|dc.description.abstract||Since the end of the Cold War, the incidence of civil war has decreased and the use of peacekeeping has increased. This thesis examines some of the factors that influence the demand for peacekeeping missions, in particular the forces prompting civil war, and the supply of peacekeeping, the ability and desire of nations to intervene through peacekeeping missions.
Given the considerable ambiguities associated with peacekeeping, we attempt to integrate third party intervention into traditional bilateral models of conflict and investigate the extent to which conflict models can help the intervening nation develop more effective strategies.
Determining the objectives of the intervening governments is crucial. The second part of this thesis addresses the motivations that interact to produce troop contribution by a diverse pool of participants. Results suggest that at the domestic level the comparative advantage in manpower, the tolerance of casualties and the sustainability of multiple missions, all play a role. At the international level peacekeeping contributions are driven by the global security threat, the proximity to the conflict area and the number of displaced people.
A number of NATO members have suspended compulsory military services, moving to an All-Volunteer Force. Since ending conscription tends to have two opposite effects, fewer soldiers paid higher wages, it is not obvious what the net effect on personnel cost is. We show that while the end of conscription did not reduce the share of spending on personnel, NATO forces are increasingly less reliant on soldiers and more on capital.
The final part of the thesis returns to the demand side. Security incidents in Afghanistan have been rising since 2003. Given the links between anti-government elements in the country and its drug economy, we investigate the interaction between opium prices, alternative measures of income, and insurgency activities in the Afghan provinces. We find that unobservable common channels prevail in determining how income and conflict dynamics interact.
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