practices concerning the background of the neighborhood, the

family sphere, operations that relate to the Governance of the school and, more generally, the institutional context in which the school is work together to determine the disengagement of young people: a gradual withdrawal, non self-realization and non reflection in school reports, precluding to early departure from training circuits.

With regard to actions to combat irregular school attendance the two cases observed highlight the opportunities inherent in the construction of models of intervention that integrate the action of the various actors involved in the construction of the local system of education.

In “Virgilio 4” school we observed a *unfinished concatenation* of devices that has limited the phenomenon. The narrowness of public policies and the weak capacity of integration of the different institutional players in the construction of the system of local interventions had no effect on the structural causes of the phenomenon attributed to the background. Containment, custodial, disciplining practices lead the children back in educational settings without affecting environmental practices that generate the occasional absence. The absence of a pedagogical matrix and a common methodology to the different actors that make up the local system of education generates educational practices which are still bumpy, not very dialogic, sometimes even conflicting. Thus, the image of a fragmented frayed network emerges, where the school is crossed by processes of decomposition and social fragmentation.

However, “La Paz” school appears to be a case in which the school has become the focal point of a process of “empowerment” that integrates the actions of the various players in the area by creating a “practices of community” (Gherardi, 2008) that could affect significantly the phenomenon of school attendance. The re-birth of the school develops within an overall change of the district which the families, associations and institutions of the municipality of Albacete take part in. In particular, adult education is the cornerstone underpinning the generative process of inclusion and social cohesion, the learning community is built which at the same time becomes a teaching community. Parental participation in various devices implemented in the school produces awareness and

subjectivity of knowledge, that is the emergence of the personal dimension of the subject and actor, able to change directly, through their own actions, the experience of daily life. In this way, education shapes our political action, that is, the subjective capacity to help build the local system of education. So, it becomes possible to build the new dynamics of sharing and educational practices aimed at the younger generation can have a significant impact on the ability to recognize the value of education, as a fundamental resource for the individual and social development.

In the Spanish case observed the pragmatic collective dimension of individual agency emerges, or his being, his building also in the educational public relationship, in a social interactive dimension of training. The role and importance of the school environment as a co-major player emerges along with other institutional and social actors of the system of local governance in building the capacity to aspire the change (Appadurai, 2004), or the ability to imagine and wish for the change, acquire the power to influence the living conditions of their own and others, gain recognition and thus produce social innovation.

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Mediterranean, Knowledge, Culture and Heritage 1

Mohamed BENGUERNA - Emiliana MANGONE
Editors

BEYOND THE BORDERS
THE MEDITERRANEAN BETWEEN CULTURES,
MIGRATIONS AND LIFE-WORLD

This book resulted from a rich collaboration among sociologists of different nationalities and reflects on Mediterranean as a strategic element to overcome the current crisis in Europe, becoming an incentive for the review of European policies and providing a solid foundation for the growth of a true European cultural heritage and knowledge, then passing it on to future generations. This book represents an attempt to go beyond the “boundaries” and this means rethinking the current idea of Europe and of the Mediterranean. The knowledge and cultural values of the Mediterranean can be the driving force to overcome the *impasse* of which Europe cannot free itself.

Therefore, while some chapters strive to formulate more general categories, others deal with the concrete situated reality. We expect this reflection to produce a refreshing outlook on Mediterranean.

The book is organized in three parts, which dialogue with each other: “Mediterranean and Culture”, “Mediterranean and Migrations” and “Mediterranean and Life-world”.

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