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dc.contributor.authorBimonte, Giovanna
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-13T12:31:32Z
dc.date.available2016-07-13T12:31:32Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationBimonte, G. (2013). “A general coalition structure: some equivalence results”. DISES Working Paper 3.230, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche.it_IT
dc.identifier.issn1971-3029it_IT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10556/2119
dc.description.abstractThe formation of coalition may imply some theoretical difficulties, such as costs arising from forming a coalition or sharing information among agents. In this paper we will assume that only a subset S of the set of all possible coalitions in an economy is the set of admissible coalitions. We define the S-core concept, as in Hervs-Moreno. We will extend to a model with both uncertainty and asymmetric informations the results showed in Okuda and Shitovitz.it_IT
dc.format.extent12 p.it_IT
dc.language.isoenit_IT
dc.relation.ispartofWorking Papers ; 3.230it_IT
dc.sourceUniSa. Sistema Bibliotecario di Ateneoit_IT
dc.subjectDifferential information economyit_IT
dc.subjectRestriction on coalition for- mationit_IT
dc.subjectPrivate coreit_IT
dc.titleA general coalition structure: some equivalence resultsit_IT
dc.typeWorking Paperit_IT
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